
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HANDBOOKS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE.—No. 162

ZIONISM

LONDON:
PUBLISHED BY H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE.

1920

Presented for Review.
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EDITORIAL NOTE

In the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connexion with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious, and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous inquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics, and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes ; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,

General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

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ZIONISM

Chronological Summary

720 B. C. Ten Tribes transplanted by Sargon.
606–588 B. C. Remaining two Tribes exiled to Babylon.
536 B. C. Cyrus sends Jews back to Jerusalem.
175 B. C. Maccabean rebellion.
70 A. D. Destruction of the Temple.
1563. Joseph Nasi colonizes Tiberias.
Jews from Spain and Portugal at Safed.
1799. Napoleon promises to give the Holy Land to the Jews.
1800–6. Pamphlets by Bickeno, Witherby, and Mayer.
1827. Sir Moses Montefiore's first visit to Palestine.
1838. Lord Shaftesbury suggests to Palmerston the settlement of the Jews in Palestine.
1843. The Association for Promoting Jewish Settlements in Palestine (afterwards the Palestine Colonization Fund).
1843. The Society for the Promotion of Jewish Agricultural Labour in the Holy Land.
1874. Sir Moses Montefiore's seventh and last visit.
1878. The Anti-Semitic movement begins in Germany.
1880. Anti-Jewish pogroms begin in Russia.
1882. Pinsker's pamphlet, *Auto-Emancipation*, leads to the foundation of the 'Chovevi Zion' (Lovers of Zion).
c. 1888. Baron Edmond de Rothschild begins to establish agricultural colonies in Palestine.
1896. Theodor Herzl's pamphlet, *A Jewish State*.
1897. First Zionist Congress at Basle. The Basle Programme drawn up.
1901. Abdul Hamid refuses to grant a charter for a Jewish settlement in Palestine.
1903. Joseph Chamberlain offers territory in Uganda to the Zionists.
1904. Death of Herzl.
1905. The Uganda offer is declined by the Seventh Congress.
1913. Eleventh and latest Zionist Congress.
1917. Declaration by David Alexander and Claude Montefiore on a Jewish National State.
1917. Mr. Balfour promises to facilitate 'the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people'.
1918. Conquest of Palestine by General Allenby.
Zionist Commission sent to Palestine.

§ 1. Zionism in the Bible

A Zionist is something more than an 'advocate of colonizing of Palestine by modern Jews' as he is defined in the Oxford dictionary. Whether he looks forward to a 'political' or to a merely 'cultural' Jewish occupation of Palestine, whether he is himself religious or non-religious, or even anti-religious, he has been imbued by the history of his race with a passionate love of the Zion of Scripture; and from this common sentiment Zionism draws its best energy.

Though it is less than twenty-five years since Theodor Herzl in his *Jewish State* suggested Zionism as a solution of the Jewish question, it is also the oldest nationalist movement in history. The earliest books of the Bible make Palestine the rallying-point of Israel and the Nations. Moses, Isaiah, Malachi, all preached the love of the Holy Land. The Zionism of the Bible is far anterior to the exile of Israel—even the first exile. It dates back to the prehistoric days of Israel in Egypt; and Moses was the first Zionist. The Promised Land of the Patriarchs is the country where 'I will make of thee a great nation . . . and I will bless them that bless thee . . . and in thee shall all the families of the earth be blessed'.[1] Jacob is to be brought back to this land, this fruitful land of 'the dew of heaven, and the fatness of the earth, and plenty of corn and wine'.[2] During the Exodus, Moses warns his people that, when their children 'walk contrary', God will 'bring the land into desolation, and . . . scatter them among the nations . . . And yet for all that . . . will remember the covenant of their ancestors' and restore them.[3]

The dispersion of Israel among the nations was long anterior even to the destruction of the first Temple; its literature is not limited to the Bible and the Hebrew Prayer Book, nor its history to Palestine. Much of the yearning for Palestine in the Psalms and elsewhere is not the lament of the exile or captive, but the expres-

[1] Genesis xii. 2, 3. [2] Ibid. xxvii. 28.
[3] Leviticus xxvi. 21, 32, 33, 44, 45.

sion of the emotion of the self-banished trader and colonist. In 720 B. C. the Assyrians under Sargon conquered the Ten Tribes and transplanted them eastwards to the Far East, to Armenia, Persia, Afghanistan, perhaps to India, China, and Japan. Joel, Micah, and Hosea prophesied in those times and predicted that 'many nations shall come and say, Come ye, and let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, and to the house of the God of Jacob; and he will teach us of his ways, and we will walk in his paths: for the law shall go forth out of Zion, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem.[1] . . . Thou wilt perform the truth to Jacob, and the mercy to Abraham, which thou hast sworn unto our fathers from the days of old.'[2] 'Be glad then, ye children of Zion . . . the floors shall be full of wheat, and the vats shall overflow with wine and oil.'[3]

'I will bring again the captivity of my people Israel, and they shall build the waste cities, and inhabit them; and they shall plant vineyards, and drink the wine thereof; they shall also make gardens, and eat the fruit of them. And I will plant them upon their land, and they shall no more be plucked up out of their land which I have given them, saith the Lord.'[4]

Isaiah (750–695 B. C.), in whom, of all the prophets, the union of the real with the ideal is most clearly marked, is essentially Messianic. The earlier chapters reflect the world war of the time, Assyria at its zenith, Babylon becoming its menace, Egypt, Tyre, and Syria doomed. But 'the Lord shall set his hand again the second time to recover the remnant of his people, . . . from Assyria, and from Egypt, . . . and from the islands of the sea. And he shall set up an ensign for the nations, and shall assemble the outcasts of Israel, and gather together the dispersed of Judah from the four corners of the earth.'[5] The later chapters of the book attributed to Isaiah deal with the conditions towards the close of the Babylonian Captivity a couple of centuries later, but they proclaim even more triumphantly the Restoration

[1] Micah iv. 2. [2] Ibid. vii. 20. [3] Joel ii. 23, 24.
[4] Amos ix. 14–15. [5] Isaiah xi. 11–12.

of Israel. 'Say ye to the daughter of Zion, Behold, thy salvation cometh . . . And they shall call them, The holy people, The redeemed of the Lord: and thou shalt be called, Sought out, A City not forsaken.[1] . . . And ye shall be comforted in Jerusalem.[2] . . . And they shall bring all your brethren for an offering unto the Lord out of all nations, upon horses, and in chariots, and in litters, and upon mules, and upon swift beasts, to my holy mountain Jerusalem.'[3] 'For the Lord shall comfort Zion: he will comfort all her waste places; and he will make her wilderness like Eden, and her desert like the garden of the Lord; joy and gladness shall be found therein.'[4] The conquest of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar led to a further deportation; and many of the remaining two tribes were exiled to Babylon in three batches in 606, 599, and 588. The number of actual exiles does not seem to have been very large, but it included 'all the princes, and all the mighty men of valour, even ten thousand captives, and all the craftsmen and smiths: none remained, save the poorest sort of the people of the land.'[5] Most went eastward to Mesopotamia with Jeremiah and Baruch and Ezekiel, but some fled southward to Egypt.

After seventy years, a partial return took place. The resettlement of Palestine, started by Cyrus and continued by Darius, is of peculiar interest at the present time.

§ 2. Home Rule in Palestine under the Persians and Greeks

The Persian Empire, towards the end of the sixth century B. C., was mighty and enlightened, and therefore tolerant. The return from Babylon was never more than partial; the Persian Jews were prosperous and contented, and many of them highly placed. Cyrus in 536 called upon God's people—'his God be with him, and let him go up to Jerusalem, which is in Judah, and build the house of the Lord . . . And whoso-

[1] Isaiah lxii. 11–12. [2] Ibid. lxvi. 13. [3] Ibid. lxvi. 20.
[4] Ibid. li. 3. [5] 2 Kings xxiv. 10–16.

ever remaineth in any place where he sojourneth, let the men of his place help him with silver, and with gold '.[1] In response to the call, 42,000 Jews under Zerubbabel and Jeshua the High Priest returned from captivity. In the reign of Darius a second batch under Haggai, the prophet, returned in 519, when the second Temple was built; a third of some 1,500, in the reign of Artaxerxes in 458, under Ezra; and a fourth in 445, under Nehemiah. A continuation of Nehemiah's narrative can be traced in the Elephantine papyri down to 419 and perhaps later. These remarkable documents show the relations between the Jews who had returned to Zion and those of the Diaspora, who had remained in the lands of their birth and their civil allegiance.

The colonists, who had rebuilt the Temple and deemed it necessary to fortify Jerusalem, found themselves in a minority. They had to deal with the local intrigues of the Samaritan opposition; and the difficulties they had to contend with are set forth by Haggai and Zechariah, who comforted the settlers when they were discouraged. Nehemiah was a Persian official, and his interest had been aroused by the sad reports concerning the Jews who had returned to Jerusalem, how they were ' in great affliction and reproach : the wall of Jerusalem also is broken down '.[2] He persuaded Artaxerxes to send him ' unto Judah, unto the city of my fathers' sepulchres, that I may build it '.[3] He succeeded in rebuilding Jerusalem, despite the intrigues and even the armed force of the local Persian officials, and especially of the Samaritans. Like Ezra, his predecessor, he had to complain of the spiritual indifference of his co-religionists; and he instituted reforms. The Samaritan opposition was routed, and, notwithstanding the persistence of a certain amount of intermarriage,[4] never again recovered its influence in Jerusalem, though the erection of a temple at Elephantine seems to point to some sort of compromise between Jew and Samaritan in Egypt.

[1] Ezra i. 3–4. [2] Nehemiah i. 3.
[3] Ibid. ii. 5. [4] Ibid. xiii. 3.

Alexander the Great, in his conquests, spared Jerusalem and much favoured the Jews; and, when he founded Alexandria in 332, many Jews settled there. These Egyptian Jews developed a high culture of their own and gradually became contented with Ptolemaic and Roman rule. But the Palestinians were stauncher; and when, in 175 B. C., Antiochus Epiphanes endeavoured to precipitate their hellenization, the Maccabean rebellion enabled the Jews to recover their independence and become independent for a couple of centuries. To this period the latter part of Zechariah refers. The Diaspora, who had emigrated, will be brought back again out of Egypt and Assyria into the land of Gilead and Lebanon.[1]

Yet, even in its most prosperous time, Palestine was peopled by only a minority of the Jews. Most of them spread into Galilee, Syria, Egypt, and beyond the seas, so that in the second century B. C. the Jewish Sibyl says of the Diaspora, 'Every land is full of thee and every sea', and Strabo, Philo, Seneca, and the author of the Acts of the Apostles prove that the Jewish race was disseminated in their time over the whole of the civilized world. Philo says that in Egypt alone there were a million Jews, an eighth of the population.

The Maccabeans preserved the independence of Palestine, in spite of the growing imperialism of Rome, until Pompey took Jerusalem in B. C. 63. After this date the local rulers of the Idumaean dynasty (established by Herod in 37 B. C.) were always in the position of 'client-kings' under the Roman government. Judaea itself became under Augustus a 'second-class' Roman province. Internal dissensions produced the insurrection which ended with the destruction of the Temple in 70 A. D. Under Hadrian, A. D. 130, the Jews again rebelled. Jerusalem was destroyed and rebuilt by the Emperor as a Roman colony under the name Aelia Capitolina. No Jews were allowed to reside in it. Thus all hopes of Jewish independence were for the time destroyed.

[1] Zech. x. 10.

§ 3. After the Roman Conquest

The Romans planted colonies in Palestine with the express intention of preventing the political regeneration of the Jew. But, excluded from Palestine, the Jews strove in the first place to establish, upon the ruins of Hellenism, actual commonwealths in Cyrene, Cyprus, Egypt, and Mesopotamia. There were repeated insurrections of the Jews under several Roman emperors. In the fourth century the Emperor Julian actually contemplated restoring Palestine to the Jews. The passionate longing for Palestine has always remained a Jewish characteristic. It permeates the Apocrypha and writings of the Rabbis. It is the *leitmotif* of the Jewish national fasts and the Hebrew Prayer Book. Every Jewish sermon and every Talmudic discussion, every occasional prayer, ended with the stock formula, 'May the redeemer come unto Zion!' Daily the Jews pray, 'O bring us in peace from the four corners of the earth, and make us to go upright to our land'.

In the solemn and ancient liturgy of the Day of Atonement, to this very day, the Jews all over the world pray that the redemption may succeed a League of Nations:

> Now, therefore, O Lord our God, impose thine awe upon all thy works .. . that all creatures may fear thee . . . that they may all form a single league to do thy work with a perfect heart. . . .
>
> Give then glory, O Lord, unto thy people, praise to them that fear thee, hope to them that seek thee, and free speech to them that wait for thee, joy to thy land, gladness to thy city, a flourishing horn unto David thy servant, and a clear shining light unto the son of Jesse, thine anointed, speedily in our days.
>
> Then shall the just also see and be glad . . . while all wickedness shall be wholly consumed like smoke, when thou makest the dominion of arrogance to pass away from the earth.
>
> And thou, O Lord, shalt reign, thou alone, over all thy works on Mount Zion, the dwelling-place of thy glory, and in Jerusalem, thy holy city.

Throughout Christian times the Jews have clung to the firm belief in their ultimate return to the Holy Land. Such belief has induced them to lend credence to pseudo-Messiahs, who claimed to be their deliverers appointed to bring about the promised Messianic Kingdom. Some of these were impostors, others self-deluded. Josephus tells of those in the first century; others were Bar Kokba under Hadrian, Moses of Crete in 446, Serenus, a Syrian in the eighth century, David Alroy of Bagdad (the hero of Disraeli's novel of that name) in the twelfth, Abulafia of Messina in 1299, Asher Lemmlein of Istria in 1502, David Reubeni of Cranganore, India, in 1524, and Sabbatai Zevi of Smyrna in 1666. Sabbatai's adventures created a tremendous stir in western Europe; and, although he eventually became an apostate to Islam, he had a line of successors in whom the strange sect of Dunmeh, who live in Salonika, continue to believe. In fact there have been, throughout the centuries, periodic Zionist agitations which have convulsed Jewry; and repeated failures have but strengthened its faith in the final restoration.

§ 4. The Reformation

The invention of printing, the establishment of the Spanish Inquisition, the translation of the Bible, and the Reformation were great events which acted and reacted on Jew and non-Jew alike. The work of the Reformers was furthered by the Rabbis, who helped and taught the Bible translators and Protestant Reformers. With the spread of the Reformation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, religious enthusiasm, coupled with mysticism of an extravagant type, became increasingly prevalent in England, Holland, Denmark, and Germany.

The leading Protestant theologians were on terms of intimacy with Jewish scholars, and searched the Hebrew scriptures with great care and zeal. Sects such as the Anabaptists and Independents became more and more Jewish in their line of thought. . . . Books were written with a view to reconcile the Jewish

and Christian beliefs as to the Messiah. At the time of the return of the Jews to England (1655), several Christians declared themselves to be Messiahs of the Jewish nation and imagined a Jewish kingdom of which they were to be the King. Many kept the Jewish seventh day Sabbath, and we are told of certain Quakers called Sabbatharii, that they were so pious that they killed a cat for eating a mouse on Saturday. Tovey tells us that the Anti-Semites of the time declared that the Jews saw in Cromwell their Messiah.[1]

This Messianic extravagance had its counterpart among the Jews in a renewed belief in quite a series of pseudo-Messiahs; but these, instead of being merely unsuccessful leaders of Jewish rebels against their oppressors, were now men who numbered distinguished Gentiles among their friends or followers and had diplomatic relations with the princes of their time. Their resistless call to their adherents was the announcement that they would bring Israel back to the Promised Land. Nor was it only mystics or impostors that cherished this hope. Thus Joseph Nasi, Duke of Naxos, a Turkish statesman, originally a *maranno* fugitive from Portugal, persuaded Sultan Soliman II in 1563 to give him Tiberias and the neighbourhood for colonization by the Jews.[2] He introduced the mulberry and culture of silk into Palestine, and started a trade in cloth with Venice. He invited all persecuted Jews, especially in the Papal States, to become farmers or artisans in the new Jewish community. And, although his particular colony had no great success, it was undoubtedly the first practical step to the repopulation of Palestine by the Jew.

Side by side with those colonists, there came to northern Palestine a number of mystics and legists impelled by a religious craving, and seeking to forget the horrors of the expulsion of the Jews from Spain and Portugal. Schechter, in his *Studies in Judaism*,[3] paints

[1] L. Simon, *Aspects of the Hebrew Genius* [Introduction by E. N. Adler, xix]. London, 1910.

[2] E. Charrière, *Négociations de la France dans l'Orient*, II. p. 736. Paris, 1850.

[3] Second Series, p. 202.

a vivid picture of these pilgrim fathers in a chapter entitled 'Safed in the Sixteenth Century'. He translates the words of one of the greatest of them, Rabbi Joseph Caro:

> After nearly fifteen hundred years of living in the exile and persecution, God remembered unto his people his covenant with their fathers, and brought them back from their captivity, one of a city and two of a family, from the corners of the earth to the land of glory, and they settled in the city of Safed, the desire of all lands.

Safed was preferred to Jerusalem because both the Jews and the Turks of Jerusalem were at the time more exacting and even hostile to alien immigrants. The Jewish community in Safed soon grew to over a thousand families and exceeded that of Jerusalem; and its spiritual wealth—for it was famous for its Kabbalists—was a greater magnet than the importance of its wool trade. The distinction between the business or agricultural Jew and the scholar or saint, who cares nothing for material gain, and is satisfied with his share of the *Halukah* provided by the charitable Jews of Europe and America, has subsisted to this very day.

§ 5. The French Revolution

In the eighteenth century imaginative and emotional religion tended to be superseded or overshadowed by Rationalism. Jews were as 'enlightened' as Gentiles; and the scientific movement of the time found expression in the French Revolution. Montesquieu, the philosopher, commenced the enfranchisement of the Jew; Mirabeau, the patriot, carried it on; and Napoleon completed it. It was this that led to the eventual emancipation of the Jews of western Europe and a renaissance of Jewish literature under Mendelssohn. The Mendelssohnian school brought about a great linguistic change. The vernacular took the place of Hebrew. The Bible first, and then text-books of science and art, history and geography, poetry, and even novels, were written in German but printed

in Hebrew letters, so that the Jew of the time, illiterate except as to Hebrew, should be able to read them. But the Mendelssohnians were also assimilationists, and thus introduced the only vital change into Judaism since the conquest of Jerusalem by the Romans. Till their day, no Jew had doubted that the dispersion was only temporary and 'the restoration of the national polity might be expected at any moment'; he had looked upon himself as a temporary settler in the land where he happened to live, and indeed, at any rate in Germany, he had been physically separated by the walls of his Ghetto from the society and culture of the non-Jew. Many Jews, especially in Germany, carried away by the glamour of their new citizenship, left the fold altogether. It was the age of *Massentaufen* (baptisms *en masse*). Others abandoned their tribal nationalism and went so far as to eliminate from the prayer book of 'reform' Judaism all references to the hope of a return to the Holy Land and to substitute for a Messiah belief in an ideal Messianic destiny of the spirit common to Israel and mankind. But the mass of Jewry has remained true to its Prayer Book and its Bible. Nevertheless, the Jews in the first half of the nineteenth century were, perhaps, less concerned with Palestine than were non-Jews. The Jewish problem of the day seemed to be in process of solution. Little or nothing was to be heard even of schemes for colonizing Jews outside Palestine. Such had formerly advocated Jewish settlements on the 'Wild Coast' (1654), in the West Indies (1659), and in South America (1749)—the last under the sovereignty of Marshal de Saxe. The colonial scheme of Mordecai Noah of Philadelphia (1785–1851) was made memorable by the support given to it by President Adams.

Mendelssohn himself was hardly an assimilationist. In 1770, consulted as to a scheme for the resettlement of Jews in Palestine, he opposed such an idea only because the Jews were too scattered and feeble, the expense would be too great, and the Powers would never consent. Napoleon in 1799, when on his Syrian

campaign, issued a proclamation to the Jews, calling upon them to join his army, and promising to give them the Holy Land. This campaign failed, but in 1807 Napoleon again proposed a solution of the Jewish question—from the opposite angle—by summoning the *Sanhedrin*, which was to regulate Jewish custom and fit the Jews for French nationality.

Christians during this period were less lukewarm; and some there were who, believing the Biblical promises, sought to tempt the Jews back to the land of their fathers, generally with the expectation, express or implied, of their ultimate conversion to Christianity. Thus in 1806 a pamphlet[1] addressed to the Jews, after an examination of the prophecies under both Christian and Jewish dispensations, proceeds, 'As there is every reason to suppose that the restoration of the Jews is nigh at hand, I shall now conclude this address by congratulating them on the happy prospect before them in the beautiful language of Ezekiel', and so forth. Bickeno's 'Restoration of the Jews—the Crisis of all Nations' appeared in 1800, and Witherby's 'Attempt to Remove Prejudices concerning the Jewish Nation' in 1804, the latter being a plea both for the Jews' restoration to Palestine, and for their civil equality outside Palestine.

Once admitted to the society of the Gentile, as a citizen with all civil rights, the Jew could not help taking his place in literature and even in general politics. Cumberland's 'Jew' is no longer the crafty and cruel Shylock of dramatic tradition, but a good-hearted philanthropist, benevolent though rich. Byron's 'Hebrew Melodies' bewail the homelessness of Israel. The heroine of Scott's *Ivanhoe* is a Jewess, a perfect heroine of romance. Disraeli reflects—perhaps also deflects—the views of his time and his own impressions of a three years' visit to the East (1830–1) when he makes out of his aristocratic hero 'Tancred' a sort of prototype of Herzl, who tries to realize the Messianic ideal of and in Palestine.

[1] L. Mayer, *Restoration of the Jews*, 3rd ed. London, 1806.

§ 6. Montefiore, Shaftesbury, and Mordecai Noah

In 1827 the famous centenarian Sir Moses Montefiore paid the first of his seven pilgrimages to Palestine. His wife's diary pictures the ruin and abject misery produced by tyranny and misrule, but ends with a note of hope for the 'return to Zion with songs'. The conquest of Syria by Mehemet Ali in 1832 caused Jew and Gentile to turn their thoughts to Palestine. Many Jews flocked thither, and we are told of 30,000 Polish Jews who petitioned Tsar Nicholas to be allowed 'to proceed to Palestine in a body and await there during three years the coming of the Messiah'. Before 1840 there were supposed to be forty thousand Jews settled, especially in the four 'holy' cities, Jerusalem, Hebron, Safed, and Tiberias, mostly poor and dependent on their richer brethren in Europe for support. In 1838 Sir Moses paid his second visit with the special object of submitting to Mehemet Ali a scheme for Jewish colonization in Syria. During this journey he investigated the prospects of local agriculture.[1] After nine years, Mehemet Ali was ousted from Syria, which was restored to the Porte, largely owing to the armed intervention of Great Britain.

Already in 1838, Lord Shaftesbury[2] was 'anxious about the hopes and destinies of the Jewish people. Everything seems ripe for their return to Palestine.' He prepared a memorandum for the Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, suggesting their settlement there under the guarantee of the Great Powers. These views he elaborated in an anonymous article in the *Quarterly Review* for January 1839. Palmerston was not unfriendly, but there was no Jewish organization capable of handling so big a matter, and so the ambitious project

[1] The Appendix to Lady Montefiore's *Notes from a Journal* (London, 1844) contains Extracts from Reports, Letters, and Addresses on Agriculture in the Holy Land presented to Sir Moses during his sojourn there.

[2] Hodder's *Life and Work of the Seventh Earl of Shaftesbury*, i. 310, quoted by N. Sokolov in his work, *The History of Zionism* (2 vols., 1919.).

was whittled down to the official protection by England of Jews in the East. And yet this concession has proved by no means insignificant, for it is the logical precursor of Mr. Balfour's Declaration of November 1917.

The American Mordecai Noah had been reluctantly obliged to abandon his scheme for the constitution of a Jewish colony in the State of New York, and had gravitated towards Palestine. He agreed with a 'continental Jew' who in 1844 wrote to the *Voice of Jacob*, 'We would willingly emigrate, we would go to America, to Texas, but most willingly to Palestine under English protection'.

Noah had become a warm advocate of the restoration of Israel to Palestine when in October 1844 he delivered an eloquent address in New York, in which he urged his countrymen that it was the duty of Christians to help the Jews to regain the land of their fathers. The *Spectator* in 1845 (quoted in the *Voice of Jacob* of August 1, 1845) supports the scheme in the following terms:

> The enterprise which seems to be laying strong hold of the imaginations of a large portion of the European Jews appears at first sight feasible enough. The population of Syria has been reduced to a tithe of what the country could easily support; whole districts are uninhabited. With the permission of the Ottoman Government, the Jews wishing to colonize in Palestine could easily find lands. The old constitutional mode of government and taxation in Turkey favours the formation of a number of agricultural settlements. The Divan declares how much tribute each village or district has to pay, leaving the principal inhabitants to apportion the contribution of each individual and holding them responsible for the whole. The same parties exercise the internal police of their community, subject to the surveillance of the higher authorities. The institutions of the Ottoman Empire would afford the Jewish colonists large scope of local self-government. Were a number of Jewish agricultural settlements established at moderate distances from each other, the superior intelligence, industry, and wealth of their members would lend them importance and their numbers and union deter alien tribes from aggression. Secure themselves, they would as it were inoculate the population of Syria with steady industrious habits. The Ottoman Govern-

ment would be a gainer every way, were it to invite the immigration of such colonists by granting them considerable immunities. At present it cannot preserve order in Syria; that Pashalic costs money instead of yielding tribute. The Jews would form the nucleus of an industrious, orderly population, consisting of men who have been trained to live as citizens—who know the value of domestic peace assured by laws—and are not likely to become the tools of ambitious Pashas aspiring to independence. In the present temper of the Jews, a large body of immigrants might apparently be attracted to Palestine, were the Ottoman Government to enter into a definite contract with them and induce England—or a Committee of European Powers—to become guarantees for its observance.

The British public was intensely sympathetic to the idea of Palestine for the Jews. *The Times* of March 9, 1840, reported an earlier memorandum to the Powers suggesting the restoration of the Jews to Palestine. *The Times* of August 26 printed this memorandum in full, together with encouraging replies from most of the sovereigns addressed. It also contained a letter by 'An English Christian' appealing to the British people to buy Palestine for the Jews.

Henry Hawkes, on the occasion of the Chief Rabbi Herschel's death in 1842, preached a sermon on the *Position of the Jews*, 'speaking comfortably to Jerusalem' and claiming for them equal rights of citizenship.

> The time is ripe: no ungenerous policy, no exclusive irreligion can stand against you. There is a moral power, accumulated, ever more accumulating, that will work with you in the bosom of our own Christian nation, philanthropists the most mighty in divine energies. Let not our past injustice discourage you; we are ready for better things: work with us to their accomplishment.[1]

Herschel himself had figured in 1838 in Henry Innes's 'Letter to the friends in Scotland of God's ancient people the Jews, including a correspondence with Dr. Herschel the Chief Rabbi of the Jewish Synagogues in London'. Innes believed in 'Israel's

[1] *Position of the Jews.* A Sermon, by Henry Hawkes (London, 1843).

return from his dispersions', but imagined that conversion to Christianity was the condition precedent.

In 1844 a clergyman named Crybbalt convened a meeting in the Hanover Square Rooms for the formation of the "British and Foreign Society for promoting the Restoration of the Jewish Nation to Palestine"; another clergyman, named Bradshaw, in *A Tract for the Times*, asked Parliament to grant four millions if the churches collected one million for such restoration. Next year E. L. Mitford, of the Ceylon Civil Service, in 'An Appeal on behalf of the Jewish nation, in connexion with British Policy in the Levant', asked for their re-establishment in Palestine 'as a protected state, under the guardianship of Great Britain', with a view to 'their final establishment as an independent state'. In 1845 Colonel George Gawler, founder and second Governor of South Australia, advised 'the foundation of the most important colony that the world will perhaps ever witness' in his 'Tranquillization of Syria and the East. Observations and Practical Suggestions in furtherance of the Establishment of Jewish Colonies in Palestine; the most sober and sensible remedy for the miseries of Asiatic Turkey'. In 1849 he accompanied Montefiore to Palestine, and in 1853 renewed his proposals that Jewish settlements there should be promoted by England, which 'does most urgently need the shortest and safest lines of communications. . . . Egypt and Syria stand in intimate connexion. A foreign hostile power mighty in either would soon endanger British trade.' [1]

§ 7. Jewish Emancipation in England

Not till after a generation of heated controversy did even England admit Jews to Parliament. In this controversy Macaulay took a leading part. His

[1] Some of these facts are condensed from Sokolov's *History of Zionism*, and A. M. Hyamson's *British Projects for the Restoration of Jews to Palestine*, published in the twenty-sixth publication of the American Jewish Historical Society (1918).

maiden speech, delivered in the House of Commons in 1830, was in favour of Grant's Bill for the Removal of Jewish Disabilities. 'On every principle of moral obligation', he said, 'the Jew has a right to political power.' His famous essay on the 'Civil Disabilities of the Jews' appeared in the *Edinburgh Review* of January 1831. His argument against the idea that Jewish Nationalism unfits the Jews for complete civil rights outside Palestine is worth quoting.

> But it is said, the Scriptures declare that the Jews are to be restored to their own country; and the whole nation looks forward to that restoration. They are therefore not so deeply interested as others in the prosperity of England. It is not their home, but merely the place of their sojourn, the house of their bondage. This argument, which first appeared in *The Times* newspaper[1] . . . belongs to a class of sophisms by which the most hateful persecutions may easily be justified. To charge men with practical consequences which they themselves deny is disingenuous in controversy; it is atrocious in government. . . . People are now reasoning about the Jews as our fathers reasoned about the Papists. . . . The Christian believes, as well as the Jew, that at some future period the present order of things will come to an end. Nay, many Christians believe that the Messiah will shortly establish a kingdom on the earth. . . . Now wherein does this doctrine differ, as far as its political tendency is concerned, from the doctrine of the Jew? If a Jew is unfit to legislate for us because he believes that he or his remote descendants will be removed to Palestine, can we safely open the House of Commons to a fifth monarchy man, who expects that before this generation shall pass away, all the kingdoms of the earth will be swallowed up in one divine empire?

Nearly thirty years elapsed before Jewish emancipation in England was accomplished,[2] but during that period Macaulay's essay undoubtedly played a great part in converting public opinion. In 1847 the *Quarterly Review* published an article setting forth the case against the Jewish claim, but the whole argument is directed towards rebutting that of the essay. The

[1] May 3, 1830.

[2] On July 26, 1858, Baron Lionel de Rothschild took his seat in due form in the House of Commons.

advocates of emancipation frankly confessed their belief that, once given equal civil rights, the Jews would soon be completely assimilated.

About this time various institutions were founded in connexion with Palestine which showed the lively interest of the public. Such were—

The Association for Promoting Jewish Settlements in Palestine (1843), afterwards the Palestine Colonization Fund;

The Society for the Promotion of Jewish Agricultural Labour in the Holy Land (1843);

The Palestine Society;

The Syria Society;

The Syrian Improvement Committee (before 1863);

The Jerusalem Water Relief Society (1864);

The Palestine Exploration Fund (1865), and similar Societies in France, Germany, and Russia.

Of some of these committees Montefiore was a member; and, though some Zionists have been inclined to look upon him as an opposing influence, as the protagonist of the philanthropic school, there can be no doubt that in the nineteenth century Palestine owed most to him for the beginnings of its colonization. Cobbett's taunt that 'the Israelite is never seen to take a spade in his hand' had made a deep impression upon him, and he determined to do his best to encourage agriculture and handicrafts among his brethren, especially in Palestine. Colonel Churchill wished to re-establish a Jewish kingdom in Palestine. Montefiore, though he threw cold water on the idea on the ground that the times were not ripe, entrusted the Colonel on his return to the East with a fund or the encouragement of thrift among the Jews of the Holy Land; he sent a printing-press to Jerusalem, started a linen factory, and supplied various committees there with agricultural implements and even with cattle. In 1849 Colonel Gawler accompanied him on another visit to the Holy Land. In 1854 he and Chief Rabbi Nathan Adler appealed to the Jews of England for funds to relieve distress in Palestine due

to the failure of the harvest and the crisis caused by the Crimean War. The Holy Land Relief Fund then constituted is still in existence. Having raised upwards of £20,000 and having also just received a legacy of $50,000 for the benefit of Palestine Jews from Judah Touro of New Orleans, Sir Moses went out again to Palestine in May 1855. On his way he obtained from the Sultan a firman permitting the purchase of land, and bought land at Jaffa and Jerusalem on which he planted gardens, erected a windmill, opened a girls' school, and established agricultural colonies at Safed and Tiberias. In 1874 correspondence between Montefiore, Colonel Gawler's son, the Haham Bashi of Jerusalem, and many of the local Jews, was published by the Jewish Board of Deputies 'on the Promotion of Agriculture and other Industrial Pursuits' in the Holy Land; and in the same year Sir Moses made his seventh, and last, pilgrimage to Jerusalem. He suggested sanitary improvements, housing of the working classes in garden cities where olive-trees, vines, and vegetables should be grown, and loan societies to enable colonists to purchase land; and he bade them 'begin at once'. The Sir Moses Montefiore Testimonial Committee, founded in 1878 to commemorate his centenary, adopted some of these suggestions; and the neat little houses outside the Jaffa gate have been erected by building societies which it constituted. Montefiore's noble life kindled the imagination of his co-religionists throughout the world, created quite a literature concerning him in many languages, and, although the glamour attached to his activities is now somewhat out of fashion among Zionists, undoubtedly led to an ever-increasing faith in Palestine as the country for the Jewish colonist. In 1876 George Eliot's *Daniel Deronda* appeared—a famous novel in which both emancipation and nationalism are claimed for the Jew. Mordecai is the prophet of the hope that 'our race shall have an organic centre, a heart and brain to watch and guide and execute; the outraged Jew shall have a defence in the court of nations'.

§ 8. Anti-Semitism and Modern Zionism

But Zionism would never have attained its present overwhelming grasp of the minds and hopes of the vast majority of Jewry but for the outbreak of Anti-Semitism and the clouding of the prospects of Jews, alike emancipated, half-emancipated, and not emancipated at all.

The beginning of the nineteenth century, as has been seen, was still influenced by the liberal ideas of the Revolution. Prejudice there was against the Jew, but it was merely incidental. In 1848 the Continental Jew fought for freedom with all his heart and soul. Even in the three Prussian Wars, which culminated in Sedan and the foundation of the German Empire, Jews had shed their blood for their fatherland and were not subjected to deliberate and organized persecution and attack. But 1870 turned the Prussian heads. Heinrich von Treitschke (1834–96), a Saxon renegade to Prussia, became the chief panegyrist of the House of Hohenzollern and the militarism for which it stood. In his chair at the University of Berlin and in the Reichstag he pleaded eloquently for the narrowest German nationalism. He vehemently supported the Government in its attacks upon the Socialists and Poles, upon the Catholics and the Jews. The Jews have had to suffer from Anti-Semitism ever since 1878; and Treitschke was one of the few men of eminence who gave his support to the attacks upon them which began in that year.

The virus soon spread throughout Europe. In the East it led to the pogroms in Russia which started in 1880 and have recurred about every ten years. In England, Goldwin Smith raised the question 'Can Jews be patriots?' in 1878; then ensued a series of articles in which Hermann Adler was the apologist. The contagion spread a little later even to liberal France, where, in 1886, Drumont wrote *La France Juive*, preached that all French misfortunes were due to the Machiavellian Jew, and,

to keep the ball rolling, founded *La Libre Parole.* Drumont is the father of the Anti-Semitism of the Dreyfus trial of 1898.

A whole literature arose around Anti-Semitism in general and the Dreyfus trial in particular. The Jews did not confine themselves to apologetic propaganda. Their leaders, in the more enlightened countries of the West, formed institutions with the express object of protecting their less-favoured co-religionists from oppression and injustice. But above all 'Zionism' came into being as a positive remedy for the alleged homelessness of the disfranchised Jew. The term appears to have been first used in 1886, but was popularized by Herzl ten years later.

§ 9. The Origin of Modern Zionism

Already in 1862, Moses Hess, one of the early leaders of the Social Democratic movement in Germany, wrote a book, *Rom und Jerusalem,* in which he discussed the Jewish problem. Persecution of the Jew throughout the world had convinced him that Jews were likely to remain strangers wherever they dwelt, that emancipation was difficult to reconcile with Jewish national feeling, and that a Jewish Nationality was the only solution of the problem. But the views of Hess fell upon deaf ears among Western Jewry; and emancipation still appeared to them the preferable solution.

Dr. Leon Pinsker of Odessa, in a pamphlet, *Auto-Emancipation,* published in 1882 and translated into Hebrew and most of the European languages, urged that Jews must help themselves. Writing under the stress of the Russian pogroms he declared that 'neither miracles from above, nor the kindness of Gentiles, nor the progress of nationalism would solve the Jewish problem. They could only become a living nation by beginning to live as a nation and strive for the realization of their national aspirations. . . . A home must be found for oppressed Jews, especially Russian Jews.' His chief disciple, the well-known Hebrew writer and

philosopher, Asher Ginzberg, known as 'Ahad Ha'am' ('one of the people'), has, since 1889, suggested a rather more idealistic solution. Palestine, as a home for Jews, must also be a new moral centre for spiritual inspiration and guidance. His views have been adopted by large numbers of the Zionists themselves; and, indeed, he would probably now describe himself as a Zionist, though he does not see eye to eye with the bulk of the modern leaders of Zionism.

The Russian movement, 'Chovevi Zion' ('Lovers of Zion'), was undoubtedly inspired by Pinsker and Ginzberg, and gathered momentum and force in Odessa and southern Russia and the pale of Jewish settlement, whence it spread to western Europe.

In England it acquired considerable importance by reason of the position of its adherents and the enthusiasm of its chief, Col. A. E. Goldsmid. Its constitution was drafted by E. N. Adler and settled by the Right Hon. Arthur Cohen, Q.C., a nephew of Sir Moses Montefiore. Its objects were expressed to be:

(*a*) To foster the national ideal in Israel.
(*b*) To promote colonization of Palestine and neighbouring territories by Jews, by establishing new colonies, or assisting those already established.
(*c*) To diffuse the knowledge of Hebrew as a living language.
(*d*) To further the moral and material status of Israel.

Its organization took a somewhat military form, being governed by 'Head-quarters Tent' and various Local Tents in the metropolis, provinces, and colonies. The Head-quarters Tent was presided over by a Chief and each Local Tent by a Commander. For some years it published a quarterly magazine, *Palestine*, edited by Dr. S. A. Hirsch. In 1892 it began to purchase land in Palestine; but its international action was in the hands of a Central Committee at Paris, a Committee in Odessa, and an office at Jaffa for the purchase and sale of land and negotiation with the Turkish authorities for facilitating Jewish colonization. 'Chovevi Zion', though in the year 1897 it was administering half a dozen colonies, building agricultural dwellings,

subsidizing and assisting libraries and schools, never achieved more than a *succès d'estime*. Still, it undoubtedly paved the way for modern Zionism; and Herzl could not have achieved his phenomenal success if these 'Lovers of Zion' had not prepared the soil.

Meantime two individual Jews had, by their reasoned munificence, achieved far more than Montefiore in turning their co-religionists to agriculture. Baron Maurice Hirsch (1831–96) founded the Jewish Colonization Association (commonly known as 'Ica'), and endowed it with over ten millions sterling. Its original object was to relieve the oppressed Jews—primarily those of Russia and Rumania—by encouraging emigration to its colonies in the Argentine, Brazil, Canada, and the United States. The Baron, however, did not favour Palestine as a field for colonization, because he feared that Russia would become the predominant power there. Baron Edmond de Rothschild has for the last thirty years unostentatiously, but on a scientific basis, also devoted millions to the establishment of agricultural colonies exclusively in Palestine, and especially for viticulture, and he had succeeded before the war in putting his colonies on a self-supporting basis. The 'Ica' is administered by delegates of the Anglo-Jewish Association, the Alliance Israélite of Paris, and Jews of Frankfort, Berlin, and Brussels. A few years ago it undertook for Rothschild the management of his Palestine colonies, so that, although not a Zionist organization, it has great interests in the Holy Land.

§ 10. Herzl

Throughout the nineteenth century, Palestine had commanded the increasing attention of the Jews; but it lacked the vivifying touch of a genius who was to make it monopolize their hopes and ambitions.

Such a genius was Herzl, 'the tall figure with the black-bearded Assyrian head that drew all eyes'. He was the founder of the modern idea of Zionism, and in the brief space of ten years from the publication of

his *Jewish State* was able, by his fascinating personality, which impressed itself upon high and low, Jew and Gentile, Court circles and the proletariat of the Russian Ghetto, to bring the secular aspirations of Jewry into the sphere of practical politics. He gathered round him the philosopher, the student, the oppressed, the dissatisfied, and the enthusiast, into a sort of Cave of Adullam.

At first he was looked upon askance by the great bulk of Western Jews, who, in easy circumstances and sometimes in high positions, were well on the way to assimilation in the countries of their birth and adoption. Even in eastern Europe, ultra-orthodox Jews viewed his projects with disfavour, because they feared that his schemes were independent of religious ideals, and saw in him a political enthusiast but not a descendant of the prophets. They could not recognize in the courtly and well-spoken journalist anything approaching their traditional picture of a Messiah or even his precursor. Herzl's most famous saying was that the return to Zion would be preceded by the return to Judaism.

§ 11. The Zionist Congresses

Public interest in the movement was also kept alive and keenly stirred by the annual meeting of Zionist Congresses during the holiday season, and generally in Switzerland. These were attended by ever-increasing numbers of Jews from all parts of the world, and flattered both participants and spectators by their resemblance to the parliament of a constitutional State.

The first, second, and third were held at Basle in August 1897, 1898, and 1899. Mr. Sokolov, a publicist of Warsaw, one of the prominent leaders of the Zionists and a member of the 'Inner Actions Committee' at the outbreak of the war, gives the following picturesque description of the Congress:

> I still see that odd motley gathering—Rabbis and University professors, medical men and engineers, lawyers and littérateurs, mathematicians, chemists, bankers, merchants, trades-

men, University students, agriculturists, book-keepers, clerks —all professions and occupations. Orthodox Jews, moderate Conservatives, Chassidim, reformers, freethinkers, Ashkenazim, Sephardim, Galician Straimlech, and Parisian top-hats, German preachers, Lithuanian Rectors of Yeshiboth, Capitalists and Socialists, philanthropists and *Bettelstudenten*, from Polish plains and Swiss mountains, from Lithuanian *Ghetti* and Vienna 'Rings', speaking Russian, Polish, German, English, French, Italian, Spanish, Hungarian, Arabic, Dutch, Bulgarian, Serbian, Danish, Yiddish and Hebrew, all had come there united by one will, unfurling one banner, forgetting at once all their differences, all their communities' petty questions, all their family worries, all their personal troubles, inspired by one idea, devoted to one great cause, reasoning, arguing, discussing, with a power of conviction and enthusiasm as if this question of a home for the nation were the most personal, the most vital question to every one of them.

The second Congress was notable for an eloquent address by Max Nordau. In burning words he attacked the Anti-Semitism of the Gentile, and the lukewarmness of the rich and 'cultured' Jews who remained in Babylon. The fourth Congress was held in London in 1900 at the Queen's Hall. The fifth and sixth were again held in Basle in 1901 and in July 1903. At all of these Herzl presided. In 1901 he was still hopeful of persuading the Sultan to grant a Jewish charter to Palestine, and he visited Constantinople twice in that year. The Sultan Abdul Hamid expressed his sympathy but did not grant the charter. The key-note of the Congress of that year (at which thirty English delegates attended) was the desirability of obtaining concessions in Palestine. The Jewish National Fund, of which more hereafter, was organized for the purchase of land. At the sixth Congress, in 1903, Herzl had to admit the failure of his Turkish negotiations; and the emigration of persecuted Jews to Egypt and to Uganda was suggested as a temporary measure.

Lord Cromer was most sympathetic to the former scheme, and the latter was offered to the Zionists by Joseph Chamberlain, then Colonial Secretary, who had just returned from South Africa. Chamberlain's offer was enthusiastically welcomed by a section of the

Zionists and by all with gratitude. It was a *beau geste* on the part of the Government, and a recognition that Herzl and his following were regarded seriously in serious quarters. The Chamberlain scheme of territory within an English Colony was too tempting and too flattering to be summarily rejected; and, though Herzl said that the Jewish people could have no other ultimate goal than Palestine, and that immigration elsewhere could only be subsidiary, it was at his recommendation that the Congress resolved to send out an expedition to East Africa to investigate the Uganda proposal.

The Russian Zionists, however, regarded the scheme as treason to Zionism, and under the leadership of Ussishkin held a counter-Congress in Palestine in the Colony of Zichron Jacob and another in Charkov in November 1903, which presented an ultimatum to Herzl calling upon him to abandon the scheme.

The press throughout Europe, and especially in England, devoted much space to the subject, and the bibliography of Zionism has been rapidly increasing ever since.[1] In April 1904 a *modus vivendi* was found by a conference of the Greater Actions Committee, which, while taking cognizance of the Palestinian work of the Inner Actions Committee, assented to the dispatch to Uganda of a Commission of Enquiry, but left the final decision to the next Congress. It was at this juncture, when there was this cleavage in the ranks of the Zionists, that Herzl died suddenly, a comparatively young man, on July 3, 1904.

The report brought back by the Commission to Uganda was not a favourable one. The seventh, or 'Sabbath', Congress was held at Basle in July 1905 under the presidency of Max Nordau, and attended by delegates from twenty-two countries. The Jewish Territorial Organization (generally known as 'Ito')

[1] Thus Thomsen's *Palästina-Literatur* contains 84 entries between 1895 and 1904, and 311 entries, including 40 newspapers and magazines, for 1904–9. See also Zeitlin's *Bibliotheca Sionistica*, 1852–1905, limited to Hebrew books on Zionism.

had been founded some months previously by Israel Zangwill and others, who remained members of the Zionist body; but at this Congress such of the Zionists as were 'territorialists' and favoured a colony in Africa or elsewhere were beaten hip and thigh, for the Congress voted all extra-Palestinian work as outside its programme. The proceedings were of a somewhat turbulent nature. A suggestion that the Zionists should be ruled by a triumvirate consisting of Nordau, Marmorek, and Wolffsohn was rejected, the presidency being conferred upon Wolffsohn of Cologne and the seat of administration shifted from Vienna to his city. The Inner Actions Committee, whose president was *ex officio* head of the Zionists, was enlarged from five to seven members resident in Cologne, Berlin, The Hague, Charkov, Paris, and London. In the Greater Actions Committee there were five English delegates, including Zangwill and Gaster.

Of 350 Russian delegates attending this Congress, 300 voted against East Africa. They were what is known as 'Zione Zion', whose one object was Palestine and who claimed that the Jews already resident there must be consulted. Zangwill and the 'Ito' formed a constitutional opposition. The 'Jewish Colonial Trust' was constituted as a financial organization for securing funds for the development of colonization and agriculture in Palestine. In England the 'London Zionist League' was started as a sort of counterpoise to the 'Ito'.

The Actions Committee endeavoured to arrange a conference with other Jewish bodies to see if they would undertake the African scheme; but the 'Ica' and the Alliance Israélite refused, on the ground that the report was unfavourable; while the members of the Anglo-Jewish Association who attended the conference objected to the alternative offered as being, in the circumstances, too speculative. And so the Uganda scheme fell to the ground.

In August 1907 the eighth Congress was held at The Hague, under the presidency of Wolffsohn. A new

constitution was adopted, under which Congresses were to meet every other year, with a conference in the years intervening. The Greater Actions Committee was to consist of (*a*) twenty-three members elected by Congress on the nomination of standing Committees; (*b*) the Presidents of the Executives of the National Federation and of other Federations; (*c*) the Chairmen of Council and Directors of the Jewish Colonial Trust, the Anglo-Palestine Co., and the Jewish National Fund; (*d*) the Chairmen of the Board of Arbitration and the Congress Council. The leadership was to be with the Deputy President and three other members of the Actions Committee.

Wolffsohn's health was breaking down, and he offered to resign; but the Congress decided to make no change in the presidency till their next meeting. The Russian delegates, under Ussishkin, sought to capture the movement. They were all for political work, and wished the seat of administration to be removed from Cologne to Paris or Berlin, but did not carry their point. Wolffsohn was a practical Zionist, and belonged to the more sober section who thought that the preparation of the people and the land for colonizing was the practical work for Palestine. This mode of economic penetration was a reversion to the Palestinian activities of the 'Chovevi Zion' type.

At the biennial conference held in July 1910 a suggestion that the Administration should be strengthened by an Advisory Board consisting of Nordau, Sir Francis Montefiore and Tchlenov, a leading Russian Zionist, fell through, as each of these gentlemen declined to act. Nordau was beginning to create an opposition to the Wolffsohn leadership.

In August 1911 the tenth or 'Jubilee' Congress was held at Basle, under the presidency of Nordau. Here the cleavage between the political Zionists and the cultural Zionists became accentuated, but, on the whole, the tendency was rather to the Palestinian ideals of the 'Chovevi Zion'. A decided movement ensued for the re-establishment of Hebrew as a living

language; and some interest was shown in Jewish emigration outside Palestine to relieve the economic pressure arising out of persecution. A symptom of the cleavage in Zionist ranks was evidenced in the English law courts, where an attempt, opposed by Zangwill in person, was made to restrain the Jewish Colonial Trust from colonizing elsewhere than in Palestine, Syria, Asiatic Turkey, Sinai, and Cyprus. Four hundred delegates from 28 countries attended this Congress, which was chiefly memorable for the progress made by the 'Mizrahists', a section which insisted on the religious side of Zionism as of at least equal importance to the political.

Meantime the differences between Wolffsohn, who was the leader of the cultural Zionists, and the acting President Nordau, who was leader of the political opposition, grew more bitter. Nordau took the opportunity offered him, when he presided at a Herzl Memorial Meeting at Paris in August 1913, while pronouncing an impassioned eulogy of Herzl, to attack Wolffsohn, to defend political Zionism, and explain his own abstention from the forthcoming Congress.

In September 1913 the eleventh and latest Congress was held at Vienna, under the presidency of Wolffsohn. The proceedings at this Congress were disorganized and the Zionists as a body were disappointed and discouraged. It was a triumph of practical over political Zionism. There was a dispute between Nordau and the Executive over the choice of a leader. Tchlenov, the Russian Zionist, was unacceptable, and so was Ussishkin; finally Wolffsohn succeeded in retaining his leadership of the party for a while.

The chief practical outcome of the Congress was the emergence of a Jewish University in Jerusalem. Such a University had formed part of the original programme of 1901, but had been left in the background, as it was feared that it might divert energy from the really urgent agricultural work in Palestine. It was now argued, however, that it might prove valuable because it would bring educated people into Palestine

and advance friendly relations between the Arabs and the Jews, and that the students whom it educated would go out into the world and spread Palestinian ideals among their co-religionists. Even Nordau did not deny that it was practical to make agricultural, economic, and educational experiments in the Holy Land, such as model farms, a Herzl forest, co-operative societies, and a University. But he urged that, although such practical work had so far only resulted in changing the position of 50,000 Jews out of the ten millions in dire need of immediate help, it did none the less prove a theory, and largely and nobly benefit the whole of Jewry by its value and example.

If you go to Palestine (said Nordau) and see a house with a tidy appearance, and ask, Whose house is this ? you will be answered, ' It is that of a Jew and a Zionist '. If you see people who are decently clothed, who hold their heads high, who sedulously cultivate the soil; and if, in the midst of deserts where there is no shade, you light upon a place where there are trees, and you ask who planted these trees, again you will be told ' a Jew and a Zionist did this work '. This creates an impression and is a herald of Jewish capacity and dignity.

Wolffsohn died in September 1914. During his illness the leadership of the movement was vested in the Inner Actions Committee, consisting of Warburg, Tchlenov, Sokolov, Hantke, Lewin, and Jacobson, and the administration had been shifted for a while from Cologne to Berlin under Sokolov's management; but the outbreak of the Great War made it necessary for the Zionists to leave Berlin. The members of the Inner Actions Committee went to Copenhagen, and then to New York, where a Provisional Actions Committee, or Emergency Executive, was organized under the chairmanship of Louis D. Brandeis, now a Judge of the Supreme Court of the United States. His *Jewish Problem and How to Solve It*[1] is one of the most striking Zionist pamphlets which have appeared. He claims that Zionism is not incompatible with

[1] Zionist Essays Publication Committee, New York, 1915.

patriotism, that it has brought inspiration to the Jews in the Diaspora, and that three million American Jews —a fifth of all the Jews in the world—may well insist that

Jews are a distinct nationality, of which every Jew, whatever his country, his station or shade of belief, is necessarily a member. Let us insist that the struggle for liberty shall not cease until equality of opportunity is accorded to nationalities as to individuals. Let us insist also that full equality of opportunity cannot be obtained by Jews until we, like members of other nationalities, shall have the option of living elsewhere or of returning to the land of our forefathers.

§ 12. The Basel Programme

The First Zionist Congress established the Zionist Organization and laid down its programme, known as the Basel programme, in the following terms:

Zionism strives to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law. The Congress contemplates the following means to the attainment of this end:

1. The promotion on suitable lines of the colonization of Palestine by Jewish agricultural and industrial workers.
2. The organization and binding together of the whole of Jewry by means of appropriate institutions, local and international, in accordance with the laws of each country.
3. The strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment and consciousness.
4. Preparatory steps towards obtaining Government consent where necessary to the attainment of the aim of Zionism.

As has been seen, the second and fourth parts of this programme almost monopolized attention in the earlier years. But, later on, after political conditions had changed in Turkey, the first and third parts of the programme assumed greater importance. Practical work in Palestine and the education of the national sentiment in the younger generation came to the front.

§ 13. Organization

The Zionists form an organized democratic electoral system. All Jews become members on payment of

a nominal fee called 'shekel' (in the equivalent of currency, one shilling, franc, or mark). Each member who has paid a shekel for two successive years has one vote, and every group of 200 shekel-payers has the right to elect a delegate to the Zionist Congress.

A delegate must be not less than 24 years of age; a deputy is generally chosen to take his place in case of unavoidable absence from the Congress.

The Congress is the legislative body of the Zionist Organization. The delegates choose from among themselves a 'Greater Actions Committee', of not less than 21, nor more than 60, members.

The Congress then elects from out of this Committee a small Executive Committee of six. Finally the Congress elects a Chairman of the Executive Committee, who is also the President of the Congress, and the Head of the whole Organization. Dr. Theodor Herzl was the first Head until his death in 1904. He was succeeded by David Wolffsohn, whose powers theoretically devolved upon the Inner Actions Committee but were in fact exercised by Dr. Haim Weizmann, a Professor of Science in the Victoria University, Manchester, who possessed great tact and force of character. The head-quarters of the organization were originally Vienna, where Dr. Herzl lived, later Cologne, then Berlin, and, since the war, Copenhagen, New York, and London. The aim of the movement has been to move the head-quarters to Palestine as soon as conditions permit, because no other country can be more than an accidental and temporary head-quarters. The most convenient centre for the majority of Zionists would be in Russia, for, though the fame of the Organization is West European, its life-blood and strongest membership consists of Russian Jews. Berlin was only chosen because of its proximity to Russian Jewry. The Congresses would also have been held in Russia, if the situation of Russian Jewry had been better, and public meetings had not been forbidden by law.

The adherents of the movement are formed into Societies, which in each country are nominally controlled by a local Zionist Federation, or a Zionist

Separate Union, consisting of not less than 3,000 members. These Federations and Separate Unions are responsible to head-quarters for administrative work, e. g. distribution and collection of the shekels, arrangement of elections, reception of leaders and arrangement of propaganda tours, and publication of Zionist literature in the language of the country. Among the more important Separate Unions are the 'Mizrahi', strictly observant Zionists, the 'Poáli Zion', who are Socialists as well as Zionists, and two bodies of Zionist working men united in friendly and benefit societies—the Order of Ancient Maccabeans in England and the Order of Knights of Zion in America.

This Organization has been in existence since the first Congress in 1897, and many improvements have been effected at later Congresses. As a form for the general body of Zionist workers it is excellent, but its extent has never fulfilled the hopes or expectations of its founder Herzl. He tried to bind together the whole of Jewry in the Organization, but unfortunately Jewry was, and still is, to a large extent only nominally one people. The fragments in the different countries still consider themselves more or less independent of all other fragments. English Jews, speaking generally, are more English than Jews, and refuse to become members of any other semi-political organization. They have their votes as British citizens. Their 'Jewishness' can find sufficient scope in a limited religious observance, and they cannot see any reason to become adherents of the Zionist Organization.[1]

Apart from the active group of Zionist leaders who carry on the Herzl tradition and the Basle programme of practical politics, the 'Mizrahists' represent the religious element in Zionism as opposed to the secularist and Socialist 'Poáli Zion'. Nearly all the Zionists of Holland, all the Russian Rabbis, probably a majority of the Russian Zionists, and many of those of Germany (especially Frankfurt) belong to the former group.

[1] See *Zionism: its Organization and Institutions*, by S. Landman. (London, 1915.)

The latter, or the 'pig and plough' Zionists, are agricultural, scientific, non-religious, perhaps anti-religious. Their chief adherents are the students and radicals, the intellectuals of the United States as well as Russia. The most forceful and energetic Zionist leaders belong to them. The long duration of the war and the vast upheavals of the Jewish populations of Eastern Europe have made it difficult to estimate the relative strength of the two parties. Probably the majority rests with the secularists; but, merely on grounds of policy, they would be badly advised ostentatiously to eliminate religion. It is said that a father of a boy at the Jaffa gymnasium, who asked the authorities to see to it that he was confirmed, was met with a blank refusal on the ground that they had nothing to do with religious matters. The Commission recently sent out to Palestine under the auspices of the British Government contained no member of the Mizrahi party. A Jewish Palestine without Judaism is unthinkable; and it cannot be denied that many, perhaps desirable, adherents to the cause have been frightened away because of its lack of spirituality.

§ 14. The Jewish National Fund

The Jewish National Fund was organized with a view to develop the systematic colonization activity in Palestine. Its establishment originated at the first Zionist Congress (1897), when Professor Shapira of Heidelberg proposed that donations should be collected from Jews of all parts of the world in order to create a 'General Jewish Fund', of which two-thirds were to be devoted to the purchase of land, and one-third to its maintenance and cultivation. Such land was to be mainly rural, suitable for colonization, and never to be sold, but let only to Jews upon hereditary lease. Four years later, at the fifth Congress, a Jewish National Fund was constituted as a limited liability company, with its control vested in the Zionist Congress and its mandatories as the chosen representatives of the Jewish

people. Under its memorandum and articles of association only 75 per cent. can be invested in Palestine, and the balance must be reserved in cash or realizable securities. Its bankers are the Jewish Colonial Trust, Ltd. It professes to meet the needs of three-fourths of the Jewish population of the world, i.e. about 6,000,000 in Russia, 1,000,000 in Galicia and the Bukovina, 250,000 in Rumania, 150,000 in the East of London, and 3,000,000 in the United States. These live in 'densely concentrated settlements', display an almost uniform mode of living, and speak the same tongue (Yiddish).

A quarter of the Russian Jews are artisans who are practically excluded from the factories of the country; and even where, as in Poland, Jewish business men of the middle class exist, their living is 'threatened by a boycott organized by the autochthonous population in order to displace the Jewish middle class by their own, which is still in the course of formation'. In consequence of the war, hundreds of thousands of Jews in the regions in which the war has been raging have been reduced to beggary and will be compelled to emigrate. The claim that Russia itself, once the restrictions of right of domicile are abolished, would become a sort of Paradise for the Jews is untenable, 'in the light of the fact that anti-semitism is prevalent even in the countries where there are no Jewish masses.' In the ten years after 1892 over 120,000 Galician Jews out of a population of 850,000 emigrated to America. Between 1881 and 1908 about a million and a half Russian Jews emigrated thither. Even there overcrowding and cases of much poverty and distress are found. The American Department of Labour (*Bulletin*, 1908) describes the position in which the Jewish domestic workers live as 'quite terrible', and states that they are condemned to work under the worst conditions.

Since 1908 many Jewish emigrants have been diverted to Palestine under the auspices of the Zionists, and it is hoped that, with a brighter future opening out

for Palestine, such emigration will be largely increased. The Zionist Fund already amounts to over 12,000,000 francs, and this too is expected to be largely increased. Up to 1914 the capital of the National Fund invested in Palestine amounted to £195,000. In a second edition of a pamphlet on the Fund (No. 1 of the National Fund Library recently issued), it is stated that during the eight months of the year 1917, notwithstanding the colossal disadvantages under which it laboured, its revenue exceeded £50,000, derived as to 531,000 francs from Russia, 214,000 from North America, 18,000 from Holland, 15,000 from England, 15,000 from Canada, 14,000 from the Argentine, 40,000 from South Africa, Switzerland, Greece, East Asia, France, Sweden, Egypt, Denmark, Belgium, Australia, and Italy, and from 'other countries', presumably central Europe, 453,000 francs.[1]

§ 15. Zionism and the Jewish Community

During the war, there have been cross-currents in Jewry which have resulted in a distinct triumph for the Zionists. The Palestine question is one of the great problems for the Peace Congress. The Governments of the Allied Powers, especially Great Britain, the United States, France, and Italy, are believed to see its solution in some government by or for the Jews. Most Zionists hope for this under the aegis of Great Britain. The great Jewish communal bodies, especially in England, have kept aloof from the Zionists. Russian pogroms and Rumania's disregard of the Treaty of Berlin inspired them with horror and indignation. But the Zionists, somewhat unfairly, taunt them because their feelings of generosity and philanthropy had diverted the Hirsch millions to South America rather than to Palestine, because their philanthropy was blind, and they seemed opposed to any scheme which went beyond almsgiving. As a matter of fact

[1] See *The Jewish National Fund*, by Adolf Böhm, 2nd ed. The Hague, 1917.

such communal bodies have done good and great work for their brethren. The co-operation of English and French Jews in the Damascus affair of 1840, when the Jewish quarter was sacked and Montefiore, Crémieux, and Munk were delegated to Alexandria and Constantinople, to intervene for their oppressed co-religionists, marked a turning-point in Jewish history. It was the first time that Western Jews had worked together for the protection of Jewish interests all over the world. A more recent instance of persecution, the forced abduction and baptism of Mortara in Rome, led to the establishment in 1860 at Paris of the Alliance Israélite Universelle. And, when the position of this international body was threatened by the Franco-Prussian War, it was deemed advisable to found in England the Anglo-Jewish Association to carry on the work. The Association started as an English branch of the parent institution, but has, ever since 1871, maintained a separate existence, though the two have always preserved friendly and indeed intimate relations. Its successive presidents have been Jacob Waley, Baron H. de Worms, Sir Julian Goldsmid, M.P., and Claude G. Montefiore.

The Jewish Board of Deputies was founded in 1846 to watch the interests of the Jews of Great Britain and Ireland. Originally composed only of 'Deputies of the Portuguese Nation', it now consists of representatives of various Metropolitan and Provincial Synagogues, and may be taken to be fairly representative of the Jewish community in this country, although a considerable number of Jews resident in England are not members of such Synagogues. Among its presidents have been Sir Moses Montefiore, his nephews, J. M. Montefiore, Sir Joseph Sebag Montefiore, and Arthur Cohen, Q.C., D. L. Alexander, K.C., and now Sir Stuart Samuel. The Board is concerned, *inter alia*, with the protection of rights of the Jews in this country in respect to such matters as marriages, Sabbath observance, &c. But, especially in Sir Moses' time, it never failed, in cases of emergency, to invite

and beg the intervention of the Government when foreign Jews were being flagrantly persecuted.

The Anglo-Jewish Association was founded in 1871, to continue the work of the Alliance Israélite Universelle, which, before the Franco-Prussian War, had interested itself in the welfare of persecuted Jews all over the world. Its aims were 'to aid in promoting the social, moral, and intellectual progress of the Jew', and 'to obtain protection for those who may suffer in consequence of being Jews'. Accordingly, when any grave case of persecution arose, the Anglo-Jewish Association, like the Board of Deputies, sought the intervention of the British Government. This produced a certain amount of overlapping; and, from the year 1886, the Board of Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish Association appointed a 'conjoint' committee of both bodies to deal with the British Government in such cases. Its meetings were presided over alternately by the presidents of its constituents, and its political secretary was Mr. Lucien Wolf. This Conjoint Committee was composed of leading English Jews, and its relations with the British Government were always highly satisfactory. The Foreign Office never turned a deaf ear to its representations; and the Jews gratefully acknowledged that the Government could always be relied upon to bring its powerful influence to bear in lessening, and often preventing, the sufferings of Jewish victims of persecution. The Committee was in close touch with similar Jewish committees abroad, especially the American Jewish Committee, and its labours were attended with considerable success, so that, before the war, they had almost persuaded the Governments of Russia and Rumania to relax their Anti-Semitic legislation and administration. When the war broke out everything was altered. The persecuting Governments became our friends, and Palestine was a most important factor in the war policy of the Allies. To Zionists and non-Zionists alike the future of the country had become a matter of vital interest. On October 1, 1916, the

Conjoint Committee submitted to H.M. Government the following formula in regard to Jewish interests in Palestine:

In the event of Palestine coming within the spheres of influence of Great Britain or France at the close of the war, the Governments of those Powers will not fail to take account of the historic interest that country possesses for the Jewish community. The Jewish population will be secured in the enjoyment of civil and religious liberty, equal political rights with the rest of the population, reasonable facilities for immigration and colonization, and such municipal privileges in the towns and colonies inhabited by them as may be shown to be necessary.

Meantime the Zionists had entered into direct relations with the Foreign Office, and attempts were not wanting to bring the Conjoint Committee into line with them. But its formula fell short of the Basle programme, and no agreement could be arrived at. The Conjoint Committee instructed their two presidents to make the following public statement of their views as to Jewish resettlement and their objections to the Nationalist policy of the Zionists:

In view of the statements and discussions lately published in the newspapers relative to a projected Jewish resettlement in Palestine on a national basis, the Conjoint Foreign Committee of the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Anglo-Jewish Association deem it necessary to place on record the views they hold on this important question.

The Holy Land has necessarily a profound and undying interest for all Jews as the cradle of their religion, the main theatre of Bible History, and the site of its sacred memorials. It is not, however, as a mere shrine or place of pilgrimage that they regard the country. Since the dawn of their political emancipation in Europe, the Jews have made the rehabilitation of the Jewish community in the Holy Land one of their chief cares; and they have always cherished the hope that the result of their labours would be the regeneration on Palestinian soil of a Jewish community worthy of the great memories of their environment, and a source of spiritual inspiration to the whole of Jewry. Accordingly, the Conjoint Committee have welcomed with deep satisfaction the prospect of a rich fruition of this work, opened to them by the victorious progress of the British Army in Palestine.

The 'Cultural' Policy.—Anxious that on this question all sections and parties in Jewry should be united in a common effort, the Committee intimated to the Zionist organizations as far back as the winter of 1914 their readiness to co-operate with them on the basis of the so-called 'cultural' policy which had been adopted at the last two Zionist Congresses in 1911 and 1913. This policy aimed primarily at making Palestine a Jewish spiritual centre by securing for the local Jews, and the colonists who might join them, such conditions of life as would best enable them to develop the Jewish genius on lines of its own. Larger political questions, not directly affecting this main purpose, were left to be solved as need and opportunity might render possible. Unfortunately, an agreement on these lines has not proved practicable; and the Conjoint Committee are consequently compelled to pursue their work alone. They are doing so on the basis of a formula adopted by them in March 1916, in which they proposed to recommend to His Majesty's Government the formal recognition of the high historic interest Palestine possesses for the Jewish community, and a public declaration that at the close of the war 'the Jewish population will be secured in the enjoyment of civil and religious liberty, equal political rights with the rest of the population, reasonable facilities for immigration and colonization, and such municipal privileges in the towns and colonies inhabited by them as may be shown to be necessary'.

That is still the policy of the Conjoint Committee.

Meanwhile the Committee have learnt from the published statements of the Zionist leaders in this country that they now favour a much larger scheme of an essentially political character. Two points in this scheme appear to the Committee to be open to grave objections on public grounds.

Nationality and religion.—The first is a claim that the Jewish settlements in Palestine shall be recognized as possessing a national character in a political sense. Were this claim of purely local import, it might well be left to settle itself in accordance with the general political exigencies of the reorganization of the country under a new sovereign power. The Conjoint Committee, indeed, would have no objections to urge against a local Jewish nationality establishing itself in such conditions. But the present claim is not of this limited scope. It is part and parcel of a wider Zionist theory which regards all the Jewish communities of the world as constituting one homeless nationality, incapable of complete social and political identification with the nations among whom they dwell; and it is argued that for this homeless nationality a political centre and an always available homeland in Palestine are necessary.

Against this theory the Conjoint Committee strongly and earnestly protest. Emancipated Jews in this country regard themselves primarily as a religious community, and they have always based their claims to political equality with their fellow-citizens of other creeds on this assumption, and on its corollary—that they have no separate national aspirations in a political sense. They hold Judaism to be a religious system with which their political status has no concern; and they maintain that, as citizens of the countries in which they live, they are fully and sincerely identified with the national spirit and interests of those countries. It follows that the establishment of a Jewish nationality in Palestine founded on this theory of Jewish homelessness must have the effect throughout the world of stamping the Jews as strangers in their native lands, and of undermining their hard-won position as citizens and nationals of those lands. Moreover a Jewish political nationality carried to its logical conclusion must in the present circumstances of the world be an anachronism. The Jewish religion being the only certain test of the Jew, a Jewish nationality must be founded on, and limited by, the religion. It cannot be supposed for a moment that any section of Jews would aim at a commonwealth governed by religious tests and limited in the matter of freedom of conscience; but can a religious nationality express itself politically in any other way? The only alternative would be a secular Jewish nationality recruited on some loose and obscure principle of race and ethnographic peculiarity; but this would not be Jewish in any spiritual sense, and its establishment in Palestine would be a denial of all the ideals and hopes by which the revival of Jewish life in that country commends itself to the Jewish consciousness and Jewish sympathy. On these grounds the Conjoint Committee deprecate most earnestly the national proposals of the Zionists.

Undesirable privileges.—The second point in the Zionist programme which has aroused the misgivings of the Conjoint Committee is the proposal to invest the Jewish settlers in Palestine with certain special rights in excess of those enjoyed by the rest of the population, these rights to be embodied in a Charter and administered by a Jewish Chartered Company. Whether it is desirable or not to confide any portion of the administration of Palestine to a Chartered Company need not be discussed; but it is certainly very undesirable that Jews should solicit or accept such a concession on a basis of political privilege and economic preferences. Any such action would prove a veritable calamity for the whole Jewish people. In all the countries in which they live the principle of equal rights

for all religious denominations is vital for them. Were they to set an example in Palestine of disregarding this principle, they would convict themselves of having appealed to it for purely selfish motives. In the countries in which they are still struggling for equal rights they would find themselves hopelessly compromised, while in other countries where those rights have been secured they would have great difficulty in defending them.

The proposal is the more inadmissible because the Jews are, and will probably long remain, a minority of the population in Palestine, and because it might involve them in the bitterest feuds with their neighbours of other races and religions, which would seriously retard their progress, and would find deplorable echoes throughout the Orient. Nor is the scheme necessary for the Zionists themselves. If the Jews prevail in a competition based on perfect equality of rights and opportunity, they will establish their eventual preponderance in the land on a far sounder foundation than any that can be secured by privileges and monopolies.

If the Conjoint Committee can be satisfied with regard to these points they will be prepared to co-operate for securing for the Zionist Organization the united support of Jewry.

(Signed) DAVID L. ALEXANDER,
President, Board of Deputies of British Jews.
CLAUDE G. MONTEFIORE,
President, Anglo-Jewish Association.

London, *May 17th*, 1917.

This statement appeared in *The Times* of May 24, 1917, and raised a storm of protest in the Jewish community. Among the dissentients who wrote to *The Times* were the Chief Rabbi, Lord Rothschild, and a member of the Conjoint Committee, E. N. Adler, who pointed out that the statement did not represent the views of the majority either of Jews or non-Jews or even of the constituent assemblies which the Conjoint Committee represented. The Jewish Board of Deputies denounced the treaty with the Anglo-Jewish Association, and the Conjoint Committee came to an end. After considerable discussion, its place was taken by a 'Joint Committee' with a mandate to represent its constituents on all matters except Palestine; but in November 1918 this embargo was removed, and it is hoped that, in view of

the moderation of present Zionist demands, these may be supported, or at any rate not opposed, by the Board of Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish Association. The irreconcilables formed themselves into a 'League of British Jews' so as to protect each other against the insinuation that they are aliens in the land of their birth, and that, as Jews, they cannot be Englishmen! The League is believed to have achieved no great success; and the Zionists, while denying that there is any ground for their fears, retort that those who wish to stay in the wilderness may stay there.

In Germany the *Hilfsverein der Deutschen Juden* was founded in 1901 for the relief of oppressed Jews abroad, and ultimately ousted the German branch of the Alliance Israélite. The *Hilfsverein* founded and supported schools in Palestine, and, largely owing to the liberality of two of its prominent members, Herr Jacob Simon and Dr. Paul Nathan, acquired very considerable influence there. At first it encouraged the use of the Hebrew language as the vehicle of instruction, but eventually it demanded, perhaps at the instigation of the Wilhelmstrasse, that Hebrew should for the most part be replaced by German. This method of German propaganda was attacked in August 1913 by a meeting of the Palestinian Teachers' Union held in Jaffa. Over a hundred teachers from all parts of Palestine attended, and almost unanimously passed a resolution that 'the principles of national education demand that all subjects of instruction shall be taught in the Hebrew language, and this meeting pledges the members of the Teachers' Union to fight with all energy against the instruction of secular subjects in a foreign language'.[1] In January 1914 the new Haifa Technical Institute, which drew its support from Jewry all over the world, especially from America, Russia, and Germany, was threatened with ruin by the bitter controversy which ensued. A suggested compromise only succeeded in fanning the indignation

[1] *The German Attack on the Hebrew Schools in Palestine*, by Israel Cohen (London, 1918).

of the Zionists and young colonists and students of Palestine. Imposing demonstrations against the *Hilfsverein* were made in Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Haifa, and also in Europe and the United States. Many of the teachers in the *Hilfsverein* schools resigned their posts or were dismissed. The war put an end to the controversy by stopping educational activities in Palestine for the time; but, as Mr. Israel Cohen observes,

> It is not unreasonable to suppose the change of policy of the *Hilfsverein* was due to secret pressure exercised by the German Government, with a view to making the Jewish schools nurseries of Prussian *Kultur*. This sinister intention was ignominiously defeated through Palestinian Jewry rising to the defence of the Hebrew language as of its most holy possession.

§ 16. The Future of Palestine

After the conquest of Palestine by General Allenby, the British Government lost no time in taking steps to fulfil the promise made by Mr. Balfour in his declaration of November 2, 1917. The declaration ran as follows:

> His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

This Declaration has since been endorsed by the Governments of France and Italy. President Wilson has also publicly expressed his sympathy with the British Government's Declaration.

The Government authorized the Zionist Organization to send out to Palestine a commission, representative of English, American, French, and Russian Jewry, to investigate and work out ways and means for the establishment of the Jewish national home. The commission went to Palestine accompanied by Major the Hon. W. Ormsby-Gore, M.P., as their liaison

officer with the British authorities of Palestine. It returned in October 1918, but Zionists have so far done little to set forth a practical scheme for the administration of Palestine under their auspices.

The Jews of Palestine divide themselves into two very distinct sections. The old inhabitants are descendants of refugees from Spain and Portugal who began to settle there early in the sixteenth century, and of successive generations of pilgrims who had gone there to study and live a life of contemplation and die in the land of their fathers. These are persons of not much initiative and largely dependent on a somewhat mischievous system, known as *Halukah* ('distribution') because the money collected for Palestine among the Jews of Europe and America was distributed between them. *Halukah* benefits correspond with the allowances made to 'remittance men' in the Colonies.

The second class, however, consists of genuine colonists, agriculturists, students, and even painters and sculptors, who have come to Palestine during recent years from Russia, Rumania, and elsewhere, some of them the victims of persecution, seeking a refuge anywhere, but others drawn to Palestine and Palestine only by the ideals of the Chovevi Zion and the Zionists. They came from love of the country, and a real desire to revive it, and make it again a land of milk and honey. To this class also a considerable number of the officers and men of the Jewish regiments which served in Palestine are likely to belong.

An interesting suggestion for the new Zionist situation is set forth in a communication to the *Jewish Chronicle* of November 15, 1918. The letter assumes that Palestine is to be under British suzerainty, but to be forthwith administered by a 'Jewish Commonwealth'. Inasmuch as the Jews are at present by no means a majority of the population, the principle of self-determination cannot yet apply; but it is admitted to be essential that such a Commonwealth must be acceptable to the present inhabitants, and that no landowner should be expropriated. It suggests that such

a Jewish administration would be acceptable to the Arabs and would possess their confidence. The writer attaches great importance to the name of the country. He thinks it should be called 'Israel', and the inhabitants 'Israelites', whether they profess the Jewish religion or not. Hebrew is to be the language of the country, the governor a Jew, preferably one who has distinguished himself as an administrator in the British Empire. The governor is to be assisted by a State Council, partly nominated and partly elected. There is to be complete religious toleration, but Jewish law is to be the fundamental law of the land, and Jewish Sabbaths and Holy Days are to be the recognized days of rest.

This scheme seems somewhat premature, but, so far as the Arabs are concerned, the son of the King of the Hejaz, the Emir Feizul, is reported to have stated in London on December 11 that

> Arabs are not jealous of Zionist Jews and intend to give them fair play, and the Zionist Jews have assured the Nationalist Arabs of their intention to see that they too have fair play in their respective areas. Turkish intrigue in Palestine has raised jealousy between the Jewish colonists and the local peasants; but the mutual understanding of the aims of the Arabs and the Jews will at once clear away the last trace of this former bitterness.

Dr. Weizmann himself, on his return from Palestine, has reported to the Zionists in such wise as to disappoint some of the keenest nationalists among them. They fear that the future condition of Palestine, as he foreshadows it, is by no means ambitious enough. They are inclined to regard his proposals as merely colonization and 'the settling on the land of a number of peasants, presumably those who are unable to live in other countries, and who would be glad to go to Palestine on charity lines'. He is not sufficiently nationalist for them, and they fear that his Zionism is merely that of the old Chovevi Zion philanthropist. They ask whether this is not precisely the formula of the Conjoint Committee of March 3, 1916, which

claimed for the Jewish population of Palestine liberty and political rights and reasonable facilities for emigration and colonization, and such municipal privileges as are shown to be necessary. And they ask, therefore, what need there has been for the acute differences of opinion which have, for the last year, divided the Anglo-Jewish community into two camps, Zionists on the one hand, and their opponents on the other. As a matter of fact, the expression of such doubts is no discouraging feature. It rather seems to show a tendency to *rapprochement* between the two schools. Extremists on both sides will have to give way.

Jewish opinion would prefer Palestine to be controlled for the present as a part, or at any rate a dependency, of the British Empire; but its administration should be largely entrusted to Jews of the colonist type, who have already made such notable improvements in the cultivation of the soil, notwithstanding the almost hopeless difficulties imposed upon them by their former corrupt Turkish rulers. Zionists of this way of thinking believe that, under such conditions, the Jewish population would rapidly increase until the Jew became the predominant partner in the combination.

The Hebrew language is already spoken in many parts of Palestine by thousands of inhabitants and by more people than any other language except its sister-tongue—the Arabic. For the adoption by non-Jews of a Jewish dialect Zionists can point to the instance of Salonika, where Spanish Jews form about half the population and their *Ladino* or Spanish Hebrew has been to some extent adopted as the language of commerce by Jew and non-Jew alike.

Outside Jewry, an overwhelming mass of public opinion would appear to favour Jewish administration in Palestine, not that it could ever provide a home for the millions of Jews in eastern Europe, but because it would satisfy their secular aspirations, raise their sense of dignity and self-respect, and relieve, to some extent at least, the pressure of the congested districts in which circumstances have forced them to congregate.

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Editorial Note.

In the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connection with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous enquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

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General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.

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TABLE OF ALTERNATIVE PLACE-NAMES.

Acre	Akka	Jerusalem	El-Kuds
Aleppo	Haleb	Kishon river	Nahr el-Mukatta
Alexandretta	Iskanderun	Latakia	Laskie
Amanus	Giaur Dagh	Lebanon	Libnan
Anti-Lebanon	Jebel esh-Sharki	Litani river	Nahr el-Kasimie
Antioch	Antakia	Orontes river	Nahr el-Asi
Baalbek	El Buka'a	Palmyra	Tadmur
Beersheba	Bir es-Seba	Shechem	Nablus
Damascus	Esh-Sham	Sidon	Saida
Dead Sea	Bahr el-Lut	Tiberias	Tubariya
Gaza	Ghaza, Ghazzeh	Tripoli	Tarabolus
Hebron	El-Khulil	Tyre	Es-Sur
Hermon	Jebel esh-Sheikh	Yarmuk river	Nahr el-Menadire
Jaffa, Joppa	Yafe		

I. GEOGRAPHY PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL

(1) Position and Frontiers

Syria, broadly speaking, is the country that lies between the eastern shore of the Mediterranean and the deserts of Arabia; but, except in the west, the boundaries are vague. In Turkish official usage Syria consists of the vilayet of Damascus, extending from the Arabian borders on the extreme south to 35° 25′ north latitude.

Syria has no fixed boundary on the east; but in recent years the advance eastward of the sedentary population and the policy of the Turkish Government have considerably extended the limits of Syria in this direction. Starting south of Akaba, on the Red Sea, the boundary crosses the Hejaz railway, runs northward, and turns east so as to encircle the Jebel Druz; thence continuing by longitude 37° to the neighbourhood of Hama, and crossing diagonally to the eastward bend of the Euphrates, near Rakka. The Euphrates then forms the boundary to beyond Rum Kale (about 37° 20′ N.). The best physical boundary between northern Syria and Arabia, according to Blanckenhorn, would be the ranges of Jebel esh-Sharki (Jebel et-Tawil) and Jebel Bishri, which stretch from Damascus past Tadmur and reach the Euphrates at Halebie. The building of a railway from Homs to the Euphrates would probably tend to establish some such political frontier.

On the north the latest boundary of the vilayet of Aleppo supplies a provisional frontier. It starts from Jonah's Pillar, slightly north of Alexandretta, runs eastward to Giaur Dagh (the Amanus range), follows the crest of these hills northwards to a point nearly due west of Rum Kale, and then strikes on to the

Euphrates somewhat north of that place. There have been various temporary extensions of this line both to the east and to the north, but there is no satisfactory physical boundary corresponding either to the present administrative line or to former political lines, although various possibilities have been suggested. The further north the line is moved the greater is the wedge of Syrian territory between Asia Minor and Mesopotamia, and the larger is the Turkish-speaking territory included in Syria. It must also be remembered that Alexandretta is now the port of western Mesopotamia, and it will be to the interest of any power established there to have access to the Mediterranean secured.

In the south the boundary between Egypt and Syria, settled in 1906, follows an arbitrary line drawn from slightly west of Rafa on the Mediterranean to slightly east of Taba, south of Akaba, on the Red Sea. The boundary is completed by a line starting south of Akaba and running north-eastwards towards Ma'an and the depression of El-Jafar, separating the vilayet of Damascus from the vilayet of the Hejaz.

In modern usage the expression Palestine has no precise meaning, but it is best taken as being equivalent to southern Syria. When defined in accordance with geographical and political conditions, the drawing of the northern boundary alone presents any special difficulty. On the west side of Jordan the Litani (Nahr el-Kasimie) is a definite physical limit from its western bend to its mouth, and the boundary may then be completed from the bend of the Litani eastward to the Jordan or may follow the northern limit of the kaza of the Merj Ayun.

The amount of country east of the Jordan that may be reckoned to Palestine depends chiefly on the political situation of Damascus. If Damascus itself be associated with southern Syria the difficulty disappears, as all that portion of the centre of Syria that lies to the east of Jebel esh-Sharki may easily be separated from northern Syria and associated with Pales-

tine. If, on the other hand, only a portion of the country along the Hejaz railway line, south of Damascus, is to be united to Palestine a satisfactory solution is not easily found. If the line be drawn at the Yarmuk (Nahr el-Menadire) full justice is done to the claims of Damascus. On the other hand, the Hauran now finds its principal commercial outlet into Palestine by the railway to Haifa, and so should be associated with Palestine rather than with Damascus. In that case the most distinctive line, physically, east of Jordan, skirts the southern and south-eastern base of Mount Hermon (Jebel esh-Sheikh), and then follows the Wadi Zabirani and the Nahr el-Awaj to the border village of El-Uijane, with its lake into which the Nahr el-Awaj flows.

The area of Syria, as defined above, has never been exactly measured, and estimates vary, according to the territories included, from 72,000 square miles (186,000 sq. km.) to 80,000 square miles (207,000 sq. km.) and 91,700 square miles (237,600 sq. km.) as a maximum. The area of southern Syria (Palestine) can be given more exactly. Western Palestine as far as Bir es-Seba has an area of 6,040 square miles (15,655 sq. km.); the country south of Bir es-Seba, as far as Akaba, 4,500 square miles (11,660 sq. km.); total for western Palestine, 10,540 square miles (27,315 sq. km.). The corresponding country east of Jordan and as far north as Hermon may be estimated to be of similar extent. The total area of southern Syria is accordingly about 21,000 square miles. This figure suggests that the 72,000 square miles suggested as the area for the whole of Syria is an over-estimate rather than an under-estimate.

The extreme length of Syria from about 37° 20′ to 29° 50′ north latitude is about 550 miles, and its width from the sea to the desert varies from 100 to 130 miles. From Rakka, on the Euphrates, to the sea is a distance of 180 miles.

Administrative Divisions.—Syria includes the three vilayets of Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut, and since

1887-8 the two sanjaks of Lebanon and Jerusalem. In 1908 the territory from Bir es-Seba to Akaba became a separate sanjak (though still associated with Jerusalem). The boundaries of the vilayet of Aleppo are noted above (p. 1). The sanjak of Jerusalem has been gradually extended since 1888, at the expense of the vilayet of Damascus, the eastern parts of which were distributed in 1894 and again in 1907. The vilayet of Beirut is split into two separate parts by the semi-autonomous district of Lebanon.

(2) Surface, Coast, River System and Lakes

Surface

Syria is bordered by a coastal plain of varying width. In northern Syria the relative area of coastal plain is small except to the north of Alexandretta and around the Bay of Antioch. Between Latakia and Tripoli extensive plains spread in two inland sweeps of great depth, continuing in varying width as far as the base of Lebanon. The region immediately south of Latakia is well watered by perennial rivers, and the soil is rich and well cultivated, although the southern part is partially flooded in winter. Towards Saida the plain widens to a considerable breadth, and is very fertile.

South of the Litani, in Palestine, coastal plains become a more marked and constant feature, and there follow in succession the plain of Es-Sur (Tyre), some 12 miles in length and 1 mile broad at its widest part, and the plain of Akka (Acre), which stretches for some 20 miles as far as Carmel, and has an average depth of 4 miles, being continued inland along the basin of the Mukatta river in the plain of Esdraelon. South of the Carmel promontory the coastal plain runs continuously, and with gradually increasing breadth, to the confines of Egypt. The Nahr el-Auja divides this strip into two parts, the plain of Sharon in the north and that of Philistia in the south. Both sections have great agricultural possibilities.

Physically the rest of the territory of Syria lies in three parallel belts running roughly north and south: (1) the Maritime Range, with its broken coastal plain; (2) the Central Depression; (3) the Eastern Plateau, to the verge of the desert. On the north these three salient features are limited by the chain of the Anti-Taurus, and on the south they merge into the desert.

The *Maritime Range*, in north Syria, is divided into three sections, which are, from north to south: (1) the Amanus or Giaur Dagh, between the Jihan and the Orontes (Nahr el-Asi); (2) Jebel Ansarie, between the Orontes and the Nahr el-Kebir (near Tripoli); (3) the Lebanon, between the Nahr el-Kebir and the Litani (Nahr el-Kasimie). The construction of the range presents certain prevailing characteristics. The main ridge lies in general towards the east, but the western slopes are of greater importance, as on these practically all the perennial water is found and to them almost all occupation is confined. The general aspect is bare and rocky, but there are many fertile localities among the hills which are well watered. The range forms a formidable barrier to communication with the interior. Its average altitude is 3,000 ft., but numerous peaks rise to nearly 6,000 ft., and Duldul Dagh, in the north, attains a height of 8,500 ft.

Jebel Ansarie in its northern part has its main ridge close to the sea, skirting the Orontes gorge. It drains southward to the Nahr el-Kebir and eastward to the Orontes, through the cultivable tableland of Jebel Kuseir. Many of the Kebir spurs are clothed with forests. The main ridge lies to the east, at an average height of 3,000 ft., with several peaks. The general aspect of Jebel Ansarie is comparatively tame, and its slopes are easier, its gorges less wild, and its country more fertile and adaptable to cultivation than the Lebanon. Between Hama and Homs the mountains spread eastward in low and easy slopes, with little or no perennial water. This region is one of the least known and least developed in Syria.

The Lebanon is the highest and most rugged and developed region in Syria, and the main ridge for two-thirds of its length rises to sub-Alpine heights. There is a group of peaks in the north, the highest being Dahr el-Kadhib (10,018 ft.), and southwards Jebel Sunnin (8,650 ft.) marks the centre of the range. The eastern flank of the northern part is separated from the main chain by an elevated valley with an altitude of 5,000 ft. South of this the eastern slopes are unsuited to occupation; but the western slopes, although intersected by many gorges, have a perennial water supply, and are studded with villages. In general the northern part of Lebanon is less fertile than the southern.

South of the Litani the range continues southward through southern Syria to the Sinaitic plateau, its continuity only being interrupted by the plain of Esdraelon, which forms the easiest entrance to the interior of the country. The watershed in general is so situated that less than one-third of the country lies on its eastern side. The western slope is long and gradual, and merges into plains near the coast, but the eastern slope is steep and precipitous, especially towards its southern end.

South of the Esdraelon plain is the open hill system of Samaria, with the ridge of Carmel (altitude 1,810 ft.), and then the range, continuing parallel with the Jordan valley, passes imperceptibly into the compact tableland of Judaea.

In Judaea the highlands attain their greatest height (about 3,300 ft.) just north of Hebron, and then descend gradually towards the desert and the Egyptian frontier. The ridge as a whole varies in width from 14 to 17 miles, and its general character, especially in the south, is that of a stony upland with rough scrub and thorn vegetation, much broken up by deep valleys running both eastward and westward.

Central Depression.—With a few interruptions this feature is clearly defined from the base of the Anti-Taurus to the Gulf of Akaba. At the northern end it

is a wide plain, with an altitude of about 500 ft., narrowing as it rises southward to the heights of Amir Musa Dagh (altitude 1,800 ft.). Thence it falls southward to the broad Antioch plain, El-Amk, with its lakes and marshes. The whole of this northern part of the depression is extremely fertile.

From El-Amk the depression narrows and rises towards the south, carrying the Orontes, and widens out again into the marshy and almost level valley plain of El-Ghab, which is about 6 miles by 40 miles, and extremely fertile. From Hama it bends eastwards, and emerges upon the fertile Homs plain. Between the high ranges of Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon the depression becomes the plain of Sahlet Baalbek, much of which is barren and stony, although with fertile belts. In the latitude of Baalbek is the highest point of the depression (3,600 ft.), on a low swell, where are the upper sources of the Orontes flowing north and the Litani flowing south. With a gentle fall to southwards the plain reaches Lake Hule basin, at about sea-level. This forms the head of the remarkable "rift," or deep, trough-like valley, known as the Ghor, down which the Jordan runs to the Dead Sea. The Ghor falls rapidly to a depth of about 680 ft. below sea-level at the Lake of Tiberias; the valley is here not more than 4 miles in breadth. At the Dead Sea, about 65 miles further south, the valley has reached a depth below the sea of 1,300 ft., the depression continuing downwards to twice that depth in the bed of the sea. South of the Dead Sea the depression is prolonged for another 100 miles to the Red Sea by the wide Wadi Araba.

The Eastern Plateau.—In Kurd Dagh, the northern part of this region, broken ridges rise to a height of over 4,000 ft., but at Aleppo the altitude is 1,205 ft. The plateau falls easily to the Euphrates in rolling downs intersected by valleys, which are generally fertile, though scantily watered. The Aleppo region falls southward in rolling hills to the lower plateau and to the desert, which commences at this point. Southward lies the plain of Homs, a level and fertile

but waterless tract stretching eastward to the desert and southward to the Anti-Lebanon range.

The mountain system of Anti-Lebanon consists of four distinct chains converging southward on Hermon. It has been compared to a hand, palm upward, Hermon (Jebel esh-Sheikh) representing the palm and the several chains the four fingers. Hermon is the most conspicuous mountain in this part of Syria, its snow-capped crest rising to a height of 9,700 ft. Its lower slopes are fertile and fairly well watered, and the well-wooded southern slopes fall to the Ghor and the highlands of Jaulan. The higher altitudes are bare and stony.

Along the eastern base of Anti-Lebanon the desert in parts approaches close to the mountains. The country is generally poor until the Damascus plain (2,260 ft.) is reached. This level tract, "the Garden of Syria," owes its great fertility to the Barada, which is here adapted to an extensive system of irrigation. The plain is limited on the south by the Nahr el-Awaj, which descends from Hermon. The Hauran Plain, treeless and level and dotted with villages, now stretches indefinitely southwards; in parts it is diversified by volcanic hills and boulders, in parts it consists of fine, red, stoneless soil. Everywhere the soil is fertile, although it is practically devoid of perennial water except in the western part and in the district of Jaulan, which marks the limit of the plateau towards the Jordan valley. On the eastern side of the plain is El-Leja, a black, desolate, and almost inaccessible region, with an area of about 350 square miles, containing patches of arable and pasture land which support the scanty population. Immediately east of El-Leja is Jebel Druz, whose main ridge rises to an average height of 4,000 ft. Numerous other peaks occur, the highest being Tell el-Jeno (5,910 ft.), many of whose ravines and spurs are clothed with oak. The soil is rich, and bears fine crops.

South of the river Yarmuk the mountains rise into a lofty fissured tableland, the western flank of which

extends as far as the southern extremity of the Dead Sea, while on the east it merges into the desert-steppe. This tableland is divided into three main sections: (1) From the Yarmuk to Wadi Hesbun, which empties into the Jordan near its mouth. This region comprises the hill masses of Jebel Ajlun and of the northern Belka. A considerable part of the latter is well wooded. (2) From the Hesbun to Wadi el-Hasa, the latter river falling into the Dead Sea at its southern end. This consists of the districts of southern Belka and El-Kerak, which form an open and high plateau sometimes known as the Mountains of Moab. The highest summit is Jebel Shihan (3,470 ft.). The region contains various perennial streams, and there are large tracts of the best wheat-growing land in Syria. (3) From the Hasa to the Gulf of Akaba. Here the mountains continue for the most part as a narrow and sterile plateau, terminating further south just east of the Gulf of Akaba.

Coast

The coast-line of Syria from the Gulf of Alexandretta to the Egyptian frontier runs in general from north to south. In northern Syria naturally good harbours are few, except in the Gulf of Alexandretta, where secure anchorage may be found at all seasons. Latakia and Tripoli are comparatively open and exposed, and Beirut depends largely on artificial protection. With the exception of the stretches of plain (see above, p. 4), the whole extent of coastline to a short distance beyond the Litani is in the main abrupt and in parts lofty.

In southern Syria, beyond Akka (Acre) the shore is conspicuously uniform and low, mainly consisting of long shallow curves of low, sandy beach. With the exception of the headland of Carmel there are no strongly marked prominences producing sheltered bays, and Athlit, Tantura, Abu Zabura, Jaffa (Yafe), and Askalon provide the only possibilities of natural harbourage. The small estuaries of the coastal streams

both in north and south Syria are usually closed by sand-bars.

River System and Lakes

The central depression forms the only drainage bed of great length in Syria, and in it flow the three great rivers, Orontes, Litani, and Jordan. In the north several considerable streams come down from the Kurd Dagh, flowing towards the Euphrates.

(*a*) *Northern Syria.*—The maritime slopes are mostly well watered, especially in Lebanon, which sends considerable streams to the sea, some of which, such as the Beirut, Kelb, Ibrahim, Kadisha, Barid, Akkar, Kebir (Tripoli), Alrash, and Kebir (Latakia) are perennial.

The Orontes and the Litani rise close together near Baalbek, and flow north and south respectively.

The *Orontes* (Nahr el-Asi) is the longest river in Syria. Some 20 miles from its source it receives copious affluents, and then, a large stream tapped by irrigation canals, it flows to the artificial reservoir of Lake Homs. Thence it flows to Homs, Hama, and Kalat es-Seijar, where it bends northward through the long marshy plain of El-Ghab, being then supplemented by the waters of several lakes and small perennial streams. The river is thickly fringed with papyrus and other reeds.

Beyond Jisr esh-Shoghu it flows in a deep gorge to Antioch plain, bending westwards to receive the navigable Kara Su, a larger stream than the Orontes itself, flowing from the Lake of Antioch. This lake catches the waters of the upper Kara Su and Afrin Su, which drain the country to the north and east. From Antioch the Orontes pursues its remaining course of 21 miles, and flows to the sea over a bar, being 200 yards wide and 12 ft. deep at its mouth. In winter it is navigable 3 miles from the sea for vessels of 100 tons.

The *Litani*, after receiving the Yafufe, the Barduni, and the Zair, flows close to the Lebanon base

to below Kalat esh-Shakif. Its bed lies in parts in a deep and narrow gorge. About 1½ miles from the sea the river widens, and falls into the Mediterranean 5½ miles north of Tyre.

(*b*) *Southern Syria.*—The *Jordan* is the most important and in some respects the most peculiar river of this part of Syria. It flows southwards in the Ghor (see p. 7 above), and draws its head-waters from the slopes of Hermon. Its three main sources, the Nahr el-Leddan, the Nahr Baniyas, and the Nahr Hasbani, unite in the Plain of Hule (altitude 150 ft.), and flow to the marshy and papyrus-choked lake of Hule, a few feet above sea-level. Issuing from this lake the Jordan has a fall of 65 ft. to the mile and enters Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee) at 682 ft. below sea-level. This lake measures 13 miles by 7½ miles, and has a maximum depth of 160 ft. After leaving the lake the waters of the stream become very turbid. The fall gradually decreases, and the river enters the Dead Sea 1,300 ft. below the level of the Mediterranean. In this section the river actually flows in a trough, in some places 150 ft. deep and from a quarter of a mile to 2 miles wide, called the *zor*, which it has hollowed out for itself in the *ghor*. The *ghor* is intersected on both banks by the deep channels of small lateral streams and winter torrents.

The Jordan receives two main perennial affluents on the left bank, the Yarmuk and the Zerka, and on the right bank the Jalud and the Fara. The direct length of the Jordan from its most remote sources to the Dead Sea is about 104 miles, and of its actual course probably twice as much.

The *Dead Sea* has an extreme length of 50 miles, and its greatest width is about 10 miles. The greatest depth of the lake, 1,310 ft., is in the northern part, at which point the bottom is at least 2,600 ft. below the level of the Mediterranean. In its southern part the bed is shallow and shelving. In consequence of extraordinary evaporation the water is impregnated with 26 per cent. of mineral salts, and is extremely buoyant.

The minor water-courses all flow westwards into the Mediterranean, and of these the principal are (from north to south) the Nahr Namein, Nahr el-Mukatta (Kishon), Zerka, Iskanderun, Auja, and Rubin. They are the outlets of the wadi-basins of the western slope of the maritime range in Palestine, and, with the exception of the Mukatta, are usually perennial in their lower courses.

(3) Climate

Syria has practically only two seasons—a dry, hot summer and a rainy but comparatively warm winter. Broadly speaking, three climatic zones may be distinguished: the humid, sub-tropical coastal region; the mountains, with a more temperate and drier climate; and the tropical depression of the Ghor.

Temperature.—The temperature varies from the intense heat of the Ghor to the Alpine temperature of the higher peaks of Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon. The mean annual temperature of the coastal zone averages about 70° F. (21° C.), and ranges from 57° F. (14° C.) in January to 84° F. (29° C.) in August; of the mountains 61° F. (16° C.), ranging from 43° F. (6° C.) to 73° F. (23° C.); of the Jordan depression 73° F. (23° C.) to as high as 130° F. (54° C.) in the shade. The mean annual temperature of Jerusalem (altitude 2,200 ft.) is 60° F. (15½° C.), with a yearly range of 29° F. (16° C.); Jaffa (altitude 66 ft.), 67° F. (19° C.); Beirut (altitude 115 ft.), 69° F. (20½° C.); Kereye, on the Lebanon (altitude 3,300 ft.), 56° F. (13° C.).

The climate of Syria is characterised not only by extremes of temperature but also by very great daily variations, amounting to 23° F. (13° C.) in summer and 15° F. (8° C.) in winter. On the tableland east of Jordan the daily variation is sometimes as great as 48° F. (27° C.). The heat at Damascus and other places in the depression and towards the desert is great, while on the sea coast the sun temperature often reaches 145° F. (63° C.), and in the deep Jordan

valley and the narrow gorges debouching into it the heat is blistering.

Frost seldom occurs on the coast, and never in the Jordan valley, but in the mountains it is not infrequent from December to February. Snow falls each winter to a considerable depth, but lies for any long period only in the higher altitudes; it sometimes lies for over a month in northern Jaulan, and for much longer periods at heights of over 4,000 ft. in Jebel Druz, Hermon, Lebanon, and Anti-Lebanon.

Rainfall.—The average yearly rainfall varies from 16 in. to 45 in., according to the district, and is least in the south, increasing northwards. In the coastal belt Gaza has an average rainfall of 16 in., Jaffa 20 in., Haifa 26 in., Beirut 35 in., Alexandretta 36 in.; in the highland belt, Hebron 25 in., Jerusalem 26 in., Nazareth 27 in., the higher altitudes of Lebanon 45 in. The central depression in general gets much less rain, and the Ghor least of all: Jericho 8 in., Tiberias 17 in., and Damascus 27½ in. Kereye has an exceptional record of 63 in. The rainy season begins about the middle or end of November, but about five-ninths of the total fall occurs in January and February, and about one-third from mid-March to the end of April. The average number of rainy days is: Gaza 41, Jaffa 53, Beirut 82, Jerusalem 58, Kereye 80.

Winds.—On the yearly average the wind blows from the north and north-west for 114 days (May—October); from the west for 55 days, and from the south-west and south for 46 days (winter). The sirocco sets in in May and again in October, the thermometer then rapidly rising to 100° F. or more. A light sea-wind sets in almost every morning, and blows till sundown, when the cooler land-breeze begins.

(4) Sanitary Conditions

Syria, generally speaking, may be regarded as a healthy country, and the prevalent diseases are mainly due to neglect, under the Turkish regime, of the most elementary sanitary precautions.

In winter the comparatively mild climate permits life in the open air, so the country is to a large extent free from the severe inflammatory affections so fatal in colder climates. The high mountains are, moreover, an excellent sanatorium for those enervated by the climatic conditions of the lower and damper parts of the country.

The most widely spread endemic diseases are malaria and trachoma. The former is naturally especially prevalent in all places where water stagnates, or where there are faulty or unclean cisterns. Trachoma is largely due to want of personal cleanliness, and is often accompanied by loss of sight. The so-called " Jericho " and " Aleppo boil " are confined mainly to the districts of Jericho, Homs, and Hama, and to the old town of Aleppo. Among epidemic diseases are meningitis, Malta fever, cholera, and at rare intervals dengue fever. Syphilis is exceedingly widespread, even in the villages.

The health conditions in the Jewish colonies generally are comparatively good.

(5) Race and Language

Race

Syria has always been a land much exposed to invasion and conquest, and it therefore contains a large number of foreign elements, derived from both ancient and modern times. The Turks and Kurds are modern examples of these foreign elements. Distinct from this is the replenishment of the population from the tribes of the Arabian Desert, which maintains the specific racial character of the Syrian people. The transition between the nomad Beduin and the Syrian fellahin, or peasants, may be seen all along the eastern border, but the extremes are distinct. The Syrian people have a civilisation and history that marks them off sharply from the Arabs. Both peoples speak Arabic, and both profess Islam: but as some of the Syrians are Shias,

and therefore at variance with the Sunnite Arabs, they cannot be entirely identified.

Such elements of the population as the Ansarie and the Druses preserve more purely than most the blood and customs of an early period; but they are not, therefore, distinct races from the Syrians. The native Christians, also, are a part of the same Syrian people as their Moslem neighbours, and even the Arabic-speaking Jews (as distinct from recent Jewish immigrants) cannot be sharply distinguished from a racial point of view.

The most important foreign elements in the population of Syria are the Turks (and Turcomans), who are mainly officials, Circassians, Kurds, Armenians, Persians, immigrant Jews, and a certain number of Europeans. The Jews have recently increased rapidly, owing to immigration from Russia and Rumania, and are most numerous in Palestine (about 90,000).[1] The Europeans are settled chiefly in the coast towns, and in Jerusalem, Aleppo, and Damascus. There are several German "colonies" in Palestine, but the entire number of colonists does not exceed 2,500.

Language

The language of the country is Arabic (Syrian Arabic) spoken with considerable dialectal variation in different parts. Aramaic (Syriac) is now used only in a few villages to the north of Damascus and in the liturgies of some of the churches. Turkish is almost entirely the language of officials. The Jews speak a medley of languages, according to their origin, but most Jewish immigrants speak Yiddish. The missions have diffused a considerable knowledge of European languages, but English, and more especially French, are more generally understood than German. Many Russian schools have been established.

[1] Another recent estimate gives, for Palestine only, 475,000 Mohammedans, 150,000 Jews, 35,000 Greek Orthodox, 25,000 Catholics (including Uniats), and 15,000 other religions (including Protestants).

(6) Population

Distribution

The latest official record (1914-15) makes the registered population of Syria 3,156,000. This does not include those who are not Ottoman subjects, nor the Beduin, and is believed to be otherwise under-estimated. The total population may be estimated at about $3\frac{1}{2}$ millions.

The average density of the population is 43 per square mile. In the vilayet of Aleppo it is only 30 (population 857,000, including Beduin), in Lebanon 330 (population 407,700, excluding Beirut, which has 500,000), in western Palestine (as far as Bir es-Seba) 119 (population 718,000). For some years before the war the population of Lebanon was decreasing, and in 1914 it was probably less than 300,000.

The largest towns in Syria are Aleppo, Damascus (populations 200,000 or more), and Beirut (180,000). Jerusalem, Homs, Hama, and Aintab range between 60,000 and 80,000, and the following between 20,000 and 40,000: Jaffa, Gaza, Hebron, Nablus, Haifa, and Safed, in western Palestine; Tripoli, Latakia, and Antioch on or near the northern coast. In Lebanon (Beirut is not included in the province) Zahleh is the only town of any size (14,000). Elsewhere most of the Syrian people live in hamlets or small villages.

Movement

There are no statistics by which the birth- and death-rates, with the rate of increase of the population, may be determined, but the death-rate is known to be high. Emigration has seriously drained the country for many years, although, on the contrary, some of the towns of western Palestine have lately increased rapidly (*e.g.*, Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, Nazareth). Since 1880 the population of the coast towns generally has consistently increased (*e.g.*, Beirut, Tripoli, and Latakia); but

many districts are quite stationary, and others have largely decreased in population.

Recently the influence of emigration has been most marked in Lebanon, the Jebel Ansarie, and the neighbourhood of Homs and Hama.

The most numerous immigrants since 1880 have been Jews (between 60,000 and 70,000), who have settled in Palestine and are the chief cause of the modern growth of Jerusalem and Jaffa. Of these immigrants only 10,500 have settled in the Jewish agricultural colonies. Another substantial increase of population has been brought by the Circassians, who have settled at various points along the eastern borders.

II. POLITICAL HISTORY

Chronological Summary

1535 French rights in " Holy Places " (reasserted 1740, 1878).
1649 French assertion of protection of Maronites (confirmed 1727, 1792, 1901).
1774 Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji. Russian protection of Christians.
1788-1840 Beshir Omar el-Shehab in Lebanon.
1791 Jezzar (d. 1804) expels French residents.
1799 Napoleon invades Syria; defeated at Acre by Jezzar and British.
1821 American mission at Beirut.
1831 Egyptian invasion of Syria.
1831-40 Egyptian occupation.
1841 Egyptians expelled by British forces.
1840-45 Druse and Maronite troubles.
1847-54 Greek and Latin contention as to " Holy Places."
1856 Hatti Humayun. Equality of religions.
1859 French religious missions.
1860 Damascus massacre; French intervention.
1861 Organic Statute of the Lebanon.
1864 Law of the Vilayets. Direct administration of Syria.
1869 German Crown Prince's visit to Jerusalem.
1870 First Hebrew colony in Palestine (Alliance israélite universelle).
1876 Abdul Hamid Sultan.
1878 Treaty of Berlin; equal civil and political rights for all religions.
1878 British Jews settle in Palestine.
1879 Circassian colonies in Syria.
1886 Railway construction.
1887 Jerusalem Sanjak directly dependent on Porte
1888 Further Hebrew colonies forbidden.
1895 Herzl and the Zionist movement.
1898 German Emperor's visit to Palestine.
1904 Hejaz Railway begun.
1908 Young Turk Revolution.
1908 German Jew colonies increase.

1909 Foundation of Arab " clubs."
1909-14 Repression by Young Turks of nationalist movements.
1915 Lebanon Organic Statute denounced.
1915 " Young Arab " party's application to the King of the Hejaz.
1917, Dec. British capture of Jerusalem.

Syria after Napoleon's Expedition.—The nineteenth century opened on the morrow of Napoleon's retreat from Palestine, his renunciation of designs on Syria, and his departure from Egypt. His expedition was barren of military advantage, and left the political state of Syria to continue as in the century past. But by attracting Sir Sydney Smith, with a British fleet, to the Lebanon coast, in March 1799, Napoleon brought into being the somewhat antagonistic views regarding Syria which still exist. For that reason the birth of the century marks an epoch in Syrian history. For that reason, however, only. The broad lines of political and economic life were to remain for another generation practically unchanged. What they had been during the eighteenth century has been sketched in the general survey of Asiatic Turkey.[1] If we look at Syria a decade after Napoleon's expedition we find it still in much the same state. During the years 1810 to 1812 the Swiss traveller, J. L. Burckhardt, lived in Aleppo, and wandered in Arab guise over most of Syria as far south as Petra and Sinai. He has left, in his Travels, a special description of the political situation as he found it, and general indications.

Various Local Rulers.—He represents Syria as a decentralised country, parcelled among divers local autonomies, under the rule of native chiefs or foreign pashas. The latter had generally been introduced by the Porte, but thereafter were quit of Ottoman control for the payment of tribute. Nominally the whole area was divided into five pashaliks, which, however, had come to be under three, or even only two, rulers, the Pasha of Damascus being also ruler

[1] See *Turkey in Asia*, No. 58 of this series.

of Tripoli, and the Pasha of Acre appropriating Gaza permanently and Damascus now and then. Really, three-quarters of Syria had very little to say to these rulers. All lying to the north, north-east, and north-west of the Aleppo oasis, including the towns of Killis, Aintab, and Marash, was in the hands of independent Aghas and Beys, mostly Kurds or Turcomans, the latter paying tribute and some sort of allegiance to the great Dere-Bey family of Chapanoghlu at Yuzgad, in Cappadocia. West to the Orontes, down the river almost to Antioch, and up it nearly to Hama, ruled three self-made princelings, seated in Edlib, Jisr Shogr, and Kala'at el-Mudik; while Antioch itself and Alexandretta were obeying only their own Aghas, and Kuchuk Ali, the Kurdish lord of Payas, held all the north-western angle. South of Antioch to within sight of Acre the whole length of the mountain country was autonomous, the Ansarie, under the Fakker house of Safita, and the Ismailiya admitting no Ottoman officer to the northern half, and the Shehab Emir of the Lebanon none, except as a guest, to the southern half. The Buka'a and most of Anti-Lebanon were at the discretion of the Emir of Baalbek, a Metawali. All the Trans-Jordan lands, except the Nukra Plain in the Hauran, kept outside Ottoman control, and so also did parts of western Palestine, for example the Nablus district, the Ghor, and the neighbourhood of Hebron. Needless to say, the Syrian deserts, east and south, remained untouched by Ottoman power. This list of exceptions leaves little to the direct rule of the pashas beyond the immediate neighbourhoods of Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Damascus; the littoral strip from Latakia to Gaza (with many interruptions); Galilee and parts of Samaria and Judaea. Nor even there was their rule always effective. Burckhardt's account of Aleppo in his time, torn between sherifs and janissaries, often without a pasha at all, besieged more than once by its pasha (when it had one) from a neighbouring hillock, and defied by Kurds and Turcomans at its very gates, illustrates better than

anything else the condition of Ottoman government in Syria a hundred years ago.

Imperfect Imperial Control.—Over even its imperial officers the Porte exercised very imperfect control, excepting over the weakest, the Pasha of Aleppo. One not infrequently made war on another. In 1803 the Pasha of Damascus marched on the Pasha of Baghdad, and in the following year was himself attacked by the Kiaya of the Pasha of Acre. The last-named pashalik had become almost private property. Ahmed Jezzar, who had foiled Napoleon, lived on to 1804; and, dying, bequeathed south Syria to one of his Mamelukes. The Porte could do no more than "confirm" the nominee of Jezzar. Actually, in 1810, Suleiman Pasha of Acre was holding not only Gaza, but also Damascus and Tripoli; that is to say, so far as the bulk of Syria was under any one rule, it was under a Prince of Acre. And so it was to remain for twenty years more. To avoid infringing this *imperium in imperio*, and revealing the unreality of Osmanli control, the Caliph's Grand Vizier, who was commissioned in 1807 to turn the British out of Egypt, had to lead his army down the uncomfortable roads east of the Jordan; and it is not surprising that, three years later, no political effect of this manifestation of imperial power was visible in Syria.

Suzerainty of Caliph.—Nevertheless, if there was little substance of Ottoman Empire in Syria, there was everywhere something more than its shadow. Burckhardt somewhat minimises it. The pashas and almost all local princelings, Emirs, and Beys not only acknowledged the suzerainty of the Caliph by seeking (sometimes *ex post facto*) his approval of their successions or usurpations and paying a quit-rent for them, but also had a precarious and usually brief tenure, if disowned by the suzerain. Burckhardt does, in fact, admit that not to show marks of fealty was ill-esteemed by the Syrian population of whatever race and creed; and anyone who withheld them was regarded as illegitimate or a rebel. Ahmed Jezzar had an Ottoman

commissary at his side when he was resisting Napoleon at Acre, and the Shehab Emir never failed to pay to the Imperial Treasury at Constantinople a proportion (even excessive) of the *miri* (land-tax), which he extorted in triplicate, and sometimes quadruplicate, out of his feudatories.

Feudalism was, and continued to be, the dominant social feature throughout Syria. It was a feudalism of ancient prescription, centred not, as in Asia Minor, upon families sprung from Household officers of the Ottoman Sultan or commissaries of the Porte and enriched by the exercise of Imperial functions, but on chiefs who held power in virtue of descent from families originally preferred by popular selection or their own arms. We have ample evidence of its universal prevalence, whether the feudal unit was tribe, district, town, village, or clan; but we happen to know it best in the Lebanon, as it was in the time of Emir Beshir Omar el-Shehab, whose long reign covered intermittently all the period from 1788 to 1840. The paramount power of the Shehabs was based at the first on Druse tribal feudalism, to which the family, though originally Arabs of Hira, had obtained a claim by marriage with the greater family of Ma'an. It came to be supported and confirmed by a vassalage, not of birth so much as appointment—by a whole hierarchy of *mukatajis*, who contracted for taxes and had penal powers. As a result, the old feudalism of birth was subjected in the eighteenth century to a new feudalism, identical in character with that most often found in the Anatolian Dere-Beyliks, but sanctioned by a paramount Emir, not an Ottoman Sultan. In disgust at this change, a large section of the Druses emigrated to the Hauran; but a strong remnant remained in Lebanon under the chiefs of the Jumblatt and Yezbeki families. This kept Druse feudalism alive, and prepared a day of reckoning with the Christian elements in the mountain, who not only accepted the new feudalism, but secretly incorporated the Emir in their own religious circle. About 1820 the

Emir, who, at the time of Burckhardt's visit, had not got the measure of the Jumblatts, put the Druses firmly under his heel, and became free to lord it over Lebanon as independently and arbitrarily as his ally, Abdullah Pasha, son of a Mameluke of Jezzar, was lording it over Palestine from his palace at Acre.

Hereditary System.—In the course of a century the *mukatajis* became hereditary in most localities of the mountain by a process which operates inevitably in feudal countries, however drastically the substitution of appointment for birth may have been effected in an earlier generation. In the rest of Syria also the same process was repeated again and again, the deeply ingrained feudalism of the population disposing it, after a short lapse of time, to accord freely to birth the fealty which their fathers had been forced to give to appointment. Owing to this instinct, itself due largely to survival of nomadic tribalism among settled Arabs, more feudal features exist in Syria at this day than in any other settled region of Turkey.

When the Egyptian invasion of Syria began in 1831, the country was still under an eighteenth-century regime, still entirely feudal, and still given over to Abdullahs and Beshirs. Mahmud II had been at work on Asia Minor for over a decade, breaking up its feudalism and converting it from a dependency of the Ottoman Empire indirectly administered, into an extension of the Imperial centre itself. He had intended to make himself master in his own house of Syria also, and his writing was already on the wall. But the Russian war of 1828 delayed the execution of his will; and, with peace hardly restored, Mehemet Ali of Egypt sent an army across the Sinai Desert, which, by excluding the Sultan from Syria for the rest of his term of life, postponed Imperial centralisation there to successors less able, less single-minded, and more beset by international tutors.

International Rivalry of Foreign Powers.—Before, however, we pass to the Egyptian invasion, a word should be said about that international rivalry for

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Syrian sympathies which had been inaugurated before the century began. During thirty years it developed obscurely, and gave little warning of the importance it was destined to assume. The earliest protagonists were France and Great Britain, traditionally the leading actors on that time-honoured stage. It was long before other competitors would enter the lists. Russia did not challenge in earnest till the 'fifties; and Prussia waited till there was a German Empire. A still longer period elapsed before Italy began to make herself felt in the Holy Land.

It cannot be doubted that France and Great Britain had very similar motives in endeavouring to obtain, each for herself, a preponderating influence in Syrian affairs: for each was anxious to establish herself in this neighbourhood on the road to the East, in order to secure the fullest advantage for her trade with India and China. With the progress of invention, it was felt that it would not be long before the difficulties of time and space would be overcome; it was obvious that the possession, or, at all events, the domination, of the countries round the eastern end of the Mediterranean would greatly facilitate the trade of whichever Power happened to be the strongest, at the time, in those regions. Hence the attraction both of Egypt and of Syria for the two great maritime Powers during the greater part of the nineteenth century, and hence the preponderating influence in the Near East which those Powers, now in happy alliance, enjoyed till near the end of that period.

French and British in Syria.—France had enjoyed a long start, but during two centuries made indifferent use of her Syrian monopoly. Nominal " protector " of the Latin Church in the Ottoman Empire since the Capitulations granted in 1535 by Sultan Suleiman to Francis I, she had allowed Latin rights to the Holy Places of Palestine to be limited by rights, equal or even superior, of the Orthodox Church; and she had made little use of her opportunities for acting politically in the Lebanon. Before the

last decades of the eighteenth century middle and southern Syria did not appear to France or any other European Power to have much political significance, the south-eastern angle of the Levant being considered a blind alley. Such politico-economic interest as the Western nations felt in Syria was directed to the north of the country, where Aleppo had been a half-way house to India and the East since the days of Queen Elizabeth. Moreover, towards the end of the eighteenth century the political effect of the platonic interest which Louis XIV and Louis XV had displayed in the Maronites was virtually obliterated by the anti-religious tendencies of the French Revolution. Jezzar turned the French residents out of his coast towns in 1791, and found none to object; and the French eclipse was completed by Napoleon's open avowal of anti-Christian policy in Egypt. Consequently, on invading Syria, Napoleon found, to his disappointment, Emir Beshir arrayed with Jezzar, and the Maronites helping, though somewhat half-heartedly, to beat him back from the walls of Acre; while the British admiral, Sir Sydney Smith, had no difficulty in instituting an accord with Beshir, which subsequent British hospitality and assistance, after the latter's exile from the mountain, in December 1799, went far to cement.

After 1808 Beshir's power grew in middle and south Syria, and became paramount when the Circassian Abdullah had succeeded to Acre in 1820 and put the Jumblatt chief out of the way. British influence had now every chance, France being discredited by the long absence of her flag from the Levant. But, like France before her, Great Britain found no conspicuous opportunity for using political influence. The Lebanese had yet to develop acute antagonism of creed; and, so long as but one European Power, whether France before 1800 or Great Britain afterwards, was concerning itself with them at one time, they lacked the external temptation to dissension which was to offer itself presently. British influence, therefore, was doing as yet no more harm in

middle and south Syria than French interest had done before it; but the fact that two European Powers, with growing and antagonistic interests in the Levant,[1] had gained a footing, where one alone used to be, foreshadowed danger.

The Egyptian Invasion.—This danger the Egyptian invasion and occupation of Syria was to bring to a head. Anxious to secure his Pashalik from sudden attack, to command a supply of ship timber, and to control the land to which 6,000 Sharkiyah fellahin had escaped from military service, Mehemet Ali had been giving a favourable ear for a while past to some (chiefly ex-officers of the Grand Army) who constantly reminded him of the example of Napoleon. He had tried, by cajolery and bribery, in 1822 and 1823, to persuade the youth and inexperience of Abdullah, the heir of Jezzar, to link his fate with Egypt's; and, failing, had asked the Porte outright for the Acre Pashalik no less than thrice. Put off with Crete only, he resolved to take what would not be given. It was the hope of France that he might succeed. Predominant in his councils, she looked to be carried back into Syria by his arms; and subsequently the Porte on more than one occasion reproached the French Government with interested connivance in a rebellion which, alone among the five Great Powers, France refused eventually to extinguish. Great Britain remained indifferent, trusting to her hold on both Mehemet Ali and the Emir of the Lebanon, and unwilling to thwart the controller of the overland route to India. Both Powers, therefore, kept their fleets out of harm's way; and late in October 1831 Ibrahim Pasha crossed the desert to go a greater distance than either he or his father had planned or desired, and effect more than they would ever know. For it is this Egyptian occupation which closed in Syria the ancient order of decentralised autonomy, and introduced the modern order of centralised dependence, vexed and limited by the rival interests of foreign Powers.

[1] See especially Driault, *Question d'Orient*, Paris, 1917.

Egyptian Occupation.—To end the nominal Empire of Turkey in Syria took less than a year of Egyptian conquest. To enable Turkey to have real Empire there was the work of nine years more of Egyptian occupation. Ibrahim did very much what Mahmud had done in Asia Minor and had intended to do in Syria, but probably would have been less able to do. He abolished once for all the decentralised pashaliks, and broke the power of local chieftains and recalcitrant or predatory townsmen and villagers, tribes and clans, to a greater or less degree, all over the area; while he enforced regular taxation and compelled the recognition of non-Moslem rights in local government. In the lower and the plain regions, *e.g.*, the Antioch and Aleppo districts, the middle and upper Orontes valley, the Damascus district, the western Trans-Jordan lands, and Palestine generally, his work was fairly complete by 1840, and Ainsworth has testified that in 1835 the Antiochene country was as safe as England. But pacification had not been effected without serious difficulties. The Moslems of Damascus and Safed, for example, had to be compelled by force of arms to admit Christians and Jews to any rights at all, and to forgo the gratification of seeing them walk the gutters or dismount at sight of the faithful. When the British Consul rode into Damascus in 1835 he had to be closely hemmed in by troops. In 1840 he could go where he pleased, unattended. The Nablus folk, who had defied Napoleon, tried the same course with Ibrahim, on being asked to accept military service, and actually besieged him in Jerusalem. Nazareth was as troublesome as Safed, and Hebron held out longer than Nablus. The Hauran Druses and the Arabs of the Ghor and Kerak needed several punitive expeditions and tedious experience of closed markets, occupied watering-places, and prohibited pastures. The Hauran and Kerak in particular gave Ibrahim some stiff fighting; and the villagers of the Judaean highlands once exacted the release of their leader, Abu Ghosh, by blocking, with 17,000 armed men, Ibrahim's passage from Jerusalem to meet his father on

the coast. He had to thank the Emir Beshir that the Palestine revolt of 1834 came to nothing in the end.

In the mountains not so much was attempted. Lebanon kept its single prince; but he was constrained to help the unpopular disarmament of his Druses, and the Mountain had to grow accustomed to the passage of Egyptian troops. The Metawalis were coerced by a regular garrison at Baalbek. The Ansarie found their coast firmly held and their contributions rigorously exacted. The predatory Turcomans and Kurds of the north, who continued recalcitrant throughout the Egyptian occupation, had to keep to their higher mountains or the Antioch marshes; and Kuchuk Ali had no successor at Payas.

The process, like all interference with vested abuses, was cordially detested; and, when the moment came for Egyptian withdrawal—even at the prospect of it—Ibrahim found whole districts rise upon his rear and flanks. But his name has lived on in Syria, to be used still with awe and respect, although Egyptians are almost as unpopular there as, on account of another past occupation, they are in Hejaz. Superior apparatus and knowledge of its use may compensate for presumed physical and moral inferiority, but it will never make the user acceptable in his surroundings.

Encouragement of Europeans.—The work of the Egyptian occupation, however, had further results. In opening up Syria to Europe, even as Egypt had been opened during a quarter of a century past, it went far beyond Mahmud's work in Asia Minor. Mention has been made already of Ibrahim's consideration for the non-Moslem elements in the native population—a consideration for which he paid the price of present unpopularity, and they that of irreconcilable rancour. Attracted by such evidence of a liberal policy, Europeans came to Syria as they had never come before; and all, except those who were so ill-advised as to throw the Sultan at his head, were made welcome by Ibrahim. The earliest books on Syria that are still read—Chesney's,

Ainsworth's, Kinglake's, Thomson's, Lamartine's, Warburton's, &c.—narrate the authors' travels under his ægis, and some of the travellers were not mere globe-trotters. In 1839 Moses Montefiore discovered for Europe the Palestinian Jews and the possibilities of Jewish restoration. In 1835 a British Commission was studying a line for an overland route to the Euphrates; and the little opposition it encountered, in its extraordinary task of hauling steamers in sections overland from the Orontes to the Euphrates, is a testimony to Ibrahim's power, all the more significant because the British held their permission, not from him, but from the Sultan with whom he was at war. During those ten years Europe progressed from mediæval ignorance of Syria to almost as much knowledge of it as she has had up to the present war. When Lady Hester Stanhope settled in the Lebanon, in 1814, it was a wild, unknown region; and the British Government could only keep precarious touch with Pitt's niece through a Levantine consular agent in Cyprus. When she died, in 1839, a visit to her at Joun had become a common incident of the grand tour; and a British Consul rode up from Saida to collect and seal her effects.

Lebanon Question; Beshir.—Finally, for good or for ill, it was the Egyptian occupation that caused Syria to become a cockpit of Great Powers. If it did not make the Lebanon question, it brought it on. The fault was only in part Ibrahim's. During nine years of Egyptian occupation there was no more Lebanon question than there had been since the establishment of the Shehab dynasty and the emigration of the Yemenite Druses. Not that the Mountain had been an abode of peace during those hundred years; but its intermittent intestine warfare had been feudal, not religious—wars of one Druse sheikh or group of sheikhs against another—Jumblatts against Yezbekis, or one Shehab against others, with some Maronites or some Orthodox Greeks or some Metawalis enlisted for one or for both. Hitherto Druses had led in council and action, thanks to their superior feudal cohesion, their

social organization, which encouraged alert political spirit, and their small proportion of fellahin; also because, in Metn and Shuf, they held the best of the Mountain. If latterly the stars of their chiefs had paled before the single splendour of Beshir, the eclipse of the Jumblatts had gratified the Yezbekis. Beshir, who had begun life as more Moslem than Druse, was regarded as laxly complacent to all creeds rather than representative of any one (his reputed conversion to Maronite Christianity got abroad later). He held his power by grace neither of Maronite nor Druse, but of their common fealty to the Padishah of Stambul and the favour of the Pashas of Acre and Damascus. His overlordship did not impair Druse pride of place; his sympathy secured the position of the Christian clergy; and his strong hand protected the fields from all marauders but his own tax-collectors. All elements alike obeyed him, sharing his sentiment for Great Britain, if the Maronite clergy retained also some sentiment for France; but neither Maronite nor Druse yet entertained thought or hope of oppressing the other by the help of a foreign patron. Even in 1832, when certain Druses, instigated by sheikhs of the Jumblatt and Abu Nakid houses, fomented a scuffle with Christians in a Maronite centre (Der el-Kamar) and disowned Beshir's authority, further fighting was easily prevented by the prompt arrival of an Egyptian detachment from Baalbek; and no outside Power was concerned in the matter, except the Porte.

Druses and Maronites; Britain and France.—The economic state of the Mountain, however, grew worse during the Egyptian period. Ibrahim exacted regularly and inexorably the annual contribution for his father. Beshir had to provide both for this and for his personal greed and administration. His *mukataajis* also were determined to live well. The amount of *miri* (land-tax) which would be requisitioned by the Emir in any one year could not be foreseen. The Mountain became discontented, suspicious, and apprehensive. In

1838 Ibrahim took an unfortunate step. At his wits' end to deal with the Druses of the Hauran, who had cost him 15,000 casualties, he called in the Emir Beshir, armed 7,000 Maronites, and sent these against cousins of their fellow-mountaineers. They were successful, and disarmed the Hauran. Beshir, anxious about the effect in the Lebanon, asked that not only should these Maronites retain their arms, but other Maronites be armed, up to 24,000 in all; and Ibrahim, in the first flush of his gratitude, consented.

With the Druses already hostile, after their forcible disarmament, Ibrahim tried, two years later, to take back his gift from the Maronites, and enrol them, as well as the Druses, in his *nizam*. Beshir seconded this order, by telling each element that the other alone would be disarmed in permanence. Both were soon disillusioned, and each proceeded to sink for a moment its now profound suspicion of the other in a common hatred of the Egyptian. It was known that the Powers had come on the scene in earnest and arrested Ibrahim's advance the previous year, after his crowning victory at Nizib; but it was not yet known that there was division between Great Britain and France. Some Maronites and some Druses rose together, chose a Frenchman for leader, and appealed to the British and French Consuls in Beirut. It was a very partial rising. The mass of the Druses came out, only to return immediately to their obedience; the mass of the Maronites never came out at all. A small body of insurgents kept the field for a time against weak Egyptian forces on the coast; but Ibrahim would quickly have overwhelmed it from the inner country had it not been for events which had nothing at all to do, in their inception, with the Lebanon revolt—the Treaty of London restoring Syria to the Porte, and Mehemet Ali's refusal to yield except to force.

Egyptians driven out; Measures for Settlement.—Great Britain accepted a mandate to execute the London warrant, which France had declined to endorse. The easiest way was to shut Ibrahim from his vital ports.

These ports lie from Tripoli to Acre. Therefore, unfortunately, operations had to begin in the Lebanon. A British force landed in August 1840, called out the mountaineers, armed them without distinction of creed, and in three months swept both the Egyptians and Emir Beshir off mountain and littoral. Armed, blooded, and free, Druses and Maronites parted company to face one another, demand mutual satisfaction for accumulated griefs, and assert their respective equality or superiority in the future. Neither Great Britain nor France, it is clear, desired a civil war in Lebanon; but, while the former had armed both parties, the latter was favouring one and inspiring it to demand majority rights. British sympathy, therefore, inevitably went out to the minority, which, for its part, had been quick to recognise the discord of the two Powers and the superiority of British influence with the new Ottoman Powers that were. Tension lasted until October 1841, and then broke in rapine and massacre—Druses on the one side, Maronites, with Metawali, on the other, and the blame as much on one as the other. Not till January 1843 was there any truce. The Porte tried direct government in vain, and at the instance of the Powers consented at last to control a dual autonomy under a Maronite and a Druse.

Outbreaks of 1845.—This may have been the best that could be done while native passions were hot, and the new accord between Great Britain and France was weakened by the unpopularity of Louis Philippe's government and the avowed intention of Legitimists, Clericals, and Imperialists to force French interests in Syria to the front. But it was a bad measure. The hands to which the Powers had just entrusted Syria were fatally weakened. While the rest of the country could be brought under direct control of the Imperial centre, the Porte was compelled, in Lebanon, to accept a survival of the old order of decentralisation, so constituted as to remain an open sore. For, in reality, there was no peace yet. Too lately had the Mountain

been drawing apart into fanatic camps. The Druses, with secular predominance to lose, continued restless, ashamed of such degradation of their chiefs as Churchill witnessed in the 'forties. The Maronites, who stood to gain, were irritatingly complacent under their Emir Haidar. The newly-established paramount authority was alien and derogatory. If both Druses and Maronites used frankly to acknowledge the suzerainty of a Sultan in distant Stambul, they murmured now at sovereignty exercised through a *mushir* in Saida. They had, both of them, learned by this time to appeal against his authority and one another to outside Powers of unknown strength but known rivalry. France and Great Britain had, indeed, returned to governmental harmony at home since 1842, but in the Lebanon their representatives were still at odds, and when trouble broke out again in 1845 were manifestly partisans. Their positions and aims differed as positive from negative. Poujade, inspired by the colonial element in the French Opposition, aspired to change the political and social state of the Lebanon, to promote a protectorate of his nation in Syria, and to invert the secular relation of Maronites to Druses. Rose, acting on his Government's fixed policy of preventing the introduction into Turkey of any foreign protectorate or sphere of exclusive influence, encouraged Lebanese society to resume, under Omar Pasha, the same mutual relations as had existed in the earlier days of Emir Beshir. France, for obvious reasons, hoped to compass her subversive aims through the Maronites; Great Britain, for reasons equally obvious, endeavoured to preserve the *status quo ante* by means of the Druses. Strong divergence of sentiment and sympathy was added to the political discord of the Consuls. The Maronites, as they then were, mariolatrous, priest-ridden, inconstant in warfare, and only in small part willing to fight at all, did not commend themselves to Rose as did the keen, warlike Druses. By the recent action of the

latter against Ibrahim Pasha in both the Lebanon and Hauran close ties had been riveted between Briton and Druse, while the Maronites had trimmed to the Egyptian, and to a Power which lately had stood out of the European Concert. Both Great Powers, working equally in their own interests, the one for peaceful change, the other for peaceful conservation, failed equally, and both were responsible for the outbreaks of 1845. The Maronites began them in the hope of driving the Druse remnant right out of the Mountain; but the Druses rendered worse than they had received. Both Great Powers showed themselves commendably impartial in encouraging the Porte to deal out even-handed justice and in blaming it for what had been largely their own work.

Reassertion of Turkish Authority.—When this account was settled, or, rather, deferred, the Mountain relapsed for fifteen years into such quiescence as interrupts the activities of a volcano, in which subterraneous forces continue at work. The Porte, anxious to complete the task of Ibrahim, found the Lebanon an impediment. It was successful enough with the Kurds and Turcomans of the north, against whom expeditions proceeded in 1845 and 1846, suppressing chieftains and deporting villagers from Amanus and Taurus into the lowlands, and *vice versâ*; and it pacified, if it could not break, the Hauran. But when, in 1846, it sent a strong force into the Lebanon to effect wholesale arrests among feudal sheikhs of both parties, the result was not satisfactory. The Maronites rather than the Druses were weakened, the latter being always better able to replace lost leaders; and the chances of future trouble were only strengthened, the more so since the interest and sentiment of the Turks inclined them inevitably to be tender with the Druses. Were they not a minority fighting by themselves against a majority suspected of reliance on the intervention of a European Power?

Latin and Greek Rivalry about the "Holy Places."—Turkish favour towards the Druses became

more pronounced after the Imperial Restoration in France, whose colonial designs grew more suspect. In 1847 a serious tumult between Latins and Greeks in the Church of the Nativity at Bethlehem had resulted in favour of the Greeks, but led to the return of the Latin Patriarch *in partibus* to Jerusalem, and of a French Consul-General to support him. Four years later, when Louis Napoleon was in power as President, a Commission was demanded to report on the whole question of encroachments by the Orthodox Church upon ancient rights of French-protected Latins in the Holy Places of Palestine. The Russian Tsar had already revived his eighteenth-century claim to protect politically all Christians of the Eastern Rite in the Ottoman Empire. Was a similar claim to the Latins, based on French Capitulations, now in the mind of Louis Napoleon? The Porte desired one Protectorate as little as the other, and the Commission of 1851 was brought to nought. But two years later, a reiteration and definition of the Russian demand, with a stipulation for substantial guarantees, promising the greater danger, threw the Sultan into the French Emperor's arms, and brought on the Crimean War.

Effects of Crimean War; Confusion in Syria.—This war, far away though it was waged, had an evil influence on Syria. With heavy recruiting of the settled peasantry, and withdrawal of the better garrison troops, the newly-established Ottoman peace began everywhere to break down. Travellers who penetrated rural Syrian districts in the middle 'fifties bear witness to a general growth of insecurity and lively fear of nomads and mountaineers. The Metawalis were in open rebellion in the Buka'a and the northern Lebanon. In 1854 Ismail Bey, of the Metawara tribe of the Ansarie, succeeded in restoring his mountains to their pre-Egyptian independence for several years. Homs and Hama remained in a state of siege for months; and the neighbourhood of Damascus was as unsafe as that of Aleppo had been before Ibrahim's

conquest. It was not a return to the old order; for formerly feudal chiefs had had the power to stop all rapine but their own. Now there was no restraint but that of an immature Turkish administration, relying upon such tatterdemalion forces as Rey remarked sheltering in the ruins of Lebanese palaces in 1857.

Massacre of 1860.—Nor did the successful issue of the war bring any gain to Turkey. It only increased the French weight upon her back, and led to the reiteration of the *Hatti Humayun*, promising Christians and Jews the same rights as Moslems. The Druses saw the Maronites about to be exalted in their room; the fanatic faithful of Damascus believed that a worse than Egyptian regime impended over their heads. The result was the year 1860, infamous for all time in the annals of Syria. The reports of two Commissions working at cross-purposes, the rivalry of two Powers united in the primary object of securing atonement for atrocities and precluding their repetition, but divided, secretive, and suspicious in all other respects, finally, much mutual defamation ever since, have rendered hopelessly obscure the history of that and the following year. We can be sure only of the situation which was brought about.

Constitution of Autonomous Lebanon.—It would be useless, even were it in place, to ask now who was responsible, or in what measure, for those massacres of sixty years ago, or with what precise motives foreign intervention was planned, carried out, and crowned by the constitution of an autonomous Lebanon under a Christian *mushir*, who, in practice, would always be a Catholic. Certainly, if Lebanon alone had but added another to its series of internecine tumults, even at a cost of 5,000 lives, there would have been no mandate of Europe and no Organic Statute. It was not the Lebanon events, but the Damascus massacre, interpreted as a symptom of infectious fanaticism, that overcame the reluctance of Great Britain to commission Louis Napoleon. It is equally useless to enquire now whether it was wise, in the general interest of the Ottoman

Empire, or fair to the Ottoman Sultan, to guarantee for ever such an infringement of his sovereignty as the autonomous State of the Lebanon. But we may still ask usefully whether it had any effect on the general economy of Syria so bad as to offset the benefit it conferred on a part. The honest answer is negative. On the debit side we have to set no more than some periodic unrest of Buka'a villages seeking, for the sake of political or economic advantage of the moment, to be reckoned on one side or the other of a frontier which was never delimited; the development of Beirut into a focus of European diplomatic intrigue and native separatism; and, perhaps, the annual emigration of four to five thousand Lebanese, unable to live well within the narrow bounds assigned to an autonomous State which should have included the Buka'a, and the westward slopes of Anti-Lebanon and Hermon, as well as the coast-line from Tyre to Tripoli. This last disadvantage, at any rate, has been compensated by the knowledge and capital brought home again by the emigrants after a few years in Europe or America. To credit, on the other hand, stands the capital fact that, two years after the final ratification of the Organic Statute in 1864, warfare ceased in Lebanon for fifty years. Maronites and Druses relapsed into peace, if not amity; and public security and standards of social and political life advanced to a point not nearly reached by any other province of the Ottoman Empire.

Lebanon has been a spoiled child of fortune. Thanks to its misdeeds, it has received, at the hands of aliens, liberties which it has done very little in its history to vindicate for itself. Even if Burton's gibe, that the Lebanese hide their weapons at the call of patriotism, be too bitter, it may be owned that they have turned their arms ninety-nine times in a hundred on one another, and have allowed Arabs, Turks, and Egyptians to ride roughshod over them, unopposed by any local patriotism worthy to be mentioned in the same breath with that of the Armenians, the Greeks, and the Balkan races, or even that of their own Druse

cousins in the Hauran. The measure of their happiness is their lack of history down to the outbreak of the recent war. Indeed, their danger, as time went on, lay in the uncompromising attitude of the Powers towards the charter of the Lebanon. Suspicious of one another, and unwilling to give the Porte any opening, they tried to prevent any change, even the most plainly desirable, in the Constitution they had made; and such slight beneficial modifications as were, indeed, introduced, *e.g.*, in 1868 or 1892, were accepted only on protest as accomplished facts.

Organization of the Rest of Syria.—On the rest of Syria the settlement of the Lebanon had, on the whole, a good effect. It is no mere coincidence that the Ottoman Law of the Vilayets is dated 1864. The able Ministers of the half-crazy Abdul Aziz feared that more Lebanons would be constituted, unless their master's house were set in some sort of order. The attention of the world was being called to the south-eastern Levant by the construction of the Suez Canal. Napoleon III, who, in 1861, had commissioned Gifford Palgrave to go down from Damascus into the Arabian peninsula, was known to cherish far-reaching plans for the Arab lands. High-placed Europeans began to appear at the Holy Places. The future Kaiser, Frederick, came to Jerusalem in 1869; and the Empress Eugénie planned a pilgrimage in the same year, but did not make it. Russia, in spite of her Crimean defeat, was increasing her solicitude for the Holy City, having acquired a large tract of building land just outside it in 1856. The annual tale of Russian pilgrims, formerly a few hundreds, had become, by 1870, a matter of thousands, while since 1847 the growing influx of Russian Jews had been causing uneasiness to the Porte. For these and many other reasons the viziers saw it was high time to bring Syria under the same centralised system of direct administration, civil and military, as Asia Minor; and this they accomplished in the 'sixties. The system was substantially that still in force, only one important administrative change

having been made since. This took place in 1887, when an access of nerves about Jewish colonisation and the imminence of railway construction (the Jaffa—Jerusalem line, first mooted as long ago as 1864, was definitely sanctioned in 1888), caused Abdul Hamid to detach the Jerusalem *sanjak* from the vilayet of Syria and make it depend directly on the Porte. Even the irreconcilable Druses of the Hauran were forced by Midhat to accept a *kaimakam* depending directly on Damascus, and to send representatives to his *mejliss*. But this dose of law and order was sweetened by the choice of the officer from the native house of Atrash, and by the renunciation of taxes and military service for the time being.

Relapse owing to Franco-German and Russo-Turkish Wars.—Further efforts to knit Syria to Constantinople and further steps in its internal development would, doubtless, have taken place but for two great wars and the intervening bankruptcy of Turkey. The catastrophe of France in 1870 relieved the Porte of its chief apprehension about the Arab-speaking part of its Empire; the financial crisis of 1874 cut short all reform; and the Russian war of 1877 produced on the outlying provinces much the same effect as had been coincident with the war in the Crimea. The Hauran Druses once more threw off the shadow of dependence. Eastern and central Syria became a happy hunting ground of nomads and other highwaymen. The Kurds again did as they liked in the north, and so did the Ansarie in their mountains. Only the Lebanon remained undisturbed. Then came the Treaty of Berlin, the consolidation of Abdul Hamid's position, after storms of constitutional revolution and war had subsided, and the inauguration of that Asiatic policy by which he looked to redress the balance of Europe.

Abdul Hamid's Policy.—In this policy Syria was the most vital province, as it has always been in the policy of Asiatic Empires which have tried to hold under one yoke Irak, Arabia, and Egypt. It is true

that Egypt, since the digging of the Suez Canal and the development of steam communication, stood no longer in the relation to Syria that it had held a generation before. But Abdul Hamid, it must be remembered, was very slow to abandon the hope that it would come again under his control; to the persistent vitality of this hope among Turks the Tabah affair of 1906, the programme of the Committee of Union and Progress, and very recent events have given conspicuous proof. He still held that a land-way to Egypt, as also to Arabia and Irak, must, at all cost, be better assured; and that by such assurance all those provinces, together with Syria, would be knit firmly into his Empire.

Circassian Colonies.—The harbingers of Abdul Hamid in Syria were Circassians. His idea of planting these truculent refugees on the desert fringes, as irregular garrisons, to hold back the nomad Arabs, was not quite new; for Richard Burton, when British Consul at Damascus in 1870, had found groups of them already established on the Alah plateau, east of Homs. But the immigration from the Caucasus, which followed the Treaty of Berlin, gave Abdul Hamid far more Cherkess material to dispose of than his predecessor had. A part of this he settled, from 1879 onwards, along the Haj Road towards the Belka. The colonists were to be pioneers in every sense; for they had to introduce not only their ploughs where nomad Arabs had been content to pasture, but also, in the 'eighties, their own government and police; for in neither the Jaulan nor the Belka would the Imperial Government organize permanently its administration or garrisons till 1895. The lands assigned were mostly Government property according to the letter of the Ottoman law, since, no doubt, they had neither paid tax nor been tilled within the prescribed term, nor, indeed, at any time. But Ottoman law did not run in Trans-Jordan, and the nomads and half-settled Arab villagers held that the lands so disposed of were, in fact, theirs. Accordingly, local enmity to the colonists was assured from the outset, and all the years since have been filled with

strife. The Government consistently supported its colonists, rounding up more than once on their behalf an irreconcilable tribe or clan, as, for example, the Abbad Arabs near Es-Salt, or a section of the Beni Hasan, near Jerash, and sending it to cool its passions west of Jordan or in the Eastern Desert; and the Cherkess have been able to hold on. But the Arabs have not forgotten what they believe to be their territorial rights, and the racial feud smoulders unquenched.

Administration and Communications.—In pursuance of his policy Abdul Hamid took in hand, in the early 'eighties, the public insecurity of northern Syria and southern Palestine, multiplying guards and increasing garrisons, and paying particular and unwelcome attention then and later to both the Kurds of Amanus and the robber Armenians of Zeitun. Improved communications, however, he knew, or soon learned, would provide the most effective means to his end. In the year 1885, when the Jaffa—Jerusalem track was improved into a metalled chaussée, began an era of road-building throughout Syria, and in 1886 it was followed by one of railway construction. This was destined, in the course of the next thirty years, to give Syria through-connection with Constantinople, a railway from Aleppo to Bir es-Seba linked to five ports, and trunk lines to Arabia on the one hand and Mesopotamia on the other. When it is remembered, further, that such harbour structures as exist in Syria, and the equipment of principal cities like Aleppo, Damascus, Beirut, and Jerusalem with broad ways, modern buildings, electric lighting, tramways, and other convenient apparatus, are also of Abdul Hamid's time, one is bound to admit that a good deal of beneficent construction—almost all, in fact, that makes Syria as a whole the most civilised province of Turkey at this day—stands to the credit of a Sultan whose energies are popularly supposed to have been uniformly destructive and sinister.

Railway Schemes.—Two, in particular, among the

railway enterprises of his reign are of capital significance for the political future of Syria; but, being still incomplete, they have been able to exercise but a small part of their destined influence. These are the Hejaz railway, which promises to make Damascus again the chief gathering point of Moslem pilgrims, and the Baghdad railway, which should give back to Aleppo some of its lost importance in the commerce of East and West. Both cities, indeed, have resumed something of their cosmopolitan character; but the Hejaz railway must reach Mecca and the Baghdad railway the Gulf before either will relieve the Suez Canal of any great proportion of the men and merchandise that pass through it to-day.

Settlement of the Country.—The consolidating effect, whether designed or accidental, of these measures of Abdul Hamid's reign was supplemented by a deliberate governmental effort to diminish nomadism, to whose disturbing social influence, exercised from east and south, all Syrian history bears witness. The precedent of the Trans-Jordan agricultural colonies was followed in the north. Strong bodies of Cherkess were settled round the head of the Syrian Desert, on Imperial estates about Membij, and also at Rakka; and both in the Euphrates valley and in Trans-Jordan measures were taken to encourage or compel settlement along the arable fringes. These measures took the form of free or favourable grants of land, opening of local markets, establishment of administrative posts and police caracols, and, latterly, road construction and the institution of a posting service from Aleppo to Felluja and Baghdad. In the Trans-Jordan country, where settlement had been slowly spreading for a generation, amid a welter of tribal claims and feuds, the Government undertook at last, in the 'nineties, to assure and promote the process by establishing garrisoned posts from Kuneitra southwards, and by introducing administrative machinery of the same type as in the rest of Syria. A *mutessarif* appeared at Kerak, for example, in 1895, and *kaimakams* and *mudirs* fol-

lowed throughout the Belka region, and southward as far as Shobak and Ma'an. In 1896 considerable irregular forces were sent against the Hauran Druses; and with the exile of over 1,000 of their notables to Crete, Rhodes, and Asia Minor some peace was secured. On the southern desert frontier Bir es-Seba was selected to be a focus of settlement and a steadying influence. Made an administrative centre in 1904, it was garrisoned and provided with solid government buildings; and an experiment was made, not unsuccessfully, with a Court of Tribal Appeal, to which representatives of the nomadic and half-settled Arabs of all the region east of the Egyptian frontier were called as assessors.

Christian Influx into Palestine.—Meanwhile, Palestine became an ever more irksome possession for Abdul Hamid. As he watched colonists, pilgrims, and tourists pour in an ever-swelling stream from Christendom and Jewry, he foresaw a second Lebanon to be constituted at the gates of Egypt and Arabia. Christian missions and educational institutions had been increasing steadily throughout Syria during all his reign, despite studied and obstinate obstruction. The American representatives, who dated back (at Beirut) to 1821, he regarded with least distrust, relying on the official aloofness of the United States from Old World politics. They had, however, extended their activities greatly since 1870, rebuilding the Beirut College in 1872, and opening schools all over Palestine; and, disinterested though they might be, the encouragement they offered to emigration from Lebanon and elsewhere, and the democratic and liberal ideas which their curriculum introduced to the minds of Armenians and Syrians, were disquieting to an Imperial Absolutist. Worse than these, however, were the French Jesuits, Franciscans, Dominicans, Sisters of St. Joseph of the Apparition, of St. Vincent de Paul, and others, who had been spreading all over Syria since 1859, and had established in Jerusalem a centre of educational and other charitable effort.

Thence their Sisters of the Rosary were penetrating even the doubtful districts east of the Jordan. The Italians, whose Franciscans were of such old establishment at Jerusalem (fourteenth century) as to be accepted as a matter of course, were not regarded as likely to increase either the numbers or the liberalism of their institutions; but the British Church missionary schools and hospitals throughout Palestine were another matter, and the Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem had recently instituted a new centre for educating natives, whether Protestant or other.

Jewish Immigrants.—More, however, than any Christians, Abdul Hamid believed he had reason to fear the Jews. They were to be a wedge driven in by the hands of France, Russia, and Great Britain, whom, in this connection, he suspected in the order named. The *Alliance israélite universelle*, of Paris, had introduced a first Hebrew colony to Palestine in 1870. British Jews followed suit in 1878. Four years later there was a veritable rush, as a result of pogroms in Russia and Rumania. With ten colonies already in existence, occupying some of the best land of the maritime lowlands, while Jerusalem, Hebron, Tiberias, and Safed had long sheltered Jewish communities, the Porte resolved to act. In 1888 it informed the Powers that it would not admit another Hebrew colony into Palestine, or, indeed, any Jew pilgrim, except on payment of heavy caution for his departure within a short term; and that the standing interdict against aliens holding real estate would be rigorously enforced. This effort, however, availed but little. The Powers (although Great Britain had pledged herself to cease protecting Russian Jews after 1890) refused to accept discriminatory legislation against their nationals, Hebrew or other; while a people so well supplied and so conversant with finance as the Jews found little difficulty in evading the prohibitions of a Turkish administration. The tide of Jewish colonisation slackened, but did not stop, and it flowed again with renewed volume after Herzl had enunciated his Zionist

gospel in 1895. Some, even then, dared to speak openly of coming Hebrew domination where Jews had hitherto crept to hide.

German Emperor's Visit.—Foiled by the Powers, and betrayed by men of his own household, Abdul Hamid turned to his one Christian friend, a sovereign who never browbeat him, but watched the French and Russians, and was not credited with any predilection for the Jews. Kaiser Wilhelm II appeared in Palestine in October 1898, made a royal progress through the country, was presented with lands at Jerusalem, and there inaugurated a German epoch of the city's history. German influence, which had begun obscurely about the time of the Prussian Crown Prince's visit in 1869, and had been sustained inconspicuously by small Templar colonies at Haifa and on Mount Carmel, was to challenge henceforward all others in Palestine. But when the spectre of a second Franco-Lebanon had thus been laid, Abdul Hamid was not minded to raise that of a German Palestine: and he was careful to keep his gratitude within bounds. Herzl retired baffled from Constantinople in 1902, and obstruction continued to be offered to the Jews. Only after the revolution of 1908 could the German-Jew institutions, which had come into existence to take control of the Hebrew movement in Palestine, begin to make headway, and the German era of Jew colonisation increased materially the numbers and holdings of alien settlers.

Progress under Abdul Hamid.—Taken as a whole, the Hamidian regime in Syria marked Imperial progress, and is open to less criticism than elsewhere in Turkey. There were, of course, bad features—the same repressive atmosphere as in other provinces; the same nervousness of foreign encroachment, issuing, for example, in fantastic prohibition of access to coastal districts; the same suspicious and jealous system of administration. But there was no general sense of oppression and terror. The population steadily increased. When the Porte took over from the Egyptians in 1841, Syria and Palestine were estimated to contain

less than a million and a quarter inhabitants. Sixty years later these had swelled to nearly four millions. In spite of the presence of a large Armenian population in the north, the Armenian troubles of the reign in the rest of the Empire awoke but a faint echo in Syria. No urban massacre took place there, even when such neighbouring centres as Urfa, Birejik, and Adana were convulsed; and a few isolated atrocities committed in convents and villages, like that at Yenije Kale in 1896, were so generally condemned by the public opinion of Aleppo, Alexandretta, Aintab, and other towns that their contagion never spread. Even Zeitun, provocative though it was, escaped any very severe treatment. Thanks to the influence of Syrians like Izzet Pasha el-Abid, in Abdul Hamid's secret councils, the province got something more than its share of Government help and opportunity of advancement, with the result that it was by no means ripe for revolt in 1908, and that Abdul Hamid's name is not held accursed there at this day. It would not have required more than some consideration, some breadth of sympathy, some relaxation of doctrinaire patriotism, to secure the co-operation of Young Arabs with Young Turks and the continued solidarity of Syria with the Ottoman Empire.

Young Turk Revolution and Arabs.—Such consideration, however, the Arab-speaking peoples were not to find at the hands of the Ottomanising doctrinaires of the Committee of Union and Progress. Like other provincials, the Arabs had been carried off their feet by the high-sounding phrases which rang out at the first from Saloniką and Constantinople. Syria found these words easy to act upon, since she had no such notoriously subversive elements in her population as existed, for example, in European Turkey and in some parts of Asia Minor; and, even in Damascus, there was not much bitterness between races or creeds. But with ideas of nationality, home rule, and representative institutions in the air, no wonder the Arabs thought of managing

their own domestic affairs in their own language, of developing their own country, and of themselves enjoying the responsibilities and emoluments of its administration. Nothing more, even on the witness of Ahmed Jemal Pasha himself, was in the programme of the three or four Arab literary and political clubs which had come into being at Constantinople by the end of 1908, or in that of the larger "Reform Club," which was formed at Beirut in the following year.

Attempts at Ottoman Nationalisation.—The Committee of Union and Progress, however, lost no time in showing that it would have none of these ideals—not any nationalism but Ottoman Turk, not any official language but Turkish, not any home rule within the Empire, not any of the higher power in other hands than those that subscribed to its programme of one race, one language, one administration. One Constantinople club, the Akha el-Arab, founded by Shefik el-Muayad and Nadra Mutran, was snuffed out; Arab deputies heard plain words in the Chamber, and plainer if they attended meetings of the Committee of Union and Progress; the Adana massacre showed Arab-speaking Christians that they had not found a new earth; and the undisguised contempt testified by the Turks towards Arab Moslems warned these to expect no superior offices or emoluments. There was no mistaking the survival of the Old Turk in the Young one. All spirit of home rule was dealt with promptly and drastically, whether it was the Kurdish spirit of Ibrahim Pasha Milli in 1908; or the Arab spirit of the Mujaliah of Kerak, which threatened the Hejaz railway in 1910; or the Druse spirit, which provoked Sami Pasha in 1911; or the Armenian spirit of Zeitun, which never rested till broken in August 1914.

Anti-Turkish Committees.—By the time the Balkan War was going ill for the Turks the temper of Syrian Arabs had changed for the worse. Clubs like the Kahtaniya, which had been formed without a thought

of separatism, now contemplated a national *jihad* against Turkish "infidels," which Christians and Jews were called to join. Other clubs, the Jemiyat el-Islahiah, for example, were started to invite foreign intervention in Syria and even permanent foreign protection; and the attempt to suppress them in Beirut was met by a cessation of all trade and business for three days. In 1912 we find many of the Syrian Committeemen gathered into Egypt, where a "decentralisation society" ("el-La-Merkesiah") had been constituted with a non-separatist programme. It gradually became bitterly anti-Turk, and inclined to seek French or other European intervention. When the meagre concessions offered to the Arab Convention at Paris had proved a dead letter, the secret societies of Syria became definitely separatist; and the year 1914 was occupied with revolutionary intrigues in all the principal cities, the Turks knowing something of them and suspecting more, but being unable to lay their hands as yet on the leaders or on proofs of their guilt.

Incriminating correspondence was, however, found by the Turks soon after the outbreak of the recent war; and courts-martial, constituted in permanence at Aley, Damascus, and Aleppo, found excuse for instituting a reign of terror, which sent to execution or exile almost all possible leaders of Syrian revolt, and also for infringing the Constitution of the Lebanon. A Moslem Governor and Turkish garrisons were despatched to the Mountain in 1915, pending formal denunciation of the Organic Statute in the following year.

III. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

(1) Religious

(i) *Mohammedans*

Generally speaking, the indigenous population of Syria and Palestine is Sunni Moslem; and Jerusalem is regarded by orthodox Moslems as the holiest city after Mecca and Medina. The fellahin are more religious than the Beduins, though the latter were particularly influenced by the Wahabite movement.

There are in Syria a certain number of Shia sects, and of religious communities who came into existence during the first centuries of Mohammedan activity. To this latter class belong the Metawalis, who range from Lebanon as far as Homs; the Ismailites, or Assassins, who first appeared in Mesopotamia in the tenth century and are now to be met with in the Nusairiya mountains in the north of Syria; and the Druses.

The Druses number 55,000 in Hauran, 50,000 in the Lebanon (where they are to the Maronites as 2 is to 7), and about 45,000 in Hasbeya, Raheyra, and Homs The Druses of Hauran are the most representative of their sect. They are secret Unitarians (Muwahhidin), believing in successive reincarnations of the One God; these reincarnations include Jesus, but not Mohammed. The last incarnation was Hakim, the sixth Fatimite Caliph, who founded the sect in A.D. 996. Hakim will reappear in the world to make his religion supreme. The Druses believe in metempsychosis; they consider prayer to be an impertinent interference with the Creator, but are not fatalists. Polygamy and the use of wine and tobacco are forbidden. Truth in words is enjoined as a commandment, but only between Druses.

Outwardly, the Druses conform to Orthodox Mohammedanism; in their secret religion only 15 per cent. of the adults of both sexes are fully initiated, and wear a white turban as a distinguishing mark. It is doubtful whether there is any foundation for the tales of pagan practices connected with the secret religion.

(ii) *Christians*

Antioch and Jerusalem were the centres of Christianity in Syria and Palestine under the Roman Empire. The former was the seat of one of the three Great Patriarchs; the latter was given patriarchal dignity in the fifth century. Both sees were torn asunder by the Nestorian and Monophysite heresies in the fifth and sixth centuries, and through the epochs of the Arab invasions, the Crusade, and the Turkish rule, have never succeeded in re-establishing orthodoxy in their respective spheres. A further schism has been caused by the division between eastern and western Christendom.

The present position is that there are three Uniat Patriarchs and one Orthodox Patriarch of Antioch,[1] and a Latin and an Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem. The Uniat Patriarchs of Antioch are: (i) the Melchite, who resides at a monastery in the Lebanon, and has jurisdiction over all Uniats of Greek nationality in the Turkish Empire; (ii) the Maronite, who also resides in the Lebanon, and has jurisdiction over about 500,000 people; (iii) the Syrian, who resides near Diarbekr, and rules over 15,000-20,000 people who have seceded from the Jacobite Church.

Of the communities represented by these three Patriarchs, the Melchite represents the old Orthodox and Imperialist Byzantine Church, which refused, in the fifth and sixth centuries, to accept the Nestorian and Monophysite heresies; the Maronite represents a very old and extensive body of Christians in the Lebanon and other mountainous districts in Syria,

[1] There is also a Jacobite Patriarch.

whose orthodoxy during the Middle Ages is more than questionable, but who accepted a constitution from Rome in 1736. The Maronite Church has retained local usages, but Romanising influences are gaining ground, especially since the higher native clergy have begun to be educated in seminaries at Rome and Paris. There are Maronite colonies in Cyprus, Alexandria, and the United States.

The Syrian community is a reflux of the wave of Monophysite heresy that resulted in the foundation of a heretical sect by Jacob Baradaeus in the sixth century. The Jacobite sect included 150 archbishoprics during the Middle Ages, but has now only a small following. About 1860 the Uniat seceders were able to gain possession of most of the Jacobite churches.

The Orthodox Patriarch of Antioch, who now resides at Damascus, retains little of his old authority. Nearly all the 250,000 Christians under his jurisdiction are Syrian Arabs who know no Greek; but from 1724 to 1899 all the Patriarchs were Greeks, and, as a rule, unable even to speak Arabic. In 1899, when the see fell vacant, the Arabs proposed a candidate of their own, who was backed by the Russians and Rumanians; the Sultan yielded to pressure from the Russian Ambassador and appointed the Arab candidate. The Constantinopolitan Greeks, supported by the French Ambassador, refused to recognise the Arab candidate, who was, however, installed. Throughout his patriarchate (1899-1906), he was not recognised by Constantinople or Jerusalem; and the schism was continued under the next Patriarch.

The Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem has about 15,000 Christians under his jurisdiction. The Patriarchs have, since the sixteenth century, been Greeks who, until last century, lived in Constantinople, whereas the Orthodox Christians are, again, Syrian Arabs. The history of the Patriarchate during the last fifty years has been one continual struggle against Russian interference.

The Latin Patriarchate was founded during the Crusades; after the tragic failure of the latter the Patriarchs *in partibus* resided in Rome. In 1847 Pius IX sent the Latin Patriarch back to reside at Jerusalem.

Both Catholic and Protestant missions have been active in Palestine; and, from the early nineteenth century, much educational and medical work has been done by missionaries, mainly of English, French, American, or German nationality (*cf.* pp. 53—56)

The custody of the Christian Holy Places has naturally been a matter of supreme interest to Christians, and has caused many disputes. Not the least unedifying feature of these disputes has been the way in which the religious claims of their own Churches have been used by Governments as pretexts for political interference on a large scale.

(iii) *Jews*

The Jewish religion in Palestine and Syria is in no way distinguished from orthodox Judaism elsewhere. Their ritual is Sephardic or Ashkenazic, according as they originate from Spain and Portugal or the rest of Europe. The newcomers, especially the colonists, are inclined to be somewhat lax in their observance of rites and ceremonies. Of special interest among the Jews of Jerusalem are the colonies of Yemenite and Bokhariot Jews who immigrated because of the oppression they suffered in Arabia and Central Asia. There is no great cathedral synagogue even in Jerusalem.

The Jewish Holy Places are the Temple Area, now occupied by the Mosque of Omar, and the cave of Macpelah, covered by the Hebron Mosque. The Tomb of Rachel near Bethlehem, and the Tombs of the Rabbis at Tiberias are objects of exclusively Jewish reverence.

(2) Political

Except in the semi-autonomous Lebanon, the Government of Syria and Palestine differs from that of the

Turkish provinces only in that the Sanjak of Jerusalem is directly under the Porte.[1]

Lebanon has been, since European intervention of 1861, which followed the massacres of 1860, a separate sanjak under a Christian *mushir*, advised by a Central Council of Twelve, of whom only two are Moslems. The ordinance of 1861 was revised by the Porte in 1864, in concert with the six great protecting Powers.

The administrative divisions of Syria and Palestine have already been enumerated.[2]

(3) Public Education

General.—In Syria and Palestine elementary education is nominally compulsory for all. It may be given in other than State schools. For example, in Aleppo, a city of 250,000 inhabitants, there are stated to be 710 Moslem, 250 Christian, and 30 Jewish schools, with 19,000, 8,000, and 2,000 pupils respectively. This represents a school attendance of about 10 per cent. of the population. But, as the average number of pupils throughout the Turkish Empire is 4 per cent., that figure would probably be a fair estimate for Syria and Palestine also. The general level of efficiency in the State schools is low. Elementary education of a conventional kind is supplied gratis in the schools attached to the mosques.

Educational Work under British Control.—Ten British missionary societies report 19 educational institutions and boarding schools with close on 1,000 pupils; and about 120 elementary and village schools with about 9,000 pupils, of whom over two-thirds are girls. In Gaza alone 400 girls are in the mission schools.

The most important institutions are:—

In Syria: the Girls' Training College of the British-Syrian Mission at Beirut (staff, 6 Europeans and 15

[1] See above, p. 39.
[2] See above, p. 3.

native teachers; 114 boarders, of whom 42 are normal students; and 120 day pupils). There are also high-grade schools at Aleppo, Damascus, and Brumana in the Lebanon.

In Palestine: an English College (33 pupils) and the Bishop Gobat High School (84 pupils), both for men and boys, in Jerusalem; a Training School at Bethlehem (41 pupils); and an Orphanage School at Nazareth, both for girls. These four institutions belong to the Church Missionary Society. There are also high-grade schools at Jaffa, Safed, and Es-Salt, and several other places. A new college for well-to-do girls has recently been opened with great success in Jerusalem.

Educational Work under American Control.—This is all in Syria, except that the American Friends have schools at Ramallah, near Jerusalem. In Syria, 7 American Mission Boards have 19 institutions and boarding schools with about 1,400 pupils, and 118 day schools with 5,500 pupils, of whom over 3,000 are boys. The Syrian Protestant College in Beirut, governed by a Board of Trustees in New York, is a centre of light and learning in the country. It includes schools of medicine, pharmacy, dentistry, commerce, and arts and sciences. It has over 20 buildings and a staff of 69 foreigners. Even up to the middle of 1918 the College had over 700 students on its roll (not included in previous total), and its influence is felt in every country in the Levant. There are other American schools of high grade at Sidon (the Gerard Institution with industrial departments), Tripoli, Zahle, and other centres.

Roman Catholic Educational Agencies.—The following statistics are given by Comte Jean de Kergolay in the *Journal des Débats*. In Damascus and its neighbourhood between 4,000 and 5,000 children were being educated before the war by French religious communities. In Hauran there were nine schools, with 540 scholars. In Beirut the French Sisters of Charity had a girls' school with

2,000 scholars on the rolls; the Lazarists conducted a boys' school; there were also a boarding school and a day school for between 5,000 and 6,000 girls, and three other boys' schools. In Aleppo there was a Franciscan commercial college.

The Jesuit University in Beirut, founded as a school in 1875, almost immediately took the rank of a university, which has since 1891 had the power to confer degrees in philosophy and theology in accordance with the usage of the Gregorian University in Rome. The French Ministry of Public Instruction has also authorized it to grant the classical baccalaureate for Oriental lay scholars desirous of pursuing medical or legal studies in France. The Medical School, opened in 1883, was given, five years later, the power of conferring medical degrees after an examination passed before a Medical Committee sent out from France. These degrees were recognized in 1890 by Egypt, and in 1898 by Turkey; 390 doctors and 92 chemists have thus qualified. There were 275 students in 1911. There was also an Oriental Faculty, the lectures of which were open free; and smaller schools of law and engineering. A secondary and an elementary school, connected with this machinery for higher education, had, in 1913, 582 and 600 scholars respectively.

In Palestine there are 13 schools, several of them for girls, controlled by the Franciscans; these contain 1,700 children.

Jewish Educational Agencies.—European Jews have for the last half-century paid special regard to the educational needs of their co-religionists in Palestine. In Jerusalem there are the Rothschild Technical School and the Evelina Girls' School (Anglo-Jewish Association of London), and two boys' schools, one of which is administered by the Alliance Israélite of Paris (which also has founded an agricultural school at Jaffa); the other was formerly managed by the Hilfsverein of Berlin. These Jewish schools have restored Hebrew to its ancient rôle as the vernacular

of the Jews of Palestine. The foundation-stone of a Jewish University in Jerusalem was laid in 1918.

Other Educational Agencies.—German Protestant Missions have about 14 elementary schools in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem and in Haifa and Beirut, and an orphanage with a normal department attached in Jerusalem.

The Jaffa Gymnasium is chiefly Russian. The Greeks also have made provision for the education of their co-religionists and nationals in Palestine.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

Popular Opinion and National Sentiment

It is impossible to speak of any common national sentiment in Syria, since its population consists of so many diverse elements, often with conflicting interests and ideals. It may, however, be roughly divided for the present purpose into (i) Moslem, (ii) Christian (including Orthodox and Catholic), and (iii) Jewish. Each of these must be considered separately.

(i) *Moslems*

The majority of the population of Syria is Moslem; but it is by no means homogeneous in race, mentality, or organization, even in Palestine. Some West Syrians, who advocate the doctrine of "la Syrie intégrale," preach that Palestine is part of Syria, and that all the land from Alexandretta to Jaffa and from Aleppo to Ma'an is one country that can become a homogeneous state or nation. But such a policy could hardly be realised, even if there were no such things as the Arab and Zionist movements; and the existence of these movements makes it impossible. The people west of the Jordan are not Arabs, but only Arab-speaking. The bulk of the population are *fellahin*; that is to say, agricultural workers owning land as a village community or working land for the Syrian effendi. In the Gaza district they are mostly of Egyptian origin; elsewhere they are of the most mixed race. They have for

centuries been ground down, overtaxed, and bullied by the Turk, and still more by the Arab-speaking Turkish minor official and by the Syrian and Levantine landowner. They have little, if any, national sentiment, and would probably welcome any stable form of government which would guarantee to them reasonable security and enjoyment of the fruits of their labour.

A nebulous Syrian sentimentalism originated in Beirut, among a class of lawyers and traders, with no civilisation of their own, and demoralised by 500 years of Turkish misrule. They, like the Moslem effendi class in Palestine, and particularly the educated Moslem-Levantine population of Jaffa, evince a feeling somewhat akin to hostility towards the Arab movement, very similar to the feeling prevalent in Cairo and Alexandria. This class, while regretting the opportunities for illegitimate gain offered by Turkish rule, has no real political cohesion, and, above all, no power of organization. There is, however, a very widespread fear among the Moslem landowners that the progress of Zionism is inimical to their interests; and societies have been formed to organize resistance to the sale of land to the Jews.

A satisfactory solution of the West Syrian problem, which involves the territory north of the Litani river and west of the Rayak-Homs railway, is a matter for arrangement, now that Syria is definitely cleared of the Turks. As one goes eastward from the watershed which divides the Mediterranean from the Jordan valley, there is an increasing proportion of Arabs; and Trans-Jordania is an Arab country. The Arab movement is becoming increasingly national; its goal is Arab independence, free from British or French protection. It has as its aim the rehabilitation of the Arab nation, and the restoration of Damascus as a centre of Arab learning and culture (*cf.* p. 63) and an independent Arab capital.

(ii) *Christians*

The Christians in Palestine are for the most part settled in clearly defined local communities. There are about 12,000 in Jerusalem, 10,000 in Bethlehem, about 3,000 in Jaffa, and there are in addition a few Christian villages in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem. There is also a very considerable settlement of Christians who are partly Arab in race and speech beyond the Jordan, notably at Es-Salt. The overwhelming majority of the Christians in Judaea belong to Orthodox sects; in Jerusalem there are twice as many Orthodox as Catholics. The bulk of the Christians are interested, directly or indirectly, in the Holy Places and the pilgrims' traffic. However, in the villages round Jerusalem, and notably in Bethlehem, they engage in agricultural production, and must be regarded as an important element in the Palestinian local population.

The politics of Orthodoxy are in a transitional stage. Hitherto there has been a tendency to gravitate more and more into the orbit of Russia. Before the war large sums of money were received from Russia, and an annual flow of Russian pilgrims sustained the growing connection. The war and the Russian revolution have diverted this line of development. A certain number of the leading Orthodox clerics are now turning to the Kingdom of Greece; but, among many others, and the laity in particular, there are signs of the growth of the idea of a local Orthodox Church, autonomous and centred round the autonomous Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem.

Catholics tend to fall into two very distinct groups. These two groups centre round the Italian Franciscans and the French clerics respectively. The head of the Franciscans is the Custode della Terra Santa, who lives in the Franciscan Convent attached to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.

The Franciscans are in possession of the more important rights in connection with the Holy Places so

far as the Catholics are concerned. On the whole, they have the largest numerical following among the Palestinian Catholics. The various French orders do a great deal of educational work among Moslems as well as Christians.

The Armenians (non-Catholic), of all Christian denominations, are the most friendly disposed to the Anglican communion on the one hand, and, politically speaking, to the Zionists on the other. The Anglican Cathedral, with St. George's School attached to it, has for some time played a certain part in the Christian life of Jerusalem.

There has been during the past ten or fifteen years striking growth in German religious and political penetration. The city of Jerusalem is to-day literally dominated by new German religious buildings. Within the city, near the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, is the great Lutheran Church of the Redeemer. Immediately outside the walls, near the Damascus Gate, is the big German Catholic Hospice, while on the other side of the city the Catholic Church of the Dormition has recently been rebuilt in the German Romanesque style by German effort. Above all, on the Mount of Olives, is the great German Convent. Large establishments at Bethlehem and the agricultural colonies of Savona and Wilhelma, founded by the German Templars near Jaffa, are evidence of the rapid growth of German penetration.

American Protestant and other missions have also done much work in Syria; the well-known American college at Beirut is the most prominent of these.

(iii) *Jews*

The Jews in Palestine may be divided into two main classes, by no means identical in their social conditions and their aspirations. On the one hand there are the older inhabitants, some of them craftsmen or agriculturists, refugees from other lands; but the great majority of them, particularly in Jerusalem, are fanatical in religion and opposed to modern Zionism.

On the other, there are the more recent immigrants, consisting mainly of agricultural colonists introduced into the country by Zionist influence or other philanthropic agencies. The attitude of the two classes to political questions generally and to the Zionist movement in particular, is widely divergent.[1]

In Jerusalem the Jews form the majority of the population, outnumbering all the Christians and Moslems combined. In Hebron they are a small minority. The Jerusalem Jews include a minority of Zionists, composed of the artisan and shop-keeping classes; but the bulk of Jerusalem Jewry consists of the orthodox Jews, either devoted entirely to the religious life or dependent upon the religious devotees. This class of Jews (the Halukah) produces no wealth, and depends on charity, being supported by contributions from Jews all over the world. It does not participate in the political life of the country or in the common work of organization of the colonists. The religious devotees, who are emigrants or the children of emigrants from the ghettoes of Russia, Hungary, Galicia, and Rumania, spend their whole lives in the study of religious books; and their lives are regulated by the closest observance of the Judaic ritual. Some of them are undoubtedly "religious," but many of them live on alms in a condition of dirt, poverty, and idleness, which is almost indescribable. They, however, regard themselves as a caste above the other Jews of Jerusalem. The children begin at an early age to study the Talmud in the Talmud Torah schools, after which they continue their study for the remainder of their lives in the Yeshivoth. There they read or intone aloud from Hebrew books daily from sunrise to sunset, or are cross-examined by the rabbis regarding the most abstruse points of scholastic interpretation of the Mishnah in German Yiddish. All this takes place in conditions so insanitary that periodical ravages of typhus and malaria carry off numbers of the popula-

[1] For the Zionist Movement, see *Zionism*, No. 162 of this series.

tion, whose physical development is almost atrophied and whose intellectual development is abnormally strained. They are intensely bigoted, and are ruled by the rabbis. Nevertheless, these students represent an idea which must not be allowed to die; they have kept alive some aspects of Judaism for the Jewish people. The Hebrew university would go a long way to inspire the Halukah with the idea that they did not exist merely for themselves. It is important that the Halukah should be guided in such a way as would assure the flame of Jewish learning being kept alive in Jerusalem under more tolerable conditions.

There are in addition other communities, attracted to Jerusalem as the Holy City from all parts of the world, who, while they do not carry matters to such extremes as those described above, live a life of comparative seclusion from the ordinary affairs of the world and as more or less self-contained colonies. The most interesting of these is the Bokhara-Samarkand colony from Trans-Caspia. This colony, which is situated some two miles outside the Holy City, speaks either Hebrew or Persian Yiddish; most of the people write in Persian character. They are well-to-do, somewhat attractive in mien, and, if their statements regarding their origin are true, they are the descendants of people who have lived in Bokhara and Samarkand since the time of Tamerlane the Great, and before his time in Persia, and before that in Babylon. Another element that deserves mention is the Yemenites, who have been coming back to Palestine in fair numbers during the last twelve or fifteen years under the influence of the Zionist movement. These Yemenite Jews, who speak a pure Hebrew and very pure Arabic, have been cut off from the rest of the world since the rise of Islam in the seventh century of our era. They are the remnant of those large Jewish communities, many autonomous, which existed in all the cities of Arabia in the time of Mohammed. They have maintained themselves absolutely distinct and orthodox in religion for many

centuries in Yemen, and have acted as metal-workers, craftsmen, and carpenters for their Arab rulers. Three or four thousand Yemenites are now living in Palestine either as agricultural labourers or still as craftsmen in Jerusalem.

The Jewish agricultural colonies, which have grown up during the past twenty-five years, show a level of agricultural and scientific development far ahead of anything else in Palestine. The Jews have in many cases flung themselves upon barren and uncultivated land and transformed it into rich intensively cultivated plantations. The colonies are inhabited by strong and healthy agriculturists living in clean, well-built houses, and possessing a high degree of commercial and political organization, as well as a distinctive social life. The schools are progressive and excellent in every way. The children think and talk in Hebrew, and all the colonists possess the newly acquired national consciousness. They have their own newspapers, their own cultural institutions, and their own national anthem. They are all pioneers, and look forward to the day when they can acquire more land and can be joined by emigrants from all parts of the world inspired by the same ideals. They have a representative system of organization on an adult suffrage basis. Each colony is self-contained and autonomous; and the common affairs of all the colonists are in the hands of a Federal Committee elected by the Vaads (Committees of the Colonists).

The most important event which has taken place, so far as the Jewish community in Palestine is concerned, since our occupation, has been the recruiting of Palestine Jews, whatever their national states, into the British army; and practically the whole available Jewish youth of the colonies and many of the townsmen of military age came forward for voluntary enlistment in the Jewish battalions, took the oath to King George V, and were clad in British uniforms. The initiative in favour of the recruiting movement

took place as the result of the demand of the Jewish population itself, rather than from any desire or even encouragement from the British authorities. The campaign in Palestine is regarded by the Jews as a campaign for the liberation of the country from the thraldom of Turkish misrule, and the return of even Turkish suzerainty would be regarded by them as a betrayal.

The essence of the Zionist ideal is the desire to found upon the soil of Palestine a revived Hebrew nation based upon an agricultural life and the use of the Hebrew language. Just before the war, a struggle took place between the Zionists in Palestine and a body called the "Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden," over an attempt by the German Jews to introduce the German language into certain Jewish schools in Palestine. The whole secret of British popularity in Palestine depends upon our willingness to give the people freedom to develop their own national consciousness in their own way.

The desires of the Zionists, as formulated in the document quoted in *Zionism* (No. 162 of this series, p. 39), are very moderate in themselves and by no means inconsistent with the interests and ideals of either the Arab movement or of the Moslem inhabitants of Palestine. Jewish national development, cultural, agricultural, and economic, is inevitable and natural in Palestine after the war. There is so much unoccupied and uncultivated land in Palestine that there is plenty of room for Zionist development without ousting the existing Moslem population. The Jews have already shown that land, hitherto regarded as barren, can be converted in a very short space of time into rich vineyards, or into fruit and almond plantations. With the Arab movement centred at Damascus, Zionism in Palestine would be a help rather than a hindrance to it; for that movement would only suffer from the attempt to absorb a district ethnologically and otherwise so different from countries in which the Arab element stands alone or is distinctly predominant.

Above all, from the Zionist point of view, Turkish and German influences must be kept as far as possible from the confines of Palestine; and this can only be done by the realisation of Arab hopes.

The Zionist development will be practical rather than political, and Zionists make no secret of the fact that they wish the political control of the country to remain in the hands of Great Britain. They seek to have in Palestine cultural and local autonomy together with commercial representation, such as has been granted to the Mohammedans in India. They want Hebrew recognized as an official language of the country equally with Arabic.

History, age-long associations, and present-day conditions point alike to the separability of Syria and Palestine; and such a separation violates none of the principles laid down by the Allied Powers at the commencement, or recognised by them in the course, of the recent war.

IV. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(A) MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

(1) Internal

(a) *Roads, Caravan Routes, Tracks*

Of the more important Syrian roads, two, the Beirut—Damascus and Tripoli—Homs roads, are peculiar in having been built by private companies, both of which were afterwards bought out by the railway company whose lines between the same points have more or less superseded the roads. All other roads are due to the Government, and are divided into three classes: those of the first class, connecting capitals of vilayets with Constantinople or with the nearest seaport or railway station, are seven or eight metres in width, and metalled to a depth of 25 cm.; second class roads, which connect vilayet capital towns, are six metres in width, with lighter metalling; all other roads are included in the third class. Maintenance of roads is exacted from the population, either in labour or in a money equivalent, and in 1889 10 per cent. of the revenue of the Banque agricole was also assigned to this purpose. Bridge-tolls are collected in some instances. Nevertheless, before 1914 the roads generally were very defective, except in the Lebanon, where they were well kept up. During the war, however, great improvements have been effected both by repairs and by fresh construction, additions of about 500 km. in all being reported.

The existing system of main roads in June 1916 may be summarised as follows:—

(i) Along the coast: Gaza—Jaffa—Haifa, about 180 km., and Es-Sur—Saida—Beirut—Tripoli, about 170 km. Between Haifa and Es-Sur a stretch of some 60 km. remains ill-provided, and a much longer one between Tripoli and Alexandretta, a region which is especially badly served. At Alexandretta the coast road begins again, skirting the gulf and then striking west to Missis and Adana.

(ii) The main internal artery: El-Auja—Bir es-Seba (Beersheba) — Hebron (El-Khulil) —Jerusalem—Nablus (Shechem)—Nazareth—Tiberias (Tubariya)—Kuneitra—Damascus—Homs—Hama—Aleppo (Haleb)—Killis—Aintab, about 750 km.

(iii) Roads from the principal towns on the coast joining or crossing the route last described: Gaza—Bir es-Seba, about 45 km.; Jaffa—Jerusalem—Jericho—Es-Salt—Amman, 182 km.; Jaffa—Nablus, 60 km.; Saida—Safed—Roshpina, 76 km.; Beirut—Damascus, 126 km.; Tripoli—Homs, 94 km.; Alexandretta—Aleppo —Meskene, 245 km.

A road from Akka to Safed, which should be very useful, has been begun. The road between Alexandretta and Aleppo, the most important trade route of the country, is partially out of repair. With proper maintenance and the extension of the roads, vehicular transport, both mechanical and animal-drawn, would no doubt soon increase. Hitherto, waggons have been little used except in the Lebanon and by the agricultural colonists near Haifa and Jaffa. Motor lorries have recently been extensively employed for military transport, the wear and tear occasioned to the roads being made good by labour battalions.

The main caravan routes from Syria take five directions, (i) northwards to Marash and beyond: (ii) north-east across the upper Euphrates towards

Urfa and Diarbekr; (iii) eastward across the Euphrates towards Mosul and, further south, Baghdad; (iv) south and south-east to Arabia; (v) south-west to Egypt.

(i) The most direct route from Alexandretta to Marash leaves the Aleppo road at the Beilan Pass, and follows the Kara Su valley along the eastern slope of the Amanus (Elma Dagh). This valley is unhealthy in summer, and there is an alternative route *via* Payas, Osmania, and the Bagche Pass. There is a considerable traffic, chiefly by means of camels, between Alexandretta and the inland towns to the north and north-east.

(ii) From Aleppo, routes leading in the direction of Urfa and Diarbekr cross the Euphrates at three points, Birijik, Jerablus, and Tel Ahmar (Kala'at en-Nejim). The northern crossing at Birijik is taken by caravans from Killis, Aintab, and Marash, the route from Marash passing slightly north of Aintab. From Aleppo there are two well-defined routes, by Akhterin to Jerablus, and by El-Bab and Membij to Tel Ahmar, the latter, which had gone out of favour owing to danger from Beduin, having since 1908 come into use again.

(iii) The two main easterly routes (for Mosul, Baghdad, &c.) are from Aleppo to Meskene (whence goods for Baghdad are commonly carried down the river on rafts to Faluja), and from Damascus to Deir ez-Zor (Ed-Deir) *via* Tadmur (Palmyra). Traffic between Damascus and Baghdad is fairly regular, caravans passing each way every 40 or 60 days; they are less frequent in the summer months. The usual route between Damascus and Tadmur is by Nebk and Karyatein. There is also a direct route between Tadmur and Homs.

(iv) The old pilgrim road from Damascus to Ma'an for Medina and Mecca is now largely super-

seded by the railway, and a more important caravan route in this direction is that leading from the Hauran down the Wadi Sirhan to Jauf and central Arabia. At Weisat, about 175 km. from Jauf by this way, another track strikes westward to Ma'an.

(v) Traffic to and from Egypt is for the most part by sea, but the old coast road *via* Gaza and Rafa is still used, and many camels are sent that way in the summer.

Inferior roads and tracks are too numerous to describe in detail, though they have an importance in consequence of the large extent to which pack-animals are still used. It has been estimated that in Syria the tonnage transported by animals is at least equal to that sent by rail. Since 1914, however, pack-animals have been commandeered in large numbers for military purposes, and very many are reported to have died.

(b) *Rivers*

The Euphrates lying outside the scope of the present survey, Syria and Palestine may be said to have no navigable rivers. In winter, boats of 100 tons can ascend the Nahr el-Asi (Orontes) for about three miles; this river is 100 yds. wide at its mouth; its depth inside the bar is 9 ft., and on the bar 3-5 ft. There are no canals. During the war a service of motor boats and barges across the Dead Sea was established in order to transport grain from the Kerak district to the north-west shore for Jerusalem. A small steam launch owned by the Hejaz Railway plies on the Lake of Tiberias from Semakh to Tiberias in connection with trains.

(c) *Railways*

(i) *Railway System in General*

The railways fall into four groups:—

1. The Baghdad Railway, of which the Syrian portions are: Islahie — Muslimie — Aleppo,

142 km.; Muslimie—Jerablus, 93 km.; Alexandretta—Toprak Kale branch, 60 km.; total, 295 km., completed 1914.

2. The French Group, consisting of:

(*a*) The system of the company now called the Société Ottomane du Chemin de fer Damas—Hama et prolongements. This includes three lines of a total length of 682 km.:

i. Beirut—Rayak—Damascus—Mzerib, 249 km., completed 1895;

ii. Rayak—Homs—Hama—Aleppo, 331 km., completed 1906;

iii. Tripoli—Homs, 102 km., completed 1911.

(*b*) Chemin de fer de la Palestine (Jaffa—Jerusalem), 87 km., completed 1892.

(*c*) Tramways Libanais (administered by the management of the Beirut—Damascus line): Beirut Harbour—Mameltein, 19 km., completed 1908. In 1913 an extension was undertaken to Jebeil, 20 km. further.

3. The Hejaz Railway, of which the Syrian section of the main line, Damascus—Deraa—Ma'an, 459 km., was completed in 1904. Between 1904 and 1917 the following lines were added: Haifa—Deraa—Bosra, 200 km.; Akka—Beled esh-Sheikh (Haifa line), 17 km.; Afule (El-Fule, Haifa line)—Massudie—Ludd (Jaffa line), about 100 km.; Massudie—Nablus, 15 km.; Wadi Surar (Jaffa line)—Bir es-Seba—El-Auja, 155 km., with a branch Et-Tine—Julis—Deir Sineid—Beit Hanum, 39 km. to be carried on to Gaza, some 10 km. further, and a sub-branch of about 12 km. from Deir Sineid to Huj. These two branch lines have been dismantled since the British occupation. The total length is 997 km., exclusive of the Arabian section from Ma'an to Medina [843 km.], the present terminus to the south. This line is

linked up with the French Beirut—Mzerib line by short branches at Damascus and Mzerib.

Some portions of these railways have been more or less dismantled during the war, *viz.*, the line between Alexandretta and Erzin on the branch of the Baghdad Railway, the Damascus—Mzerib section, the Tripoli—Homs line, the Jaffa—Jerusalem line between Jaffa and Ramle, and the Deraa—Ma'an section, and the greater portion of the Deraa—Bosra eski Sham section on the Hejaz main line. This last has been partly destroyed by the British Army, while the Alexandretta—Toprak Kale line has also been bombarded by the Allies.

4. Strategic railways built by the British Army. These consist of the following:—
   (*a*) The extension of the Kantara—Rafa line along the coast *viâ* Gaza and Sukereir to Ludd on the Jaffa—Jerusalem line: approximately 102 km.
   (*b*) A branch line from Rafa to Bir es-Seba: 60 km.
   (*c*) Ludd—Tulkeram, 44 km. This line was built practically along the old Turkish 3 ft. $5\frac{1}{2}$ in. gauge line which has been dismantled.
   (*d*) Tulkeram—Haifa, 67 km. This runs along the old Turkish railway alignment as far as El-Mejdel.
   (*e*) The line from Ludd to Jerusalem has been altered from the Turkish 3 ft. $5\frac{1}{2}$ in. gauge to the standard gauge.

All the railways are single track, and burn coal or patent fuel.

Local electric tramways have been installed at Beirut and Damascus, but have so far been unremunerative, apparently owing largely to the excessive cost of the concessions. Similar systems have been planned at Aleppo, Jerusalem, and Jaffa. A horse-tramway owned by a native company connects the town of Tripoli with its harbour of El-Mina, 2 km. distant.

(ii) *Particulars of Construction*

Gauges. On the Baghdad Railway, the Tripoli—Aleppo section of the Chemin de fer Damas—Hama, and on the British lines, the gauge is the normal one of 1·435 m., or 4 ft. 8½ in. On all others it is the narrow gauge of 1·05 m., or 3 ft. 5·34 in. (the Jaffa line was 5 cm. narrower, but has been altered during the war).

The *mode of traction* on all lines is the usual adhesion system, except on the line of the Chemin de fer Damas—Hama from Beirut to Rayak, on which, between the stations of Hadeth and Jedita-Shtora, trains are run on a rack-rail (Swiss Abt) system for a distance of 31 km.

Bridges, gradients, &c.

1. Baghdad Railway.—The line from Islahie, which enters the Aleppo vilayet near Rajun, crosses several streams, the chief bridges being at 12·8 km. and 37 km.; there is also a 130 ft. bridge at Kurd Kulak. Beyond Aleppo the line crosses the Kuweik by a 60 ft. span girder bridge, the Sajur by a two-span girder and reinforced concrete bridge, each span of 30 ft., and leaves Syrian territory at Jerablus, where the bridge over the Euphrates is of 10 spans, with overhead lattice girder, and of a total length of 2,677 ft. Between Akbar and Katma the ruling gradient is 1 in 40, elsewhere it is 1 in 80.

2. (*a*) Chemin de fer Damas—Hama et prolongements.

(i) Beirut—Damascus—Mzerib. Apart from one curve of 80 metres radius between Damascus and Mzerib, the sharpest curve on the adhesion section has a radius of 100 metres, and on the rack section a radius of 120 metres. On the rack section the steepest gradient is about 1 in 12, between Muderij and Deir el-Beidar. On the ordinary line are some gradients of 1 in 33-40. There are a number of bridges, the most

notable being two of 50 ft. over the Litani, and two of 60 ft. over the Barada; these are girder bridges. There are five tunnels, but the length of the longest is not more than 400 yds.

(ii) Rayak—Aleppo. The ruling gradient is 1 in 80. After the 48th kilometre from Rayak there are several bridges, including two of three 20 ft. girders, and at the 98th km. there is a 50 ft. girder bridge. Further on there are two large bridges over the Orontes: one, near Telbise, has a central span of 80 ft. between two 30 ft. arches (while beyond it is a four-span girder bridge over a tributary stream); the other, at Hama, is 165 ft. long.

(iii) Tripoli—Homs. The steepest gradient is 1 in 50, and the chief bridge that over the Orontes.

2. (*b*) Chemin de fer de la Palestine (Jaffa—Jerusalem). There is a sharp curve at Ludd station, and others after Deir Aban. The steepest gradient is 1 in 62. Over the Wadi Surar there is a girder bridge of 50 ft. beyond Sayad, and two others of 100 ft., beyond Deir Aban.

3. Hejaz Railway.

(i) Damascus—Ma'an. There is insufficient ballast on several sections. Gradients of 1 in 45 occur, one coinciding with a sharp curve of 100 m. radius at the tunnel (154 yds. long) south of Amman, where derailments have taken place; there is also a sharp curved gradient after Khan Sebib (295 km.). The more important viaducts and bridges are: one of three 20 ft. arches over Nahr el-Awaj, one of five 20 ft. arches after Deraa, two of six 20 ft. arches over Wadi Zerka (at 207 km. and 220 km.), the Amman viaduct of ten 25 ft. arches, one of six 20 ft. arches after Jise, four of six 25 ft. arches after Khan Sebib, and another similar one at 348 km.

(ii) Haifa—Deraa. There is a masonry bridge of six 20 ft. arches over Nahr el-Mukatta, one of three 25 ft. arches over the Nazareth road, and one of six 40 ft. arches over the Jordan. From this point a long

succession of bridges and tunnels occurs. There are thirteen bridges over the Yarmuk, the last, which has a central girder span of 165 ft. with three 40 ft. masonry arches on either side, being the longest. Of the seven tunnels, the longest is 300 yds. Between Haifa and Jasr Mejamie in the Jordan valley the ruling gradient is 1 in 70; east of that point the gradient varies between 1 in 40 and 1 in 55.

(iii) Afule—Ludd. The line follows an easy route in the plain, crossing a few water-courses and the Nahr el-Auja. Accurate details are not yet available.

(iv) Wadi Surar—El-Auja. There are a number of bridges, of which the largest are: one of ten arches at Wadi el-Abiad, one of 16 arches over Wadi Rakhama (36 km.), one of 19 arches at Um Dabkal (93 km.), and one of 15 arches at Arak el-Menshiya (116 km.).

4. British Strategic Railways. Details of the construction of these lines are not yet available.

(iii) *Relations to Government: Foreign and Other Concessions*

The only State-owned railway is the Hejaz system, which owes its inception to the Sultan Abdul Hamid; it has been built with funds subscribed by Mohammedans in Turkey and elsewhere, supplemented by taxation, and much of the labour was supplied by soldiers. Other lines have been built, under concessions, by private companies:—

1. Baghdad Railway (German). The concession for the Syrian sections is for 99 years from 1908.

2. (*a*) Chemin de fer Damas—Hama et prolongements.

(i) Beirut—Damascus—Mzerib. A concession for the Damascus—Mzerib section was originally given to a Belgian company, and another for a line from Beirut to Damascus to a French company; in 1892 these companies amalgamated, and the concession for the whole was fixed at 99 years from 1891.

(ii) Rayak—Aleppo. The concession is for 99 years from 1893.

(iii) Tripoli—Homs. This concession (granted in 1908) runs concurrently with the last, and includes a service of lighters in the port of El-Mina. The Government has the right to half the gross receipts above 15,000 frs. per km. from the 46th to the 50th year of the concession, and subsequently to half those above 18,600 frs.

2. (*b*) Chemin de fer de la Palestine (Jaffa—Jerusalem). The concession is for 71 years from 1888.

2. (*c*) Tramways Libanais. The concession is for 99 years from 1891, with provision for prolongation of the line northwards to Tripoli and southwards to Saida.

(iv) *Finance*

1. Bagndad Railway.—The company has a capital of 15,000,000 frs. only, the building expenses having been met by the State, which issued 4 per cent. bonds to the company at the rate of 269,110 frs. per km.; and there is a kilometric guarantee of 4,500 frs. for working expenses. If the gross receipts exceed this latter sum, the difference up to 5,500 frs. goes to the Government, and 60 per cent. of any further excess. No separate statistics for the Syrian sections of the line have been issued. In 1915 the total gross receipts were 10,443,553 frs., and 5,900,912 frs. were paid to the Government on account of receipts above the guarantee, but no dividend was declared; from 1906-13 there was a dividend of 5 per cent. The Government has a right of purchase at any time.[1]

2. (*a*) Chemin de fer Damas—Hama. The capital of this company, behind which is the Paris Régie Générale des Chemins de fer, consists of 107,500,000 frs. in 4 per cent. debentures, issued since the reconstruction of 1901, on which interest has regularly been paid; 60,000,000 frs. in 3 per cent. old debentures, taken over by the Imperial

[1] See also *Anatolia*, No. 59 of this series, pp. 45-48.

Ottoman Bank, on which for the years 1907-1911 slightly under 3 per cent. *per annum* was paid; and 15,000,000 frs. in ordinary shares, which received in the same period only a little over 1 per cent. *per annum*. Only the Rayak-Aleppo line has a kilometric guarantee, finally fixed at 13,600 frs., which in 1911 cost the Government over 1,800,000 frs. In 1905 the company received £T150,000 in State bonds as compensation for loss entailed by the competition of the Hejaz Railway, whose line from Damascus to Deraa runs parallel with the French line to Mzerib.

The traffic returns show that while the Beirut—Damascus—Mzerib line is the most lucrative, the Rayak—Aleppo line has progressed more steadily.

(i) Beirut—Damascus—Mzerib line.

Year.		Gross receipts in frs.	Receipts per km. in frs.
1907	...	4,171,991	16,891
1908	...	4,704,744	19,048
1909	...	4,619,333	18,701
1910	...	4,578,055	18,585
1911	...	4,350,436	17,458

(ii) Rayak—Aleppo line.

Year.		Gross receipts in frs.	Receipts per km. in frs.
1907	...	1,804,648	5,436
1908	...	2,110,000	6,355
1909	...	2,284,610	6,881
1910	...	2,627,234	7,913
1911	...	2,678,625	8,063

(iii) Tripoli—Homs line. For the seven months of 1911 during which the line was working the gross receipts were 627,757 frs.; at this rate the receipts for the whole year would be 10,550 frs. pr km.

2. (*b*) Chemin de fer de la Palestine (Jaffa—Jerusalem). The capital of the company consists of 286,000 frs. in old debentures redeemable without interest by 1949; 9,512,000 frs. in new 5 per cent.

debentures, to which 95 per cent. of the net revenue is assigned; and 4,000,000 frs. in ordinary shares (all in units of 500 frs.). Since the reconstruction in 1894 the gross receipts have risen steadily, and in 1908 the full dividend of 5 per cent. tax free on the new debentures was paid, but the return to shareholders was still under 1 per cent.

Year.	Gross receipts in frs.	Receipts per km. in frs.
1907 ...	1,120,609	12,881
1908 ...	1,120,690	12,882
1909 ...	1,211,079	13,920
1910 ...	1,368,423 (approx.)	15,729
1911 ...	1,388,755	15,963

Receipts are largely derived from passenger traffic, which is at its height in March and April. Of the goods traffic over 80 per cent. is in the direction of Jerusalem, whence there is little export. The competition of camel transport is assisted by the inconvenient position of the railway stations both at Jaffa and Jerusalem.

2. (*c*) Tramways Libanais. The capital is 2,400,000 frs. in 4 per cent. debentures, interest on which has been paid, and 3,600,000 frs. in ordinary shares, which have hitherto received no dividend. Statistics of the traffic of this line are not published.

3. Hejaz Railway.—Being Government property, this system is independent of interest-bearing capital.

Year.	Gross receipts in £T.	Receipts per km. in £T.
1911-12 ...	282,868	193
1912-13 ...	297,976	198

Working expenses for the year 1912-13 were £T 251,702. These figures include the extra-Syrian section from Ma'an to Medina. Receipts have depended on passengers rather than on goods. The most profitable portion of the line is that from Haifa to Deraa, but no separate statistics are available.

(v) *Adequacy to Economic Needs; Possibilities of Expansion*

Syria is now comparatively well provided with railways, though the use of two gauges is unfortunate. A line traverses the interior of the country from north to south, forking at Deraa into two branches, one running east of the Jordan, while the other, with its feeders, serves the region west of that river. The chief ports, Beirut, Alexandretta, Haifa, Jaffa, Tripoli, are linked with the internal railway, and the main inland centres of commerce and industry have been given communication by rail with the sea. Some projected extensions would further improve the system.

On the Baghdad Railway branches are designed to Aintab and Birejik; a branch *viâ* Killis to Aintab, which is a flourishing industrial town, is especially desirable.

A proposal put forward in 1909 by the Ministry of Public Works included a line from Rayak to El-Arish *via* Afule. A line has now been built from Afule southwards, but the extension north to Rayak remains to be constructed; it would traverse a fertile region, and serve the considerable town of Safed.

In 1908 the administration of the Hejaz Railway was authorised to build a line from Afule to Jerusalem. There is continuous railway communication between these places, and though the route might be greatly shortened by building a line from Nablus to Jerusalem, it is doubtful whether such an undertaking is sufficiently needed to justify the labour and expense. Connected with this plan is one for a branch from Jerusalem to Ma'an by Jericho and Es-Salt, which would give access to a somewhat isolated district, and in particular facilitate the exploitation of the large phosphate area about Es-Salt (*cf.* p. 111). It has also been proposed to extend the Deraa—Bosra branch to Salchat and then carry it northwards through the Druse country to join the main line again at El-Mismije.

The line of the Tramways Libanais (Beirut—Mameltein—Jebeil) was planned to connect Tripoli and Saida.

In 1913 the extension to Jebeil was taken in hand; and the completion of the programme should be beneficial, and not unremunerative in this populous district.

The project of connecting the Palestinian and Egyptian railways has lately been realised by the construction of the military line from El-Kantara to Gaza. A proposed branch of the Hejaz Railway, connecting Ma'an and Akaba, might prove of some economic importance, provided that political and military considerations permitted its construction.

The question of the line advocated by Sir W. Willcocks across the Syrian desert to Mesopotamia becomes important in view of recent events. The best route seems to be Tripoli—Homs—Tadmur, whence the line might be carried along the regular caravan track to Deir ez-Zor (190 km.), or strike more directly east to Abu Kemal (245 km.), a route on which, however, water is scarcer. By the former, the total length (passing directly from Ana to Baghdad, and avoiding Hit) would be 916 km., of which 814 would be new; by the latter 830 km., 728 being new. The Tripoli—Homs line has comparatively easy gradients and good alignment, and is further commended by its standard gauge. The railways to Damascus from Beirut and Haifa are narrow-gauge; the Beirut line is, moreover, handicapped by its rack-rail section, and the port is already too small for the traffic, while against the Haifa—Damascus route there is the greater distance. A line from Alexandretta to Aleppo *via* Beilan would be very costly.

Apart from the projects described above, further development in suitable localities by minor branch lines, which would obviate expensive camel transport, is desirable (*cf.*, however, p. 85, note).

(d) *Posts, Telegraphs, Telephones*

The foreign post offices, which were maintained in several centres by each of the six Powers, were formally abolished by the Government in 1914. Turkish post offices are of three kinds: (1) international, from which

telegrams can be sent in a European language (not cypher); (2) native, at which only Turkish or Arabic telegrams are accepted; and (3) postal stations without telegraphic connection. Offices of the first two classes are fairly numerous, and postal facilities now extend to all the more important towns. The following places have international offices: Aintab, Akka, Aleppo, Alexandretta, Antakia, Baabda, Beirut, Beit ed-Din, Damascus, Gaza, Haifa, Hasbeya, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Kuneitra, Latakia, El-Merkez, El-Mina (Tripoli), Nazareth, Safed, Saida, Tiberias.

Syria has no public telephones; short lines have been installed in some towns for official use.

(2) External

(a) *Ports*

(i) *Accommodation, &c.*

In general, westerly winds predominate on the coast. From April to October land and sea breezes prevail, but in April and May hot south-east winds are liable to occur. Gales begin in November, and are frequent in January and February, generally starting from south or south-east and veering to south-west or to north-west, when they may become very violent. The current generally sets north; its rate, even when helped by wind, is rarely over one mile an hour. There is no variation of tide at ports north of Jaffa, though here spring tides rise $1\frac{1}{2}$ ft.

The only adequately constructed port is that of *Beirut*, built at a cost of 12,500,000 frs. by a French company, which has a concession for 99 years from 1887. Its management since 1903 has been in the hands of the Régie Générale des Chemins de fer (*cf.* p. 74). In 1909 the revenue was 1,038,695 frs. gross, 210,835 frs. net. The capital consists of 6,000,000 frs. in shares and 7,500,000 frs. in 4 per cent. debentures: the former received a first dividend of 1 per cent. in 1904, and this rose gradually to $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in 1913. The

harbour, which is about fifty acres in extent, lies between two moles, the width at the entrance being about 160 yds. and the depth seven fathoms, decreasing to one fathom by the quays. The railway runs on to the main quay. Four electric cranes of five tons capacity have lately been set up, and Beirut alone of Syrian ports possesses proper warehouse accommodation. There are two coaling wharves, the outer one about 150 yds. in length, with a depth of 17-25 ft. of water alongside, the inner about 100 yds., with 6 ft. of water. Nearly all steam vessels enter the harbour when they can find room, but the port is too small, as well as too shallow, for modern requirements. The anchorage outside is open from west to north, and strong westerly gales are frequent from November to March; but ships are comparatively safe above the mouth of the Nahr Beirut, just east of the town, where there is a tough mud bottom.

The six other ports which are regularly visited by steamers—Alexandretta, El-Mina (Tripoli), Haifa, Jaffa, Latakia, Saida—are at present open roadsteads without artificial protection. *Alexandretta* (Iskanderun), at the south-east corner of the gulf which bears its name, has the safest anchorage on the whole Syrian coast. Winds, indeed, are extremely variable here, but there is shelter from all except those from the north, which in January and February sometimes delay landing for a few hours. The bottom is generally mud. There are some fairly good storehouses and several small piers for loading and discharging cargo, which has to be done by means of lighters; the Custom House pier, 120 yds. long and 9 yds. broad, with a steam crane of $1\frac{1}{2}$ tons, has only 5 ft. of water at the end. The projected harbour works were begun in 1912 by the Baghdad Railway Company, but so far have made little progress. The town is handicapped by the prevalence of malaria in summer, and seems unlikely to grow greatly in importance except as a port of transit.

El-Mina, the port of Tripoli (Tarabolus), is protected to some extent on the west by a chain of low rocks and

little islands which runs north-west for some distance from the promontory. Between two of the islands a channel nearly half a mile broad and at least six fathoms deep gives access to the bay from the west. The roadstead, however, lies open to the north, though when gales blow from that quarter an anchorage south-west of the promontory may be utilised. Boats of 5 ft. draught can discharge at one of the moles, except in a strong north wind. There is a coal wharf 120 ft. in length, with 6 ft. of water alongside. Warehouse accommodation, as usual, is defective. Surveys for projected harbour works have been made.

Haifa lies on the south-west shore of the sandy bay at Akka, which is well protected on that side by Mount Carmel, and affords a safe anchorage in summer. The railway pier extends about 380 yds., and has a width of about 50 yds., with a depth of 12 ft. of water at the end; it is supplied with two cranes, the larger lifting two tons. There was no coal wharf in 1914, though large stocks of coal were imported for the Hejaz Railway.

At *Jaffa* the harbour lies between a sea wall on the north side of the town and a fringe of low rocks, the width ranging from 50 to 100 yds., and the depth from 3 to 7 ft. It is provided with a short wharf and jetty. The best anchorage is in seven to nine fathoms, sand, about half a mile off the rocks, but ships lying there are much incommoded by westerly winds, which are accompanied by a heavy swell and a northerly current of 1-1½ miles an hour. They have sometimes to proceed to Haifa in order to land passengers. Jaffa is subject to malaria, especially in autumn.

The ancient port of *Latakia* is choked with sand, and useless except for coasting vessels; others anchor outside in the open about a mile off shore on a sandy bottom.

At *Saida* (Sidon) the anchorage, on a sandy bottom, has some natural protection from west and south-west winds, a narrow island a quarter of a mile in length lying off the ancient port, which is sanded up and can shelter only a few small coasting vessels.

Besides the places mentioned there are several minor stations, of which two, *Akka* (Acre) and *Gaza,* receive a few calls from steamers in the harvest season. From Akka the coast trends for three miles south-east from the peninsula on which the town stands. Large vessels anchor about a mile out in 9-10 fathoms, smaller vessels in 5-6 fathoms, sandy bottom. Gaza is separated from the coast by two miles of drifting sand. Vessels anchor about a mile out to receive cargoes, but owing to the exposed position and a persistent heavy swell from the west loading is often a tedious process. Suedia, Banias, Tartus, Jebel, Yunie, Nebi Yunus, Es-Sur (Tyre), and Kaisarie (Caesarea) are small places with a certain amount of coastal traffic, conducted for the most part by sailing vessels. Late in 1913 official sanction was obtained for opening Yunie and Nebi Yunus, on the Lebanon coast, to steamers.

(ii) *Volume and Distribution of Trade.*

Tables showing the tonnage of steamships engaging in foreign trade at various Syrian ports from 1910 to 1913 are printed in the Appendix (Table I). In estimating the total volume of foreign shipping engaged in the Syrian trade, it must, of course, be remembered that many vessels call at several Syrian ports on the same voyage, and are consequently included in the returns of each of these ports.

Beirut, which since the loss of Salonika has been the third port of the Turkish Empire, has a rich hinterland in the Lebanon, the Buka'a, and Damascus, with which it is connected by railway, and is the principal distributing centre of foreign manufactured goods, especially the large textile imports from England. It is also the chief coaling station on this coast, and plays a leading part in the silk export to France. This prominent and well-established position may be impaired when the harbour works designed for Alexandretta and Haifa, both of which have now obtained railway communications with the interior, have been provided. A certain amount of the traffic with the Aleppo district

has already been diverted to Tripoli by the railway thence to Homs, which reduced the distance by rail to the sea by over 100 miles, besides obviating the reloading necessitated by the change of gauge at Rayak. The new branch from Alexandretta to Toprak Kale will make Alexandretta a still more attractive alternative for trade with Aleppo. The competition of Haifa with Beirut for the Damascus market is already felt.

Alexandretta is clearly marked out by nature as the harbour *par excellence* of northern Syria. It has long been the principal port of Aleppo, with which it is connected by a much-frequented road, and also of a wide district to the north and east, and an increasing trade with this region seems now assured by the branch of the Baghdad Railway connecting Alexandretta with the main line. Copper from Arghana, in Kurdistan, was already exported through Alexandretta to Belgium, and among the other exports were large numbers of sheep and cattle, principally for Egypt, from the Euphrates district and beyond, liquorice for the United States, silk from the Antioch district for France, native fabrics for Egypt and Turkey, Aintab leather for Egypt and Tunis, and pistachio nuts from Aleppo and Aintab for England, Turkey, and Egypt.

From *Tripoli* an easy route skirts the Lebanon in a north-easterly direction, and is now followed by the railway to Homs. Though, as already remarked, the advantage temporarily secured by this railway in regard to Aleppo has passed to Alexandretta, Tripoli remains the gate of the rich Homs-Hama district. Silk and eggs for France, native fabrics and soap for Egypt and Turkey, oranges for Turkey and Russia, and wool for the United States, England, and Italy are the principal exports.

Haifa, which in 1906 became the Mediterranean port of the Hejaz Railway, is likely to rise rapidly in importance when once supplied with an adequate harbour. It has a fertile hinterland in the plain of Esdraelon, the upper Jordan valley, and the Hauran, which the railway has now opened up, and considerable

quantities of grain and sesame go this way, especially to Marseilles. Haifa has begun to attract imports for Damascus as well as for Arabia, and may well play the part in southern Syria that seems destined for Alexandretta in the north. It is now connected by rail with Jerusalem, from which, however, it is twice as far as Jaffa.

Jaffa, in spite of the disadvantages of its harbour, has a large export and import trade, being not only the centre of a fertile district, which produces especially oranges, wine, and oil, but also the port of Jerusalem and the nearest regular port to Egypt, whither goes an appreciable part of the local produce. The bulk of the orange export, with some durra, goes to England.

Latakia and *Saida* are on much the same level, and serve only local needs. The former is best known for the black tobacco which it exports to England and Egypt. Saida, besides oranges, eggs, figs, &c., exports a little bitumen from Hasbaya, on the slopes of Hermon.

Of the minor ports, *Akka* and *Gaza* are visited by steamers after the harvest for the export of grain. Akka has no natural advantages compared with the adjacent Haifa, with which it is now connected by rail, and which is likely in future to handle the Hauran cereals, of which there has been some export *via* Akka in the past. Barley from Gaza is taken by England.

(iii) *Adequacy to Economic Needs; Possibilities of Development.*

The inadequacy of the Syrian ports in their present condition has long been recognised, even Beirut being inconveniently small. Works at Alexandretta are, however, included in the concession of the Baghdad Railway Company, which began some operations there in 1912, while a French concession for harbours at Haifa, Tripoli, and Jaffa was agreed on in 1913, and arrangements for their construction at Haifa and Jaffa, at an estimated cost in each case of fifteen to twenty million francs, were in progress at the outbreak of war. Jaffa stands in especial need of some artificial protection for

shipping. With these additions, and the provision of suitable warehouses, the country would be sufficiently well supplied, though minor improvements at the smaller places of call are no doubt desirable. The people of the Lebanon in particular are anxious for the development of the harbours on their littoral, and the French concession of 1913, already mentioned, provided that any new works at Yunie or Nebi Yunus should be granted to the Beirut Harbour Company.[1]

(b) *Shipping Lines*

Before the war Syrian ports would have enjoyed good sea communications if their harbours had been more adequate and quarantine on vessels from Egypt less frequent. The following lines have regular services and carry mails :—

Messageries Maritimes : from Marseilles (1) weekly to Alexandria, Port Said, Jaffa, Haifa, Beirut (on the return journey Jaffa only is visited once a fortnight); (2) fortnightly to Constantinople, Smyrna, Rhodes, Beirut, north as far as Mersina, thence to Larnaka (Cyprus), Jaffa, and Haifa, returning to Marseilles by Beirut, Smyrna, and Constantinople. The second of these services provided the most rapid service between Constantinople and Syria. The company has a subvention from the French Government.

Austrian Lloyd : weekly from Trieste to Alexandria, Port Said, Jaffa, Haifa, Saida, Beirut, Tripoli, Latakia, Alexandretta, Mersina, and back the same way. Subsidised by the Austrian Government.

Khedivial Mail Steamship Company : weekly from Alexandria to Jaffa, Haifa, Beirut and back, with fortnightly extension to Mersina, Smyrna, and Constantinople.

[1] The above remarks must be taken as referring to pre-war conditions. A good deal of uncertainty prevails regarding the present state of the country, but, in view of the reported depopulation of certain districts (see p. 87), existing facilities of communication might be expected to prove more than adequate for some time to come.

The Società Marittima Italiana and the Società Italiana di Servizi Marittimi both maintain fortnightly services from Genoa or Venice to Alexandria, Jaffa, Haifa, Beirut, Tripoli, Alexandretta, Mersina, and from Venice to Beirut by Rhodes or the Piraeus.

Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company: weekly from Odessa to Constantinople, Smyrna, Mersina, Alexandretta, Latakia, Tripoli, Beirut, Haifa, Jaffa, and Egypt. Many pilgrims from Russia come this way.

The recurrence of Alexandria in these services is noticeable. That port, moreover, receives the bulk of the British exports to Syria, which are sent from Liverpool or Manchester, and reshipped from Alexandria to their destination.

Besides these mail steamers, numerous merchant vessels call more or less frequently, those of the Rumanian Service Maritime, the Deutsche Levante Linie, and the Bulgarian Varna Company sometimes taking passengers as well as cargo. Among British lines are the Prince, Moss, Ellerman, Asia Minor Steamship Company, and Westcott and Laurance; the Orient is Belgian, with British boats. A " conference " or syndicate, including the Prince Line, Westcott and Laurance, the Deutsche Levante Linie, the German Atlas Linie, the Belgian Armement Adolf Deppe, and the Royal Netherlands Line, with sailings from London, Antwerp, and the chief German and Dutch ports, was established for the unification of freights and the exclusion of competition. A curious feature of this combine was that goods for Syria of German origin enjoyed cheaper rates than those of other countries. Ottoman shipping, apart from the small sailing vessels engaged in the coasting trade, has much decreased since 1911.

(c) *Telegraphic Communication Abroad*

There is no direct cable between Syria and Europe. Foreign telegrams may go either by Constantinople or by Egypt through the Eastern Telegraph Company. A

submarine cable connected Latakia with Agios Theodoros, in Cyprus. All the chief ports (including Akka and Gaza) have "international" telegraph stations (*cf.* p. 79).

Except at the German sanatorium on the Mount of Olives, there were no wireless installations before the war, but other stations have since been established, at any rate at Hebron, Ramle, and Damascus, and no doubt at Aleppo.

(B) INDUSTRY

(1) Labour

(a) *Supply of Labour*

Syria as a whole is thinly populated (*cf.* p. 16), and the supply of labour is not generally abundant, though certain districts are, no doubt, better off than others. The Lebanon especially, in spite of a large emigration (*cf.* p. 17), was comparatively well peopled before the war, and the bulk of the population being Christian, male labour could be supplemented by that of women, which was an important factor in the silk industry; it is, however, not usual for women to continue work of this kind after marriage. Again, in some parts of Palestine the labour supply has been appreciably increased by Jewish immigration. A United States consular report of 1909-10 goes so far as to assert that in the south the abundance and cheapness of labour formed an obstacle to the introduction of agricultural machinery. This, however, can certainly not be said of the country at large, where scarcity of labour is a common complaint, and machinery is usually regarded as the remedy. During the war the situation has undergone a change. The countryside has been drained of men of military age, some of whom will, of course, not return; and the population has been further thinned by famine and disease. The Lebanon especially has suffered severely, being reported to have lost from half

to three-quarters of its inhabitants. On the other hand, there has been some accession in northern Syria of Armenian refugees, of whom some 40,000 are stated to have been drafted into the Aleppo vilayet. These may relieve the scarcity of labour which has hampered the textile industry of Aleppo. It is possible, too, that war conditions may to some extent break down the Mussulman prejudice against female labour. The mortality among beasts of draught and burden—a serious matter for both agriculture and trade—has been noted above, p. 68.

(b) *Labour Conditions*

According to a law of 1916, all labourers in factories having a capital of £T 100 or over, and workers enough to make 750 working days a year, must be Turkish subjects. Another recent enactment enables the State to demand labour at will. Four days' work annually (or a money payment in lieu of work) for road-making was previously incumbent on male subjects between the ages of 18 and 60.

As noted below (p. 99), peasant proprietorship has declined, and no small proportion of the fellahin are now insecure metayer tenants of large landholders. A certain number also work for a daily wage. In Palestine, for instance, on the land of the Jewish colonists, both Jews and Arabs find employment, commonly earning from one to two francs a day. This may be regarded as an average wage for agricultural labour. In the Lebanon, to take another example, during the olive-gathering season, 6 or 7 piastres are paid for men, and about half that amount for women and children; but lower rates are found elsewhere, and payment is sometimes made in kind at the rate of about 1/13 (7-8 per cent.) of the quantity gathered. In other industries also wages are low judged by European standards, grown men, unless specially skilled, seldom earning more than about two francs a

day, and often less (*cf.* p. 113), while the scale for female and child labour is considerably lower. In the factories little attention has hitherto been paid to hygiene; in particular the unhealthy conditions prevailing in some of the Lebanese silk-spinning establishments, where young girls work for long hours in steamy and ill-ventilated rooms, have been the subject of criticism. Attempts at improvement have lately been made in some instances.

(2) Agriculture

Syria is essentially an agricultural country. Its wealth is derived almost wholly from the cultivation of the soil, and the bulk of the population is engaged in raising produce of various kinds or in keeping and breeding domestic animals. The extent of the cultivated area is not accurately known. Official figures for the year 1915 give to cultivation in the vilayet of Damascus, exclusive of natural pastures and forests, 15,710,481 *donum* (14,438 sq. km.),[1] and in the Lebanon 435,200 *donum* (400 sq. km.), *i.e.*, about 16 per cent. and 12 per cent. respectively of the total areas. In the vilayet of Aleppo and the mutessariflik of Jerusalem the proportion is probably somewhat smaller, in the vilayet of Beirut somewhat higher, and the total area normally under crops may be put roughly at from 20,000 to 24,000 sq. km., or from 10 per cent. to 12 per cent. of the whole. This is no doubt capable of appreciable extension, even if the ancient limits cannot be reached. The theory of a considerable alteration of climate in the historical period is, indeed, now commonly discredited; but, on the other hand, the facts are not easily explained without supposing some decrease of moisture in these regions. Drought is the chief danger to the harvest. Much depends on equable distribution

[1] Reckoning the *donum* as 919 sq. metres, or 1,088 to 1 sq. km. The exact value of the *donum* in Syria is said to be 919:3024 sq. metres, or about 227 acres.

of rainfall during the winter season, and a failure of the late rain in March and April makes a great difference to the wheat crop. Damage from frost or hail is rare (*cf.*, however, p. 93, note), but locusts may be very injurious. The Italian locust has been persistent of late in the Aleppo vilayet, and Sudanese locusts have occasionally appeared in great numbers, causing serious loss, for instance, in 1915.

(a) *Products of Commercial Value*

Vegetable Products. Owing to its geological complexity, and the great diversity of its climate, which ranges from tropical heat in the Jordan valley to a temperature on the upper slopes of the mountains compatible with perennial snow, Syria has a rich variety of vegetable products. Cereals, vegetables, and fruit trees are produced in profusion; tobacco, cotton, and hemp are successfully cultivated; and there are some wild-growing plants of value.

Cereals. Of these the chief is wheat, to which is devoted nearly half the area under grain, the total crop in the average year being estimated at upwards of a million tons. It is sown in December-January, and harvested between the end of May and the beginning of July. The principal wheat districts are the upland plains east of the Jordan, especially the Hauran, and the Buka'a (Coele-Syria), and, in the west, the plain of Esdraelon. Several varieties are grown, that of the Hauran being the most esteemed.

Barley is cultivated on about 30 per cent. of the cereal area, and the normal crop is some 500,000 tons, much of which is grown in the Homs-Hama district, and about Gaza and Bir es-Seba. Gaza barley ripens as early as the end of April, and is much appreciated by English brewers, but the crop is uncertain, and the amount available for export varies greatly. Barley is largely used locally for feeding animals.

Durra (Indian millet), which is sown in March-April, and harvested five months later, yields about

200,000 tons. The bulk is used for bread by the poorer classes, small quantities only being exported.

Maize is grown in the plains of Damascus, the Hauran, &c., but is of minor importance, as are oats and rye, which are only raised in small quantities by the foreign colonists.

Sesame, from which oil is produced, is one of the most valuable crops, fetching as much as £16 a ton, but it needs much labour and is very uncertain; consequently it is not much in favour except as a preparatory for wheat. It is grown chiefly on the coastal plain and in the Homs-Hama district, the annual yield being about 30,000 tons, of which a third or so is exported.

Rice, which requires a swampy soil, is grown in small quantities in the north of the Aleppo vilayet and in the upper Jordan valley (Jaulan district). Its cultivation is subject to Government restriction.

Leguminous plants, including chickpeas, lentils, beans, vetches, and lupins, are largely cultivated. Chickpeas are sown in February, the others earlier, and harvest time extends from April to July. The total crop may be estimated at about 500,000 tons, and chickpeas and lupins are exported in appreciable quantities. The latter are sometimes grown merely as a manure. Lucern and clover are grown for fodder, especially in the vilayets of Damascus and Aleppo.

Vegetables, which are for the most part consumed locally, include potatoes, turnips, onions, melons, marrows, aubergines (egg plants), tomatoes, carrots, garlic, cabbages, cauliflowers, artichokes, and asparagus. Potatoes, which fetch £4 5s. the ton, are not much grown except in the Damascus and Aleppo districts: an obstacle to their wider cultivation is the fact that they ripen early and do not keep through the hot weather till the next sowing time, so that seed-potatoes must be imported afresh every year. The combined yield of potatoes and turnips amounts to about 200,000 tons. Melons grow best on the coastal plain

between Jaffa and Haifa, whence they are sent in large numbers to Constantinople and Egypt in the autumn. There is also some export of onions from Tripoli and Latakia. Experiments recently made with sugar-beet by Jewish colonists are said to have given satisfactory results.

Other crops. Tobacco. The Beirut vilayet and the Lebanon are the chief tobacco-growing districts, smaller amounts being produced also in the vilayets of Aleppo (at Aintab and Killis) and Damascus. According to official statistics the area under tobacco in the departmental districts of Latakia, Aleppo, and Beirut with Damascus, in the year 1911-12 was 20,203 *donum* (about 18·5 sq. km., 4,652 acres), and the produce 1,310,000 kg.; in the following year the production was larger, the export from Latakia alone amounting to 1,323,944 kg. The Latakia smoke-dried tobacco is practically all exported, about 90 per cent. going to England. There is also an export to Egypt both of the ordinary tobacco and of *tombac*, a variety used in the *nargileh* or hookah, and grown mainly about Latakia. The total value of the tobacco crop, which is subject to official restriction, is put at about five million francs.

Cotton was extensively cultivated during the American Civil War, but subsequently died out along the coast, and in central and southern Syria it has reappeared only in the last ten years. The neighbourhoods of Latakia, Akka, Tiberias, and Nablus, and the valleys of Esdraelon and the Buka'a now produce some 1,000 tons, and approximately twice that amount is grown in the Aleppo vilayet (chiefly about Edlib, Dana, Killis, and Aintab), where heavy dews make artificial irrigation unnecessary.

Hemp, the annual crop of which was estimated in 1911 at about 1,300 tons, is grown chiefly in the Barada valley (Damascus), and to a less extent in the Euphrates district of the Aleppo vilayet. The best fibres are exported, and the rest used in the factories of Damascus.

Sugar-cane can be grown on the coast and in the Jordan valley, but needs profuse irrigation, and is only cultivated in small quantities for chewing.

Other minor crops are carraway seed, fennel, and aniseed, the first of which is grown about Tripoli, the other two in the neighbourhood of Damascus. Aniseed, of which about 500 tons are raised, is used locally for flavouring arrack, and there is some export, as of carraway seed and fennel, to Egypt.

Fruit trees. Four of these, the olive, vine, mulberry, and orange, are of special importance.

Olive trees may be seen all over the country, but the largest groves are in the Lebanon, and about Beirut, Tripoli, Akka, Nablus, Safed, Ludd, Antioch, Edlib, Killis,[1] Aintab. The tree, which is comparatively hardy, growing on the poorest soil and requiring little attention, comes into bearing between its eighth and twelfth years, but usually yields a good crop (10-20 *okes*[2]) only in alternate years. It attains a great age. Olives are gathered green in September for eating, but hang till about the end of October when intended for oil-making. The total number of trees in the country before the war may be estimated, from official and semi-official statistics, at upwards of 10 million, producing 125,000,000 *okes* (about 158,000 tons) to the value of about 30,000,000 frs. During the last three years, however, the number has been much reduced, many trees having been cut down for fuel for the railways, &c.; as many as a third are stated to have been sacrificed in this way.

Vines are also very widely cultivated. Official and semi-official figures of 1910 and 1913 give the grape-producing area as 887,227 *donum* (nearly 815·5 sq. km.), with an output of 250,268,150 *okes*, exclusive of the Lebanon, for which another 30,000 *donum* (over

[1] Many trees in this neighbourhood were destroyed by frost some years ago.

[2] The *oke* (*okka*) is reckoned at 1·282 kg. or 792·5 to the English ton.

27·5 sq. km.) and 20,000,000 *okes* may be added, raising the total production to some 345,000 tons. Of this a certain proportion is dried or converted into wine or spirits, but the bulk is consumed fresh on the spot. The vintage begins in July at Gaza and Jericho, the period varying elsewhere with the climate and the kind of grapes. Phylloxera, which has made its appearance during the last twenty years, has been successfully met by the introduction of American vines.

The white mulberry is largely cultivated in northern Syria on the coastal plain between Saida and Antioch (Antakia), the lower mountain slopes, and in the Buka'a, for feeding silkworms; the black mulberry is also grown to some extent for its fruit. The tree thrives in both heavy and sandy soil (the latter being said to produce the most suitable leaves), arriving at maturity in 15-25 years, and living for 80-100. In regular plantations other crops—vegetables, grain, or tobacco—are often placed between the rows. The young silkworms are hatched in April and May, and their feeding, which is largely carried on by women and children, lasts for about five weeks. Subsequently the leaves are used for fodder. The area devoted to mulberry trees in 1914 may be put at about 310,000 *donum* (285·5 sq. km.), with a production of fresh cocoons of about 6,600,000 kg. Owing to decreasing profits due to the competition of Chinese and Japanese silk, there has been a tendency in recent years to replace mulberries by oranges or tobacco; and during the war, which has closed the French market, there has been a great decline. In the Lebanon, which is the centre of the silk industry, the production in 1915 is stated to have been not above half the normal, in 1916 not above a third; and many mulberry-trees are said to have been felled.

The cultivation of oranges and lemons, especially the former, has made great strides in the last two decades, though, owing to the need of summer irrigation, it is limited to districts where water is readily accessible, *e.g.*, the neighbourhood of rivers and the plains

between Gaza and Haifa. The bulk of the orange plantations are in the vilayet of Beirut and the mutessarifik of Jerusalem, the Jaffa district being especially important; the chief lemon groves are about Saida. Official statistics make the area under oranges and lemons in Beirut 26,430 *donum* (about 24·3 sq. km.), and the weight of fruit 21,078,000 *okes* (about 26,680 tons). There are no corresponding figures for the Jerusalem province, but the area under cultivation must be at least as large, and the weight produced is probably considerably greater. The Aleppo vilayet is comparatively unimportant in this respect. Large quantities, to the value of about 8,000,000 frs., representing perhaps half the total crop, are exported, especially oranges from Jaffa. During the war the plantations have suffered severely, particularly in the Jaffa neighbourhood, partly from locusts, but still more from the failure of irrigation. Fortunately, orange-trees mature quickly, and the groves could be restored within a few years.

Of other cultivated fruit trees, statistics are available only for the Aleppo vilayet, where in 1914 there were reckoned to be 1,314,520 fig trees, yielding 34,038,780 *okes* (43,080 tons); 289,021 apple trees, yielding 911,250 *okes* (1,153 tons); 105,350 pistachio trees, yielding 811,125 *okes* (1,026 tons); and smaller numbers of pear, peach, apricot, pomegranate, black mulberry, almond, and walnut trees. Other trees which occur are quince, plum, cherry, hazelnut (especially about Hama and Damascus), and carob, while in the Jordan valley grow date palms, bananas, and cactus figs. The carob-fruit (known as locusts) is partly exported for spirit manufacture, partly converted into syrup for home consumption. The chief fruit crops are apricots, especially about Damascus, where quantities are dried or made into paste, figs, of which a few are dried and exported, pomegranates, pistachios, almonds, and walnuts. Pistachios, which are cultivated in the vilayet of Aleppo, were exported in 1912

to the value of 1,500,000 frs., representing, perhaps, about half the crop; the crop of walnuts, grown chiefly in the Damascus district, averages about 4,000 tons, with a value of about 1,000,000 frs.; while the almond crop, a considerable part of which comes from the Jewish colonies, is worth approximately the same amount. Some dates are also exported. The total value of the average yield of the fruit trees must reach 10,000,000 frs.

The preservation of the fruit is for the most part done by the actual growers. Olives, green and black, are preserved in salt water, especially at Damascus, where a species, large in size but of low oil-producing capacity, is grown. From three to four million *okes* are prepared annually.

Apricot preserving is another speciality of Damascus and the neighbourhood, where this fruit is largely cultivated. It is both dried whole and made into a paste, the kernels being also an article of export. In 1909, the annual production of dried apricots was put at 500-700 tons, and of the paste at 3,000-4,000 tons, and it has tended to increase. Some of the paste is exported to Rumania, and both the paste and the dried fruit go to Egypt and all parts of Turkey. Apricots and other fruits are also preserved with sugar at Damascus, and " Turkish Delight " is made there in considerable quantities. The annual value of these various products, including apricot kernels, is estimated at four to five million francs.

Dried figs are produced at Antioch and about Saida, but the industry is not large. They are not usually prepared like Smyrna figs, but are compressed into a solid mass.

Sultanas are produced chiefly in the vilayet of Aleppo, and about Damascus, Es-Salt (from which the word sultana is sometimes derived), Zahle in the Lebanon, and Hebron. The small grapes are moistened with olive oil, and then dried over hot ashes and afterwards in the sun. In 1914, the production of the vilayets of Damascus and Aleppo was about 11,000,000

okes. Large quantities of grapes are also converted into a kind of honey. In the vilayet of Damascus over 33,000,000 *okes*, in that of Aleppo over 14,000,000 *okes* were so used in 1914.

Of the *wild produce*, much the most valuable is the liquorice root, which grows abundantly in the Aleppo vilayet, particularly in the upper Euphrates region and about Antioch. The greater part of the root collected goes to the United States; in 1908 the amount was over 20,000 tons, to the value of £158,510, these being the highest figures in recent years. In the north-eastern districts there is also a considerable production of gall-nuts, valonia, yellow berries (buckthorn), gum-tragacanth, and scammony, though much of what passes through Aleppo and Alexandretta in these kinds comes from beyond Syrian borders. Colocynth grows in the sandy region of Gaza and Bir es-Seba, and about 1,500 tons are exported annually, chiefly to Germany. The papyrus of Lake Hule (Merom) is made into mats by the Arabs of the district. Gum-arabic is obtained from the acacias to the east of the Dead Sea.

Animals and Animal Products.—The quadrupeds kept are horses, donkeys, mules, camels, buffaloes, kine, sheep, goats, and pigs. The horses in ordinary use are of very fair quality, but pedigree animals are not often seen now, even among the Beduin. Donkeys and camels are the usual beasts of burden, and are found everywhere; they are sometimes used by the fellahin in place of oxen for ploughing. Donkeys are of two kinds, the common sort and the large white Arabian variety, which commands a higher price. Camels are usually bought from the Beduin of the desert, and not home-bred. The best cows are those of Damascus and the Lebanon, the Damascus (Egyptian) variety being the richer in milk; there is also a useful cross between the two. Those found elsewhere are as a rule small and ill-favoured, and give little milk except in the spring. Buffaloes are confined to swampy districts. Sheep, which are mostly fat-tailed, are especially important; besides those bred in the country many come in from

the north and east, the great centre of distribution being Aleppo. Goats also are kept in large numbers, and the Angora goat occurs occasionally in northern Syria. A few pigs are found in Christian villages. Trustworthy statistics of the numbers of these various animals in the whole country are not to be had. Figures for 1914-15 gave, for the vilayets of Aleppo and Damascus, 190,130 horses, mules, and donkeys; 299,325 cattle, including buffaloes; 3,614,976 sheep and goats; and 150,402 camels. On the basis of these returns and of incomplete semi-official statistics for 1909-10, the total number in 1914 of horses, mules, and donkeys may be put roughly at 270,000; of cattle at 500,000; of sheep and goats at 4,800,000; of camels at 200,000; with a combined value of about 265,000,000 frs. These numbers, however, have certainly been much reduced during the war, which has made especially heavy demands on transport animals.

In the vilayet of Damascus and the Lebanon, where fodder is plentiful, milk and its products are obtained chiefly from cows, elsewhere from sheep and goats, which are the source of the large quantities of native butter (*ghi* or *semn*) brought by the nomadic tribes of the desert to Aleppo, Hama, and Homs. An extension of cow-keeping is hindered by the lack of fodder, the poverty of the fellahin, and their inability to co-operate or arrange for the disposal of their milk. Of sheep's wool there is a large production and a considerable export, to which the desert tribes make important contributions. Shearing takes place usually in May or June, the yield per sheep being about 3 kg. Lamb-skins are also exported, but other skins and hides are mostly absorbed by the home market. According to official statistics for 1914-15, the production in the vilayets of Aleppo and Damascus of milk, butter, and cheese was 62,536,493 *okes* (79,160 tons); of wool and goats'-hair, 1,826,994 *okes* (2,312 tons); with 447,274 hides and skins. Altogether, including the increment in young, the annual value of the produce of the animals mentioned may be reckoned at about 80,000,000 frs.

Fowls, turkeys, pigeons, and more rarely geese and ducks, are kept, especially in the vicinity of large towns, but nowhere on an extensive scale. The fowls and ducks, as usual in the East, are small and poor layers, and the industry generally, which might be highly profitable, especially as there is no tax on birds, is in a backward condition. Eggs are, however, exported to a considerable extent, chiefly by Beirut merchants, who buy them up through local agents. Prices *per* 100 range from 2-3 frs. in spring to 5-8 frs. in autumn.

Bee-keeping is carried on in a primitive fashion by the natives, especially in the mountain valleys, where flowers are plentiful. Much better results are obtained by colonists who use European hives.

(b) *Methods of Cultivation*

Although large proprietorship predominates (*cf.* p. 88), farming on a large scale is the exception. As a rule estates are let and sublet to peasant cultivators, the normal size of individual holdings being roughly reckoned as the extent that can be tilled by means of a pair of oxen, *i.e.*, 100-250 *donum* (about 23-57 acres), though smaller farms are common.

The cultivation of these modest holdings proceeds on methods which have changed little with the lapse of centuries. Crops on arable land fall into two classes, winter (wheat, barley, &c.) and summer (sesame, durra, &c.), but the same soil will not produce a double crop except where artificial irrigation is possible. Rotation of crops follows the two-field system, in which the main crop of wheat or barley is sown in alternate years only, the land, in the intermediate years, being either left fallow or put under a crop of different type, such as sesame, durra, leguminous plants or roots. Such rotation, though not providing for winter fodder, is adapted to the natural requirements of the soil, but needs to be supplemented by adequate manuring, the absence of which is the chief defect in native cultivation. Animal manure is unavailable in any large

quantity, partly because the animals are mostly on pasture, partly owing to its use as fuel. Artificial manures, which have been proved by experiment to be beneficial and remunerative, are beyond the reach of the fellah, whose tenure, moreover, is not commonly such as to encourage him to sink any savings in the improvement of his land. The result is progressive impoverishment of the soil. No great importance is attached to the removal of stones, which do not hamper the native plough and sickle. On the hill-slopes, especially in the Lebanon and in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem, terraces are often built to prevent the erosion of the thin layer of soil in the rainy season. This terrace-building descends from remote antiquity, and was much more highly elaborated in the past than now. Planting of trees is generally neglected, except in the immediate neighbourhood of towns and villages, and the more extensive plantations are generally owned by large proprietors or town capitalists. Here again development is hindered by poverty and the prevailing conditions of tenure. In the Lebanon, however, and about Damascus, tree culture is successfully carried on by small farmers, as also in the Jewish colonies.

The agricultural implements in common use are extremely primitive, though better adapted to local conditions than is often supposed. Ploughing must be completed as soon as possible after the first rains, and the light iron-tipped wooden plough does its work quickly, and is readily drawn by a pair of oxen, which are cheaper to keep than horses or mules; it penetrates only a few inches, but if the ground is to retain its moisture and to produce summer crops, this loosening of the upper layer is better than deep ploughing. Reaping with the sickle suits the stony soil, which in Syria is only too common. There is less to be said for the ox-drawn threshing sledge, which is wasteful. But it has the merit of cheapness, and is said to break up the hard straw well, while the time and labour involved in its use are of no great consequence to the native after his crops have been reaped. European machines and

implements, which have been introduced by the Jewish and German colonists, can be employed advantageously in certain conditions, which, however, are by no means always present.

Owing largely to the exhaustion of the soil, productivity is comparatively low except in especially favoured districts. On the unmanured lands of the fellahin the yield of wheat may be reckoned at eight to tenfold; of barley, beans, lentils, and peas at ten to fifteenfold; of sesame at forty to fiftyfold; of durra at sixty to eightyfold. Under native cultivation a hectare ($2\frac{1}{2}$ acres) of land of best quality in the neighbourhood of Jaffa produces only about 1,540 kg. of wheat or 1,760 kg. of barley, though yields of 2,000 and 2,880 kg. respectively are obtained by the better methods of the Jewish colonists. A typical holding of 100 *donum* (23 acres) of medium quality cultivated with grain by a fellah and his wife gives in an average year a net income of about 750 frs., and this is not more than doubled on the best land; with the usual rent, the profit would be reduced by about 40 per cent. In the Jewish colonies of Galilee, where working expenses are heavier, the net income per hectare for grain cultivation is even lower than on the fellahin holdings, but much better results are obtained by German colonists near Jaffa, who supplement grain by production of milk, vegetables, and fruit. The relatively poor returns obtained from pure agriculture have led the colonists and others who can command the capital to turn to plantations of oranges, vines, and other fruit trees. On land of medium quality in the Jaffa district the net annual return per hectare of oranges is 557 frs., of almonds 267 frs., of apricots and peaches 196 frs., of olives 170 frs., and of vines 214 frs; the profit on these forms of cultivation works out at 10-11 per cent. on the capital outlay, and this may probably be reckoned as the average return on fruit-tree culture elsewhere in Syria.

Irrigation and drainage. In the hot dry months of summer irrigation is necessary for oranges, lemons,

apples, pears, bananas, sugar-cane, hemp, cotton (in Palestine), and many vegetables (not, however, for water-melons, pumpkins, tomatoes, marrows, aubergines, or onions). It may be performed in three ways: (1) by leading water from rivers, as in the Damascus plains from the Barada and other streams, in the Buka'a from the Litani, and at Homs, Hama, and Antioch from the Orontes; (2) by raising water from wells by means of the ancient waterwheel worked by animals; (3) by mechanical pumping, either from rivers of which the bed is too deep for the first method, or from wells. Suction pumps driven by petrol or gas engines were introduced by the Jewish and German colonists, and have been spreading to the native cultivators; wind-motors are used at a number of stations on the Hejaz Railway, and by some German colonists. Irrigation from wells is practised chiefly in the coastal plain between Gaza and Haifa, where water is commonly found at about sea level, and wells rarely attain a depth of 50 metres. Recently much deeper excavation has been tried in higher localities; water is obtained from wells of over 90 metres on the spur of Mount Carmel, and has been reached by mechanical boring at twice that depth in Judaea. An elaborate riverside pumping station has been set up by a German company on the banks of the Auja, whence water is supplied to about 1,500 *donum* (340 acres) of land at the Jewish colony of Petach Tikwa. A more extended use of this river has been projected, and would not be difficult, while other irrigation schemes, more or less practicable, have also been mooted. The Jordan, however, like some other Palestine rivers, has too deep a bed to lend itself very readily to such projects. Much remains to be done in the way of economising the country's winter surplus by means of reservoirs or dams, a method far more developed in early times than at present.

Drainage on a small scale by laying pipes or planting eucalyptus trees has been carried out by colonists in Palestine; the extensive marshes on the coastal plains

and about Lake Hule (Merom) could only be reclaimed by more elaborate and costly works.

(c) *Forestry*

It has been estimated that 88 per cent. of the forests of Turkey are State-owned, and except in the Lebanon there is certainly little private property in the forests of Syria. According to statistics of the year 1907-8 the vilayets of Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut contained only 2,000 hectares (about 4,950 acres) of privately-owned forest; on the other hand, in the Lebanon, which those statistics do not include, the forests are entirely owned either by private persons or by village communities. With regard to the present extent of forests, official statistics for 1915 assign to the vilayet of Aleppo 135,000 hectares, to Damascus 61,000, to Beirut 55,000, to the Lebanon 60,000, a total of 311,000 hectares (1,200 sq. miles). Some reduction has no doubt taken place in consequence of the heavy demand for timber and fuel occasioned by the war. The 1907-8 statistics, which do not seem very trustworthy, represent the forests of the Aleppo vilayet as consisting of 53 per cent. of pine or fir, and 34 per cent. of oak; those of the Beirut vilayet of 75 per cent. of pine or fir, and 21 per cent. of oak; and those of Damascus entirely of oak. In the Lebanon also pine and oak predominate. Oaks, of which there are several varieties, tend to be rather stunted. Other trees found are carob, pistachio, sumach, cypress, plane, poplar, and lastly eucalyptus, which has been planted in large groves by Jewish settlers, especially about Kaisarie. The cedars of Lebanon are reduced to a few small groups.

The forests have been subject to Government control since 1870, and two schools, an upper and a lower, from which the local inspectors, keepers, and other officials are drawn, have been maintained at Constantinople. These officials, however, were more interested in increasing revenues than in arresting the advance of

deforestation, which has been most rapid along the coast, in the neighbourhood of towns, and wherever railways or roads facilitate transport. Profits were obtained by putting up the forestry rights to auction or allowing villagers to cut trees on payment of certain dues; and tithe is paid on wood sold by private or corporate owners. Much damage has been done by fire as well as by indiscriminate felling. A great hindrance to the growth of trees are the flocks of goats which keep down all young wood within reach, and saplings are often felled merely for the sake of fodder. Sheep-farmers too are hostile to trees, on which wool is lost by rubbing. Quite recently steps have been taken to place the forestry of the Empire on a better footing. An Austrian expert has been called in to advise, a better inspection service instituted, and exploitation regulated by new enactments. One of these (1917) provides that foreign companies receiving concessions must offer half their shares for a period of three months to Ottoman subjects.

Timber from the forests is used mainly for fuel, either raw or in the form of charcoal; rough planks, posts, &c., are also made, but the better qualities of wood for building and cabinet-making are imported. In 1907-8 the output of timber in the vilayets of Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut was worth 6,573,168 piastres (1,645,000 frs.); with the addition of the production of the Lebanon, of wood used privately by villagers, and various by-products (gall-nuts, pine seeds, sumach leaves, &c.), the annual value of the forests may be put at three or four million francs.

(d) *Land-Tenure*

Agricultural methods and conditions have depended in no small degree on the complicated system of land-tenure in Turkey, which is described at length in *Turkey in Europe* (No. 16 of this series), pp. 92 *seq.*; the following account summarises the main points.

Land held by private persons may be of three kinds:—

Miri, the property of the State. The crown domains, though retaining their old name, were declared State property on the re-establishment of the constitution in 1908.

Mulk, private freehold.

Vakuf, land vested in religious or charitable institutions.

Of these mulk is of comparatively small extent, private property being found chiefly in the areas of towns and villages, where individual freeholds are limited to half a *donum* (1/9 acre) in addition to the site built upon. Practically the whole of the cultivated area consists of either miri or vakuf. Miri is held by individuals, but the State ownership involves certain restrictions upon its disposal, which, however, were lightened in 1913. It may now be freely sold, leased, or mortgaged, except to foreign companies, but cannot be disposed of by will, lapsing in case of failure of legal heirs to the State, to which it also reverts if left uncultivated for three successive years. Until 1913 the tenant was not even permitted free agricultural use of his land, permission being necessary for planting trees or vines, as well as for the erection of buildings; but these disabilities are now substantially removed. Of vakuf land, which is under the supervision of a special Ministry, there are different varieties, depending partly on the terms of the original dedication. Both mulk and, with the consent of the State, miri can be converted into vakuf, and the previous owner or tenant may retain the usufruct with its free disposal, or both ownership and usufruct may become vested in the institution concerned. In the latter case the land is usually let for periods not exceeding three years.

Apart from these legal distinctions, agriculture has been greatly affected by certain other fundamental facts, to which brief reference must be made.

The existing land-register, which was drawn up fifty years ago, is very inexact with regard both to measurements and boundaries, and enjoys no public confidence. A proper survey and valuation was decreed in 1913, but has not yet been begun in Syria.

In the next place, a primitive system of collective tenure still prevails at many villages, though individual indebtedness has of late not infrequently led to partition. Under this system the land is reapportioned among the families of the village every two years, a practice resulting in stereotyped cultivation, and leading the temporary holders to minimise their outlay of both capital and labour.

Apart from communal land, much is concentrated in a few hands. Vakuf accounts for a good deal. Another large section, including the greater part of the Jordan valley, consists of domains belonging to the late Sultan, which have lapsed to the State and are commonly leased in small plots in return for one-fifth of the produce paid in kind. Moreover, the old miri land has to an increasing extent passed into the hands of large proprietors, who, as a rule, do not farm it themselves, but let it on similar terms to small cultivators. The plain of Esdraelon, for instance, is now entirely owned by a few town landlords. These large proprietors are apt to regard their estates merely as an investment, and the fellahin, or peasant cultivators, are always liable to be evicted when a favourable opportunity for realisation offers. It is also customary, in order to obviate any prescriptive rights, to change tenants at intervals. A frequent cause of land passing into capitalist hands is the oppression of the tax collector, from which the fellah seeks relief, either by disposing of his holding to a local effendi, or by turning it into vakuf. In Turkey the burden of direct taxation falls mainly upon the land (*cf.* p. 138), and is aggravated by the tax-farming system, which involves much extortion and oppression.

A large proportion of the fellahin, therefore, are in no sense proprietors, but merely cultivators with a

limited, and often highly precarious, tenure. In 1907 it was estimated that in Judaea 50 per cent., in north Syria 20-30 per cent., in Galilee 20 per cent., and in the Hauran 15 per cent. only of the land was the property of the actual occupiers. A recent official report of the vilayet of Damascus puts the small holdings there at 25 per cent. Fruit plantations often belong to large owners; the orange-groves of Jaffa, for example, are mostly owned by town effendis. On the other hand, many of the silk cultivators of the Lebanon are small independent proprietors.

The price of agricultural land varies greatly with its quality, position, facilities for irrigation, and the kind of culture to which it is suited. It is highest in the Lebanon, where returning emigrants increase the demand: unplanted land of average quality will there fetch from 600 frs. to 1,000 frs. per *donum*, while for the same area planted with mulberries, 1,000-1,200 frs., or with oranges, 1,500-3,000 frs. may be paid. Irrigated fruit gardens at Homs are worth 1,000-1,500 frs. the *donum*. Land suitable for orange-plantation, but depending on pumped water, fetches in the Jewish and German colonies 300 frs. Grain land of the best quality costs in Palestine 30-50 frs. per *donum*, in north Syria 10-30 frs. Value is reduced by distance from a town, and especially by proximity to the desert, where there is danger of Beduin incursions; land may be had, for instance, on the eastern borders of the Aleppo vilayet for $\frac{1}{2}$-5 frs. the *donum*. In Palestine prices have risen in consequence of the spread of the colonies, which have taken up more than a tenth of the cultivable area. Land which has lapsed to the State is often bought up by capitalists very cheaply.

(3) Fisheries

The coasts are not well adapted for the development of an important fishing industry. There is neither great abundance nor great variety of fish; owing to shallow water the fishing boats which, as

usual in the Mediterranean, are small sailing vessels, have to go a long way out; in winter there are frequent storms, while the summer heat interferes with transport and limits consumption to the vicinity of the coast.

No fish exist in the Dead Sea; in the other inland lakes, especially Tiberias, Hule, and the Amuk lake near Antioch, they are plentiful, as likewise in the rivers. They are taken by net, line, and dynamite, but for the most part are only consumed locally. In the lake of Amuk, however, fish are killed by dynamite in January and February for the Aleppo and Damascus markets; in 1912 the catch there was 200,000 kg. There is practically no curing industry.

Fishing is a State monopoly. Ten piastres are paid for a permit, and there is a tax of one-fifth the value of the catch in the sea, large lakes, and rivers flowing into the sea, and one-tenth in the smaller lakes and other rivers. These taxes are assigned to the Ottoman Public Debt, and are farmed out.

The sponge fishery on the northern part of the coast has declined greatly of late, apparently owing to emigration of the divers. Where thirty years ago 400 boats were producing sponges to the annual value of 800,000 frs., there are now no more than about 30 boats and a production of 50,000 frs. The fishing season is from the middle of May to the end of October. No diving dress is worn by the fishermen, who jump into the sea with a stone to take them to the bottom. Besides a tax of £T 3 on each boat, one-fifth of the sponges are taken by the Government.

Though the murex is still found in Syrian waters, the once famous purple industry has died out.

(4) Minerals

(a) *Mining Laws*

For a full account of these see *Turkey in Europe* (No. 16 of this series), pp. 98 *seq.* The regulations now in force date from 1913, when the enactments of

1887 and 1906 were revised. They apply to all mineral obtained below ground, as well as to substances dug up in the open, and under minerals are included mineral springs, water containing salt, salt beds, &c. A permit is required for preliminary prospecting, even on land already in the possession of the prospector. Applications for prospecting rights are made to provincial governors, and if approved are granted on designation of a surety and after a payment of £T5-15, according to the extent of the concession. The permit, however, is still subject to the approval of the Ministry of Forests and Mines, against whose decision there is a further appeal. Prospecting rights, when finally obtained, last for one year, with a possible extension to a second, and may be transferred. An export of 100 tons of the mineral is allowed, or more in special circumstances. The next step is the definitive application for the concession proper; it follows a prescribed form, and if made on behalf of a company, this must be certified to be composed of Ottoman subjects. On the authorities being satisfied that all is in order, the firman is issued to the concessionnaire on a payment, in proportion to the importance of the undertaking, of £T50-200 (for open digging, £T4). Concessions for underground mining usually run for 99 years, and can be inherited or otherwise disposed of. After the firman has been granted, the concessionnaire becomes liable to two taxes, a fixed annual sum of 10 piastres per hectare payable to the landlord, who is commonly the State, and a percentage of the gross output, varying from 10 per cent. to 20 per cent. for closed mines, and from 1 per cent. to 5 per cent. on products obtained in the open. Work must be begun within two years, subject to an extension of six months for special reasons, the concession then lapsing if the mine is still unworked. A responsible agent must be appointed; and except engineers and superintendents, the workmen must be Turkish subjects. Plant and work are subject to official inspection.

Quarries are regulated by a special ordinance. They may be worked under permits granted in the same way and on similar terms as prospecting permits for mines, a firman being unnecessary.

(b) *Resources and Output*

Syria is commonly supposed to be rich in minerals, but, though there have been many mining projects, the actual output is worth perhaps barely 2,000,000 frs. a year, quarries included. In 1907 the gross revenue to the Government from mines and quarries (salt workings excluded) was 24,135 frs.; in 1908 (without Jerusalem) 37,091 frs. The following notes refer chiefly to minerals which are being or have recently been exploited.

Asphalt. The principal mine is that of Hasbeya, on the slopes of Mount Hermon, which has been worked intermittently for a number of years. About 100 tons, of the value of 50,000 frs., is the average output, which is exported to Hamburg. Asphalt is also obtained in smaller quantities from the Dead Sea (where it is found floating on the surface, and is collected by the Arabs, who pay for a permit) and from the vicinity of Latakia, but a concession held by a Greek for mines at Kefrie and other villages in this district was revoked in 1917 on the ground that no mining was being done. An asphalt and lignite mine near Jezzin, for which a concession was granted some forty years ago, is not being worked.

Lignite has been obtained during the war in the Lebanon district to the amount of about 100 tons a day. It is found in various places, but occurs in thin seams, is of poor quality, and in normal times would hardly repay working, except perhaps at Haitura, near Jezzin. According to a recent report (1918), coal has begun to arrive in Beirut from a mine at Bhamdun, twelve miles to the south-east.[1]

[1] It is reported that there is an important coal deposit 50 miles south-east of Aleppo.

Petroleum and *lubricating oil* are said to be obtained in small quantities from bituminous rock at El-Makarin, near Mzerib (the yield from twelve retorts being 180 kg. daily), and at Nebi Musa, south of Jericho, where there appears to be a spring. Borings at El-Makarin had been carried to a depth of 166 metres in 1912-3 by the Syrian Exploration Co. Concessions in the kaza of Ajlun (south-east of Lake Tiberias) have been the subject of negotiations between the British and Turkish Governments; other concessions for petroleum, &c., about Kurnub, south-west of the Dead Sea, were recently purchased by the Standard Oil Co., whose operations were, however, suspended during the war. Between twenty and thirty prospecting licences for petroleum, bitumen, or asphalt were issued between 1910 and 1913.

Salt. The salt produced in Syria comes principally from the lakes of Jebbul, east of Aleppo, which are under the management of the Ottoman Public Debt. Crystallization takes place during the summer, and is promoted by the diversion of the two streams by which the lake is fed. In 1911-12 the output was 12,080,217 kg.; in 1912-13, 9,303,392 kg.; the ordinary sale price at the place of production being 0·4 piastres (9 centimes) the kilogramme.

Chrome Ore. Three mines near Latakia were worked in 1904-7 under a prospecting licence, and 1,089 tons extracted. A concession was applied for, but the mines are no longer exploited.

Phosphates. A concession in the neighbourhood of Es-Salt was obtained in 1911 by a Turkish-Italian company, the terms including a loan of 12,500,000 frs. from the company to the Government for a branch railway from Es-Salt to Amman, and for harbour-works at Haifa. The project, however, came to nothing. The phosphates are said to lie close to the surface, and it has been estimated that with 100 workmen a daily production of 100 tons might be possible.

Iron mines in Syria are said to have been under the control of the German Eisenindustriegesellschaft.

Deposits of iron are known in several localities, but do not appear to merit extensive working. At Kesruan in the Buka'a the natives were extracting ore in a primitive fashion in 1909.

Stone and *marble* of different kinds are quarried at many places. Mill-stones of basalt from the Hauran are used in water-mills throughout the country. Potter's clay is obtained about Damascus, Jerusalem, Gaza, Ramle, &c., but is not of very high quality.

(5) Manufactures

Metallurgy. The metallurgical industry depends upon imported material, and is not of much significance. Its chief centre is Damascus, where the annual production of articles of copper and brass, plain hammered or inlaid with silver, is worth one to one-and-a-half million francs, about one-half being exported; metals are also inlaid on wood. There is a small output of a similar kind at Jerusalem. Machinery works with metal foundries are established in Jaffa, Beirut, and Haifa; repairing workshops, where smithy work is done, are found in most of the larger towns, and primitive smithies in the villages.

Chemical industry. There is a small factory at Beirut, but a chemical industry can hardly be said to exist in Syria; chemicals are imported.

Textiles are one of the few industries that can claim any real importance.

Silk spinning. Spinning machinery was first set up in 1840, and until the end of last century the industry, supported by French capital, enjoyed a progressive development, but decreasing profits owing to foreign competition have since led to a decline (*cf.* p. 94). The old hand-spindle has not yet quite disappeared. Silk spinning is centred in the Lebanon, where in 1912 there were 155 factories, as against 39 elsewhere. More than half the silk produced in the country comes from the Lebanon, and both there and in the adjoining districts of the Beirut vilayet the

bulk of it is spun on the spot between July and November. Further north, about Antioch and Latakia, the cocoons are merely dried, either by the old method of steaming and exposure to the air, or in hot air chambers, and so exported. The spinning establishments are mostly small, employing from 30 to 100 persons, who sit at basins and guide the threads from the cocoons to the spindles; only a few factories belonging to Lyons firms are fitted up with modern plant. Possessing little capital, the native manufacturers are largely dependent upon advances made to them by French importers. The number of persons who were engaged in spinning before the war is estimated at 10,000-12,000, mostly Christian women or girls. Wages are low, the equivalent of about 30-90 centimes for a twelve-hour day, and half as much for children. The future of the silk industry is doubtful, especially if the Lebanon remains deprived of its former privilege of immunity from tithe and trades-tax.

Weaving. All silk of better quality is normally exported either as raw silk or as dried cocoons. What is rejected goes to the native looms, supplemented by Chinese silk. Cotton, and, to a less degree, wool, are also woven, the yarns being imported. Weaving is a home industry in a double sense, as it supplies primarily local needs and is carried on by workers who have two or three wooden hand-looms in their houses, or a dozen or so in small buildings called *kaiserliks*. The output is limited and labour poorly paid, grown silkweavers earning 1-2 frs. a day, cotton-weavers half that sum, boys 15-50 centimes; women are hardly employed, except in Aleppo and the Lebanon. Cloths of pure silk, cotton, and wool are produced, and also mixtures of these, the kind and quality varying at the different centres, of which the chief are Aleppo, Homs, Damascus, Aintab, the Lebanon, Hama, and Gaza. At Aleppo in 1909 there were 5,500 looms for cotton, and 4,500 for silk, or silk and cotton, but a more recent report gives the numbers

as 3,000 and 1,200 respectively; the only carpet factory was closed some years ago. At Homs before the war about 10,000 weavers were engaged, some employers having as many as 200, and profits of from 15 to 20 per cent. were obtained. Homs cloths are finer and dearer than those of Aleppo, and have a good sale in Egypt as well as in Turkey. The Egyptian market is further supplied by Damascus, where mixtures of silk and cotton are a speciality, and some 5,000 weavers are normally employed, including 1,000 wool weavers. Aintab, where there are about 4,500 weavers, chiefly produces cheap cotton cloths which have a large sale, but also manufactures low-grade rugs and the goat-hair cloths of which Beduin tents are made. Cottons are the staple product of the 2,000 Lebanese looms, which, however, in consequence of the claims of the silk industry, are not fully engaged throughout the year. At Gaza with Mejel there are about 550 hand-looms, producing cotton cloth. The annual value of the total output is estimated at thirty to forty million francs. Further development of the industry has been impeded by the absence of co-operation and organisation, the predominance of the primitive hand-loom, with its restricted output, and the competition of foreign cotton cloth. Some Jacquard machines are in use at Aleppo and Damascus, but power-looms have not so far been introduced with success. The new customs tariff (p. 135) is designed to meet foreign competition.

Knitting. Cotton socks and stockings are made in a number of towns, especially at Aleppo and Damascus; 5,000-6,000 machines were in use at Aleppo and 1,500 or more at Damascus. Like weaving, this is essentially a home industry, and the women and children engaged turn out from one dozen to three dozen pairs, and earn 40-60 centimes, daily. The annual output is valued at 10,000,000 frs.

Lace-making and *embroidery* are in the main Christian or Jewish industries, practised chiefly at Aintab (where they were started by American mission-

aries, and before the war employed three or four thousand women and girls), but also in the Lebanon, at Jerusalem, Nazareth, Jaffa, Aleppo, and other places.

There are also a number of miscellaneous industries, of which the following deserve mention:—

Oil and soap production. Olive oil. Most of the presses in use are still of the primitive wooden kind, and slow and wasteful in working, though during the last 20 years many have been replaced by iron screw-presses or hydraulic machines; in 1911 there were already about 80 of the last in the Lebanon. The number of oil presses in the country is not ascertained, but may well be 600-800, employing on an average 10 workmen each. There is also a large native factory at Tripoli engaged in the chemical extraction of oil from the refuse olive cake, which when not so utilised is burnt as fuel. A second factory of this kind was installed shortly before the war at Beirut by an English firm. The extraction of edible oil must take place very soon after the olives are gathered, the tendency to ferment being accelerated by the native method of knocking the berries from the trees with sticks. Less than half of the 22,000 tons produced annually, representing a value of some 25,000,000 frs., is fit for food or export, the remainder being used for soap. The oil is at present hardly equal in quality to the best European.

Sesame oil is produced as an article of food at Aleppo and Damascus, but chiefly in the mutessariflik of Jerusalem, where there are some forty small factories at Jaffa, Ludd, Jerusalem, Ramle, &c., each capable of treating 150-200 kg. of sesame daily, from which about 45 per cent. of oil is extracted by primitive methods. Better results are obtained by two Jewish factories at Jaffa, working with hydraulic presses. Unpressed sesame is made into a popular sweetmeat. The pressed cake is used as fodder, and also by the poor for food.

Volatile oils are produced on a small scale in different localities from mimosa, thyme, geranium, orange-blossom, and aniseed; they are used in a perfume factory at Tripoli, and in another at Jaffa, and are also exported. Oil from the bay berry is extracted in considerable quantities about Antioch and in the south of the Aleppo vilayet for use as an ingredient of soap.

Inferior olive oil is used for making soap, and the centres of this large industry are naturally in the chief olive districts, the Lebanon, and in or about Aleppo, Antioch, Damascus, Tripoli, Nablus, and Jaffa. The factories are mostly quite small, many having a single boiler, and only a few in the Lebanon and Tripoli districts have iron pans, the others using receptacles of stone or brick with an iron plate at the bottom. Owners often work not on their own account, but for regular customers who provide the oil. Modern methods are followed in two factories (Russo-Jewish and German) at Haifa. The total number of factories is about 150, with an annual output of some 20,000 tons, which is partly exported to other parts of the Turkish Empire, and also to Egypt and Cyprus. Besides olive oil, the ingredients used are caustic soda, carbonate of soda (for which the ash of a plant called *killi*, found about Tadmur and Es-Salt, is often substituted), bay oil, lime, and talc, the mixtures varying slightly in different localities. The soap is cooled on an earthen floor, where it is cut into squares, and turns out very hard, a quality which recommends it to native taste. In some years the supply of oil is not equal to the demand, and is supplemented from outside. Experiments with imported vegetable oils (cotton seed, coco-nut, and groundnut) have also been made, but the results are not greatly liked.

Milling, &c. Mills driven by motor, steam, or water-power are met with all over the country; the windmills introduced in the middle of last century have been given up. The old water-mills, which sometimes work as many as fifteen sets of mill-

stones, still preponderate. Steam and motor mills are usually small, working with one or two pairs of stones, which grind 200-500 kg. an hour; large up-to-date installations are quite exceptional. The two most important are at Beirut, where the milling industry is of recent growth, and has been encouraged by the railway, which has facilitated the transport of wheat from the Hauran. At Damascus, on the other hand, which once supplied the Lebanon, there has been a corresponding decline, as is also the case at Jerusalem, which, owing to the Haifa railway, no longer receives the same quantity of grain from across the Jordan. Milling in the coastal district is, however, especially open to the competition of European flour. Village mills commonly work for hire, grinding the corn brought for a small money fee or a percentage of the flour.

Of wheat products other than flour, starch, which is used for native foods and sweetmeats, is made in a number of small factories at Aleppo and Damascus, which turn out 2,000,000-3,000,000 kg. a year; there is some export to other parts of Turkey and to Egypt. Macaroni, for which the hard Syrian wheat is particularly well suited, is made in a German factory at Jaffa, and at Jerusalem and Beirut, but is not in demand except among Europeans.

Wine and spirit industry. The fabrication of alcoholic liquor is subject to a duty of 15 per cent. of the value of the product, one-half being repayable on exportation. Both the native *raki* and ordinary wine are made; the former, most of which is consumed locally, chiefly in the Damascus and Aleppo vilayets; the latter, which is mostly exported, in the Lebanon, the vilayet of Beirut, and the mutessariflik of Jerusalem. The largest producers of wine are the Society of Jewish Vine-growers at Rischon le Zion near Jaffa, who own capacious cellars at that village and at Sichron Jacob, near Haifa, and annually make 30,000-40,000 hectolitres of wine and spirits from the grapes

of the neighbouring Jewish vineyards. Smaller quantities are produced at Shtora on the east slopes of the Lebanon, by the German colonists of Sarona and the Haifa district, at Latrun, and elsewhere. In 1914-15 the Damascus and Aleppo vilayets produced respectively 56,000 and 21,000 hectolitres of grape liquor, mainly *raki*. The total annual production of wine, *raki*, &c., is about 130,000 hectolitres, worth upwards of five million francs.

Tobacco-making and cigarettes. Except in the Lebanon, the preparation of these has been monopolised by the Régie des tabacs, which has a large factory at Damascus, and another at Aleppo. That at Damascus employs 200 workpeople, and turns out about 430,000 kg. of cigarettes and cigarette tobacco a year. In the Lebanon there are some 20 factories, with an annual output worth about 10,000,000 frs.

Leather industry. The most important tanning centre is Aintab, where large numbers of goatskins are turned into the red or yellow leather used in Turkey and Egypt for native slippers; some of the yellow goes to Tunis. In 1909 about 150 tanneries were engaged, their output being worth about 3,000,000 frs. Both goatskins and sheepskins are tanned at Homs, Hama, and Damascus; cow-hides chiefly at Beirut and Zahle. At the last place, where in 1910 there were about 30 small tanneries, a good box-calf is made, to the annual value of about 1,500,000 frs. Saddlery and shoemaking flourish at Damascus; in other towns shoemaking has much declined, owing to the growing taste for the European article.

Dyeing is carried on extensively in northern Syria, especially at Aleppo and Damascus, and in a minor degree at Aintab, Homs, Hama, and Beirut; small dyers, too, are found in many villages. Both woven cloth and yarns are dyed, the dyes employed being Indian and synthetic indigo, alizarin (madder) red, and aniline, all of which, except the natural indigo,

come from Germany. Indian and synthetic indigo, which are largely used, are now commonly mixed. The work is carried on by hand in small buildings, the dyers earning 50 centimes to 1½ francs a day.

Building is in a backward condition. There are no large contractors, and skilled workmen are found only in the towns, the villager being commonly his own architect and builder. Masons and bricklayers are efficient, but plasterers, carpenters, and other subsidiary workers, are generally inferior. The industry is at a standstill during the wet winter months. Of materials, iron girders, wood, cement, and tiles are imported, burnt bricks are made at Beirut and in the Lebanon, and the production of concrete has lately been developed by Jews or Germans at Jaffa, Haifa, Jerusalem, Tiberias, and Aleppo. Lime-burning is carried on in European kilns in the larger towns, and by a primitive method elsewhere.

Carpentry, woodwork, &c. Large workshops for building accessories exist in some of the towns, such as Beirut, Jaffa, and Tripoli, and wooden furniture on western models is also made at Beirut and Jaffa. At Damascus there is still a considerable production of oriental carved or inlaid woodwork, and some export to Europe and Egypt, but this industry has been declining owing to a fall in the demand and to emigration.

Devotional objects. Rosaries, crosses, and other small articles are made in large quantities at Jerusalem and Bethlehem, both for sale to tourists and for export. Some 1,000 workers produce goods to the value of about 2,000,000 frs., the materials used being chiefly olive-wood, mother-of-pearl, silver, and a black stone from the Dead Sea.

Rope and string are made at Damascus and Aleppo, at the former out of the interior fibres of the hemp grown in the locality, the latter deriving the raw material from the Euphrates district to the north-east, and to some extent also from abroad. The methods

are primitive, and the product, which has a wide local distribution, is extremely cheap.

Matting and baskets. The papyrus of Lake Hule is made into matting by the local Beduin women, and some rough mats and baskets are produced in other parts of the country.

Pottery. The best known is that of Gaza, which has a wide sale. A quantity is also made at Ramle, Jerusalem, Nablus, in the Lebanon, in the Beirut district, and at Damascus.

(6) Power

The use of electricity, which has not long been permitted, has so far made little progress. A power station outside Damascus supplies that city with light, drives street trams and irrigation pumps, and serves the workshops of the Hejaz railway at Kadem Sherif. Beirut, where also there are electric tramways, is partly lit by electricity, and some hotels in Jerusalem and Aleppo have private installations. Electric light is in use at Bir es-Seba, and electric works are reported to be under construction in the Lebanon. A small power station has been set up at the Jewish colony at Mesha.

Water-power is not much utilised, except for mills (p. 116). It supplies electricity at Damascus, and in 1913 a concession was granted for trams and light at Aleppo, for which the power was to be derived from waterfalls near Antioch. According to German reports, falls at Tell esh-Shehab, in the Yarmuk valley, are to supply power for the railway and for lighting Deraa, Tiberias, Haifa, Jerusalem, &c. Several other rivers are well adapted for the production of power, especially the upper Jordan, the Orontes (Nahr el-Asi), on which are Homs, Hama, and Antioch, the Litani, and the Nahr el-Auja, near Jaffa; the Jihan might well be drawn upon for the Killis-Aintab district.

(C) COMMERCE

(1) Domestic

(a) *Principal Branches of Trade*

Internal commerce is comparatively restricted, since the agricultural population, which forms the greater part of the community, has few wants that are not supplied by its own production. One small miscellaneous store, selling articles of clothing, sugar, coffee, rice, tobacco, salt, and so forth, suffices for the needs of a village. Trade on a large scale is thus seated in the towns, and here also many commodities are supplied direct to the consumer by the producer, who brings in vegetables, milk, fowls, eggs, &c., especially on market days, from the surrounding country. This practice is facilitated by the Oriental mode of grouping sellers of particular products in a distinct part of the bazaar or market.

As regards home produce, internal trade is most actively occupied in supplying the demand of cities and localities which are not self-supporting, and in concentrating any surplus, as well as articles which have a better market abroad, in the hands of exporters. For example, cereals go in large quantities from Homs and Hama to Aleppo, Tripoli, Beirut and the Lebanon, from the Hauran to Damascus and Haifa, from Gaza and Bir es-Seba to Jerusalem and Jaffa. Among native manufactures, oil, soap, textiles, and leather are the most important articles of distribution; tobacco and salt are Government monopolies (*see* p. 128). The chief centres of local supply are commonly also engaged in serving the foreign export houses. It is noticeable that, although, of course, there are large and small dealers, and often intermediaries between them, a strict differentiation between wholesale and retail trade is not observed.

An important and more remunerative department of domestic trade is concerned with the distribution of imports. The two great importing centres are Beirut

and Aleppo, from which supplies are drawn by the secondary markets in their respective areas, thence descending by further steps to the minor towns and villages. Trade connections of more or less stability are thus established; the interdependence of the chief towns and their special commercial functions are discussed in the following section. The considerable traffic in animals and animal produce handled by the dealers of Aleppo, Homs, Hama, and Damascus originates to a large extent outside Syrian borders, and must accordingly be included under distribution of imports.

(b) *Towns and Markets*

Commercially two cities have a primary position, Beirut and Aleppo, the former for the middle and south, the latter for the north.

Beirut and area.—Besides supplying the Lebanon interior and inland centres like Damascus and Jerusalem, the importing houses of Beirut serve also the smaller ports Tripoli, Saida, Haifa, and Jaffa, with which there is easy communication, and their respective dependencies. With the development of trade there is a tendency to advance from indirect to direct relationship; Damascus, Jaffa, and Haifa, for instance, have to some extent established independent European connections. Beirut, however, remains the chief emporium for foreign manufactures, especially the valuable textile imports from England. It also has an active export business; its merchants and the local agents of Lyons firms control the silk industry, and wool, barley, eggs, and other produce are collected there for shipment.

Damascus, which is the greatest centre of internal commerce, is the chief of the dependencies of Beirut, though 40 per cent. of its European imports may represent direct trade. Besides its more immediate neighbourhood, Damascus supplies the Hauran and the places further south now served by the Hejaz railway, but goods for these districts will go in increasing quan-

tity through Haifa. With the growth of means of communication Damascus has declined to some extent as a collecting centre for native produce, but is still an important market for camels, sheep, wool, and butter from the nomadic tribes along the border. There is some traffic with Baghdad, whence Persian rugs and cloaks are brought in exchange for rope, string, silks, and cottons.

Tripoli traders for the most part make purchases at Beirut, or transmit orders through Beirut firms. Goods so ordered are, however, often shipped to Tripoli direct, and the railway to Homs has brought the port into greater prominence, both for exports and imports.

Homs, though now connected by rail with Tripoli, and obtaining foreign supplies through that medium, similarly remains to a large extent dependent upon Beirut importing houses. It is a prominent market for the nomadic tribes of the Euphrates district, who send in sheep, wool, and butter, Mosul sheep especially coming in large numbers for subsequent distribution to Damascus, Beirut, and the Lebanon.

Haifa, having become the sea terminus of the Hejaz railway, is rising in importance. It has already emancipated itself in some degree from Beirut, and this process may easily be carried further as the volume of imports for the Hauran and Arabia increases. Haifa also supplies Akka, to which it is now joined by railway, and the inland towns Nazareth, Tiberias, and Safed.

Jaffa, like Haifa, is tending to become less dependent on Beirut, but direct importation is as yet on a comparatively small scale. Jaffa is the great centre of the cultivation and export of oranges. Of its dependents the chief are Gaza, Ramle, and Nablus, the last of which, however, is promoting relations of its own with Beirut, a process likely to be encouraged by the recently established railway connection with Haifa. Gaza is noted both for its exports of barley and as a market for camels.

Jerusalem, though, of course, obtaining its imports through Jaffa, has independent business relations with

Beirut. Hebron looks to Jerusalem for supplies, and Bir es-Seba has hitherto done so, though this connection is open to disturbance from the new railway giving access to Jaffa. Hebron traders maintain large stores at Tafile, south-east of the Dead Sea, for traffic with the neighbouring Bedouin. The Hejaz railway, which now serves the district east of the Jordan, has helped to reduce the commercial importance of Jerusalem, which previously was not great.

Aleppo and area.—The district dominated commercially by Aleppo extends southwards to Hama, and north and east far beyond the limits of Syria, including Deir ez-Zor, Mosul, Mardin, Diarbekr, and places still more remote. How far the old relations will be changed by the Baghdad railway, to which *Alexandretta* is now linked, remains to be seen. Alexandretta has hitherto been little more than a port and depot for Aleppo, and merchandise passing to or from inland towns is mainly for Aleppo account. At Aleppo itself an active trade subsists both in foreign imports and native products, especially textiles and soap. It is also the chief centre of the large traffic in sheep, cattle, wool, and butter, which are brought from the Euphrates district and beyond, and are distributed in Syria or exported.

Antioch is a considerable seat of industry (silk-weaving and soap-making), but is not otherwise prominent. *Aintab* has several flourishing industries, especially tanning and the manufacture of textiles (for which cotton yarns are largely imported); and it is a small trade centre for the districts to the north and east. Its imports through Aleppo have been on the increase, and the place is rising in commercial significance. *Killis* is of less account, but has a large market for animals.

Hama, which is the chief town of a thriving agricultural district and has a well-established textile industry, is now more dependent on Aleppo for imports than on *Beirut*. A large trade is done with the Beduin tribes to the east, Hama being one of the principal recipients of their produce, especially wool and butter.

(c) *Organisations to promote Trade and Commerce*

Chambers of Commerce modelled on the one set up in 1880 at Constantinople exist at Beirut, Aleppo, Damascus, and Jerusalem,[1] but have very few members, and are destitute alike of activity and influence. The Jerusalem Chamber, which dates from 1909, has issued some monthly reports, but shows no other signs of life. Syria is not a congenial soil for such institutions. Diversities of race, of religion, and to some extent of language, militate against co-operation among the mercantile class; moreover, the native is, as a rule, strongly individualistic in character, and partnership seldom extends beyond members of the same family. Local associations for trade purposes are found chiefly among the Jewish and German colonists, *e.g.*, the Jewish societies of wine-producers and of growers of oranges and almonds, and the similar German associations at Wilhelma and Sarona. A successful association established in 1908 by the shoemakers of Damascus for the purchase of leather and other articles is primarily concerned with the promotion of industry rather than of trade.

An institution which, in the past, has been of limited utility, but may, in virtue of newly acquired powers, do much to assist the agricultural class, is the Banque agricole. By a law of 1916 this bank was authorised to undertake the purchase and sale of land, draught animals, seed, and implements, which may be paid for by instalments (*cf.* p. 141). Co-operative credit societies have recently been started at several towns in Palestine with the assistance of the Anglo-Palestine Bank (*cf.* p. 140).

(d) *Foreign Interests*

Foreign enterprise is very prominent in public works, shipping, banking, and insurance, besides en-

[1] According to another recent authority, also at Alexandretta, Tripoli, and Jaffa, and in the Hauran. A measure for the promotion of local Chambers of Commerce has quite lately been introduced by the Government.

gaging in the business of export and import and various minor departments of trade. French companies are responsible for a large part of the railway system (*cf.* p. 69), the harbour and docks of Beirut, and the lighting by gas and electricity of that city; the water company there too is largely a French concern. A Belgian company, in which the Allgemeine Elektricitäts-Gesellschaft, of Berlin, has a considerable interest, has installed the electric tramway and light at Damascus, and the electric trams at Beirut also were financed by Belgian capitalists. (For the shipping lines, whose agents are established at the principal ports, see p. 85, and for the foreign banks, p. 139.) In the Imperial Ottoman Bank, which has branches in Syria, French influence predominates. Agencies of a number of insurance companies (life, fire, transport) are found in Beirut, Aleppo, Damascus, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Haifa, Tripoli, &c., the principal being British, French, German, Austrian, and American. In miscellaneous trade and commerce the foreign firms are, for the most part, concentrated in the seaports of Beirut, Jaffa, and Haifa, and the three large inland towns, Aleppo, Damascus, and Jerusalem; French, German, Austrian, Italian, and Greek houses predominate. English firms usually employ native representatives, and English names such as that of White & Son, engineers and dealers in machinery (Beirut and Aleppo), are rare among local traders. Of American companies, the Singer Sewing Machine Company, who have agents in many towns, the Vacuum Oil Company (Beirut and Aleppo), and the McAndrews & Forbes Company, dealers in liquorice root (Alexandretta and Antioch), are the most important. Like the Vacuum Oil Company, the Russian petroleum company, Nobel Frères, is widely represented. French interests are paramount at Beirut, but are concerned more especially with export trade, above all in silk. A large general business is conducted by what is, perhaps, the most important firm, the Établissements Orosdi Back, which has

branches at Beirut and Aleppo, besides other places in the East. Elsewhere than at Beirut, German and Austrian firms are prominent, including, besides some large commercial houses, a number of minor traders such as hotel-keepers, tailors, clockmakers, jewellers, chemists, stationers, &c. These are especially numerous at Jaffa, near which are the German colonies Wilhelma and Sarona, at Haifa, and Jerusalem. Italian and Greek traders also, especially the latter, are sometimes engaged in comparatively petty business.

(e) *Methods of Economic Penetration*

Of these the most obvious, perhaps, is the agency of Consular representatives, who are maintained in the more important trading centres, and may be of great assistance not only to their nationals on the spot, but also in keeping home manufacturers and exporters in touch with local conditions. Their influence is increased when, as in the German system, the Consular service forms part of the Diplomatic Corps. Secondly, commerce is naturally promoted by easy means of transit, and in Syria especially by shipping facilities. It is noteworthy that several of the foreign mail services are supported by subsidies from their respective Governments. Again, in a country where business depends so largely on credit (*cf.* p. 142), banking establishments can play an important part in the promotion of trade. Syrian importers not only need credit themselves, but as a rule have to grant it to their large customers, who issue negotiable promissory notes. The Deutsche Palästina Bank has of late been extremely active in extending its sphere in Palestine and pushing German interests. Commercial travellers and local commission agents are particularly important. The scarcity and ineffectiveness of British travellers, and the advantages secured by those of other nations, are emphasised in many Consular reports. Excursions of actual exporters and importers have been promoted by the German Government. A great deal of trade is

done through commission agents, and the number of foreign agents, especially Germans, residing in the chief centres is highly significant. Representatives of British firms are hardly ever themselves British born. Adaptation of business to native requirements is another point which foreign manufacturers are accustomed to study to better advantage than our own. Favourable terms of credit are of primary importance. Much, too, may be gained by a readiness to consult popular taste and by intelligibility in correspondence, catalogues, and quotation of prices. French is the language generally understood; the metric system is used in commercial transactions; and c.i.f. quotations are commonly expected. In Palestine German interests have a strong support in the colonies at Haifa, Jaffa, and Jerusalem, and are also served to some extent by the Jewish colonies, whose members are commonly German-speaking and not seldom tinged with German *Kultur*. The Zionist movement is openly advocated in Germany as a means of spreading Teutonic influence —an aspect of the question which in this country is not sufficiently appreciated. The various educational, religious, and charitable institutions—British, American, French, German, &c.—have no direct concern with trade, though they may do something by means of creating an "atmosphere." Papers and periodicals, which are read a good deal in the more Europeanised towns, are by no means negligible. The *Deutsche Levante Zeitung*, for instance, has quickly found a public among the merchants of the Levant, and is said to have done good service to German trade.

(f) *Monopolies*

The salt monopoly is assigned to and managed by the Ottoman Public Debt, which has two administrative centres, Aleppo for the vilayet of Aleppo, and Beirut for the vilayets of Beirut and Damascus and the mutessariflik of Jerusalem, with depôts in numerous places. In 1913-14 the amount sold in the administrative area

of Beirut was 13,455,000 kg., fetching, at pre-war prices, about 1,500,000 frs., so that the sale in the whole country may well approximate to 2,500,000 frs. To the Lebanon the monopoly has not applied, salt being sold by the Public Debt to dealers and others in amounts of not less than 50 kg.

The conditions of the tobacco monopoly, which has been in the hands of the Régie cointéressée des Tabacs de l'Empire ottoman since 1883, were revised in 1914. Except in the Lebanon, which has hitherto been excluded from its operations, the Régie has the sole right to control and purchase all tobacco grown, to collect duty on imported and exported tobaccos, and to manufacture and sell tobacco in its various forms. Cigarettes, tobacco, &c., are sold at fixed prices and only on licensed premises, whose holders receive a commission. Tombac, or water-pipe tobacco, which is both imported from Persia and grown in the country (p. 92), is also controlled, but is subject to special regulations. Imported tombac pays a duty of 4 piastres per kg.; that grown at home, so far as not bought by the Régie, may be sold or exported, paying duty at the same rate. The annual value of the tobacco and tombac normally sold is perhaps fourteen to fifteen million francs.

(2) Foreign Trade

No very clear statistics of foreign commerce are available. The official statistics include Adalia and Mersina with the Syrian ports, and the trade of these two places does not concern Syria, though it is true that it is not large. Secondly, these statistics confine themselves to trade with foreign countries, excluding the considerable traffic with other parts of the Ottoman Empire, and so do not do full justice to the country as an entity. They can, however, be supplemented to some extent from British Consular reports where the figures are collected for the several ports, though unfortunately not on a consistent system, those for Beirut, Tripoli, Haifa, Latakia, and Saida giving quantities only and

not values. Moreover, imported goods are often transshipped at the larger for the smaller ports (especially at Beirut), and not only are these goods reckoned in the returns for both ports but they are treated at the minor port as of Turkish origin. It is also to be remembered that the Consular statistics refer to sea trade only, and that in them, as well as in the official returns, a certain amount of the traffic to and from Alexandretta is not really Syrian.

(a) *Exports*

Statistics.—Of the tables given below in the Appendix, Table II summarises the official statistics for 1910-11, a fairly typical year, in which there was an average harvest and an absence of foreign trouble. Table III shows the values of the exports, classified according to destination, from the three principal ports, Alexandretta, Beirut, and Jaffa, during the years 1910-12. Similar figures for the minor ports are not available, but those given may be taken as fairly representative. Table IV contains classified totals with percentages, for the same three ports in the typical year 1910.

The sum of the values in Table II is 398,374,279 piastres, or approximately £3,622,000. Exports from Alexandretta, Beirut, and Jaffa to other parts of the Turkish Empire, which, as already explained, are not included in Table II, amounted in 1910 to £626,249, and for the whole of Syria may be put roughly at £700,000. But against this must be set the values of those exports included in Table II which are really of non-Syrian origin, so that the total value for 1910 may be reckoned at approximately $3\frac{3}{4}$ millions sterling.

Syrian exports consist in the main of the vegetable and animal products of the country, and tend to fluctuate with them. Of the expanding branches the most conspicuous is the export of oranges from Jaffa, which advanced steadily from 744,463 cases in 1909 to 1,608,570 cases in 1913. Exports of oranges and lemons

from Tripoli, Saida, and Beirut have not shown a corresponding growth, there being a difference of only about 50,000 cases between 1909 and 1913, but a further development of the exports from that region appears likely with the extension of this form of culture, which is tending to replace that of mulberry trees. Tobacco-planting is similarly increasing, with a corresponding effect on export, which from the Beirut-Tripoli-Latakia district amounted to 986 tons in 1913, as against 671 tons in 1912 and 689 in 1911. Silk production, on the other hand, in spite of the excellence of the silk, is generally regarded as on the wane, although in the year before the war a good crop and a large French demand led to an increased export. The export figures for cocoons and raw silk in 1910-13 were :—

—		1910.	1911.	1912.	1913.
Beirut and Tripoli ..	bales	5,075	3,997	2,760	10,900
Alexandretta ..	tons	328	353	258	328

Beirut exports of native silk or part-silk fabrics, however, had a marked decline in 1913, reaching only 3,198 bales, or less than half the average for the three preceding years. Exports of wool, which now go mostly from Tripoli, have advanced materially during the same period, as shown by the following figures :—

—		1910.	1911.	1912.	1913.
Beirut and Tripoli ..	bales	4,411	10,023	10,750	19,300
Alexandretta ..	tons	555	349	165	42

If a ton is taken as roughly equivalent to three bales, the combined figures in bales will be 6,076, 11,070, 11,245, 19,426. Soap production is only partly depen-

dent on the home olive crop, and does not vary much; the export figures show an upward tendency :—

—		1910.	1911.	1912.	1913.
Beirut and Tripoli ..	cases	15,550	16,830	12,010	17,750
Jaffa and Alexandretta	tons	4,890	5,116	8,325	6,657

Exports of wine from Jaffa have also risen, the amounts in 1909-12 being 2,289, 3,807, 5,180, and 4,477 tons respectively. Shipments of liquorice from Alexandretta are much influenced by freightage rates, the actual production being fairly constant. There is still a small export of egg-yolk and albumen from the same port, but it has almost ceased further south, where eggs are now sent out whole. The export of lace to America, previously valued at about 1,000,000 frs. annually, was stated in 1915 to have ceased, owing to deterioration in the quality.

Countries of destination.—As shown in Table IV (p. 153), France, Egypt, and other parts of the Turkish Empire are Syria's best customers. Besides the bulk of the silk, which goes to Lyons, France takes chiefly cereals, sesame, wool, skins, and eggs. Egypt imports a large variety of Syrian products—barley, durra, leguminous produce, cattle, sheep, dried apricots, wine, eggs, butter, oranges and lemons, tobacco, soap, leather, silk and cotton textiles—and much miscellaneous produce goes also to parts of Turkey, especially barley, pistachio nuts, dried apricots, eggs, butter, oranges and lemons, melons, wool, soap, skins and leather, silk and cotton fabrics. England takes large quantities of oranges, which are shipped mostly to Liverpool, barley, durra, leguminous produce, pistachio nuts, Latakia tobacco, and wool; the United States liquorice, pistachio, and devotional objects. To Austria go sesame, figs, cotton, and hides; to Germany sesame and skins; to Italy wheat, cotton, and wool; and to Russia oranges and lemons.

(b) *Imports*

Statistics.—On the defects of the published statistics see above, p. 129. The Appendix contains tables corresponding to those given for exports, Table V containing the official figures for 1910-11; Table VI, which is based on Consular reports, showing the value of goods received at the three ports in 1910-12, classified according to the country of their origin; Table VII giving similarly classified totals and percentages for the year 1910.

The chief imports are :—

1. Flour and certain articles of food which are not produced in the country, *e.g.*, rice, sugar, coffee. Flour ground by the native mills is not suited for fancy baking, and in some years is insufficient for ordinary needs. Imports of flour, sugar, rice, and coffee (non-Arabian) in the years 1910-12 were as under :—

——		1910.	1911.	1912.
Flour	kg.	24,508,000	21,392,000	11,713,000
Sugar	„	21,777,000	24,240,000	13,801,700
Rice	„	23,849,000	19,667,000	11,963,000
Coffee	„	1,465,800	1,328,160	1,345,920

The decreases noticeable in 1912 may be largely put down to the general depression caused by the Balkan War, following on the war with Italy. In the case of flour there had been some overstocking at Jaffa in previous years.

2. Coal and petroleum. The figures for 1910-12 were :—

——		1910.	1911.	1912.
Coal	tons	79,045	66,476	82,980
Petroleum ..	„	28,872	28,525	17,335

Beirut and Haifa import about 70 per cent. of the coal, and Beirut about 30 per cent. of the petroleum.

3. Wood, cement, tiles, and other building materials. Wood is largely used for box-making, as well as for building and on the railways, and its import at Jaffa rose, with the growth of orange exports, from 13,400 cubic metres in 1910 to 26,210 in 1913. Some 25,000 tons are received at the other ports. Imports of tiles declined between 1910 and 1912, but their value in any case is not very considerable.

4. Iron and other metals, metal implements, machinery, &c.—an important class. Metal (chiefly iron) imports for the years 1910 to 1912 were 18,226, 17,292, and 17,089 tons respectively, apart from large quantities of manufactured ware. The machinery received in 1910, including locomotives, motors, agricultural machines, pumps, sewing machines, &c., amounted, according to the official statistics, to 3,340 tons, with a value of 3,850,000 frs.

5. Textiles. These are by far the largest item, accounting, according to the official figures for 1910-11, for over 40 per cent. of the entire value of the imports. Cotton fabrics and yarn form the principal division in this class; the figures for these, with woollens, in 1910-12 were as follows :—

——	1910.	1911.	1912.
Alexandretta .. tons	3,289	2,543	3,484
Beirut and Jaffa.. bales and cases	29,356	31,701	23,799

The red fezes everywhere worn all come from abroad, and ready-made clothing is also imported in considerable quantity. Other commodities for which the country is entirely dependent on foreign supplies are paper, chemicals, dyes, hardware, glass, and matches.

Countries of origin.—Proportional values are shown in Table VII. The United Kingdom is the chief contributor, largely in virtue of cotton yarns and fabrics, about 60 per cent. of the quantity received coming from England. Besides these, British imports consist mainly of woollens, stockings, sacking, coal, machinery, and chemicals. Cotton yarns and sacking also come from India, together with rice and indigo; rice is also sent by Egypt. The chief contributions of other countries are :—

Turkey : Tobacco, coal, wood, and coffee (Arabia).
France : Flour, silken and woollen fabrics, tiles, cement.
Austria : Sugar, iron, metalware, woollens and other textiles, fezes, ready-made clothing, wood, cement, paper, glass, matches.
Italy : Cottons, matches.
Germany: Iron and metalware, machinery, coal, dyes, drugs.
Russia: Flour, sugar, alcohol, petroleum, wood.
Belgium: Iron, metal-ware, cement, glass, chemicals.
Rumania : Flour, petroleum.
United States : Petroleum, machinery.
China : Silk.
Brazil : Coffee.

(c) *Customs and Tariffs*

The 8 per cent. *ad valorem* duty established for all parts of Turkey in 1861-2 was raised by agreement with the Powers to 11 per cent. in 1907 (except for Egyptian goods, for which the old rate was maintained), and by the independent action of the Ottoman Government to 15 per cent. in 1914, and 30 per cent. in 1915. In 1916 the old system was superseded by an elaborately graduated tariff, to be revised at the end of three years, which aims at the protection of home products and industries, actual or potential, and their

encouragement by the admission, free or under low duties, of necessary machinery and raw materials. Textiles, leather products, furniture, woodwork, and paper are among the highly taxed articles. The duties assigned are throughout maxima, which are subject to modification by special agreement.

(d) *Commercial Treaties*

The commercial and other privileges known as Capitulations, which in relation to Great Britain had existed since 1675, were abolished by the Turkish Government in 1914. Treaties of commerce arranged with the Capitulatory Powers in 1861-2 were subsequently denounced by Turkey, but without being formally renewed they continued to be followed tacitly. Negotiations entered into for new treaties were without result, except in the case of Germany, with whom an agreement was signed in 1890; a stipulation was, however, added that the provisions and tariff should not come into force without the consent of Germany unless they were applied to other countries also, and the treaty consequently remained in abeyance. A new treaty with Germany has now been made, together with further conventions, regulating the functions of Consuls and other international matters, formerly governed by the Capitulations. With certain non-capitulatory Powers —Greece, Persia, Montenegro, Rumania, Serbia— agreements were reached some years ago conceding most-favoured-nation treatment; and a treaty was made in 1896 with Japan under which Consuls were reciprocally established and the right given to free exchange of commerce. With Bulgaria relations of free trade have subsisted, except for certain goods defined by a convention of 1906, but previous arrangements have, for the most part, been nullified by the events of the past few years, and Turkey's relations with other countries will require a comprehensive readjustment after the war.

(D) FINANCE

(1) *Public Finance*

Budget.—For the public finance of Turkey, which includes that of Syria, see *Anatolia*, No. 59 of this series, p. 115. Individually considered, Syria's financial situation contrasts very favourably with that of the Empire as a whole, local revenues being considerably in excess of the expenditure, as is seen in the following figures, taken from *La Syrie de demain*, by M. Moutran (1916), and based upon the previous Budget:—

—	Revenue.	Expenditure.
	Frs.	Frs.
Aleppo	20,275,673	7,954,573
Beirut	31,919,329	8,804,400
Damascus..	15,568,401	16,902,682
Jerusalem..	4,630,015	2,373,991
Lebanon	1,100,458	1,062,761
Total	73,493,876	37,098,407

Here expenses exceed receipts in one province only, Damascus, and this small deficit is handsomely repaired by the favourable balances elsewhere, especially in the vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut.

Of the total revenue, the bulk is accounted for by the following principal items[1]:—

	Frs.
Taxes on land, animals, trades, and in lieu of military and other services	18,657,600
Tithe	21,019,401

[1] These figures do not include the Lebanon, which had a different system, but, on the other hand, include Deir ez-Zor, the total revenue of which was only 450,000 frs. more than that of the Lebanon.

	Frs.
Import, export, transit, and other dues	11,297,002
Sale of salt and tobacco	5,487,317
Hejaz Railway	4,459,125
Stamps	3,296,268
Posts and telegraphs	2,060,754
State domains, State and private forests, mines, quarries, fishing, and hunting	2,185,980

M. Moutran estimates the expense of an efficient internal administration at 64,290,758 frs., including in this sum 15,000,000 frs. as Syria's share of the interest on the Public Debt, 5,000,000 frs. for interest on a preliminary loan of 100,000,000 frs., and 1,760,000 frs. for a foreign resident with a staff of commandants, inspectors, &c., leaving a balance of over 9,000,000 frs.

Taxes.—See *Anatolia*, No. 59 of this series, p. 129. It will suffice here to note the heavy pressure on land, which has to pay not only the tithe,[1] now amounting to 12·63 per cent. of the crop, but also a direct tax of 4 per cent. of the value of the land (an increase of 6 per cent. is made where no tithe is payable). Taxes on wine production, in conjunction with the tithe, reach 29·63 per cent. of the gross produce. The agricultural class is further burdened with the cattle tax, from which only animals under two years and two draught animals *per* cultivator are exempt. (For the tobacco and salt monopolies *cf.* p. 128.)

(2) *Currency*

The currency of Syria is, of course, that of the Ottoman Empire, being based on the Turkish pound (£T) or lira, which has the nominal value of 100 gold

[1] The Lebanon and the less settled districts to the east of the Jordan and the south of Judaea have not paid tithe, but a fixed tax instead.

piastres—a sub-unit which does not exist as a coin. There are gold coins of 25, 50, 100, 250, and 500 piastres; silver of $\frac{1}{2}$, 1, 2, 5, 10, and 20 piastres (1 mejidieh); nickel of $\frac{1}{8}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{1}{2}$, and 1 piastre (5, 10, 20, and 40 paras). In practice, Turkish gold is seldom seen, the commonest gold coin being the French 20-franc piece, which = 87$\frac{1}{2}$ gold piastres (£1 = 110 piastres, £T1 = 18*s.* 0$\frac{3}{4}$*d.*). Besides the silver and nickel coins, the old Turkish beshlik and $\frac{1}{2}$ beshlik, of an alloy of silver and copper, equivalent to 2$\frac{1}{2}$ and 1$\frac{1}{4}$ piastres, and the metallik (also alloy) of $\frac{1}{4}$ piastre or 10 paras, and multiples and sub-divisions of the latter, circulate widely. In foreign commerce prices are quoted in francs, and franc-pieces are also in use. There is a good deal of false coin about the country.

Apart from the official values, for trading purposes various local rates were commonly used in expressing prices. Thus, while in Constantinople £T1 was reckoned at 108 market piastres, at Tripoli it was 123, at Aleppo 127, at Jaffa 141; and so firmly rooted were these current local rates that they came to be recognised even in the accounts of the banks. In 1916, however, order was introduced by a measure fixing the lira for all purposes at 100 piastres. For further information about this reform and the Turkish currency generally, see *Turkey in Europe*, No. 16 of this series, p. 129. Another innovation made during the war is less fortunate. Until 1914 the only notes in circulation were those of the Ottoman Bank. Since then the country has been flooded with paper of denominations down to 1 piastre, which, in spite of pains and penalties, the population persist in discounting heavily. In Syria, Government paper has been passing at about $\frac{1}{4}$ to $\frac{1}{5}$ of its face value.

(3) *Banking*

Banks.—Seven banking companies are represented in the country:—

(i) Imperial Ottoman Bank. Branches at Aintab, Aleppo, Alexandretta, Beirut, Damascus, Haifa,

Hama, Homs, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Saida, Tripoli. The existing concession of this institution, which originated in a private British concern, but is now largely under French control, terminates in 1925. It acts for the Government in financial matters, and before 1914 it alone had the right to issue notes, which, however, were payable only at Constantinople and were never popular in the provinces; in 1913 the amount issued (against which metal in the ratio of 1 to 3 must be held) was only about £T1,100,000. But the Bank remains free to conduct business of all kinds on its own account, and hardly occupies the position of a national bank in the ordinary sense, though taking the lead in fixing rates of exchange and discount. It has been active in promoting trade by advances upon goods (see below). A new national bank, called the Crédit National Ottoman, has lately been founded at Constantinople.

(ii) Banque de Salonique. Branches at Beirut and Tripoli; nominally a Turkish company, but really a Jewish concern under Austrian influence.

(iii) Banque Commerciale de Palestine. A small Ottoman company formed in 1911, and carrying on business in Jerusalem only.

(iv) Anglo-Palestine Company. A Jewish bank, with headquarters in London, which started operations in Palestine in 1903; it has been suspended by the Turkish Government since the outbreak of the war. The company has branches at Beirut, Gaza, Haifa, Hebron, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Safed, Tiberias, and small agencies in the principal Jewish colonies. To facilitate advances to persons of small means it has adopted the principle of co-operative credit, and a number of societies have been started, especially among the Jewish agricultural population, to take advantage of this.

(v) Crédit Lyonnais. Branches at Jaffa and Jerusalem, with agencies at Beirut and elsewhere. The business of the bank has been reduced to a minimum during the war.

(vi) Deutsche Orient Bank. Branch at Aleppo; the bank was established at Constantinople in 1906 (see *Turkey in Europe*, No. 16 of this series, p. 134).

(vii) Deutsche Palästina Bank. Branches at Beirut, Damascus, Gaza, Haifa, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Nablus, Nazareth, Tripoli. This company, which dates from 1899, and has shown much activity, has important branches at Berlin and Hamburg. A fusion with the Deutsche Orient Bank is to take place after the war.

Besides these companies, there are numerous private banks in the large towns, especially Beirut and Aleppo, which do a considerable amount of minor discounting, besides undertaking deposits and current accounts. In Aleppo, for example, eight or nine firms of good standing are to be found, with a score or more of less solid establishments.

The State-supported Banque agricole, which has a number of branches, exists for the special end of making advances to cultivators for agricultural purposes. Credits are given at the rate of 6 per cent. on suitable security. Facilities for credit were appreciably extended by a law of 1916, which removed previous restrictions as to the amount and term of loans, and legitimised advances on grain, besides including in the bank's sphere of operations the purchase and sale of land, agricultural implements, animals, and seed.

Extent and methods of business.—The volume of banking business, notwithstanding the number and diffusion of the establishments engaged, is not very great; for the public companies it has been estimated that the amount involved, including deposits and current accounts, ranged before the war from £T3,000,000 to £T4,500,000. The united working capital of banks of all kinds at Aleppo was put in 1913 at 22,000,000 frs., and their annual profit at about 2,000,000 frs. Such figures indicate a comparatively low stage of development. The banks take little part in financing companies or taking up concessions.

Their business may, for the most part, be summed up under the following heads:—

(*a*) Collection of values of imported goods.

(*b*) Discounting bills of exchange and promissory notes. The rate of discount is limited by law to 9 per cent. In 1910 the banks of Beirut agreed on the rates of $6\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. for first-class banks, $6\frac{3}{4}$ for those of second-class, 7 per cent. for first-class merchants, 7-8 per cent. for others.

(*c*) Advances on real property and on goods. The former have lately been made easier by a law sanctioning mortgages in the names of the specially licensed banks, but except those granted by the Banque agricole they are as yet exceptional. Advances on goods, on the other hand, are very frequent, and may be divided into three classes: (1) Advances on staple products, grain, wool, &c., or on merchandise. Some depôts for deposits of this kind are kept by the banks, but there are no storage companies, and accommodation is limited. 75 per cent. of the value is the recognised allowance, and interest at $5\frac{1}{2}$-$6\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. is charged, besides fees for insurance, storage, &c. (2) Advances upon imports which have been ordered, but have not yet arrived. These are paid for wholly or in part on receipt of the bills of lading by the bank, which then takes over the goods on arrival, and releases them as the advances and the bank's own charges are paid off. This system is in use chiefly at Beirut and Aleppo. (3) Advances upon exported goods, the bank receiving the documents after shipment.

(*d*) Current accounts and deposits This class of business is increasing, at any rate in the larger towns and for private account. As there are no public savings banks, the ordinary banking establishments are the only available medium.

(4) *Influence of Foreign Capital*

The notorious dependence of Turkey on foreign capital has been fully shared by Syria, which, as already indicated (p. 125), is both commercially and

industrially under no small obligations to assistance from without. Until recently the only railways were French. Oversea communications are still practically monopolised by foreign shipping. The one modern port is a foreign enterprise, and the country looks to similar support for further improvements to its harbours. Other important public works due to extraneous money are the electric tramways, the lighting and water supply of Beirut, and the electric trams and light at Damascus. Large undertakings of this character have, as a rule, been left hitherto to the foreigner, though since the beginning of the war there has been a tendency in Turkey generally to greater enterprise on the part of native capitalists. In finance, all the larger banking concerns are foreign, even that which has played the part of the official national bank being only thinly disguised; on the importance of the banks in the commercial system see p. 127 and p. 139 above. The insurance business has been entirely in the hands of alien companies.

A stagnating agriculture, affecting the prosperity of the whole country, has received some stimulus in Palestine from the Jewish and German colonies, and such advances as have been witnessed in the last decade or two are in no small degree the effect of their example. The spread of the colonies has also led to a substantial advance in the market value of agricultural land in their neighbourhood. Another of the few native industries of significance, the culture and spinning of silk, has rested largely upon French support, the enforced withdrawal of which during the war has been followed by a marked decline in production. Materially, the beneficial influence of external resources has thus been strongly felt, and they have been a not less potent factor in the promotion of the health and education of the people through the hospitals, schools, and other institutions which have been established and maintained by foreign benevolence.

(5) *Principal Fields of Investment*

Communications.—On the possibilities of the development of railways and ports, *cf.* pp. 77 and 84. Though essential needs are fairly well satisfied by the existing railway system, there is room for improvement, especially by the extension of local branch lines. With regard to ports, the construction of suitable works at Jaffa, Haifa, and Alexandretta is urgently demanded. For the last of these the Baghdad Railway Company holds the concession; for Jaffa and Haifa (with Tripoli) a concession was granted in 1913 to France, and some preliminary financial arrangements were made which have now lapsed in consequence of the war.

Mining.—The prospects here are very uncertain, and further scientific investigation is required. Explorers have noted the occurrence of metals, &c., at various points, but the possibility of their being profitably exploited is not established. Fuel is a vital want, but so far neither coal nor petroleum has been obtained in any quantity. That a profitable oilfield exists within the borders of Syria has yet to be proved; recent expert examinations of concessions in the neighbourhood of Latakia and to the east of the Jordan and the Dead Sea were not of a very hopeful character. The potentialities of the phosphate deposits of the latter region (*cf.* p. 111) are also not yet fully ascertained.

Electricity.—In the absence of combustibles, the utilisation of water-power, for which sufficient opportunities exist (*cf.* p. 120), should be especially fruitful. Of the larger towns only Beirut and Damascus are at present supplied with electricity.

Agricultural development.—Both in drainage and irrigation much remains to be done. On the coast about Alexandretta and between Jaffa and Gaza, as well as inland north of Antioch and about the Lakes of Hule and Tiberias, large tracts of land might be reclaimed. Cultivation is also capable of appreciable extension and improvement by irrigation, either by pumping, in

which the use of water-power would play a prominent part, or by means of the ancient system of reservoirs. Acquisition of land by private companies is restricted by the existing law, and anything tending to the expropriation of the peasantry is to be deprecated.

Building, &c.—As has been already remarked (p. 119), there are at present no large local contracting establishments, although there appears to be an opening for such. The possibilities of the country as a health resort, which it is well fitted to become by virtue both of its climate and the presence of a number of hot springs, are as yet undeveloped. More adequate storage accommodation in the commercial centres, perhaps also provision for cold storage in connection with one or more of the shipping lines, are other needs.

Miscellaneous industries.—Various branches of industry, for which the raw material is or can be produced in the country, appear capable of introduction or development and improvement. Milling and oil-pressing, for example, need to be further modernised. With an extension of the cultivation of sugar-cane or beet, sugar manufacture might become profitable, and there is an abundance of material for the production of alcohol, which at present is largely imported. If cotton were more widely grown, it is possible that cotton-spinning might be successful; for wool-spinning there is already in the country an ample supply of raw material. The weaving industry, however, is hardly likely to expand very much except under the protection of a tariff. There is no obvious reason why the demand for such things as cement, tiles, and glass should not now be satisfied on the spot. Tiles and similar products have lately been manufactured to some extent locally, but a glass factory started at Damascus in 1909-10 was a failure. The utilisation of the papyrus beds of northern Galilee for paper manufacture has been suggested. Further attention might well be directed to the preservation of fruit, vegetables, and fish, and the production of perfumery.

(E) GENERAL REMARKS

Syrian industry, as appears from the foregoing review, is at present very one-sided. Apart from agriculture, only silk-spinning in the Lebanon, the textile industry in the same district and at Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo, and the production of olive oil and soap at Antioch, Tripoli, Jaffa, &c., can be said to have attained any real significance. Mining is negligible, and the absence of a home supply of both coal and petroleum has been a serious hindrance to the development of manufactures. The country therefore depends greatly upon foreign imports, and its purchasing power is much affected by the quality of the harvest and similar natural factors. Agriculture, upon which everything else hangs, has been handicapped by lack of security, adverse conditions of land tenure, and a vicious system of taxation, and has remained, except in certain favoured districts, in a backward condition. The removal of these blighting influences is the prime need. Among more special means of agricultural improvement, drainage and irrigation have already been referred to (p. 101). The various forms of arboriculture successfully practised in the Jewish settlements might be extended with advantage; in the uplands of Judaea, in particular, an adequate yield is hardly to be obtained from cereals. An assured market is, however, a necessary preliminary; the dangers of neglecting this precaution have been well seen in the experiences of the Jewish colonists in wine production. Within certain limits (*cf.* p. 100) something may be hoped from a more extended use of machinery.

Trade and commerce have naturally been profoundly affected by the war. In some directions, indeed, the country has profited; for instance, in the improvement of roads, more especially in the south. But there is a longer tale of loss. Apart from such obvious results as the withdrawal of labour, the losses both of men and animals and in parts the serious depopulation due to

famine and disease, or the felling of olives and mulberry-trees for fuel, grave dislocations have been caused by the interruption of overseas communications. On the one hand, the supply of many commodities, some of vital importance, has been cut off; on the other, several of the most flourishing industries have temporarily lost their market; for example, the Lebanese silk and the oranges of Jaffa. The orange plantations have, moreover, been much damaged by the failure of irrigation consequent on the deficiency of petrol.

Some possibilities of commercial development have been briefly discussed in the section on openings for investments (p. 144 above). In general, the industrial and commercial future of Syria is closely bound up with political conditions. In Palestine the situation would be transformed by Jewish immigration on a large scale, while dependence in any way upon the British Empire would no doubt greatly strengthen the ties with Egypt, which are already close.

APPENDIX

TABLE I.—Tonnage of Steamships cleared at Principal Ports

(A) BEIRUT

Nationality.	1910.	1911.	1912.	1913.
Austrian	219,508	214,368	180,130	273,859
British	317,661	359,649	323,677	305,820
French	394,601	399,555	354,052	476,505
German	66,549	61,474	67,965	93,962
Italian	287,193	161,010	36,164	250,167
Ottoman	47,145	39,756	2,099	20,986
Russian	235,614	198,629	188,005	245,415
United States ..	62,158	53,764	38,206	37,430
Others	70,858	47,286	42,996	43,447
Total	1,701,287	1,535,491	1,233,294	1,747,591

(B) ALEXANDRETTA

Nationality.	1910.	1911.	1912.	1913.
Austrian	113,443	106,331	103,840	120,180
British	156,206	166,918	175,776	172,246
French	55,564	62,391	41,459	54,667
German	14,109	24,454	41,631	51,847
Italian	78,725	29,505	—	41,889
Russian	160,202	138,043	158,521	201,032
Others	53,253	45,077	34,417	33,833
Total ..	631,502	572,719	555,644	675,694

(c) El-Mina (Tripoli)

Nationality.	1910.	1911.	1912.	1913.
Austrian ..	206,124	198,155	216,806	229,033
British ..	183,419	209,335	204,591	213,459
French ..	143,592	124,905	133,716	191,830
German ..	12,186	37,485	70,618	88,079
Italian ..	105,497	68,322	17,502	158,617
Russian ..	179,496	139,625	168,383	197,016
Others ..	65,840	45,689	47,567	13,803
Total ..	896,154	823,516	859,183	1,091,837

(d) Haifa

Nationality.	1910.	1911.	1912.	1913.
Austrian ..	98,254	209,146	207,149	236,536
British ..	167,701	233,378	201,197	189,961
French ..	69,038	76,080	43,725	49,310
German ..	17,817	21,389	29,848	49,418
Italian ..	82,633	33,169	12,032	65,462
Russian ..	278,246	144,408	166,441	193,518
Others ..	57,755	32,690	24,953	9,175
Total ..	771,444	750,260	685,345	793,380

(E) JAFFA

Nationality.	1910.	1911.	1912.	1913.
Austrian ..	178,674	211,729	213,679	228,456
British ..	250,926	292,785	315,876	270,361
French ..	191,899	192,560	161,560	213,202
German ..	84,128	60,167	85,673	78,656
Italian ..	140,669	56,171	6,964	104,265
Russian ..	184,713	156,699	174,526	212,469
Others ..	84,382	55,350	55,806	52,906
Total ..	1,115,391	1,025,461	1,014,084	1,160,315

(F) GAZA, LATAKIA, AND SAIDA

Port.	1910.	1911.	1912.	1913.
Gaza ..	..	9,434	6,730	8,007
Latakia ..	169,816	120,341	128,147	180,808
Saida ..	61,166	22,945	25,925	49,762

TABLE II.—Summary of Exports for the Year 1910–11.

Commodity.	Alexandretta (including Adalia and Mersina).		Beirut.		Other Ports.		Total.	
	Quantity.	Value.	Quantity.	Value.	Quantity.	Value.	Quantity.	Value.
	Kg.	Piastres.	Kg.	Piastres.	Kg.	Piastres.	Kg.	Piastres.
Live animals ... ... (head)	(178,754)	29,917,302	(1,901)	850,100	(2,123)	227,835	(182,778)	30,995,237
Animal provisions	500,179	4,519,924	735,503	6,703,812	1,195,891	3,286,584	2,431,573	14,510,320
Cereals	10,988,619	16,322,760	4,367,240	4,347,624	18,723,396	21,072,157	34,079,255	41,742,541
Fruit, vegetables (fresh or preserved) ...	5,900,972	6,083,057	3,405,111	9,458,995	33,102,941	29,760,307	42,409,024	45,302,359
Trees, kernels, seeds, plants	5,960,961	3,532,927	125,743	406,062	162,319	164,030	6,249,023	4,103,019
Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, &c.	30,190	48,458	397,462	1,006,145	153,786	348,014	581,438	1,402,617
Sugar and sugar products	184,797	811,226	102,487	341,779	10,745	30,292	298,029	1,183,297
Tobacco, tombac	41,932	524,150	123,735	1,546,700	1,323,944	16,550,000	1,489,611	18,620,850
Alcoholic liquor and mineral water ...	19,100	40,941	610,595	775,361	4,036,951	3,976,267	4,666,646	4,792,569
Oil and oil products	162,293	1,335,483	227,612	1,309,386	5,994,943	24,225,173	6,384,848	26,870,042
Ivory, offal, bones, and other animal products, burning material	2,818,121	1,501,737	206,699	2,383,328	1,518,441	721,412	4,543,261	4,606,477
Chemicals, dyes, dyeing matter	1,406,638	3,049,380	34,789	65,064	1,424	11,190	1,442,851	3,125,634
Drugs, perfumes, &c.	12,694,763	8,591,089	829,442	2,161,032	74,281	197,839	13,598,486	10,949,960
Gum, glue, asphalt, &c.	236,335	1,392,731	101,670	660,875	5,175	11,878	343,180	2,065,484
Ore, metal, metal work	6,366,513	1,683,156	257,722	1,219,566	63,196	202,197	6,687,431	3,104,919
Wood and woodwork	4,898,636	1,701,638	278,067	771,820	256,884	330,517	5,433,587	2,803,975
Skins, leather, &c.	437,722	3,776,609	673,709	4,342,442	143,994	843,325	1,255,425	8,962,376
Textiles, raw and manufactured	9,051,883	77,600,714	3,201,065	79,056,070	298,638	14,889,622	12,551,586	171,546,406
Miscellaneous	7,611	29,167	135,795	763,135	50,868	893,895	194,274	1,686,197
Total	61,707,265 (61,707 metric tons.)	162,462,449 (£1,476,931)	15,814,446 (15,814 tons)	118,169,296 (£1,074,266)	67,117,817 (67,117 tons)	117,742,534 (£1,070,386)	144,639,528 (144,639 tons)	398,374,279 (£3,621,584)

TABLE III.—Comparative Table of Exports (in £) from Alexandretta, Beirut, and Jaffa in 1910–12.

Destination.	Alexandretta.			Beirut.			Jaffa.		
	1910.	1911.	1912.	1910.	1911.	1912.	1910.	1911.	1912.
United Kingdom	24,722	14,228	19,543	70,500	41,000	31,500	173,085	185,000	190,000
British Colonies (India) ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	698	9,000	10,500
Turkey	525,234	397,218	308,282	18,000	19,000	10,000	83,015	78,000	95,000
Austria	22,142	11,643	13,395	2,300	1,500	1,300	12,103	21,000	24,500
Russia	15,385	20,781	22,574	3,100	4,200	3,500	29,589	33,000	45,000
Germany	18,761	25,539	30,170	1,900	1,000	1,000	8,384	17,000	21,000
France	189,086	178,414	133,491	672,000	431,500	423,800	22,255	46,000	50,000
Egypt	322,730	209,005	258,767	17,000	22,000	23,000	277,328	270,000	290,000
Belgium	3,022	50,868	41,404	2,500	1,100	1,000	1,101	15,000	12,000
Italy	38,645	50,453	860	3,000	2,200	..	15,332	12,000	6,000
United States	137,454	84,022	190,960	21,000	17,000	21,000	4,272	10,000	11,000
Other countries	3,844	2,153	1,001	11,200	10,000	9,500	8,983	14,660	19,162
Total .. £	1,301,025	1,044,324	1,020,447	822,500	550,500	525,600	636,145	710,660	774,162

TABLE IV.—Totals of Comparative Export Values from Alexandretta, Beirut, and Jaffa for 1910.

Destination.	Value.	Percentage.
	£	
United Kingdom	268,307	9·7
British Colonies (India)	698	
Turkey	626,249	22·7
Austria	36,545	1·3
Russia	48,074	1·8
Germany	29,045	1·1
France	883,341	32
Egypt	617,058	22·4
Belgium	6,623	0·2
Italy	56,977	2
United States	162,726	5·9
Other countries	24,032	0·9
Total	£2,759,675	

TABLE V.—Summary of Imports for the Year 1910–11.

Commodity.	Alexandretta.		Beirut.		Other Ports.		Total.	
	Quantity.	Value.	Quantity.	Value.	Quantity.	Value.	Quantity.	Value.
	Kg.	Piastres.	Kg.	Piastres.	Kg.	Piastres.	Kg.	Piastres.
Live animals ... ... (head)	(955)	261,025	(1,093)	302,073	(2,286)	782,212	(4,334)	1,345,310
Animal provisions	293,867	1,699,419	390,969	1,981,996	466,532	1,777,209	1,151,368	5,458,624
Cereals	4,179,276	4,720,975	18,122,533	19,474,282	37,690,591	38,992,344	59,992,400	63,187,601
Fruit, vegetables (fresh and preserved) ...	739,996	908,044	1,088,584	1,165,846	2,505,110	1,470,629	4,333,690	3,544,519
Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, &c.	485,665	2,720,581	1,528,766	8,877,877	790,068	4,546,565	2,804,499	16,145,023
Sugar and sugar products	8,522,204	14,241,458	11,037,227	20,089,135	11,365,100	19,865,340	30,924,531	54,195,933
Tombac	...	...	724,247	7,157,881	...	...	724,247	7,157,881
Alcoholic liquor, mineral water	833,186	1,660,107	1,475,059	2,896,843	1,093,079	2,357,919	3,401,324	6,914,869
Oil and oil products	7,888,123	6,045,480	15,144,252	12,962,064	19,219,189	12,365,236	42,251,564	31,372,780
Dung, offal, bones, and other animal produce; burning material	14,325,664	2,536,511	43,447,087	8,122,356	9,150,551	2,385,482	66,923,302	13,044,349
Chemicals, dyes, dyeing matter	1,463,210	6,037,546	1,810,933	4,810,835	2,913,734	4,777,528	6,187,877	15,625,909
Drugs, perfumes, &c.	104,670	1,208,959	506,514	3,221,443	87,683	833,468	698,867	5,263,870
Explosives, arms	574,988	2,981,612	280,787	3,546,193	335,005	1,845,227	1,190,780	8,373,032
Earth, stone, and products	8,666,459	3,066,493	25,136,398	13,283,247	17,687,092	5,432,681	51,489,949	21,782,421
Metals and metal work	24,300,701	24,795,879	12,202,550	26,367,332	14,256,356	19,007,181	50,759,607	70,170,392
Wood and woodwork	2,483,251	1,282,499	18,131,847	7,987,210	20,442,119	8,987,878	41,057,217	18,257,587
Rags, paper, and products	70,902	2,136,869	1,714,388	4,530,153	929,754	2,600,023	2,715,044	9,267,045
Skins, leather, &c.	346,910	3,728,431	1,631,071	19,902,675	508,075	4,072,380	2,486,056	27,703,486
Textiles, raw and manufactured	5,639,217	62,479,644	5,352,331	234,548,426	2,267,665	21,294,099	13,259,213	318,322,169
Rubber and products	40,770	319,785	116,139	2,055,528	22,995	386,599	179,904	2,761,912
Machinery, carriages	4,465,237	14,323,157	1,131,164	7,046,155	1,149,533	5,378,672	6,745,934	26,747,984
Clocks, musical instruments, &c.	2,943	151,831	79,617	1,888,052	19,810	423,878	102,370	2,463,761
Fezes, hats, feathers, &c.	44,354	1,873,052	45,314	2,551,144	9,643	320,144	99,311	4,744,340
Objects of art, scientific instruments ...	103,305	632,983	318,827	2,725,361	42,690	759,295	464,822	4,117,639
Jewellery, hardware, &c.	34,725	3,194,550	181,699	4,709,170	46,458	1,382,255	262,882	9,285,975
Miscellaneous	53,023	283,457	504,068	3,503,237	185,737	1,129,938	742,828	4,916,632
Total	85,662,646 (85,662 metric tons)	163,290,347 (1,484,457*l.*)	162,102,371 (162,102 tons)	425,706,514 (3,870,059*l.*)	143,184,569 (143,184 tons)	163,174,182 (1,483,401*l.*)	390,949,586 (390,949 tons)	752,171,043 (6,837,918*l.*)

TABLE VI.—Comparative Table of Imports (in £) at Alexandretta, Beirut, and Jaffa in 1910–12.

Country of Origin.	Alexandretta.			Beirut.			Jaffa.		
	1910.	1911.	1912.	1910.	1911.	1912.	1910.	1911.	1912.
United Kingdom	547,853	445,405	572,788	933,500	902,000	748,500	128,730	146,000	155,000
British Colonies (India) ..	..	..	..	45,000	31,000	23,000	3,105	49,000	54,000
Turkey*	284,565	286,338	266,042	110,000	78,000	47,500	328,965	340,000	305,000
Austria	159,527	100,438	86,738	165,000	172,500	134,500	83,840	114,000	126,000
Russia	25,376	32,012	28,168	94,000	76,000	62,000	97,000	108,000	110,000
Germany	48,940	38,571	71,035	178,000	145,000	129,000	68,615	74,000	80,000
France	170,599	120,627	87,637	150,000	130,000	121,000	103,000	112,000	84,000
Egypt	33,018	29,980	50,925	27,000	23,000	29,500	58,095	70,000	61,000
Belgium	46,094	41,413	33,676	67,500	55,000	71,000	49,185	60,000	54,000
Italy	75,400	37,623	440	257,000	190,000	47,000	24,940	16,000	5,000
United States	5,911	8,351	7,387	23,200	15,750	11,000	10,400	25,000	12,000
Roumania	..	..	..	61,000	72,000	48,000	..	22,000	17,000
Other countries	1,601	4,377	4,810	42,000	30,200	25,500	46,575	33,910	27,019
Total .. £	1,398,884	1,145,135	1,209,646	2,153,200	1,920,450	1,497,500	1,002,450	1,169,910	1,090,019

* See note in Table VII.

TABLE VII.—Totals of Comparative Import Values at Alexandretta, Beirut, and Jaffa for 1910.

——	Value.	Percentage.
	£	
United Kingdom	1,610,083	35·3
British Colonies (India)	48,105	1
Egypt	118,113	2·6
Turkey*	723,530	15·9
Austria	408,367	9
Russia	216,376	4·8
Germany	295,555	6·5
France	423,599	9·3
Belgium	162,799	3·6
Italy	357,340	7·8
United States	39,511	0·9
Roumania	61,000	1·3
Other countries	90,176	2
Total	£4,554,554	

* The imports from Turkey are exaggerated, consisting partly of foreign goods re-shipped at Beirut. Approximately one-half of the Turkish imports at Jaffa are of foreign, and mainly British, origin.

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A special map of "Syria" (including Palestine) has also been issued by the War Office, on the scale of 1:2,000,000 (G.S.G.S., No. 2904; December 1918).

The special map mentioned in the foregoing note having been withdrawn from circulation, the enquirer should observe that the area which is the subject of this book is covered by the map of Eastern Turkey in Asia, published by the Royal Geographical Society, from whom it can be obtained, price 8*s.* 6*d.* (mounted), or 11*s.* 6*d.* (bound in case with explanatory text).

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TURKEY IN ASIA

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1920

Editorial Note.

In the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connection with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous enquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,
General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

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GENERAL SKETCH

Chronological Summary

1072-92 Zenith of power of Seljukian Empire.
1230-88 Ertoghrul leader of immigrant Turks.
c. 1245 Mongol invasion of Asia Minor.
1288-1326 Osman I.
1300 Assumption of title Sultan by Osman.
1386 Conquest of Karamania.
1514 Annexation of Diarbekr and Kurdistan.
1516 Occupation of Syria.
1517 Subjugation of Egypt and Hejaz.
1535 Capture of Erivan, Van, Mosul, and Baghdad.
1570 Conquest of the Yemen.
c. 1600-33 Independence of Druses in the Lebanon.
1630 Expulsion of Turks from the Yemen.
1638 Recapture of Baghdad by Murad IV.
1723-47 Independent rule of Ahmed Pasha at Baghdad.
c. 1746 Rise of the Wahhabis.
c. 1768 Ali Bey independent ruler of Egypt. Sheikh Taha established at Damascus over Syria.
1773 Defeat of Ali Bey by the Turks.
1792 Wahhabi aggressions in Arabia.
c. 1798-1840 Independent rule of Beshir in the Lebanon.
c. 1800-04 Ahmed Jezzar supreme in Acre.
1802 Wahhabis capture Mecca and Medina.
1808-39 Reign of Mahmud II.
1811 Destruction of the Mamelukes by Mehemet Ali.
1818 Defeat of the Wahhabis by Mehemet Ali.
1826 Destruction of the Janissaries by Mahmud II.
1831 Revolt of Mehemet Ali. Invasion of Syria.
1840 Expulsion of Ibrahim Pasha from Syria.
1841 Rebellion of the Druses. Direct Ottoman Government installed in the Lebanon.
Firman of the Sultan granting Pashalik of Egypt to Mehemet Ali and his descendants.
1845 and 1860 Massacres in the Lebanon.
1861 First Charter of the Lebanon.
1864 New Statute of the Lebanon.
1869 Opening of Suez Canal.
1871 Expedition of Midhat Pasha to the Persian Gulf.
1872 Turkish occupation of part of highland Yemen.
1876-1909 Reign of Abdul Hamid.

1881 Establishment of Turkish post between Baghdad and Damascus.
1888 Profession by Ibn Rashid of allegiance to the Porte.
1891 Rebellion against the Turks in the Yemen.
1894-95 Armenian massacres.
1902 Recovery of Riyadh by the Saud dynasty.
1903 Appointment of British Political Agent at Koweit.
1904 Rebellion in the Yemen.
1908 Advent of Young Turks to power.
Hejaz railway completed to Medina.
1909 Armenian massacres.
1910 Rebellion in the Yemen.
1913 Expulsion of Turks from Hasa and Eastern Arabia by Ibn Saud.

Definition

Turkey in Asia means the Asiatic dominions of the Ottoman or Osmanli Turks, who are a minority only of the Turks in Asia, are not of pure extraction, and are associated with a popular majority not Turkish at all. The north-western third of their dominions is the only part which is generally Turkish in feeling. The southern half, almost entirely Arab, identifies itself very imperfectly with Osmanli tradition and hope.

Origin and Development of Ottoman Empire

The original Turks, the embryo of the future Osmanli nation, were a very small body of migrant tribesmen, settled by the Seljukian Turks of Konia, in the thirteenth century, around Yeni-Shehr, in the north-western corner of Asia Minor. There the ground had been prepared for them by two empires, the Byzantine and the Seljukian, both, as it chanced, already moribund. The first of these empires, having spread Levantine civilisation over the ancient Bithynia and settled there many Turkish elements which had served in its wars, left this remnant of its Asian subjects to lapse into a feudal society. The second empire, itself Turkish, having given Turki colour and Moslem sympathy to almost all the rest of Asia Minor, failed to establish permanent central control. The vigorous Turki nucleus, settled under Ertoghrul after

the middle of the thirteenth century at Yeni-Shehr, showed remarkable capacity for political expansion; and, by a process at once agglutinative and assimilative, it rapidly caused a new national unity to coalesce about itself. This it led, on the one hand, into South-Eastern Europe, where the elements composing that unity found themselves at home; on the other, into Continental Asia Minor, where, with little difficulty, it could absorb disintegrated societies abandoned to local Emirs by the dying Seljuks. In less than two centuries, despite certain set-backs, the new Turkish nation, now called Osmanli or Ottoman, after Osman or Othman, its first Sultan (for Ertoghrul, out of respect for his Seljuk overlord, never assumed the title), had taken up both the vacant Imperial heritages, north and south, and had reconstituted the Roman Empire of the East.

The proper limits of this Empire were attained by the close of the fifteenth century. But in the process of its growth the new Imperial people had developed militarism to a point at which it took control of the State, and compelled the conquest of alien territories. In Asia two hundred years of warfare resulted in failure in both Caucasia and Persia; but, in the demoralised and incoherent Arab lands, easy conquests more than doubled the area of the Ottoman Empire in less than a century. Assimilation of the Arabs, however, proved as difficult as their conquest had been easy. The Osmanli Turks had to deal with an incompatible alien population just as they were beginning to feel certain evil consequences of their own military success; for this had excited in them religious fanaticism, fear of which was beginning to link the Christian world against them, and had carried them into a wider area than their centralised system had the capacity to administer. Decay at the heart of the Empire soon began to affect the limbs, and the most lately acquired provinces were the first to suffer. Conquered in the sixteenth century, the Arab lands had lapsed again to virtual independence of an anarchic sort before the seventeenth was over; and, indeed, over most of the

Asiatic part of his Empire the Ottoman Sultan had come by then to exercise little better than an otiose suzerainty.

Relation of the Provinces to the Porte

(1) *Independent States*

A little more than half-way through the eighteenth century the situation was this. Irak was being ruled by Ahmed Pasha, independent prince of Baghdad. Egypt and all southern and central Syria obeyed (if anyone) Ali Bey, independent Prince of Cairo, and his agent, Sheikh Taha, at Damascus. North Syria was disputed by Turcoman and Kurdish Beys. In Hejaz the Emirs of Mecca were no longer dependent. Yemen had been lost for more than a century to the Imams of the Qasim House, reigning at Sana. By the end of the century things had become even worse from the Ottoman point of view. A number of new chiefs had seized power in Syria, notably Ahmed Jezzar of Acre and Beshir, the Shehab Emir, in the Lebanon. In Aleppo the local Janissaries disputed control with the Turcomans; and throughout the northern borderland Zeitunli Armenians and Kurds did as they pleased. The nineteenth century opened with Wahhabis raiding up to Damascus on the one side and Kerbela on the other. There had come to be no reality of Ottoman Empire in any Arab-speaking land, and it was not so much from the Turks as from the local chieftains that the armies of Mehemet Ali had to capture Syria and Cilicia thirty years later. When the son of the Viceroy of Egypt crossed the Sinai Desert in 1831 he could have pleaded with much truth that he was going forth to reconquer for the Osmanli Sultan provinces which had virtually been lost to him for nearly two centuries.

(2) *Power of Dere Beys*

A change, however, had begun to operate in the north about ten years before that date, a change destined to

make the Ottoman Empire in Asia an evil reality, but a reality for the first time. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the power of local families, generically called Dere Beys, "valley lords," grew till almost the whole peninsula of Asia Minor was parcelled out among them. Some of these Beys were descended from former Emirs of the post-Seljuk age; some were tribal chiefs of Turcoman, Kurdish, and other immigrant elements; most were sprung from tax-farmers originally licensed by the Porte. Good examples of these three classes, in their order, were the Menteshe family in Caria; the Chobanoghlus of Yuzgad in Cappadocia, whose Turcoman power extended right across the peninsula from sea to sea, and was acknowledged by nomad groups even in the Aleppo district; and the Karamanoghlus of Manisa, Aidin, and Bergama, who had begun as Imperial commissaries for the collection of revenue and the administration of crown lands in Sarukhan. Whatever their origin, the Dere Beys had attained practical independence of Constantinople. Their broad domains spared nothing to the Imperial treasury, except on rare occasions when some energetic Beylerbey of Anadol appeared with an army on their confines. Their vassals and serfs rendered military service only to their chiefs, who ignored Imperial requisitions (as, for example, did the Karamanoghlus, when bidden in 1807 to send their contingent to an army intended to deliver Egypt from the British). In some of the larger cities, such as Sivas, Smyrna and Aleppo, the control of the local Dere Bey clashed with that of the resident Janissaries; but the Imperial Government was no better off for their disputes.

Centralisation of Government

(1) *Anatolia*

At last, in 1808, a Sultan was put by the Janissaries on the throne of Turkey who not only resolved to become master in his own house—some of his immediate

predecessors had sworn to be that—but had the courage and capacity to set about it by eliminating both Janissaries and Dere Beys. He had to wait, however, some ten years, a first attempt to suppress the king-makers in Stambul failing ignominiously soon after the receipt of his crown. His second effort was made in the provinces—at Sivas in 1818—and it attained enough success to foreshadow what was to happen eight years later in the capital itself when Mahmud massacred the Janissaries. From that date to the end of his days Mahmud II never remitted his drastic purpose to destroy in Asia the decentralising work of the two centuries before him. Using his new army for the purpose he had most at heart, while he commissioned mere vassals like Milosh and Ali Pasha to win or lose with local levies in Europe, he broke eventually the power of both Janissaries and Dere Beys from the Bosphorus to the Taurus. One never hears again, after 1840, of any member of the once great feudal families of Asia Minor lording it over Imperial representatives. By that date honourable detention, exile, prison, poison, or the bowstring, had completed their work and left an anarchy which was almost peace. The constructive sequel, the substitution of direct administration, direct collection of revenue, direct contribution of men to military service, imperial application of common Imperial law, had to be achieved by Mahmud's successor. Achieved it was, for better or worse, under Abdul Mejid; and, before the Crimean War broke out, Asia Minor had become what it was in 1914—a group of provinces depending directly on the capital, looking to it for all the government they got, and wholly identified with its policy and fortunes.

(2) *Syria and Arabia—Mehemet Ali and Ibrahim*

The history of the Arab-speaking provinces did not follow the same course. Mahmud II was never free to deal with them as he dealt with Asia Minor. By the

time he had got to work in the eastern part of the latter region, Ibrahim Pasha, acting for his father, Mehemet Ali, had occupied Syria. The Egyptian forces remained there for ten years, and in that period did some of the work that Mahmud's army had done in Asia Minor, but without the same fixed policy, without system, and therefore but partially. If a district submitted to Ibrahim and kept quiet it was left alone; if it revolted, as did Kerak, or Safed, or Nablus, it was dealt with most drastically. In the event, the result of the Egyptian occupation of Syria was that the main towns and their immediate districts were cleared of the contumacious elements which had so long defied the Porte. There was to be no more question of semi-independent pashas in Acre or Damascus or Aleppo. Furthermore, in some turbulent districts, such as the Lebanon, the leading chiefs were so far broken that the Turks, when they returned after 1841, had no great difficulty in establishing a measure of control. The Lebanese Emirs, for instance, never really found their feet again; and Beshir had no single successor wielding anything like his power in the "Mountain." But outside these restricted areas the country was left to itself. No attempt was made by Ibrahim to unify it; and in consequence one may still find at this day, up and down the length of Syria, many more survivals of native feudal chieftainships and local autonomies than in Asia Minor. It was not only in the mountain fastnesses of Jebel Ansarie, or northern Lebanon, nor only on the edges of the eastern desert, but in the Orontes valley, Commagene, and even Palestine, that powerful beys survived, with feudal power over considerable areas.

Mahmud II dying in 1839, and Ibrahim Pasha not withdrawing from Syria till 1841, the task of making Ottoman Imperial rule a reality in the Arab-speaking countries devolved altogether on Abdul Mejid. He was not the man to carry through such a business in an area much less easy to reconcile than Asia Minor; still less so was Abdul Aziz, his successor, who started

with an added handicap through the action of the Powers in the matter of the Lebanon. Restive during all Abdul Mejid's reign, by reason partly of certain legacies of Emir Beshir, partly of attempts by the Turks to establish direct government, but mostly of their insidious policy of dividing Maronite against Druse in the interest of their rule, the "Mountain" blazed up towards the close of Abdul Mejid's days, and gave his successor the fruits of the Damascus massacre to digest. The final constitution, giving autonomy to the Lebanon in 1864, made uniform incorporation of Syria in the Ottoman Empire thenceforth impossible, and constituted a permanent encouragement to other local autonomies to maintain their particularism.

Certain steps, however, were taken, in fact, by the Porte during these two reigns, which enabled Syria to pass to Abdul Hamid as a pacified, though far from Ottomanised land. Military operations about 1845 broke up the contumacy of the Giaur Dagh Kurds, and were completed by an application of the ancient Oriental measure of transplantation. Considerable bodies of Kurds were forced to come down from their hills and take up lands in the Marash and Aintab districts and on both sides of the Euphrates above Birejik. A year later 12,000 men were sent into the Lebanon, and forty chiefs were arrested and removed. In 1864 the whole of Syria was redistributed into vilayets and their sub-divisions; the Governors-General in Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut were made to depend as directly on Stambul as did the *valis* of Asia Minor, and were given Imperial forces wherewith to preserve order and maintain themselves. Some efforts were also made to obtain control of the eastern desert through the relations of the Bedouin sheikhs and their followers with the towns, and by the establishment of armed posts along the borders of the cultivated country and at certain points on through desert routes, *e.g.*, at the oasis of Tadmor. But, nevertheless, no small part of Syria remained much as it had been before the

Egyptians invaded it—Jebel Ansarie, for example, on the west, and Jebel Druz on the east, the region of Kurd Dagh in the north, the Orontes valley between Hamah and Antioch in the centre, and all below Hebron and east of the Dead Sea in the south. Thus no part of Syria was unified and Ottomanised as was Asia Minor.

Asiatic Policy of Abdul Hamid

Abdul Hamid was to do something more. Whatever the faults and failures of his imperial policy, he had a policy, and it was what Mahmud's had been. He proposed to exercise real empire over all territories coloured on his map as Ottoman, and first and foremost in Asia, for which, as the better soil for Ottoman seed, he, like Mahmud, cared more than for Europe. Asia Minor had long been sufficiently consolidated, and had only to be made to look for its salvation to him and his household officers rather than to the bureaucrats of his predecessor. By the abasement of the latter in Stambul this change came about as a matter of course. Kurdistan, Mesopotamia, and Syria offered more scope. Too late to touch the Lebanon, Abdul Hamid devoted his attention to Jebel Ansarie and the Bedouin fringes. In the mountain regions administrative centres were established, whether the mountaineers liked it or no. On the desert edge a similar policy was supplemented by extensive colonisation. *Muhajirs* (refugees) of sturdy and truculent character, principally Circassian and Turcoman, were planted down all the length of the Trans-Jordan lands, except in Jebel Druz, where the ancient enmity of Druse and Arab was expected to be sufficient guarantee of Ottoman supremacy. Encouragement and compulsion were offered to the Bedouins round the head of the Syrian Desert and in the Trans-Jordan lands to induce them to renounce nomad life for agricultural settlement. In the south of Palestine an urban administrative centre was formed at the miserable hamlet of Bir-es-Seba (Beersheba); and a Court was constituted there to settle

tribal disputes. Everywhere new public offices and new mosques rose as symbols of the Imperial authority and the pious fatherhood of the Sultan. In the latter part of the reign the construction of railways and roads was encouraged; and, in particular, the Hejaz railway was pushed southward east of the Jordan not only to consolidate Ottoman power in Syria as far as Maan, but also to knit Western Arabia to the Empire and to provide communication with the capital not dependent on someone else's control of the sea.

(1) *Arabia after* 1841

When, after 1841, the Nile Valley had passed *de jure* out of the Sultan's direct control (as, *de facto*, it had long passed), the Ottoman Caliph saw the necessity of strengthening his hold on Western Arabia and its Holy Cities, which tend always to become dependent economically and socially on Egypt. In Hejaz, in the 'forties, after the withdrawal of the Egyptians, who left the local prestige of the Meccan Emirate at a very low ebb, the Porte hastened to assume direct control and impose its garrisons on the Holy Cities; and no sooner was the Suez Canal open to traffic than it took occasion, not only to strengthen those forces, but also to send an army down to Yemen sufficient to terminate the unsatisfactory *provisorium* which had obtained there since 1849. On the invitation of the Sana citizens themselves, Mukhtar Pasha marched up to the capital; and by 1872 all Yemen, except the highland regions of Amran, Khamir, and Saadah, was brought under Ottoman control. Even the Jauf and Mareb back-country, and the slopes towards Aden, were visited by Turkish columns. The forces in Yemen could communicate with those in Asir through the Tihamah, where the power of the Sherifs of Abu Arish had been broken, and that of Idrisi had yet to be; and with the Asir force communicating directly with that in Taif, the South Arabian army formed a guard on the flank of Mecca.

Ottoman hold on Hejaz was strengthened further in the 'eighties by the ascendency which Othman Pasha secured over Emir Aun er-Rafik. The Porte nominated and removed Emirs of Mecca at will; and, till about 1911, when the present ruler of Hejaz had been three years in his position, it continued to dominate the Holy Cities, with some assistance from the Hejaz railway, completed to Medina in 1908. Though highland Yemen and, indeed, some part of the lowlands (*e.g.*, the Zebid district), proved so recalcitrant that the Porte had to maintain a strong force by dint of annual drafts, which tried severely both its resources and the patience of the population from which the recruits were drawn, its grip held good even through serious rebellions like those of 1891, 1904, and 1910. Its prestige was acknowledged in the Hadramaut, and was imposed even on Central Arabia, about 1890, by the conclusion of an informal alliance with the Rashid dynasty of Hail, to whose help in Qasim Ottoman columns were to be despatched more than once, both from north and west, in the latter part of Abdul Hamid's reign. A beginning of penetration along the Gulf shore and inwards had been made under Abdul Aziz, when Midhat marched in 1871 from Basra through Koweit into Hasa, and occupied both that province and the capital of Katr for the Porte, thus obtaining command of the inlets of supply to Central Arabia. Having Hail under their influence, the Turks seemed in a fair way to dominate Nejd, since in the 'nineties the Rashids had control also of Riyadh. But the restoration of the Saud dynasty there in 1902, and the consequent strengthening of British influence in Nejd, set them back again. Their hopes declined still lower when the Indian Government came to an understanding with Sheikh Mubarak of Koweit; and they received a mortal blow in 1913, when Ibn Saud, descending on Hasa, chased the Turkish garrisons out of that province, and ultimately out of Katr too, freeing the north-western Gulf ports. A last effort by the Turks to retain a vestige of influence

by inducing Ibn Saud to acknowledge their nominal suzerainty over the territories he had already won led to negotiations lasting from 1906 to 1914, and collapsed with the outbreak of war.

(2) *Irak*

In Irak and its borderlands Imperial Ottoman control never attained, even under Abdul Hamid, so satisfactory a position as in Syria. The urban centres from Baghdad to Basra were administered as directly from the capital and held as adequately as any Syrian cities; and the ways of communication not only between them, but also with the north and west of the Empire, were improved and policed sufficiently to make central control effective. For example, just before the close of the reign, a regular posting service was established from Aleppo down the Euphrates Valley to Baghdad, the tribesmen on both sides of the route having been cajoled or coerced into abstention from interference with the highway. But up to the last the Porte laboured under certain irremovable disadvantages, which limited its absolute discretion. Chief of these were (1) the proximity of British warships on the south, insistently solicitous about the waterway up the Shatt and the protection of the Sheikhs of Koweit and Mohammerah; (2) the proximity of the Persian border with its semi-independent, warlike mountaineers on the east, of the North Arabian and Syrian deserts on the west, and of the Mesopotamian steppes on the north; (3) the natural difficulties of the interfluvial marshes; (4) the Shiah majority among the Moslem population. Thanks to these various circumstances, the Porte had control neither of the outfall of its own chief waterway nor of one of the banks for a long way above the mouth. Tribal elements on the eastern fringe could not be controlled effectually; and the Tigris bank below Kut was never safe from attack. Though the Muntefik Arabs were induced to

settle and take to agriculture in greater proportion than previously, the Saadun family continued to exercise an almost independent power in the western back-country of the Shatt, while the character of the country on both sides of the Lower Euphrates exposed its towns, from Hilla to Kerbela, to ever-present danger of raids from one flank or the other. The last-named city, with its companion Shiah sanctuaries of Nejef and Kufa, were consistent irritants to a Sunni government. The Shatt el-Hai Arabs and those of the Lower Mesopotamian steppes alike were consistently contumacious; and the high road from Fellujah to Baghdad was not secure. The upshot of the matter is that, outside the larger towns, there was little or no Ottoman feeling in Irak; the Sultan's writ ran only at the bayonet's point; Turks were regarded as hardly less alien than Europeans, and by a majority of the population detested on religious grounds more than the local Christians.

(3) *Bedouin and Kurdish Problems*

On the Mesopotamian steppes there is a Bedouin problem in the south and a Kurdish problem in the north. It cannot be said that, before Abdul Hamid's time, either was faced by the Ottoman Government, or that Abdul Hamid himself solved one or the other. But his administration made efforts which so far succeeded that the *de facto* rulers of the steppe country, Faris and Ferhan, the two rival chiefs of the Jebel Shammar, recognised the Sultan's nominal authority, and each accepted at his hands the title of Pasha. Though the Turks never took here the extreme course whereby, after Abdul Hamid's fall, they removed Saadun from the Muntefik country to die at Aleppo, they employed freely such means of coercion as were ready to their hand in their command of Bedouin markets and of the possessions of chiefs in the towns and settled lands. These measures, however, were less effective on the richer northern downs, where Ibrahim of the Milli

had formed a league of independence, to which not only Kurds from Birejik to Jezireh-ibn-Omar, but also Arabs adhered. Down to the end of his reign Abdul Hamid did no better than save his face by a pretence that the Milli chief held sway under a grant from himself, and that the former's armed riders were troopers of the Hamidie Horse.

Nevertheless, it was among the Kurds as a whole that Abdul Hamid scored his most conspicuous success in comparison with his predecessors. By enticing or compelling Kurdish chiefs to visit Constantinople, by dealing drastically with the persons, families, and property of open rebels like Bedr Khan, by subsidies and honours to those who had not rebelled, by enrolling tribal warriors in the Hamidie Horse and giving them the uniform and training of Ottoman cavalry, by planting Ottoman administrators under the protection of detachments of regular troops wherever possible at a tribal centre or market, and finally by granting them the fields of Christians to ravage and the persons of Christian women to violate—by such means the Sultan tried to make the Kurds, from Erzerum to Khanikin, identify themselves with the Ottoman tradition and hope. Every European traveller who penetrated the wilder districts of Kurdistan, such as Bashkale or Rowanduz, found one or another of the Kurdish Beys he had been warned to reckon with, superseded by a Turkish Kaimakam who was often installed in the ancestral house of the vanished Bey himself. The policy of Ottomanisation was carried on patiently and remorselessly. The Armenian massacres of 1894–95 were part of it—a supreme concession to conciliate the Kurds and at the same time to commit them. There were no Kurds not affected, not even the Zaza Kurds of Dersim, the hardest of all to Ottomanise by Abdul Hamid's methods; for, being Shiah, they had no respect for the Caliph, and being at one with the Armenians in their midst they were not to be bribed with Christian flesh and blood. Armed posts on their

borders and a guarded road through the heart of their mountains were the only weapons that could be used. After Abdul Hamid's fall the Young Turks ventured to take a step further, not without success, by sending a punitive expedition to Dersim districts which had not yet seen Ottoman arms; even as, on the other flank of the Kurdish area, they succeeded at last in dealing, once and for all, with Ibrahim of the Milli.

Fruits of this Kurd policy were evident both in the Balkan War and during the conflict of Turkey with the *Entente* Powers. Several Kurdish units, among them one in which sons of Ibrahim served, distinguished themselves in Rumelia. After a little unsteadiness in the first year of the recent war, the Northern Kurds ranged themselves definitely against the Russian Caucasus force, partly because it contained Armenians; and, after the Russian Revolution had weakened the Russian power of offensive, they were regarded by the Turks as a sufficient containing force. In the Rowanduz and Kermanshah districts also Kurds sturdily opposed and harassed Russian columns, although they took little hostile action against our own Mesopotamian forces.

Nationalist Movement among the Arabs

With the Arab-speaking peoples, on the other hand, such progress towards Ottomanisation as was made under Abdul Hamid was not maintained after his fall, but has been counterbalanced by a serious movement towards anti-Ottoman nationalism. Seeds of this were sown long ago, but they would not have sprouted generally had it not been for the Young Turks and the Pan-Ottoman policy of 1909. In Syria, where lives an educated native class relatively as numerous and absolutely as far advanced as that in the Turk-speaking area, nationalism rapidly grew and flourished. Beirut was the earliest centre of it, but it soon gained the other towns. The country districts, never assimilated by their Turkish masters, remained

less affected. The Turks, aware of the existence and activity of " Young Arab " committees, began vigorous measures for their suppression in 1914. These redoubled in violence after the outbreak of the war. Leading Syrians were haled before courts-martial, and exiled or hanged, but this did not arrest the nationalist propaganda either in the Arab countries themselves or on foreign soils. The effect of Ahmed Jemal Pasha's " reign of terror " was to deprive Syria of almost all possible leaders of revolt, but to increase in the people the spirit of revolt. It crowned seven years of Ottomanising efforts by making Ottomanism impossible among Arabs.

Lower Irak received some seed of Arab nationalism, before the rest of the Eastern Arabs, from the hand of Seyyid Talib of Basra; but his movement had not time to spread far before the war brought a British invading force into the country. Nor, indeed, was there much favourable soil to which the plant could be transferred. Baghdad, where Arabs are well educated and progressive but a minority, formed nationalist committees; but in the rest of Irak, where the population is either predominantly Shiah or predominantly nomad, or both, particularism is even more the rule than in Syria. The Bedouin element does not desire any government; the Shiahs do not desire a Sunni government; no one, except, perhaps, some Kurds, wants to be ruled by Turks; but all desire to be ruled by Moslems.

Different Groups in Asia Minor

The Christian elements in Asia Minor have now imbibed ideas of nationalism which are inconsistent with the Ottoman ideal. The Greeks, not only of the islands, but of the western and southern littorals and the colonies of the Mæander basin, regard themselves as citizens " unredeemed " of the Hellenic Kingdom; and the Greeks of the Black Sea coast, and certain inland districts of Pontus, Cappadocia, and Phrygia,

are learning to look on themselves in a similar light. As for the Armenians, everywhere present in smaller or larger groups, but nowhere a majority except in the Commagenian Taurus, all look now for their own kingdom, having found to their cost how vain was the hope of decentralised autonomy with which they greeted the advent of the Young Turks to power. It remains to be seen whether the establishment of a Zionist home in Palestine will detach the Jews also from the allegiance which, more whole-heartedly than any other non-Moslem race, they have given to the Turks. Other comparatively small separatist groups—Circassian, Laz, Kizilbash—may detach themselves eventually, but about these it is too soon to guess.

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Editorial Note.

In the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connection with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous enquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,
General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

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I. GEOGRAPHY PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL

(1) Position

Cyprus lies in the north-east of the Levantine basin of the Mediterranean, between latitudes 34° 33′ and 35° 41′ N., and longitudes 32° 17′ and 34° 35′ E. It is distant some 44 statute miles from the coast of Asia Minor and 69 from the Syrian coast, while the port of Larnaka on the south coast of the island is 262 miles from Port Said and 1,117 from Valetta in Malta.

The nearest important Syrian ports are Beirut, terminus of the railway to Damascus, and Alexandretta (Iskanderun), terminus of a branch of the Baghdad railway. The bay of Alexandretta possesses the best and roomiest roadstead on the Syrian coast.

(2) Surface, Coasts, and Rivers

Surface and Soils

Cyprus has an area of 3,584 sq. miles; its extreme length is about 140 miles, its greatest breadth about 60 miles. The Karpass promontory is 45 miles long, and at the greatest 10 miles broad. The only Mediterranean islands which exceed Cyprus in area are Sicily and Sardinia.

Cyprus is divided into four distinct regions: (1) the coast; (2) the unbroken chain of mountains running along the northern side of the island; (3) the extensive mountain region in the south and west, which with its numerous subordinate ranges and radial spurs occu-

pies about one-third of the island; and (4) the level tract lying between these two mountain regions, called the Mesaoria (i.e. 'between the mountains').

(1) The coast is treated in a separate section below.

(2) The long, narrow, and extremely abrupt ridge of the northern, or Kerynian and Karpass, mountains is very precipitous on the north side; on the south less so, but very barren. It gives the lowland fair shelter from the north wind.

(3) The loftier highlands, which fill the south-west part of the island, have as their highest peak Mt. Troodos (6,406 ft.), and descend in gentle slopes to the plain and coast. The Troodos region is flanked by fertile rolling country along the south-west and south coasts about Limassol and Paphos, and east of the Troodos massif is the plateau terminating in Cape Greco.

(4) Between the two great uplands, and after them the most striking topographical feature of the island, is the Mesaoria, the broad tract of treeless plain, which extends across from the bay of Famagusta in the east to that of Morphou in the west, a length of 60 miles with a breadth of from 10 to 20 miles, and embraces the plains of Morphou and of Nicosia (Lefkosia). In this plain, once famous for its corn, is situated a large portion of the cultivated area of the island, and nearly the whole of the northern part is tilled. But, except in spring when the barley is green, the Mesaoria, from lack of water, presents a scene of desolation; and the bare stretches—probably also capable of cultivation—add to the aridity of the region as a whole. The plain is covered with rich alluvial soil, in many places 10 to 15 or even 20 ft. deep, through which run the beds, dry in summer, of numerous streams debouching in rivers, also intermittent, which during the rainy season overflow and leave a further rich fertilizing deposit on the land.

The sandstone foot-hills of the northern mountain range form, north of Nicosia (Lefkosia), an extremely barren zone 2 to 2½ miles broad. But north of this again lies the most beautiful region of Cyprus, on either side of Kerynia. Here the summits of the Kerynian mountains, with many strong military positions, look across the sea to the heights of Asia Minor and down upon the coast at their foot, every inch of which is valuable. This is the richest district in Cyprus, while its sea-breezes and numerous mountain streams render it one of the healthiest. There is generally water in the gorges, which fertilizes and irrigates the lower slopes, and produces green vegetation here when all is burnt up elsewhere. On the Karpass peninsula are found some of the best Cyprian forests, the dwarfed trees being counterbalanced by the dense undergrowth. The peninsula is especially healthy, as the breezes of two seas temper the summer heat.

Barren, too, are the outlying hills of the Troodos mountains. In the great summer heat, only such fields as lie in the near vicinity of the sea and draw moisture from the sea-breezes can resist the parching blight. Here plants of all kinds flourish luxuriantly; and in those cultivated zones which enjoy the moisture brought by the smaller mountain streams the crops are still more abundant. It was estimated in 1900 that of all the fertile land about three-tenths was incapable of cultivation owing to the steepness of the slope or the thinness of the soil, which is liable to be washed away by violent rainfalls.

Coasts

The coast-line, 486 miles long, is broken by several bays and capes.

The principal bays are: on the east, that of Famagusta; on the south, those of Larnaka, Akrotiri (Limas-

sol), and Episkopi; on the north-west, those of Khrysokhou and Morphou. There are no estuaries, the chief rivers, except during the rains, vanishing in swamps or on the beach before reaching the sea. Where the great plain penetrates on the east and west to the sea, the coast is low and marshy. Dunes, formed by the prevailing winds, are especially common on the flat coast near Morphou. They also occur in the bay of Famagusta (the ancient town of Salamis is almost buried in them), and again along the flat coast-line of Larnaka. The Akrotiri peninsula is almost embanked by them, and they are also found in the vicinity of Paphos and along the Karpass peninsula.

The northern coast region, a fertile plain a mile broad and hemmed in between the northern mountain range and the sea, is little indented. There are, however, headlands and coves, though none deep enough to form a good natural harbour. Kerynia is the one spot worthy of being called a seaport.

The Karpass peninsula, the north coast of which is more or less studded with rocks and reefs, has on its south side a plain continuous with the flat, dune-bordered shore of Famagusta Bay. At Famagusta a series of rocks and islets acts as a natural breakwater, and artificial improvements have made Famagusta harbour the best in Cyprus.

Although there is no natural harbour at Larnaka, its convenient position for Syrian trade in past times and easy intercourse with the capital Nicosia (Lefkosia) in modern times (26 miles of high-road) have given it the chief position in foreign trade among Cyprian ports.

Limassol is the nearest port to Troodos and is gaining in importance at the expense of Larnaka.

East of Cape Akamas (or Arnauti) lies the semicircular Khrysokhou Bay, with a level sandy shore. Thence follows the north foot of the Troodos massif

and an exceedingly rocky and steep coast; beyond this is the large bay of Morphou, in which are two small inlets with good summer anchorage.

Rivers

The rivers of Cyprus are little more than mountain torrents, with rough and stony beds, dry in summer and never navigable. During the winter rains the water rushes down the steep slopes of the mountains, breaking out from the narrow water-courses, overflowing the surrounding country, and enriching the soil with a valuable deposit of alluvial earth, whence the fertility of the Cyprian plains. There is no available water-power.

(3) CLIMATE

The year may be divided into two seasons. The winter season (which includes the autumn and the short and brilliant spring) lasts from October to March, during which the rains take place. These are so intermittent that there are weeks of fine weather between the downfalls. The most important are the autumn rains, which allow of the ploughing and sowing of the hard burnt-up ground, and the spring rains (February), which nourish the young crops. There is but little snow; the central mountains are sometimes covered for a short time, the highest summits of Troodos all the winter. The summer season, April to September, is practically rainless; the grass is dried up, and all but the most succulent plants wither. The annual rainfall is small—19 to 27 inches (480–690 mm.). It varies considerably from year to year.

Cyprus has on its coasts and plains a subtropical zone, and on the higher slopes of the mountains a subalpine zone. The winter is colder than might be expected, and, on the plains, the summer much hotter.

At Nicosia the average yearly minimum temperature for ten years was 31° F. ($-\frac{1}{2}$° C.), the average maximum 104° F. (40° C.). In summer Nicosia is hotter than Cairo and only slightly cooler than Khartoum, chiefly because sea-breezes are excluded by the mountain barriers.

In order to escape the heat, the Government and troops leave Nicosia in the summer and move to the hill-station of Troodos. On the coasts the intensity of the summer heat is, as the day grows, modified by the sea-breeze, the *imbat*, until about the middle of September, when the most insupportable heats begin. During this period even the natives prefer to travel by night. Northerly winds are cold in winter, but warm in summer. The winter gales off the coasts usually last two or three days; summer gales are never severe.

(4) Sanitary Conditions

Cyprus is now among the healthiest of Mediterranean countries. The natives frequently afford examples of great old age, and there is for settlers and visitors the advantage (especially important in the case of lung diseases) of continuous outdoor life. The bad reputation acquired by the island in the early days of British occupation, first because of the mortality among our troops (until moved to higher ground), secondly upon the attempted establishment of a colony by the Russian sect of the Dukhobors, was in both cases due to an unsuitable manner of life during the hot season.

In the autumn, malaria appears at Famagusta and Larnaka, and more or less in all irrigated districts; but it has been checked by the draining and cultivation of the one large lake, Paralimni, south of Famagusta, and of the marshes north of Larnaka and elsewhere.

Dysentery and ophthalmia are common among the natives; and the great summer heat causes, in foreigners

and natives alike, a continual perspiration, which if followed by the least chill results in an attack of fever. As elsewhere in the East, there are cases of leprosy among the natives. The bite of a redoubtable carrion-eating insect, the *mutilla* or *sphalangi*, is much feared.

(5) Race and Language

Race

The present Cypriot stock probably owes more to Greek and Phoenician colonists (especially the former), settled since 1000 B. C., than to the prehistoric population of the island. But the elements of which the stock is composed are many and various.

The Cypriots are to-day divided into 'Greeks' and 'Turks'. By the census of 1911 the population of the island (including a British military population of 144 men) was 274,108, of whom 20·6 per cent. were Mohammedans and the remainder mostly members of the Orthodox Church. In common speech a Moslem Cypriot is called a Turk, an Orthodox Christian a Greek. On the conquest of Cyprus by the Turks, Venetian troops made way for Turkish troops. These new-comers (unlike the departed Venetians) were ready to take Cypriot wives; and thus in time, since no fresh troops were sent, the pure Turkish blood tended to die out. Religion, dress, customs, and—in some parts—language remained the only visible distinction. Upon the British occupation, practically no Turks, except officials from Stamboul, left the island.

There are some negroes, descendants of slaves imported during Turkish rule from Arabia, the Sudan, and Abyssinia. The descendants of the Franks and Venetians are by some authorities traced in the Linobambaki, a race of villagers who change their religion from Christianity to Mohammedanism and back again,

according to convenience. On the Karpass mountains is a race with fair hair and blue eyes, chiefly muleteers, who are descended from transported Circassians and differ from their neighbours in customs. Neighbouring countries have supplied a sprinkling of Maronites, Armenians, Jews, Levantines, &c.

Language

The chief language is Romaic, i. e. modern Greek The purified, more classical modern Greek tongue is affected by the schoolmasters and the higher clergy; but the ordinary Cypriot clings to his own dialect, in which is a large admixture of French, Italian, and Turkish words, the result of the successive occupation of the island by the Franks, Venetians, and Turks. By the census of 1911 the Greek-speaking population was 78·9 per cent. (216,310), the Turkish-speaking 20·1 per cent. (55,213), or a proportion of nearly 4 to 1.

The Osmanli Turkish spoken by the Moslems is considered very pure. The official language is English. Turkish and Greek are recognized in the Administration, the Legislative Councils, and the Courts. Italian and French are spoken by a few families of foreign origin; Arabic by the Maronites and Druses and others of Egyptian origin.

(6) Population

Distribution

The population, in round numbers 274,000, is distributed as follows among the six administrative districts:

Nicosia (Lefkosia)	.	81,500 (78 per sq. mile)	
Famagusta	.	58,500 (72	,, ,,)
Limassol	.	46,100 (85	,, ,,)
Paphos	.	38,500 (67	,, ,,)
Larnaka	.	29,700 (81	,, ,,)
Kerynia	.	19,700 (80	,, ,,)

The population is densest in Limassol, which contains not only the port of that name, but the chief fruit-plantations and vineyards. Larnaka, the second district in point of density, contains the chief port and comparatively little barren mountain country. Kerynia, the third, is a small district, fertile and healthy, and the centre of the sponge-fishing. Of the less densely populated districts Nicosia contains a large part of Troodos; Famagusta includes the Karpass promontory; and Paphos is a mountainous district, cut off from the rest of the country.

The average density for the island is 77·25; and on the whole the distribution is fairly even, owing to the fact that the inhabitants mostly live in scattered villages. The largest proportion of Moslems, 37·31 per cent., is found in Evdimou *nahia* (district); the largest of Greek Christians, 94·23 per cent., in Kilani *nahia*—both in the Limassol division. Kerynia and Paphos are especially frequented by the Turks. The Maronites occupy the region of Kormakiti.

The excess of males over females (males 139,383, females 134,725) occurs among Greeks as well as among Moslems. The same phenomenon occurs also in Greece and other Balkan states. In 1911 the total population of Moslems was 56,428 (males 29,302, females 27,126); of non-Moslems 217,680 (males 110,081, females 107,599).

Towns

Nicosia (*Lefkosia*, pop. 16,052), the seat of the Government, as in Frankish, Venetian, and Turkish times, and also of the Greek archbishop, lies near the middle of the island. It is sheltered by the mountain ranges on the north and south, and is healthy, but the water-supply is not good.

Limassol (pop. 10,302) was, before the British occupa-

tion, little more than a village; now, owing to its more salubrious position and the fruitful upland country, it outrivals Larnaka. It is the first port for the export of carobs and wine, and a military depot.

Larnaka (pop. 9,262) is the principal seaport of Cyprus, being the nearest to the fertile plains and of convenient access (26 miles) from Nicosia, the capital. It is the port for Christian and Moslem pilgrims. Except in spring, the country in the immediate vicinity is bare. The town, like Limassol, is modern.

Famagusta with *Varosha* (pop. 5,327) is an old Venetian town, with many ruined churches. The swamps and marshes surrounding it render its neighbourhood unhealthy, but the possession of the only good natural harbour on the island is sufficient reason for its existence.

Paphos with *Ktima* (pop. 3,435) was in classical times an extensive city, but has been ruined by successive earthquakes. The modern town owes its existence to the vicinity of mines, excellent vineyards and fruit-plantations, and the fine tobacco grown on the hill-slopes. It is also centre of the silk culture.

Kerynia (pop. 1,726), head-quarters of the sponge-fishing, possesses a small harbour, the nearest to the coast of Asia Minor. It is also the nearest landing-place and port to the island capital, Nicosia.

Movement

The census of 1911 shows an increase since 1881 (3 years after the British occupation) of 88,000 souls. The increase since 1901 is 37,086, or nearly 16 per cent. (Moslems, 5,119; non-Moslems, 31,967); density of population per square mile, 77·25 as against 66·13.

The Greeks are prolific; there is an average of six children in a family, and the Greek element increases rapidly. The improved sanitary conditions of the

island under British administration have, moreover, effected a marked reduction of disease and consequently lowered the death-rate.

The Moslems have few children. Polygamy is exceptional, and in the towns the death-rate exceeds the birth-rate, the numbers being kept up only by the Greek women absorbed into Moslem families. Even in the country the Moslem birth-rate does not produce a normal rate of increase.

II. POLITICAL HISTORY

Chronological Summary

B. C. 1450 Cyprus conquered by Thothmes III of Egypt.
1100–1000 Greek colonization of Cyprus.
58 Cyprus annexed by Rome.
A. D. 395 Cyprus part of Byzantine Empire.
1184 Cyprus captured by Richard I of England.
1192–1489 Lusignan Dynasty in Cyprus.
1372–1464 Famagusta held by Genoese.
1489–1571 Cyprus ceded to Venice.
1571 Cyprus conquered by the Turks.
1878 British occupation of Cyprus.
1914 British annexation of Cyprus.
1915 Cyprus offered to Greece, but refused.

(1) Early History

From the dim vista of the bronze age Cyprus emerges archaeologically and historically upon its conquest by Thothmes III in 1450 B. C. Since that date it has known the domination of many masters. To the Egyptians succeeded Assyrians, Persians, and again Egyptians, until, in 58 B. C., Rome annexed the island. These successive conquerors did not, however, greatly change the population, which was much more affected by the rival and successive colonies of Phoenicians from Tyre, Sidon, and elsewhere on the Syrian coast and of Greeks from the Aegean coast and islands. The Greeks finally gained the predominance, often attaining some degree of independence under their local kings; and Cyprus came to be regarded, from the sixth century down to the time of Alexander the Great, as the easternmost outpost

of Greek civilization—a tradition which has had considerable influence upon political sentiment in the island itself and also in the modern kingdom of Greece.

Upon the partition of East and West in A. D. 395, Cyprus fell to the Byzantine Empire, a member of which it remained, subject to divers Moslem incursions from Syria, till 1184. In that year Isaac Komnenos, the Byzantine, seized and held it till he was ejected by Richard I of England, who married Berengaria of Navarre at Limassol. Richard sold the island to the Knights Templars in 1191; but in 1192, being unable to control the rebellious Greeks, the Knights withdrew to Syria, leaving Richard to transfer Cyprus to the Lusignans, who ruled it for three hundred years. In 1372 the Genoese ravaged the island and captured Famagusta, which was, however, recovered by the Lusignan King James II in 1464. In 1489 the rights of the Lusignan dynasty were renounced by Queen Catherine (Cornaro) in favour of the Venetian Republic, which held the island till 1571, when it was conquered by the Turks. Thenceforward, for three centuries, it formed part of the Ottoman Empire, until in July 1878,[1] by treaty with the Porte, it passed under British control.

(2) British Occupation

On July 12, 1878, Vice-Admiral Lord John Hay hoisted the British flag in Nicosia, the capital, and on July 22 Lieut.-General Sir Garnet Wolseley assumed the government of the island as Her Majesty's High Commissioner, bringing with him a large force of British and Indian troops, certain special service officers, and three civilian officials. The troops camped in the island appear to have suffered severely in health; but it is probable that an injudicious

[1] Appendix A, I and II.

choice of camping grounds, single bell-tents, and a too generous canteen, under the burning summer sun of Cyprus, had something to do with this. Experience has remedied these defects, and the island has served as a convalescent station for troops during the recent war. On June 23, 1879, Colonel Robert Biddulph, C.B., now General Sir Robert Biddulph, was appointed High Commissioner; and in 1880 the island came under the Colonial Office. Since then it has been administered as a Crown Colony, although always officially recognized as forming part of the Ottoman Empire until its recent annexation.

Discontent among the Greek population led in 1889 to the sending of a deputation of three leading Cypriots to lay their grievances before the Imperial Government. The deputation was sympathetically received, but no important changes resulted. In 1907 further proposals were submitted by the Greeks for giving power to the elected members of the Legislative Council, subject only to the veto of the Crown. These, however, were rejected as impracticable.

(3) Annexation by Great Britain

On November 5, 1914, after the declaration of war between Turkey and Great Britain, a Proclamation,[1] published simultaneously with an Order in Council,[2] announced the annexation of the island. By the terms of this document, Ottoman subjects born in Cyprus and resident in Cyprus at the date of the annexation became British subjects, while Ottoman subjects not born in Cyprus but resident there on the date of the annexation were allowed one year within which to leave the island, failing which they would become British subjects. This Proclamation was

[1] Appendix A, IV. [2] Appendix A, III.

revoked on March 3, 1915, by a new one[1] which decreed that all Ottoman subjects resident in Cyprus on November 5, 1914, became British subjects, but that any such Ottoman subject who desired to retain his nationality might, by notice under his hand addressed to the High Commissioner, elect to do so within one month of the Proclamation coming into force, in which case he had to leave Cyprus within two months of so electing, failing which he would be treated as a British subject. Only a few persons, and these chance visitors to Cyprus, elected to retain their Ottoman nationality. The announcement of the annexation, it is stated in the High Commissioner's Report, was received generally with enthusiasm, not only by the Christian population, but by the large majority of the Moslem inhabitants.

[1] Appendix A, V.

III. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

(1) Religious

The population of the island may be divided into two main elements: the Christians, who are mostly Greek, and the Moslems, who are almost entirely Ottoman (see above, p. 7). In 1911 members of the Cyprian Orthodox Christian Church numbered 214,480 (78·24 per cent. of the total population of Cyprus); Mohammedans, 56,428 (20·6 per cent.); other denominations, including Maronites, Gregorians (Armenians), and Church of England, 3,200.

Christian.—The Greek Church in Cyprus is autocephalous, electing, through the Synod, its own head in the person of the Archbishop of Cyprus. The Church of Cyprus is in communion with the other Orthodox Christian Churches of the East; but it is subject to no patriarch and has always claimed independence. It receives the holy ointment from without—till 1680 from Antioch and subsequently from Constantinople—but as a matter of courtesy and not of right. There are four sees: Nicosia, Paphos, Kition (embracing the civil districts of Larnaka and Limassol), and Kerynia; and these are of metropolitan rank, so that the Archbishop, whose head-quarters are now at Nicosia, is a primate among metropolitans. A contest for the archbishopric a few years ago, dividing the co-religionists into two hotly antagonistic bodies, greatly perplexed the minds of the Government, and at one time resulted in the election of two archbishops holding office at

the same time and a certain amount of rioting only quelled by the use of the military force.

There are several monasteries of great age. Pilgrims, even from Russia, resort to that of the Holy Cross on Stavrovouni, twelve miles from Larnaka, to revere a relic of the Cross, and especially to the Kykkou monastery in the hills near Mt. Troodos. This monastery has valuable property in Turkey, Russia, and the Balkans, the gifts of Orthodox Christians. The influence of the Church on the people is great. Until the British founded an Agricultural Department, the monks were the best cultivators.

There is an Anglican archdeacon under the jurisdiction of the Bishop of Jerusalem. The British community has erected a good church at Nicosia and some smaller places of worship in other towns.

Moslem.—The Moslems are Sunnis of the Hannifite rite. There are a chief Kadi, a Mufti, and three district Kadis. There are numerous mosques and several converted Latin Christian churches, including, at Nicosia, a fine Gothic cathedral church erected in the thirteenth century under the Lusignans. Various Moslem shrines exist; one, which lies about 4 miles from Larnaka, on the western shore of the great salt lake, is a favourite place of pilgrimage.

Properties which are dedicated to religious and charitable uses are known as *evqaf* (plural of *vaqf*) and are specially dealt with. *Vaqf* land includes properties of considerable area and value in Cyprus; and these have been administered under the Cyprus Convention by the Delegates of Evqaf and those attached to mosques, religious establishments, &c., in conjunction with a British Delegate nominated by the British Government. The properties are inalienable and mostly vested in hereditary trustees, and include mosques, tombs, establishments which

house dancing or other dervishes, and land which has been dedicated to religious or charitable purposes by permission of the Sultan. It has been the policy of the British Government here, as in India, to respect not only the properties themselves pertaining to the religion of Islam, but also the laws and regulations which are directed to control them ; and there is little doubt that the acquiescence of the Moslem inhabitants in the British regime is in a great measure due to this principle.

There are several popular survivals of ancient paganism. A coin, Charon's tribute, is placed between the lips of a corpse; the Virgin Mary is in one place called Panagia Aphroditissa ; and the Aphrodite water festival is kept up at Larnaka and Limassol at Whitsuntide.

(2) Political

During the first year of the Occupation the island was administered under the Foreign Office, practically according to the Turkish system found in force, but modified somewhat in its application by Western ideas.

Legislature.—At the close of the year 1882 the island was endowed with representative institutions, in the shape of a Legislative Council, under the presidency of the High Commissioner, consisting of eighteen members, six of whom are public officers nominated by the Crown, the rest being elected by the people for five years, unless the Council is dissolved sooner. Of the twelve elected members, nine are elected by voters of the Christian community, and three by voters of the Mohammedan community. The elected members are chosen by constituencies consisting of every male person, being either an Ottoman[1] or British

[1] The annexation of the island has modified the franchise qualification.

subject or having resided in the island not less than five years, who has attained the age of twenty-one years and pays any of the class of taxes called *verghi*. Laws enacted by the High Commissioner and the Legislative Council must be submitted for the approval of the Crown in the usual way. Not only has Cyprus a legislative body in which the elective element far outnumbers the official, but also in the Executive Council, which forms the High Commissioner's advisory body, there are, in addition to the three official members, three non-official members appointed by him, who, however, need not always be summoned. Cyprus, therefore, though governed nominally as a Crown Colony, enjoys to a certain degree representative institutions.

Local Administration.—Municipal Councils have been set up in the principal towns; some are inefficient, but others—especially that of Limassol—are active and enterprising. The village system of Mukhtars or headmen and Agas or elders has been preserved, but the Mukhtars have been made elective, with somewhat doubtful results. 'Field watchmen' are appointed to guard the crops. Some further link is, however, required between the village organization and the Commissioner, who is the direct representative of the Government, since the Mudirs, who served as intermediaries under the Turks, are now employed principally as Sheriff's officers.

Justice.—The administration of the law in Cyprus at the time of the Occupation was attended by many evils detrimental to the interests of justice, which led to an urgent appeal to the new governing authority for reform. The law in force consisted of the *Mejellé*[1]

[1] As in the courts of ancient Rome the judges decided cases on the facts disclosed, basing their decisions on the declarations of the law given by the jurisconsults, so in the Moslem courts they based

or Sacred Law, and the Ottoman Land and Criminal and Commercial Codes (the two latter founded on the Code Napoléon)—the whole forming, with Procedure Codes, what was called the Destour or Authorized Collection. This is still in force, save in so far as it has been repealed or modified by Statute.

One of the first steps of the British Government in 1878 was to institute by Ordinance No. 1 of that year a High Court of Justice, the members of which were the High Commissioner, the Judicial Commissioner, and the Deputy Commissioners in the districts, to have jurisdiction over British and foreign subjects in civil and criminal matters; but Ottoman subjects were left under the sole jurisdiction and authority of the Ottoman Courts in existence prior to the Occupation.

The condition of things, however, in the Ottoman Courts called loudly for reform; consequently, in 1882, the Cyprus Courts of Justice Order in Council was promulgated and came into force early in 1883. This Order in Council, which is still in force, constituted a Supreme Court consisting of a Chief Justice and Puisne Judge, both being English barristers, for the whole island, and six District Courts, each composed of an English barrister as President and one Moslem and one Christian member. This system doubtless leads to an impartial administration of justice, but it is cumbrous and expensive.

The Supreme Court is a Court of Appeal from District Courts in both their civil and criminal jurisdiction, and it has certain jurisdiction in bankruptcy, lunacy, and matrimonial cases formerly vested in the

their decisions on the Fetwas given by the muftis. The *Mejellé* is a sort of digest of Fetwas, a collection of legal decisions compiled from authoritative Fetwas for the use of the Nizam courts. English judges now use the *Mejellé* and give their decisions on principles therein contained.

High Court of Justice. It also has original jurisdiction under the Cyprus Neutrality Order in Council, and under the Cyprus Extradition Order in Council, both of 1881. It is a Colonial Court of Admiralty, and one judge has power to deal with election petitions. Appeals lie from its judgements, under restrictions, to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

The Order in Council (1882) provided for the Courts having jurisdiction over Ottoman subjects as distinguished from non-Ottomans, and the law to be applied to them. The annexation of the island by Great Britain and the consequent conversion of Ottoman nationality into British have necessitated the passing of another Order in Council, cited as the Cyprus Courts of Justice Amendment Order 1914, by which Cypriots who have become British subjects have had their rights reserved to them as regards the law to be applied to them and the Courts to have jurisdiction over them in accordance with the Cyprus Courts of Justice Order 1882.

By Law No. 2 of 1915, the British Subjects' Marriage Law 1889 was declared inapplicable, but the Infants' Estates Administration Law 1894 and the Births and Deaths Registration Laws 1895 and 1913 were retained as applicable, to persons who being Ottoman subjects became British subjects, by virtue of the Cyprus (Annexation) Order in Council 1914, from the date of the Order in Council.

The Order in Council of 1882 also limits the jurisdiction of the Mahkemé-i-Sherieh Courts alluded to in the Annexe to the Convention [1] to the cognizance of religious matters relating to Moslems, such as marriage, divorce, alimony, inheritance, and care of persons and estates of infant orphan Moslems. These Courts comprise that of the Kadi of Cyprus with

[1] Appendix A, II.

jurisdiction in Nicosia town, the Kadi of Nicosia-Kerynia with jurisdiction in those districts excepting Nicosia town, the Kadi of Larnaka-Famagusta, and the Kadi of Limassol-Paphos. These tribunals are retained in conformity with Article 1 of the Annexe of the Convention of June 4, 1878.[1] The reform of the Courts and their procedure was eagerly welcomed by the people, and has met with universal favour.

Police.—In September 1878 it was found necessary to constitute a force of Military Police, with a strength of some 17 officers and 200 mounted and about 390 unmounted men, in which were embodied most of the old Turkish Zaptiehs found in the island, to the number of about 270, but few of the Turkish officers, most of whom were illiterate. The new force, comprising not only Moslems (as before), but Christians, was amalgamated in 1880 with the Cyprus Pioneers, raised in 1879, and now forms a body of some 23 officers, 682 N.C.O.'s and men, and 248 mounted men, under the command of a Chief Commandant. The mounted men are trained as mounted infantry and the foot as infantry. They have won for themselves a high character for zeal and efficiency in the maintenance of law and order, the detection of crime, and the performance of the multifarious duties devolving on them in connexion with local laws.

(3) Public Education

Sir Robert Biddulph, in his first general Report on the island in 1880, considered the state of education to be at a low standard, the majority of the agricultural population having received little or none, while in many villages not a single person could read or write; the education of women was almost

[1] Appendix A, II.

entirely neglected. Some sixty-five Moslem and eighty-three Christian schools, mostly in the towns, existed at the time of occupation, the Moslem schools being to a small extent State-aided, though without inspection and indifferently attended. Little more than the recitation of the Koran was taught in the Moslem schools, while the Christian schools, mainly supported by the Church, possessed a curriculum embracing arithmetic, geography, ancient Greek, and sacred history.

In 1880 a Director of Education was appointed, and in 1881 the Government promised grants in aid, in proportion to the efforts of the people and supplementary to existing sources of support, if certain conditions were fulfilled, of which the most important was the election of School Boards in the villages. In 1883 the Director of Education, who, relieved of administrative duties, had become Inspector of Schools, reported real progress and marked improvement in many schools both Christian and Moslem. In 1905 Boards of Education were established, one to regulate the Moslem and the other the Christian schools. In 1905 and 1907 Education Laws were passed, consolidating and improving the old system, but assigning the administration of the law to Village and District Committees with the Moslem and Christian Boards of Education, while the High Commissioner has the power to prescribe the support of schools in villages unprovided for. The dual system of schools resolves all questions of religious teaching, which, however, in both classes of schools forms a highly important part of the curriculum.

In 1912 there were 391 Greek Christian and 175 Moslem State-aided schools, besides 4 Greek Christian and 16 Moslem unaided schools, educating some 25,656 Greek Christians and 5,926 Moslems, including boys

and girls. In 1916–17 the total number of schools had increased to 699 with 865 teachers and 39,567 scholars on the books and an average daily attendance (except in harvest time) of 35,701 (84 per cent. in Moslem and 92 per cent. in Christian schools), receiving a total grant in aid from the island revenue of £8,195 per annum, which, with £24,446 raised locally by assessments, &c., makes a total of £32,641.[1] Besides the elementary schools there are various secondary schools for both boys and girls. State aid is also given to a few Armenian and Maronite schools. Among the secondary schools are the *Idadi*, a Moslem high school, entirely maintained by Government (in place of the *Rushdie* school supported in Turkish times); the Greek Gymnasium (like the *Idadi* at Nicosia), to which is attached a training department for teachers in the Greek elementary schools; and smaller Greek high schools in various provincial towns.

In Nicosia is an excellent English school for boys on the lines of a grammar school. In 1912, to 26 English boys there were 65 Greek boys, and others representing every race and religion on the island, besides pupils from Egypt and other neighbouring countries. There is also an American school (instruction in the English language) at Larnaka.

A commercial school was founded in 1912 by a Greek. There are Greek, Moslem, and English girls' schools.

From these facts it is clear that education has been eagerly sought, and that much has been done since 1878 by the Government to enable the people to reap the advantages they desire; but the census of 1911 still returned 84,530 males and 116,162 females as illiterate. It must be remembered, however, that education is

[1] Cyprus Annual Report for 1916–17. Parliamentary Paper, Cd. 8434.

not compulsory, and that, the inhabitants being mostly agricultural or pastoral in their pursuits, both boys and girls are retained at home by their parents to assist them in their labours.

With the object of providing a practical equipment for young people desirous of agricultural work, a Government Agricultural School was established in 1913. It has a syllabus including instruction in plant structure, the nature and habits of injurious insects, elementary agricultural chemistry, the use of modern implements, sericulture and bee-keeping, and, as supplementary subjects, in poultry-keeping, elementary veterinary instruction, and agricultural book-keeping. There were originally twelve Moslem and nineteen Greek Christian students. Schoolmasters have also been receiving courses of agricultural instruction during their vacations.

Besides the official *Cyprus Gazette*, there are two English magazines, three Turkish newspapers, and sixteen Greek newspapers and magazines.

IV. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(A) MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

(1) INTERNAL

(*a*) *Roads*

THE roads of Cyprus are divided into two main classes: (*a*) main roads, maintained by the Public Works Department; and (*b*) village roads. By the Village Road Law of 1900, each able-bodied villager is obliged to devote six days' labour a year to any road or other work of public utility which may be decided on by the village council. The Government provides the bridges and culverts, and the work is carried out with the technical assistance of the Public Works Department. These roads are chiefly cart and bridle roads. The forest paths are under the control of the Forest Department.

At the time of the British occupation very few of the roads were more than rough tracks. To-day Cyprus may be said to have better roads than any other island in the Mediterranean. According to the official return, 684 miles of main roads were maintained in 1915; they are in general 16 ft. in width, and mostly metalled throughout. There were also over 1,000 miles of village roads. The roads from Nicosia to Larnaka, to Kopinou and to Kerynia, from Larnaka to Limassol and to Famagusta, from Famagusta to Yialousa, from Limassol to Platres on the slopes of Mount Troodos and to Paphos, are fit for motor traffic throughout the year: the other main roads during the dry season, from May to November.

By the construction, since the British occupation, of some 2,000 bridges and culverts, the numerous torrents which in winter cross the roads are no longer a source of danger to the traveller.

P.S. 803 Wt. 6325/D. 735 1000 6/20 F.O.P. [3458]

(*b*) *Rivers*

There are no navigable rivers in Cyprus. Even the most important, such as the Pedias (about 65 miles long) and the Yalias (60 miles long), are almost dry in summer. There are no navigable canals.

(*c*) *Railways*

The only railway is the Government line, opened 1905-7, which runs across the island from Famagusta to Nicosia and Morphou, with the extension, opened in 1915, up the valley of the Solia to Evrykhou on the northern slopes of the Troodos range. The total length of these lines is 76 miles. The track is single, of narrow gauge (2 ft. 6 in.). The railway was built by the consulting engineers to the Crown Agents for the Colonies from a fund provided by loan under the Colonial Loans Act of 1899 at a total cost of £164,136. Its administration is regulated by the Cyprus Government Railway Law of 1906. In 1912 its rolling-stock consisted of eight locomotives, thirteen passenger waggons, and thirty-one goods and ballast waggons. It carries about 130,000 passengers, and 80,000 tons of freight annually. The traffic has of late steadily increased, as the following figures show :—

Year.	Gross Earnings.	Working Expenses.
	£	£
1906–7	7,647	9,947
1907–8	12,380	12,557
1908–9	11,443	12,460
	10,998	12,054
1910–11	10,347	12,175
1911–12	11,407	11,663
1912–13	12,333	12,404
1913–14	13,463	11,968
1914–15	13,551	11,934
1915–16	15,785	13,866
1916–17	19,914	16,608

Branch lines from the copper mine at Skouriotissa to the main line, and thence to the sea near Karavostasi, have been begun, but their completion has been delayed owing to the difficulty of obtaining materials and rolling-stock during the war.

Of the loan of £254,000 obtained for the railway and for Famagusta harbour, £200,800 was outstanding on March 31, 1916.

(*d*) *Posts, Telegraphs, and Telephones*

Whereas in 1878 there was not a post office in the island, in 1915 there were sixty-four post offices and 196 rural mail stations. The post office revenue in 1915 amounted to £7,508, the expenditure to £6,868, not including a sum of £4,631 paid as subsidy for the mail steamer. Since 1910 a contract has been entered into with the Cairo Motor Company for a daily motor-'bus service for passengers and mails between Nicosia, Larnaka, and Limassol, a distance of about 67 miles. A similar service between Limassol and Paphos was inaugurated in December 1916.

In 1915 there were 245 miles of telegraph line working, of which 170 belonged to the Eastern Telegraph Company, and the rest to the Government railway. Up to 1916 there was no public telephone system, though there were several official and private lines, which in 1912 extended to 50 miles, exclusive of those belonging to the railway. In 1915-16 a line was constructed to connect Troodos with Evrykhou and Nicosia.

(2) External

(*a*) *Ports*

Cyprus possesses no harbour for large ships, but the small port of Famagusta is available for vessels of some size, and there are a few anchorages in open bays on the south and south-east coasts. Those at Larnaka and Limassol are safe, even in winter, pro-

vided the anchors and cables are efficient. Shipping returns for Cyprus for 1913 are given in Appendix B, Table V.

Famagusta.—Population (with Varosha) in 1911, 5,327. 'It is almost needless,' wrote Admiral Sir G. Phipps Hornby, Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet, in 1879, 'to speak of the position of Famagusta, for it must strike the eye of every seaman. Situated 250 miles from the entrance of the Suez Canal . . . . at less than half that distance from the open roadsteads of the Syrian and Karamanian coasts . . . . it would seem that the whole trade of those coasts must be drawn to the only port which can afford this perfect shelter, and the facilities for rapid loading and discharge which merchant ships require.'

The harbour works suggested by Admiral Hornby were completed in 1906 at a cost of £126,000. The inner harbour consists of an absolutely protected basin of 80 acres, of which $12\frac{1}{2}$ are dredged to 24 ft., with a channel of approach 250 ft. wide and 26 ft. deep. There is further accommodation for sailing vessels and small craft in a basin of 2 acres. The inner harbour has a concrete quay wall 900 ft. long, and a reclaimed wharf area of 5 acres, with a space for customs house, warehouses, &c. The outer harbour is formed by a line of rocky islets, which give shelter from south-east gales, and has a depth of 3-$4\frac{1}{2}$ fathoms. A breakwater could easily be constructed here. It has been said that, with further expenditure, Famagusta could be made the best harbour of the Near East. At present, however, its trade, though steadily improving, is but small. Notwithstanding the fact that it is the only port which has railway communication with the capital of the island, the steamers of the Austrian Lloyd and the Messageries Maritimes still prefer Larnaka as a port of call. Since the war began, the latter line has deserted Larnaka for Famagusta; but this may be a temporary measure.

The following are the official returns of the shipping and trade of Famagusta for the year 1913 :—

	Entered.		Cleared.	
	No. of Vessels.	Tonnage.	No. of Vessels.	Tonnage.
Sailing vessels	223	8,584	243	9,087
Steamers ..	42	42,976	10	10,837

In 1913 the value of the imports at Famagusta, including Carpas, was £134,442, of the exports £101,890; in 1916, £379,451 and £171,960 respectively.

Larnaka.—Population in 1911, 9,262. Larnaka is situated on a shallow and exposed roadstead. Mr. Fairfield reported in 1882 that the creation of a harbour there 'would be almost impossible of accomplishment, even with unlimited money.' The anchorage is described as safe, but very uncomfortable in south-east gales. There is an iron pier 900 ft. in length, completed in 1909, with a sheltering arm extending 250 ft. north, on which is an 8-ton crane; the depth alongside is 7 ft. According to the High Commissioner's report for 1909-10, safe landing is now provided for mails, goods, and passengers, and good shelter is afforded for lighters. But the *Mediterranean Pilot* for 1915 states that landing at the pier in winter is sometimes impracticable, and at all times, unless the sea is absolutely smooth, very disagreeable. There is also a jetty 400 ft. long, built for the salt traffic. A tramway, 1,100 yards long, connects it with the Salt Lake (see below, p. 49).

Shipping returns for 1913 are as follows:—

	Entered.		Cleared.	
	No. of Vessels.	Tonnage.	No. of Vessels.	Tonnage.
Sailing vessels	165	8,585	123	7,233
Steamers ..	85	162,123	84	163,028

The value of the imports in 1913 was £272,716, and of the exports £244,520; in 1917, £262,032 and £251,495 respectively.

Limassol.—Population in 1911, 10,302. The anchorage is in the open Akrotiri Bay, and is similar to that at Larnaka. There is a quay with tram and turntables, from one end of which extends an iron pier 906 ft. long, with a T-head and a depth of 15 ft. at the end, where small steamers can lie and coal; there is a 7-ton crane on the T-head, and another travelling on trolley lines. At the other end of the quay wall is a jetty, 300 ft. long, and 7 ft. wide for most of its length, but for the last 60 ft. widened to 17 ft. Landing at Limassol during north-east and south-east gales is rendered impossible by the surf, and for about forty-five days in the winter months cargo cannot be worked.

Shipping returns for 1913:—

	Entered.		Cleared.	
	No. of Vessels.	Tonnage.	No. of Vessels.	Tonnage.
Sailing vessels	181	9,092	149	7,793
Steamers ..	89	127,061	82	117,751

The value of the imports in 1913 was £148,087, and of the exports £196,607; in 1917, £204,502 and £227,657 respectively.

On the west coast the chief port is Paphos, the port of Ktima (population 3,435). It has a small harbour of $3\frac{3}{4}$ acres, dredged to a minimum depth of 8 ft. at low water, and suitable as a harbour of refuge for small coasters. Inside the harbour is a small iron pier, with 5 ft. of water alongside. In 1913 twenty-one vessels, of 300 tons, entered, and forty-six, of 740 tons, cleared. In 1913 the imports amounted to £11,151, and the exports to £41,781; in 1917 to £42,475 and £28,951 respectively.

The other harbours of Cyprus are small and unimportant. On the north coast, Kerynia, with a population of 1,726, has a harbour which is suitable for small craft, though it affords little shelter from the north-east and north. Its average depth is two fathoms; it has been dredged to a minimum depth of 8 ft. at low water, and a jetty has been constructed which extends 20 ft. into deep water. In 1913 the imports were valued at £8,175, and the exports at £16,857. Other small ports on the north coast are Mikhail Arkhangelos, the port of Akanthou; Latzi, the port of Polis, in Khrysokhou Bay; and Karavostasi, the port of Lefka, in Morphou Bay. There are small jetties at all of these, and at Karavostasi a pier is under construction.

There is a small jetty on the coast near Pyrgo, to facilitate the transport of timber from the forests of the Paphos mountains.

On the south coast, Zygi is a small port possessing a jetty 408 ft. long with 6 ft. of water at the end. It is provided with tram lines, and is suitable for the export of carobs.

On the east coast there is a jetty at Boghaz, near Tricomo.

(*b*) *Shipping Lines*

Local.—The Limassol Steamship Company, inaugurated in 1905, runs a weekly service between Alexandria and Port Said, Famagusta, Larnaka, and Limassol. For some years it held the contract for the mails for Egypt, but the service provided by it was apparently regarded as inadequate, for this contract was not renewed when it expired in 1912.

British.—The Moss Steamship Company (Ellerman) runs occasional steamers between Egypt, Cyprus, and Turkey. The steamers of the Prince Line usually call at Cyprus for carobs and beans.

Italian.—A steamer of the Navigazione Generale Italiana (Florio Rubattino) calls at Larnaka fortnightly.

Austrian.—The Austrian Lloyd had a weekly service to Cyprus *via* Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt.

French.—The Messageries Maritimes have a fortnightly service *via* Asia Minor and Syria.

German.—The Deutsche Levante Linie steamers to Alexandria called occasionally at Larnaka or Limassol.

Egyptian.—The Khedivial Mail Steamship Company has a weekly service from Egypt to Larnaka, Limassol, and Famagusta, with a fortnightly extension to Paphos. This line holds the contract for the mails for seven years as from October 1912. The subsidy amounts to about £5,000 a year.

(c) *Cables and Wireless Communication*

The Eastern Telegraph Company has a cable from Alexandria, which lands at Cape Kiti Dades and connects with Larnaka. The Imperial Ottoman Company's line from Latakia to the island had not been in working order for some years before the war.

There were no stations for wireless telegraphy in the island in 1913. By the Wireless Telegraphy Law of that year, the High Commissioner is given power to license the establishment of any such station, or the installation of any apparatus, in Cyprus.

(B) INDUSTRY

(1) Agriculture

Nearly the whole population of Cyprus is engaged in some form of agriculture or in closely-allied industries. It is estimated that there are in the island about 2,293,760 acres, of which 1,200,000 are cultivated. A further 320,000 acres are thought to be capable of cultivation. There are 450,000 acres of forest land. The remainder is rocky and not cultivable.

(a) *Products of Commercial Value*

Cereals.—Of these the most important is barley, closely followed by wheat. Oats are extensively grown, and the cultivation of rye and maize, which

have been recently introduced, is proving increasingly successful. The chief agricultural regions are the Mesaoria Plain, and the plains of Limassol and Paphos. In good years the land is estimated to produce 30 bushels of wheat and 40 of barley per acre. With the giving up of primitive methods of cultivation, a still greater yield may be relied on, especially if the efforts of the Agricultural Department to stamp out disease are successful. The ravages, in particular, of two insect pests, the *sirividhi* caterpillar (*Oecophora temperatella*) and the Hessian fly (*Cecidomyia destructor*), have sometimes caused a loss of crop to the extent of 60 per cent. In 1913 the export of barley amounted to 320,067 bushels, of which 17,000 went to the United Kingdom; no wheat or oats, however, went thither in that year.

Forage Crops.—Of forage crops, the most important are vetches. The latest reports show a large increase in the cultivation of lucerne, while the experiments in growing sainfoin, berseem (Egyptian clover) and mangel-wurzel have proved successful.

Cotton.—The cotton industry of Cyprus is a very old one. Down to the end of the eighteenth century it was the chief source from which England drew her supplies, and the prosperity of Manchester may be said to be founded on it. Under the Turkish administration it declined, but it is now making steady progress, the export having doubled between 1899 and 1912. The Agricultural Department has made successful experiments with American cotton seed, which is found to give a yield several times greater than the native kinds. The area sown with cotton by private persons is reported to be continuously increasing. At present nearly all the cotton exported goes to France and Greece. Very little, doubtless owing to heavy freight charges, goes to the United Kingdom; thus, in 1912 out of a total export of 690 tons, only 8 tons went thither.

Flax is grown in considerable quantities in the Mesaoria Plain and near Morphou. Nearly all the linseed is exported; in 1913 the exports amounted to

284 tons, value £3,039. *Aniseed* is cultivated for its oil, chiefly near Morphou. In 1913, 942 tons were exported, mostly to France. *Sesame* is another important crop, for the use of its oil is allowed in the greatest fasts of the Greek Church, when olive oil is forbidden. It is chiefly grown in the Solia Valley and near Lapathos, often alongside cotton. In 1913, 107 tons were exported, all of which went to Egypt. The *Origanum* plant, which grows freely in the forests, gives a very important essential oil of great pharmaceutical value. In 1913, 42 cwt., value £980, were exported, all to the United Kingdom. Experiments in the production of geranium, juniper, laurel, marjoram, mint, myrtle, and sage oils have had encouraging results.

Tobacco.—Tobacco was first introduced into Cyprus in the seventeenth century, but crushing taxation, together with the preference shown by manufacturers for leaf from Macedonia, killed the industry under the Turks, and it is only since 1896 that any real progress has been made. The best tobacco is said to be that of Omodos, on the southern slopes of Mount Troodos; that of Paphos and the Karpass is also good, while the neighbourhood of Nicosia is likewise favourable to its growth. The chief fault of Cypriot tobacco has been that, owing to primitive methods of curing, it smokes too hot. The Agricultural Department is striving to remedy this defect. Hitherto the supply of tobacco has done little more than meet the local demand, but a Larnaka firm is now preparing Latakia tobacco on a large scale, and a fairly large area is being sown by private persons with a view to creating an export trade. During the last few years the Persian tobacco known as 'Tumbeki' (*Nicotiana Persica*) has received attention. For the manufacture of cigarettes, &c., see below, p. 52.

The export of *Vegetables*, chiefly onions and potatoes, is increasing.

The existence of two plants of importance for tanning is to be noted. The chief is the *sumach* (*Rhus coriaria*), which is used in the preparation of

Morocco leather, and with a mordant of tin affords a yellow colour in calico printing. This plant flourishes in nearly all the vineyards of the island, and if a central factory were set up, a regular trade might be secured. In 1913, 208 tons of leaves and 130 tons of ground sumach were exported, to the total value of £1,106; 46 tons of the leaves went to the United Kingdom. The second plant of the same nature is the *shinia* or *schinia* (the local name of the *Pistacia lentiscus*). Its leaves are useful for dyeing as well as tanning purposes, and a market should be found for it in both France and Italy.

The *Rosa damascena*, from which the best attar of roses is made in Bulgaria, flourishes in Cyprus. It has not yet been put to any commercial use, but large quantities of attar of roses might be produced.

Vines.—Viticulture used to be a most important industry; the raisins of Cyprus are particularly fine, and its wines have long been celebrated in the East. The soil and climate are said to be better for grapes than those of Australia. At the time of the British occupation, the industry had decayed, owing partly to oppressive taxation, and partly to the ravages of the destructive blight *Oidium Tuckeri*, which had made its appearance in 1853. Latterly, however, the cultivation of the vine has revived. Fortunately, the phylloxera has never affected the island. The tithe on grapes has been abolished, and the Department of Agriculture has waged ceaseless war on the *sirividhi*, and has slowly aroused the villagers to the value of modern methods of combating the evil. The Department has also established model vineyards, where instruction in the pruning and dressing of vines is given. Efforts have been made to stimulate the production of wine. The vine is grown in every part of the island, but the most productive region is the south-west, round Limassol and Paphos, where the vineyards cover the slopes of the Troodos Range up to a height of 5,000 ft. In 1912 the number of acres under vines was estimated at 46,600. For the manufacture of wine, see p. 50.

Fruit Trees.—The carob tree is of great importance, as its fruit, popularly known as locust beans, furnishes no less than one-third of the total exports of the island. More than half the beans exported are sent to the United Kingdom for cattle food; some also go to France for distillation. In the East they are used as food by the poor. The tree grows in a wild state in most parts of the island, but is valueless unless grafted. It flowers in August or September, and its fruit (a pod with ten to eighteen hard beans) is gathered in the following August. The Government does its utmost to foster this important industry. Over 60,000 trees are grown in the various Government gardens, and healthy trees are distributed. Destructive diseases and insects. especially the *Cecidomyia ceratoniæ,* which have of late years ruined so much of the fruit, have been considerably lessened by the introduction of improved methods of grafting and pruning. The chief carob regions are the Karpass and the south coast generally, Zygi being one of the chief ports of export. An export duty in lieu of tithe is levied at the rate of 9 Cyprus piastres per cantar (123 lb.) in the districts of Nicosia, Larnaka, and Limassol, and of 8 piastres in those of Famagusta, Paphos, and Kerynia.

The olive tree grows wild in most parts of the island, but, like the carob, is useless unless grafted. The Agricultural Department carries on a systematic olive-pruning campaign in the villages, and, with an improvement in the productiveness of the trees and in the methods of pressing the fruit, a considerable development of the trade in olive oil may be looked for. At present, however, there is scarcely enough for local consumption, and in 1913 only 19 tons, of the value of £8,318, were exported.

The trade of Cyprus in orchard and garden fruits is only now beginning to show an advance. It is capable of very great development. At present, for instance, hardly any of such fruit goes to the United Kingdom, except a few oranges and lemons. Even the raisins have no sale there. The Government is doing its best

to remedy this state of things, and the nursery gardens distribute good seeds and grafts; demonstrations in the systematic spraying of trees are given, and so forth. The most important crops are oranges and lemons: 16,133,844 were exported in 1913, of which 82,769 went to the United Kingdom, the rest to Egypt, Turkey, Greece, and Rumania. In the same year 4,969 tons of pomegranates were exported, all to Egypt. Melons, almonds, and the caisia, or white apricot, which is peculiar to Cyprus, are grown, and the Paphos district produces excellent figs.

Another tree which could be much more cultivated is the pistachio (*Pistacia vera*). Its cultivation requires no capital and little labour, and if it is grafted on the terebinth (*Pistacia terebinthus*), which is very common in the island, it will bear fruit in three years.

Live-stock.—The rearing of live-stock forms an important part of the rural industry of the island. The Government is doing its best to improve stock, and at Athalassa it has established a stock-breeding establishment, which in 1911 raised 2,353 head. Considerable success has attended its efforts. For instance, the breed of horses is stated to have been improved out of all knowledge by the importation of English stallions. The native horses, particularly the 'Paphos pony,' are strong and sturdy, though small. The Cypriot donkey is highly thought of, and would be better if the best jacks were not exported. The Government has set up a donkey-breeding station in connection with the Athalassa farm. Equally esteemed are the mules, and still more the hinnies, which are much exported for military purposes by reason of their weight-carrying power and capacity for mountain work. The native cattle resemble the Jersey variety, but, as they are almost wholly used as draught animals, they have not milked well. Devonshire stock has now been introduced, and this should increase the milking capacity.

The wool of the Cypriot sheep has a high reputation as 'an excellent class of carpet wool, which would always find a ready sale in the London market.' Sheep

have been sent from the island to South Africa to improve the breed there. The camel also does well, and there is a small export trade in this animal. In the island itself it is not so much used now, owing to the improvement in the roads. The buffalo disappeared in the seventeenth century, but a few have recently been introduced from Egypt. Goats are poor; it has been suggested that the Angora goat should be imported and bred in Cyprus, or crossed with the native goat for the sake of its hair (mohair). At present, however, goats are little but a nuisance; the harm they do to the forests, and the efforts that are being made to reduce their numbers are treated below (p. 43). The breed of pigs and poultry has hitherto been poor, but stock from England has now been introduced. The Government has begun to breed ostriches, but the success of the experiment seems at present doubtful.

In 1915 the numbers of the principal kinds of domestic animals in the island were estimated as follows:—

Horses, mules, and donkeys ...	70,161
Horned cattle	62,928
Sheep	282,235
Goats	228,232
Camels	1,355

The figures for the sheep and goats represent the numbers counted for tax, that is, animals of one year old and upwards; 30 per cent. may be added for those under that age.

Honey.—A certain amount of honey is sent to Turkey and Egypt; in 1913, 8 tons, to the value of £240, were exported. The Department of Agriculture is trying to expand this industry, and supplies patterns of bar-frame hives to local carpenters. A greatly increased output is possible.

Silk.—The silk industry of Cyprus, once so famous, was all but ruined in the middle of the nineteenth century by the arrival of the Pebrine disease in the island; this had the further effect that the land-

lords, in despair, cut down their mulberry trees. The State is making great efforts to revive this industry, its principal task at present being to procure eggs free from disease. There are now five sericultural stations at work in the island, where eggs are hatched by the Pasteur cellular system, demonstrations in the rearing of silkworms and the winding of silk given, and pupils trained. In a number of villages, societies have been formed for the encouragement of silkworm raising and mulberry planting. The chief centres of this industry are Paphos and the Karpass. The export of silk, nearly all in cocoons, has more than doubled in the last ten years. Practically the whole of the export goes to France.

(*b*) *Methods of Cultivation*

The general scarcity of capital in the island, the innate conservatism of the peasant, and the want of modern agricultural implements have long delayed progress. But great improvement is now evident. The Cypriot peasant is naturally very shrewd and intelligent, and if it can be proved to him by practical demonstrations that improvements are desirable, he will take to them. It has always been the policy of the Government to get into direct touch with him, to foster his initiative, to invite his co-operation in the village councils, and (especially through the co-operative credit societies, see below, p. 62) to rescue him from the grip of the usurer, nowhere more ubiquitous and tenacious.[1] The Agricultural Department acts as 'the pioneer to show the way in agricultural development.' It has successfully promoted the use of labour-saving machinery. Thus it produced a light iron plough, specially adapted to the needs of the island, and this is gradually superseding the old wooden plough. It carries out in the villages experiments in chemical manures to demonstrate the benefits of these fertilisers,

[1] See the Report of the Commission on the *Extent, Causes, and Effects of Indebtedness in the Island*, printed at the Government Printing Office at Nicosia, 1918.

furnishes information regarding methods of combating diseases and pests, and gives instruction in agriculture to schoolmasters in their vacations and to the future priests of the island in the Orthodox seminary in Larnaka. In the year 1913, the Government opened an agricultural school, with thirty-one students, to impart a practical knowledge of farming. For some years the model farm and breeding establishment which it has maintained at Athalassa, near Nicosia, besides raising stock, has carried on experiments with a view to improving pasture lands and to encouraging the more judicious selection of seeds, the introduction of new cereal and fodder plants, and similar objects. There is also an experimental garden at Nicosia, with smaller ones in other centres, to encourage and improve the cultivation of fruit trees in the island. School gardens have been established in many places. The Government has promoted the formation of village agricultural societies, and encouraged the holding of agricultural shows. An agricultural bank has also been established (see p. 62).

During the last few years the Government has undertaken a considerable scheme of irrigation. The Irrigation Law of 1897 gives it power to construct reservoirs, to acquire land and to appoint Boards of Irrigation; and in the preceding year the Colonial Office granted a £60,000 loan for this purpose. The greater part of the work has been carried out in the Mesaoria Plain, and the main part was completed by 1901. The surplus waters of the Rivers Pedias and Yalias were impounded, and the swamps in which they lost themselves partially drained and planted. A large reservoir was made at Synkrasi, and there are now four others in the island. The results, however, have not been very successful 'on account of the prejudices of the villagers, who prefer to wait till the last minute for rain; thus much water is wasted, because, as no summer crops except cotton are grown, most of the water stored evaporates before autumn.' Whether any other method of irrigation would prove effective appears, however, to be doubtful.

Several attempts have been made to sink artesian wells, but the resultant flow of water has in no case been encouraging. It is urged that the existing system of storage by means of wells, springs, &c., could not be further extended except at a prohibitive cost. On the other hand, it has been suggested that, in view of the indifference of the villagers to existing storage works, they should be helped by loans to provide wells, water-wheels, air-motors, &c., and that the experiments with artesian wells have hitherto been half-hearted and inconclusive.

(*c*) *Forestry*

When the British first occupied the island, they found the once-extensive forests in a deplorable condition. Forest fires, indiscriminate and wasteful felling of timber, often solely for the sake of a little resin, and the ravages of innumerable goats, had so denuded Cyprus of trees that the rainfall had diminished, and the rivers dried up. According to the Ottoman Law, forests are divided into four classes, State forests, *vakf* forests (*i.e.*, those belonging to pious foundations), village forests and private forests. Of the last there are supposed to be none in Cyprus. The Woods and Forests Ordinance of 1879 treated the first three as in the same category, thus restricting village privileges For some years, owing to the weight of the tribute, the Government could attempt little more than protection and preservation. Wherever it was possible the goats were excluded, the fires checked, and the fellings limited. Large schemes of re-afforestation were long delayed, not only by lack of means, but by the opposition of the more ignorant peasants, who looked on 'the grazing of flocks of sheep and goats in forest areas, felling of timber, and destruction of valuable timber by extraction of pitch, as venial offences.' Gradually, however, they are being brought to see the necessity of forest preservation. Their desire for grazing grounds has been met by separating 'common' lands from true

timber areas; timber stores have been established in villages; fuel and timber are sold to the people at cost price, and fuel plantations formed round centres of population. Above all, by the Goats Law of 1913 a great step was taken towards the elimination of the worst pest of all. It has been calculated that there were then in the island some 250,000 goats, that each goat did annual damage to the extent of ten shillings, and that the resultant loss of £125,000 a year probably exceeded the total value of the goats themselves. The law in question is one of local option—that is to say, if a majority of the property owners of a village vote against goats, a year's grace is given, and at the end of that period none may be kept within the village boundaries, the existing goats being bought by the Government. Except among the goatherd class, this measure has proved popular, and an increasing number of villages (in 1917, 90 out of a total number of 640) are now reckoned as 'prescribed' under the Act, and in 1917 the number of goats had been reduced to 183,700.

The State forests of Cyprus cover an area of about 700 square miles, of which some 219 may be reckoned first-class timber forests. They are chiefly situated in the southern range of mountains between Cape Akamas and Stavravouni, and in the northern range between Capes Kormakiti and Andréas. By far the most important tree is the Aleppo pine (*Pinus halepensis* or *maritima*), which gives excellent timber, and resists the droughts. The *Pinus laricio* is found on the Troodos Range above the height of 4,000 ft. The cedar grows extensively in the Paphos forest. The *Quercus alnifolia* and the *Arbutus andrachne* furnish wood for agricultural implements, chairs, &c. The plane, alder, and walnut flourish where there is water. The Forest Department has recently planted large numbers of Spanish chestnuts, and also the *Quercus ægilops*, with a view to producing valonia. The re-afforestation of the plains, which has been rendered difficult by reason of the effect of the summer heat on the young pine seed-

lings, is being effected by the planting of the wattle, eucalyptus, and other trees. Three forest stations with nursery gardens attached have been established for the supply of seedlings, &c. In 1913 the two sawmills in the Paphos forest alone turned out 40,827 cubic feet of timber, of the value of £2,966. In 1916 the forest revenue amounted to £27,182; for 1917 it is estimated at £47,000. 'There is every reason to hope that Cyprus may regain its position as one of the best timber-producing countries in the Levant.'

(*d*) *Land Tenure*

By far the greater part of the land is in the hands of peasant proprietors. Where large estates do exist, they are worked on the *metayer* system, or some similar principle. For example, under the system called *mezari* we find the usual arrangement of one party supplying the land, the other the labour, the produce being divided between them; and under the system called *mesakah*, one party supplies trees, the other labour, the fruit being divided.

A considerable area of land, about 1,400 square miles, is at the disposal of the State, half being forest land, the other half waste (*hali*) or unoccupied land known as *arazi mevat*, which 'must be so far from a town or village that the loud voice of a person from the nearest inhabited spot cannot be heard there.' This land is gradually being disposed of at a fair price. Thus, in the eastern part of the Mesaoria Plain, the State was able to offer over 4.000 acres of drained land, which could be irrigated from recently constructed reservoirs. A considerable amount of property has been bought by the Anglo-Egyptian Land Allotment Company.

It is to be noted that immovable property in Cyprus is 'still held by the tenure prevailing at the occupation, and is governed by the Ottoman Land Code.' But the British Government has so modified and improved the system of registration that 'it is now possible to

transfer immovable property almost as quickly as movable."[1]

(2) Fisheries

Apart from the sponge industry, these are unimportant. There are no fish in the rivers, though there are plenty round the coasts, especially red and grey mullet, bream, and bass. The fishermen are described as poor and unenterprising, their boats and nets as inferior. An improvement has, however, been noticed of late years, and the number of boats is constantly increasing.

At the time of the British occupation, the island derived but little benefit from the sponge fisheries (a Government monopoly), for they were worked entirely by foreign boats which went off without giving any account of their proceedings, and only paid small licensing fees. The industry is now worked under the direction of the Government Inspector of Fisheries. He sub-lets the rights of fishing, on condition of receiving an agreed portion of sponges as Government share, usually about 33 per cent. A considerable increase in this trade has been the result, though, by reason of the good quality of the sponges, it could be developed much further, especially if the local fishermen were more ready to receive instruction. In 1915 Cyprus waters were fished by seventeen harpoon boats and seven machine boats, which procured 229,216 sponges, weighing 4,819 okes (13,463 lb.). In 1913, 6,389 lb., of the value of £4,390, were exported, of which 285 lb. went to the United Kingdom. On account of the war no sponge fishing has been possible since 1915.

(3) Minerals

In Cyprus all minerals belong to the State. The mining laws are based on the Ottoman Land Code, the Ottoman Mines Regulation Law, and the Mines Regulation Amendment Law of 1882, together with the Mines and Minerals Order of 1911. All con-

[1] *Quarterly Review*, April 1917.

cessions formerly made by Imperial decree of the Sultan are now made by the High Commissioner in writing; the functions of the various Ottoman authorities are vested in the High Commissioner in Council; all rents and royalties are payable to the island treasury for the use of the Government of the island. The Government has made many attempts to develop the mining industry, in order to lessen the dependence of Cyprus on agriculture. It compiled a list of the numerous localities in which mines were anciently worked. But as the Legislative Council refused to modify the Turkish law on the subject, fair terms for persons who wished to prospect could not be secured. The success of the working of the asbestos beds caused the Government to be inundated with applications for licences to prospect. In 1908, fifty-seven, and in 1912, twenty-one prospecting licences were issued. The list of minerals concerned comprised copper, asbestos, manganese, coal, agate, asphalt, gold, graphite, iron, iron pyrites, lead, magnesite, micaceous iron, nickel, obsidian, oil-bearing strata, pyrites, silver, and tin. Expert advice was got from Europe, and in some cases favourable reports were received, but the results so far have not been very great. Whether the ancient mineral wealth of Cyprus was exaggerated, or the ancient mines exhausted, seems uncertain. Probably the former is the more likely explanation. Dr. Oberhummer has shown that there is no historical evidence that many of the minerals in which Cyprus was reputedly rich were ever found there at all. He denies that lead or silver was ever worked, and thinks it improbable that gold was found, and has some doubts about iron. Professor Dunstan considers that nickel probably occurs in the island.

At any rate the only one of the more valuable metals which has attracted serious attention in modern times is *copper*, and even in this case the outlook is still doubtful. Most of the surface metal seems to have been worked out by the Phœnicians and Romans, and it seems doubtful if copper of sufficiently high grade to

be worth working is present in any quantity. For some years past a syndicate has endeavoured to open out the old copper mines at Lymi, near Paphos. In 1909 it was merged into a new company with new capital. In 1910 it extracted 1,000 tons of copper ore, of which 60 tons were sufficiently good to send to London. But as a whole, though the quantity was considerable, the quality was low. Prospecting operations on a considerable scale have lately been carried on by an American syndicate, the Cyprus Mines Corporation, at Katydata, near the new railway extension, and at Foucassa, near Skouriotissa; from the latter mine 730 tons of first-class ore were extracted in 1915, and a railway 4 miles long will connect the mine with Karavostasi in Morphou Bay.

Far more important than copper is *asbestos*. With the exception of Canada and South Africa, Cyprus is the only country under British rule which produces this mineral. It is only within the last ten years that the industry has received serious attention in Cyprus. In 1907 an Austrian company, the Cyprian Mining Company, of Trieste, bought a concession in the Troodos forest, and by 1913 was able to export 1,168 tons, of which only 9 cwt. went to the United Kingdom, the greater part going to Italy and Austria. In 1916 the output had increased to 1,290 tons, of the value of £14,681. As the supply is practically unlimited, it would be easy to increase the annual export five times over. The chief fault of Cypriot asbestos lies in the shortness of its fibre, but the short-fibred variety is in increasing demand for the manufacture of fireproof bricks. A superior kind has recently been discovered near Paphos.

In 1915 the Cyprus Development Company extracted from the Akamas mines, in the Paphos district, 14½ tons of *magnesite*, all of which went to England. It is reported that there is a large deposit of *sulphate of aluminium* near Levkara.

There are many *gypsum* quarries all over the island, especially in the hills near Larnaka. It is quarried for

flagstones, and is exported to be made into plaster of Paris. The export trade is almost wholly with Egypt, and attained at one time considerable dimensions. Recently, however, an inferior kind of gypsum has been found in Egypt, and this local variety has almost driven out the superior Cyprus article. Thus the exports declined from 24,209 tons in 1907 to 3,714 tons in 1913.

Salt is a Government monopoly; its sale and manufacture are regulated by the Salt Law of 1889, as amended in 1911. By the terms of the 1878 convention 4,166,229 okes (about 5,000 tons) of salt were to be sent to Turkey in addition to the tribute, but this amount appears never to have been exacted. The deposits of salt are very extensive. The produce is chiefly derived from two lakes, one south-west of Larnaka, the other west of Limassol; as they are 7 to 10 ft. below the level of the sea, the sea-water percolates into them and incrustates. The salt harvest is in August. There is great scope for the development of this industry. At present the export is very small; in 1913 only 300 tons were exported, all to Turkey. If the method of collection were improved, a better market might be found, for the salt, especially that of Larnaka, is described as excellent for both domestic and medicinal purposes.

Terra umbra is found chiefly in the Larnaka district. There is an increasing export of it to Italy (see p. 57) and to the United States. In 1913, 3,813 tons were exported, to the value of £4,100, of which only 210 tons went to the United Kingdom. There is a small export of the less important *terra verde*, which is found on the northern slopes of the Troodos range. In 1913, 5 tons, to the value of £45, were sent to Italy.

Sandstone and *limestone* are extensively quarried. All the mediæval buildings are constructed of the former material. A soft *marble* is found in the Nicosia district, and used for paving.

Oil.—The Cyprus Oil Trust, Ltd., was registered in 1910, with a capital of £20,000 (£8,052 paid up).

with a view to prospecting for oil in the island. Prospecting operations were begun, but suspended owing to the war, and on June 18, 1915, the debit to the expenditure account of the company was £2,069.

There are a fair number of *mineral springs* in the island, the waters of which are mostly sulphurous and efficacious for gout, rheumatism, and similar complaints. At Kalopanayiotis, near Levka, in the Nicosia district, are the most popular baths in Cyprus; the waters are used both internally and externally. There are also springs at Kakopetria and Pedoulas, in the same district; at Myrtou, near Kerynia; at Yioulou, near Khrysokhou, in the Paphos district; and at Treis Eliaes, near Kilani, in the Limassol district.

(4) Manufactures

Wine and Spirits.—In the last years of Turkish rule the production of wine declined. This was partly due to the injury done to grape-growers by heavy taxation and disease among the vines. Moreover, although the local consumption and the export trade to countries of the Near East were considerable, the wines were too rough to have much vogue in the West. In the process of manufacture no care was taken in selecting the grapes; the wine was allowed to ferment in open vessels, was stored in earthenware jars coated with tar, and carried to port in tarred goat-skins.

Recent attempts to revive the wine trade of Cyprus have met with much success. The burden of taxation has been redistributed and the system of collection improved. Besides taking measures to encourage the cultivation of grapes (see above, p. 37) the Department of Agriculture supervises the manufacture of large earthenware jars for the storage of wines, and induces the villagers to glaze the interiors instead of pitching them with common tar.

The wine produced is of two kinds: (1) black wine or Mavro, of the character of Burgundy, which, it is said, would, with proper treatment, equal, if not excel,

the best wines grown in France; (2) Commanderia (so called because in the Middle Ages the wine districts were part of the estates or 'commanderies' of the Military Orders). This is a wine of the character of Madeira, which, indeed, is produced from vineyards originally stocked from Cyprus. At present, the fault of Commanderia is its extreme sweetness, but it could be so treated as to rival Madeira. There is also produced in the island a very fair port. If greater pains were taken in manufacture, if larger capital were available, and if the wine were advertised systematically, as Australian wine has been, there might be a most prosperous future for this industry. A beginning has been made in the Limassol district by an English company, the Centaur Wine Company, which has set up a central factory which buys grapes from the growers for cash and makes wine on a large scale. An extension of such factories or the establishment of wineries on co-operative principles, as in South Africa, would be of great benefit to the island.

The chief customer for Cypriot wines is Egypt, but a considerable quantity goes to France and Italy. The United Kingdom receives very little. Thus in 1913, out of 1,114,519 gallons of Mavro exported, the United Kingdom took only 87,178; out of 15,430 gallons of Commanderia, only 18.

Cyprus brandy has lately been making headway, and has found its way into the English market. It is manufactured by the Centaur Company. There are two kinds of native spirit which have a considerable sale in Syria and Asia Minor, namely, *raki*, which is made of the refuse of wine, and *zuki* or *masticha*, which is flavoured with gum mastic and aniseed. There were 42 distilleries in the island in 1915.

Cyprus vinegar has also a large sale in Turkey and Egypt. In 1912, 251,881 gallons, to the value of £4,029, were exported to those countries.

Cheese.—There is a fair trade in the goats' cheese made in the island, the best of which comes from

Akanthou, on the north coast. In 1911, 182 tons, to the value of £6,618, were exported, practically all of which went to Turkey and Egypt.

Cigarettes.—There is an increasing export of cigarettes of local manufacture, and the island consumption is also very large. They are mostly made of tobacco imported specially from Macedonia, and are described as being of excellent aroma, unscented, and cheap (1*s.* to 2*s.* 6*d.* a hundred); they are becoming increasingly popular in England. In 1912, the first cigarettes made from Cypriot tobacco were put on the market, and were considered to equal in flavour the best Turkish. In 1913, 3,476 okes of cigarettes (about 9,733 lb.) were exported, to the value of £2,840, about 85 per cent. going to the United Kingdom.

Textiles.—There are water-power hand looms for the manufacture of silk and cotton stuffs in nearly every village, and at Famagusta there is a cotton mill with 600 spindles, where local cotton is converted into yarn. The calico made in the island is described as of a good and serviceable, though coarse, kind. The greater part of the textile manufactures of the island are for local consumption, the export being very small. In 1913, the value of cotton goods exported was £7,055; of woollen, £397; and of silk, £257.

Leather.—This industry includes the tanning of leather hides for boots and shoes, and of goat-skins for the transport of wine. There were 14 tanneries in the island in 1915. There is a small export trade in boots to Turkey and Egypt.

Earthenware, Tiles and Bricks.—There are several factories for making rough tiles and bricks and oil and wine jars. The most important is that at Limassol, which exports bricks of a high quality and turns out tiles which will be exported when the works are extended. Nearly all the bricks exported from Cyprus go to Egypt.

Metal Work.—Most of the metal tools and utensils required for agricultural and household purposes are locally made. A certain amount of gold and silver

filigree and hammered silver work is turned out, especially at Nicosia.

Soap.—There are two soap manufactories at Nicosia and one at Limassol.

(C) COMMERCE

(1) Domestic

There is not a large home trade except in necessaries. The standard of comfort has very greatly increased of recent years.

(*a*) *Towns, Markets, Fairs*

Nicosia (Lefkosia) is the only town of any importance except those on the coast, which have already been dealt with (see pp. 30-33). In 1911, Nicosia had a population of 16,052. It is the centre of the industries of the great central plain of the island and has manufactures of local importance, tanneries, distilleries, and flour and cotton mills, some worked by steam, others by water. It has communication by rail with Famagusta and Morphou, and is connected by good roads with Larnaka, Limassol, and Kerynia.

Apart from Nicosia and the coast towns, there is only one town (Morphou) with a population of over 3,000, and there are only six with a population of between 2,000 and 3,000.

The fair is still an important institution in Cyprus, and nearly every village has one, held on a great feast or on the festival of the patron saint. An important market is held every Friday at Nicosia, which is largely frequented by the villagers of the Mesaoria region.

(*b*) *Organizations to promote Trade and Commerce*

The important part taken by the Department of Agriculture in the development of the resources of Cyprus has already been indicated. In addition to

its other activities, the Government publishes the *Cyprus Journal*, a quarterly review of the agricultural and other industries of the island, which is issued in English, Greek, and Turkish.

There is a school of commerce for Greeks at Larnaka, and another at Lemythou, with accommodation for 60 pupils. These are private institutions.

(2) Foreign

The foreign trade of Cyprus shows fairly consistent progress, as may be seen by the following figures (which include bullion and specie):—

Year.	Exports.	Imports.	Total Value External Trade.
	£	£	£
1878	157,328	177,651	334,979
1904	488,401	472,476	960,877
1905	438,241	482,079	920,320
1906	483,956	603,054	1,087,010
1907	635,055	702,893	1,337,948
1908	653,591	618,781	1,272,372
1909	520,817	607,906	1,128,723
1910	651,068	588,480	1,239,548
1911	702,803	635,427	1,338,230
1912	789,915	706,169	1,496,084
1913	699,913	676,084	1,375,997
1914	550,239	570,050	1,120,289
1915	661,397	612,617	1,274,014

It will be noted that there has been an excess of exports over imports in five out of the last six years for which figures are given.

(*a*) *Exports*

Quantities and Values.—The exports are almost wholly of an agricultural character, those of manufactured goods being all but negligible, while of mining products only asbestos is exported in any quantity. The export of cereals is subject to violent

fluctuations according as the harvest has been good or bad. On an average, however, it may be estimated that the acreage and export of cereals have trebled since 1878. Wine, which is next in importance, has many difficulties to face, one of its chief markets, France, having almost shut it out by high duties, while in the other, Egypt, it is faced by the competition of cheap wines from Italy and Greece. Nevertheless, the export has doubled since 1878. The carob is probably the most secure item of the island's trade. Its export has enormously increased, nearly ten times as many carobs being exported in 1912 as in 1878, the value increasing from £29,971 to £251,750. The export of cotton has quadrupled in the same period, that of silk more than trebled, while that of fruit, raisins, and vegetables has become many times greater.

Countries of Destination.—Egypt is by far the most important market for the exports of the island, taking on an average not less than a third. The exports to Egypt have multiplied ten times since 1878, and include most of the cereals, live-stock, vegetables, fruit, and gypsum, and all the sesame crop. The United Kingdom is the next best customer. It takes on an average about 25 per cent. of the exports, whereas in 1878 its share was negligible (£4,934 out of £157,238). The greater part of the carob crop, much of the barley and oats, a certain number of oranges and lemons, most of the cigarettes, and all the origanum oil come to this country. France still stands third, but the growth of its trade with Cyprus has not kept pace with that of Egypt and the United Kingdom. This is partly explained by France's attitude to the wine trade. Nevertheless, France still buys nearly all the silk, aniseed and linseed, and much of the cotton. Turkey takes live-stock, spirits, salt, and sponges, but its trade with Cyprus has remained almost stationary since 1878. That of Greece, on the other hand, is ten times greater. A great deal of the cotton export goes thither. Austro-Hungarian trade has not grown so rapidly, but Austria takes most of the asbestos and

large quantities of raisins. The trade with Italy has not greatly increased since 1878, but wine, oats, asbestos, and the greater part of the *terra umbra* are sent thither. Germany had still but a small trade with Cyprus before the war, though it was slowly increasing as a result of the visits of the steamers of the Deutsche Levante Linie. There was a growing trade in raisins with Rumania.

(*b*) *Imports*

Quantities and Values.—The value of the imports into Cyprus has nearly quadrupled since 1878. With the exception of flour and such goods as tea, coffee and sugar, they consist almost entirely of manufactured goods and machinery. The industrial progress of the island and the growth of the prevalent standard of comfort are well illustrated by the details of the statistics. In 1878, the total value of imported machinery was £119. By 1904, it had risen to £7,372, and by 1913, to £26,354, the greater part representing agricultural implements, reaping machines, and the like. Manufactured goods show almost equal progress. The import of cotton goods has trebled in value since 1878, that of silk and woollen goods has increased even more. Of hardware and cutlery there is more than seven times as much imported as in 1878; of haberdashery and millinery, ten times; of coffee, five times; of flour, eight times; of tea and sugar, three times as much. There has also been a considerable increase in the import of coal, of which three times as much comes into the island as in 1878, and twice as much as ten years ago. A very similar rate of growth may be observed in the case of imports of petroleum.

Countries of Origin.—The United Kingdom furnishes by far the largest share of the imports of Cyprus; the contributor next in importance being Austria-Hungary, followed by Egypt, Turkey, and Italy. Imports from Germany were always relatively small. In 1878, the total imports from the United Kingdom

amounted to no more than £4,934 out of £177,651. During the years 1911-1913 they were nearly 30 per cent. of the whole, as the following table will show :—

Country.	Year.		
	1911.	1912.	1913.
	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.
United Kingdom and British Colonies	26·9	29·0	28·7
Austria	13·3	15·1	14·4
Turkey	12·5	12·2	10·8
Italy	12·3	11·1	10·1
Egypt	9·8	8·4	11·3
France	7·3	7·2	6·7
Greece	5·4	5·0	5·5
Germany	3·7	4·5	3·8
Other countries	8·8	7·5	8·7

The following list shows the character of the goods sent to Cyprus by the principal contributors to its import trade. The figures in parentheses show what percentage of the total imports of the commodity named was supplied by the country in question in the year 1913:—

United Kingdom.—Flour (20), fish (nearly all), manufactured cotton (80), cotton yarn (50), woollen goods (30), haberdashery and millinery (50), hardware and cutlery (20), machinery (40).

British India.—Sacks (35).

Austria-Hungary.—Raw coffee (nearly all), sugar (nearly all), woollen goods (20), haberdashery, &c. (10), hardware and cutlery (20), machinery (8), glassware (50), cigarette papers (50).

Belgium.—Iron bars (50).

Egypt.—Rice (nearly all), coal (nearly all), petroleum (30).

France.—Flour (20), butter (20), manufactured silk (25).

Germany.—Tea (15), woollen goods (15), haberdashery and millinery (10), hardware and cutlery (25), machinery (7), earthenware and china (20).
Greece.—Tobacco (80), tumbeki (50), soap (30).
Italy.—Flour (20), cotton piece goods (20), cotton yarn (30), earthenware and china (20), machinery (10).
Rumania.—Timber (25), petroleum (15).
Russia.—Petroleum (50).
Turkey.—Olive oil (all), hides and skins (nearly all), timber (75), tobacco (a little), manufactured silk (a little).

The following statistical tables appear in the Appendix (B) :—

Table I.—Principal exports.
Table II.—Export trade with principal countries.
Table III.—Principal imports.
Table IV.—Import trade with principal countries.
Table V.—Shipping returns.

(*c*) *Customs and Tariffs*

The tariff now in force is laid down in Law 22 of the year 1899. The taxes on imports are partly on an *ad valorem*, partly on a specific basis. Under the former head come such important products as earthenware, glassware, hardware, leather (except sole leather), timber, &c. The general rate is 10 per cent., except for perfumery and cartridges, which pay 20 per cent., and arms, which pay 25 per cent. Animals and live-stock, cereals, manure and fertilisers, pig-iron, silkworm eggs (under conditions), and tools and implements used in agriculture and handicrafts are, *inter alia*, admitted free of duty.

The Turkish tax on exports was abolished by the British. Wharfage dues on a specific basis are imposed, partly in place of this, partly in place of tithes.

(D) FINANCE

(1) *Public Finance*

The following figures show the revenue and expenditure of Cyprus in the years 1904-1917:—

Year (April 1 to March 31).	Revenue [1]	Expenditure.[2]
	£	£
1904–5	218,884	154,406
1905–6	238,213	159.117
1906–7	286,873	182,066
1907–8	311,810	203,029
1908–9	303,477	244,061
1909–10	309,775	251,265
1910–11	286,848	251,520
1911–12	319,572	235,526
1912–13	334,685	258,661
1913–14	341,816	296,165
1914–15	290,110	316,414
1915–16	363,692	294,318
1916–17	332,584	318,378

The amount of public debt outstanding on March 31, 1913, was £269,227.

The financial history of Cyprus since the British occupation to March 31, 1915, may be summed up as follows:—

	£	£
Revenue (exclusive of grants paid)	7,926,849	
Grants in aid from British Treasury	1,247,085	
		9,173,934
Expenditure (exclusive of share of Turkish Debt charge)	5,662,381	
Turkish Debt charge payments	3,347,538	
		9,009,919
Surplus of receipts over expenditure		164,015

[1] Excluding Imperial grants.

[2] Excluding £92,800 annually paid to Turkey in accordance with the terms of the Convention of 1878.

Surpluses of revenue over expenditure are carried forward and are available for expenditure on public works and other works of a remunerative character within the island. There is also a fixed invested Reserve Fund of £90,000, formed from surplus balances of previous years.

The chief heads of Revenue, with the figures for 1913-1914 are given below:—

	£		£
Agricultural Department	4,212	Brought forward ..	257,633
Forest revenue ..	11,278	Court receipts and stamps	13,921
Irrigation	1,070	Interest on Government moneys	10,482
Land sales	52	Post Office	8,904
Pig tax	937	Royalties	1,392
Sheep and Goat tax ..	12,524	Specific services and reimbursements ..	5,532
Tithes	98,928	Defter Hakani[1]	12,920
Customs	52,117	Verghis[2]	29,895
Excise ..	51,107	Miscellaneous ..	1,137
Port dues, &c., ..	12,037		
Railway	13,371		
Carried forward ..	257,633	Total	341,816

In the same year the chief heads of Expenditure were:—

	£		£
Agricultural Department	7,081	Brought forward ..	108,531
Audit Department ..	1,659	Legislature	726
Charges on account of Public Debt ..	12,001	Medical Department ..	11,875
Chief Secretary's Office	3,737	Pensions	7,350
Customs Department	10,617	Police Department ..	35,949
District Administration..	8,448	Postal Department ..	11,171
Education Department ..	9,026	Prisons Department ..	7,167
Forest Department ..	15,160	Public Works Department	3,462
Government Printing Office	1,927	Public Works recurrent	18,336
High Commissioner ..	3,833	Public Works extraordinary	15,637
Irrigation Department ..	1,722	Quarantine Department	736
Land Registry and Survey Departments ..	17,364	Railway Department ..	11,948
Legal Departments ..	15,956	Treasury	16,742
		Miscellaneous services..	5,458
		Surplus balances ..	41,077
Carried forward ..	108,531	Total	296,165

[1] Land registration fees. [2] Property tax.

(2) *Currency*

The monetary unit in Cyprus is the piastre (*c.p.*), equivalent to $1\frac{1}{5}d.$ or 180 to the pound sterling. The coins normally in circulation are:—

Gold.—The English sovereign is the only current coin.
Silver.—18 piastres (2 shillings), 9 piastres (1 shilling), $4\frac{1}{2}$ piastres (6*d.*), 3 piastres (4*d.*).
Copper.—1 piastre (40 paras), $\frac{1}{2}$ piastre and $\frac{1}{4}$ piastre.

The half-sovereign is not current in Cyprus, nor is English silver, but banks will buy either at a small discount. Napoleons and Turkish liras, although not legal tender, are accepted by the commercial community. There is no limit of tender for gold; for silver the limit is 540 piastres (£3); for copper, 27 piastres (3*s.*).

In 1915, the approximate value of the coins in circulation was as follows:—English gold, £300,000; other gold, £6,000; Cyprus silver, £75,000; Cyprus copper, £10,175.

There is no note currency. At the outbreak of the war, however, the shortness of gold currency was felt, and, with a view to the early clearance of the carob crop and the alleviation of the general financial stringency, it was decided to introduce a restricted note circulation. To meet the immediate demand, locally printed notes of the face value of £5 and £1, to the total value of £35,000, were issued in September, 1914, while arrangements were made for printing in England notes of the face value of £5, £1, 10*s.*, and 5*s.* Forgeries, particularly of the £1 notes, caused the notes to be demonetised at the end of June, 1915, and although at the request of the bankers and leading merchants the Government remonetised the £5, 10*s.*, and 5*s.* notes, the supply of metallic currency proved sufficient, and the small amount of paper placed in circulation has gradually been withdrawn.

(3) *Banking*

Joint-Stock Banks.—The greater part of the banking business of the island is carried on by the Imperial Ottoman Bank and the Bank of Athens, with head offices respectively at Constantinople and Athens.

The Cyprus agency of the Imperial Ottoman Bank is at Larnaka, with branch offices at Nicosia, Limassol, and Famagusta, and correspondents at Paphos and Kerynia. The bank transacts Government business, and is mainly responsible for the maintenance of the currency and of the stock of gold necessary to meet local requirements. In 1915, its deposits in the island amounted to £73,010, of which £27,680 represented Government accounts.

The Bank of Athens has its head agency at Limassol and sub-agencies at Nicosia, Larnaka, Famagusta, and Paphos. In 1915, its deposits in the island amounted to £23,382.

Both these banks transact banking and commercial business of every description. In addition, each runs a savings bank, the Imperial Ottoman Bank paying 2 per cent. on deposits, and the Bank of Athens 4 per cent.

The only local bank of any importance is the Bank of Cyprus, which was established under the sanction of the High Commissioner. Its headquarters are at Nicosia, and it has agencies at Larnaka, Limassol, Famagusta, Paphos, Kerynia, and Morphou. In 1915, its paid-up capital was £54,568, and its deposits in the island amounted to £28,194.

Credit Institutions.—These comprise the Agricultural Bank and the Village Co-operative Banks. By the Agricultural Bank Law of 1890, the High Commissioner was given power to enter into an agreement with a banking establishment to create an agricultural bank; but it was not till 1907 that such a bank commenced operations. In accordance with the agreement between the Government and the Anglo-Egyptian Allotment Company, the capital of the bank

was to be not less than £100,000. Its chief business is to make advances to persons or firms engaged in agriculture or other industries on the security of immovable property, stock, &c., the rate of interest not to exceed 9 per cent. The advantages offered by this bank have been much appreciated, and it has done a good deal to free the agricultural classes from the grip of the usurer. Its headquarters are at Famagusta.

Village banks worked on the Raiffeisen system were tentatively established in the Paphos district on the initiative of the District Commissioner about the year 1903. They worked so well that it was decided to extend the system throughout the island. By the Co-operative Credit Societies Law of 1914 any town, village, or group of villages may obtain the incorporation of a society of twelve or more persons, who must be engaged in agriculture and hold at least two *donums* (about two-thirds of an acre) of land each. Such a society can obtain loans from the Government and lend to its members, or supply them with seed, implements and other requisites of agriculture. The first certificate of registration under this law was granted in 1915 to two villages. That of Vatile has established a credit society of sixteen members with a capital of £300, and has been granted a loan of £250 by the Loan Commissioners. Five more societies were registered in 1916.

Government Savings Banks.—The Government Savings Bank Law of 1900 gives authority for the establishment of such banks under the general management of the Receiver-General of the island, the branch offices to be under the commissioners of districts. There are now six of these banks, of which the first were opened in 1903. Interest of 2½ per cent. is paid on deposits (the maximum of deposit being £300), and the banks are guaranteed by the State. It cannot be said that these banks have proved a success. On December 31, 1916, the deposits numbered only 217, the sum deposited during the year amounting to £10,259 and the withdrawals to £3,806, leaving a

balance of £6,453. Of the small number of depositors, practically all were public officials, with a few ladies, servants, &c. The reason for this failure is the small rate of interest. Private savings banks give 6 per cent. to depositors, while money can be lent with tolerable security on mortgage at 9 per cent.

Other Savings Banks.—The Savings Banks of the Imperial Ottoman Bank and of the Bank of Athens are mentioned above. There are also several local savings banks, some of which, *e.g.*, the Caisse d'Epargne La Nicosia, have developed much, and a considerable amount of commercial business is transacted by them.

(E) GENERAL REMARKS

The economic progress of Cyprus has been retarded by want of capital and by bad or uncertain means of communication. The want of capital may in great part be traced to the disinclination of British and foreign capitalists to risk their money in an island whose political position was so uncertain. Cyprus was still part of the Turkish Empire, and might at any time be restored to the direct administration of the Sultan. The heavy payment out of the revenues of the island under the Convention of 1878 might easily have been capitalised, and Cyprus would have been saved some £30,000 to £40,000 a year. But the British Government was prevented from acquiescing in this course by the uncertainty of the island's political status. In the same way the establishment of an agricultural bank, though even more necessary than in Egypt to free the peasants from the clutches of the usurers, was delayed for many years because in the circumstances the Government did not feel itself in a position to give a guarantee. The payment under the Convention affected the economic development in another way, namely, by retarding the inception or progress of public works in the island. The revenue of the island did not suffice to cover both its own internal expenditure on the scale required for civilised

government, and the payment in respect of Turkish claims; and the deficit had to be made up by the British Treasury. Every year discussions took place between the High Commissioner, the Colonial Office, and the Treasury as to reducing the deficit. Until Mr. Chamberlain became Colonial Secretary it was assumed that this object could only be achieved by reducing expenditure; but to his foresight was due a new policy of spending wisely on the public works necessary to progress. The island owes to him the harbour of Famagusta, the railway to Nicosia, the establishment of weekly steamship communication with Egypt, the island's chief customer, and the definite initiation of irrigation schemes on a large scale. As the island is dependent for the prosperity of its agriculture on a good supply of water, and the rainfall averages only 15 or 16 inches per annum, it is obvious that irrigation is of vital importance, if as yet not wholly successful.

In 1907, a new advance was made by the giving of a fixed grant in aid of £50,000 a year, thereby putting a stop to the discussions mentioned above and to a system by which, in the words of the High Commissioner of the day, 'the resources of the island were annually and absolutely depleted in order that as much as possible of the tribute might be paid from local revenues, and however much the local Treasury might benefit from legislative action, wise administration, or bountiful harvests, no increase of expenditure for the profit and improvement of the island accrued thereby.'

Although the United Kingdom still has the greatest share of the imports and takes the second place in the exports, it appears that British firms have altogether failed to realise the possibilities of the island. There is the usual complaint that foreign commercial travellers visit Cyprus and study the economic needs of the people, but that representatives of British firms do not. This is partly accounted for by the absence of a direct steamship service between Cyprus and England, and the excessively heavy freight charges

consequent on this. The effects of direct communication may be seen in the vast development in the trade of Cyprus with Egypt, which followed the establishment of a weekly service of steamers between them.

As to future developments, the possibilities have been indicated in the sections devoted to the different products of the island. To sum up: the growing of cereal crops is not likely to develop much further except through the adoption of new methods of cultivation. The wine trade, so far as the West is concerned, might possibly be increased by means of advertisement, if the improvement in the process of manufacture be continued; but it is probable that the wine will always remain more to the taste of the East. The trade in raisins, on the other hand, ought to expand very greatly, for they are among the finest in existence. Of the other agricultural products, the carob is the only one which has received serious attention in England. Insufficient notice has been taken in this country of the possibilities of the cotton and silk industries, of the fruit and vegetable trade, and of the valuable tanning and dyeing materials and essential oils which the plants of Cyprus afford. It has been indicated that the mineral resources of the island have probably been exaggerated. But in the minor mineral products, such as asbestos, gypsum, and, above all, salt, a considerable trade is possible.

APPENDIX

(A) DOCUMENTS

I

The Cyprus Convention, June 4, 1878

The Convention of Defensive Alliance between Great Britain and Turkey with respect to the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey, signed at Constantinople on June 4, 1878, commonly called the Cyprus Convention, runs as follows:—

Article I. 'If Batoum, Ardahan, Kars or any of them shall be retained by Russia, and if any attempt shall be made at any future time by Russia to take possession of further territories of H.I.M. the Sultan in Asia as fixed by the Definitive Treaty[1] of Peace, England engages to join H.I.M. the Sultan in defending them by force of arms.

'In return, H.I.M. the Sultan promises to England to introduce necessary reforms, to be agreed upon later between the two Powers, into the Government and for the protection of the Christian and other subjects of the Porte in those territories. And in order to enable England to make necessary provision for executing her engagements, H.I.M. the Sultan further consents to assign the Island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England.'

II

Annexe to the same, July 1, 1878

On July 1, 1878, an Annexe to the Convention was agreed to in the following terms:—

'1. That a Mussulman Religious Tribunal (Mahkemé-i-Sherieh) shall continue to exist in the island which will take exclusive cognizance of religious matters, and no others, concerning the Mussulman population of the island.

'2. That a Mussulman resident in the island shall be named by the Board of Pious Foundations in Turkey (Evqaf) to superin-

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[1] Treaty of Peace between Russia and Turkey signed at Constantinople January 27 (February 8), 1878.

tend, in conjunction with a Delegate to be appointed by the British Authorities, the administration of the property, funds, and lands belonging to mosques, cemeteries, Mussulman schools, and other religious establishments existing in Cyprus.

'3. That England will pay to the Porte whatever is the present excess of revenue over expenditure in the island, the excess to be calculated upon and determined by the average of the last five years.' (Stated to be 22,936 purses to be duly verified hereafter, and to the exclusion of the produce of State and Crown lands let or sold during that period.)

'4. (This article, which empowered the Sublime Porte to sell and lease lands, &c., in Cyprus belonging to the Ottoman Crown and State, the produce of which did not form part of the revenue of the island referred to in Article 3, was abandoned by the Porte under a supplementary Convention dated February 3, 1879, in return for a payment of £5,000 per annum.)

'5. That the English Government through their competent authorities may purchase compulsorily at a fair price land required for public purposes, and land which is not cultivated.

'6. That, if Russia restores to Turkey Kars and the other conquests made by her in Armenia during the last war, the island of Cyprus will be evacuated by England and the Convention of June 4, 1878, will be at an end.'

III

Order in Council (Annexation), November 5, 1914

THE CYPRUS GAZETTE

(Extraordinary)

Nicosia,

5th November, 1914.

ORDER IN COUNCIL

By the King

Whereas by virtue of the Convention of Defensive Alliance between Her Majesty Queen Victoria and His Imperial Majesty the Sultan signed June the fourth, 1878, the Annexe to the said Convention signed on July the first, 1878, and the Agreement signed on behalf of Her Majesty and His Imperial Majesty the Sultan on August the fourteenth 1878 His Imperial Majesty the Sultan assigned the island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England upon the terms and conditions specified in the said Convention, Annexe, and Agreement.

And Whereas by reason of the outbreak of War between His Majesty and His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, the said Convention, Annexe, and Agreement have become annulled and are no longer of any force or effect.

And Whereas it has, for the reasons hereinbefore appearing, seemed expedient to His Majesty that the said island should be annexed to and should form part of His Majesty's dominions, in order that proper provision may be made for the Government and protection of the said island:

Now Therefore, His Majesty is pleased by and with the advice of his Privy Council to order, and it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. From and after the date hereof the said island shall be annexed to and form part of His Majesty's dominions and the said island is annexed accordingly.

2. Nothing in this order shall affect the validity of any instructions issued by His Majesty under the Royal Sign Manual and Signet to the High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief of Cyprus or of any Order in Council affecting Cyprus or of any law or Proclamation passed or issued under any such instructions or order, or of any act or thing done under any such instructions, order, law, or proclamation save in so far as any provision of any such Order in Council, law, or proclamation may be repugnant to the provisions of any Act of Parliament which may, by reason of the annexation hereby declared, become extended to Cyprus, or to any order or regulation made under the authority of any such Act, or having in Cyprus the force and effect of any such Act.

3. His Majesty may from time to time revoke, alter, add to or amend this Order.

4. This Order may be cited as the Cyprus (Annexation) Order in Council, 1914.

And the Right Honourable Lewis Harcourt, one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, is to give the necessary directions herein accordingly.

IV

Proclamation as to Citizenship, &c., November 5, 1914

BY THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

A PROCLAMATION

Hamilton Goold-Adams,
High Commissioner.

Whereas by an Order of His Majesty the King in Council dated this 5th day of November, 1914, the island of Cyprus was annexed to and declared to form part of His Majesty's Dominions, now I, Hamilton John Goold-Adams, Major in the

Reserve of Officers of His Majesty's Army, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George, Companion of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, His Majesty's High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief in and over the island of Cyprus, do hereby proclaim that under and by virtue of the said Order in Council the following provisions have effect:—

1. Ottoman subjects born in Cyprus and now resident in Cyprus are British subjects.

2. Ottoman subjects not born in Cyprus who are now resident in Cyprus are allowed one year from the date of this Proclamation within which to leave Cyprus. Ottoman subjects mentioned in this paragraph who do not leave Cyprus within the said period of one year will on the expiration of the said period be British subjects.

Given in Nicosia this 5th day of November, 1914.

GOD SAVE THE KING

V

PROCLAMATION AS TO CITIZENSHIP (REVOKING IV), MARCH 3, 1915

THE CYPRUS GAZETTE

(Extraordinary)

Thursday, 4th March, 1915.

BY THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

A PROCLAMATION

John E. Clauson,

High Commissioner.

Whereas by the Cyprus (Annexation) Order in Council, 1914, the island of Cyprus was annexed to and declared to form part of His Majesty's Dominions.

Now, I, John Eugene Clauson, Major in the Reserve of Officers of the Corps of Royal Engineers, Knight Commander of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, Commander of the Royal Victorian Order, His Majesty's High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief in and over the island of Cyprus, do hereby proclaim that under and by virtue of the said Order in Council the following provisions have effect:

1. All Ottoman subjects resident in Cyprus on the 5th November, 1914, have become British subjects.

2. Any Ottoman subject resident in Cyprus on the 5th November, 1914, desiring to retain Ottoman nationality may by notice under his hand addressed to the High Commissioner elect to do so within one month of the coming into operation of this Proclamation: and any such person electing so to do must leave Cyprus within two months after the date of his election and take up his residence elsewhere, failing which he will be treated as a British subject.

3. Nothing in this Proclamation contained shall be deemed to affect the position of the Ottoman subjects born in Cyprus and resident elsewhere on the 5th November, 1914, with regard to whom a further Proclamation will be issued in due course.

4. This Proclamation shall come into operation on the 4th March, 1915.

5. The Proclamation by the High Commissioner dated the 5th November, 1914, and published in the *Cyprus Gazette* (Extraordinary) dated the 5th November, 1914, is hereby revoked.

Given in Nicosia the 3rd day of March, 1915.

GOD SAVE THE KING

By His Excellency's Command.

C. W. ORR,

Chief Secretary to Government

(B) TABLES

TABLE I.—QUANTITIES AND VALUES OF PRINCIPAL ARTICLES EXPORTED

——		1910.	1911.	1912.	1913.
Asbestos ..	Tons	435	713	764	1,168
	£	2,754	5,126	6,264	9,704
Carobs	Tons	1,824	2,567	3,182	2,249
	£	145,590	182,883	251,750	179,027
Cheese	Tons	167	182	166	185
	£	6,564	6,624	7,203	9,268
Coal	Tons	..	..	20	980
	£	..	..	40	1,917
Cotton, raw ..	Tons	360	350	690	672
	£	24,538	22,593	40,085	40,693
Fruit, raisins ..	Tons	3,149	2,680	3,128	3,972
	£	34,639	29,636	31,940	39,002
,, other kinds	£	20,136	31,760	29,815	31,510
Grain, barley ..	Bushels	541,548	550,797	510,840	320,067
	£	52,624	56,415	60,882	37,747
,, oats ..	Bushels	129,582	83,488	71,310	37,331
	£	8,783	5,793	5,894	3,704
,, wheat ..	Bushels	44,240	1,055	77,760	88,017
	£	9,215	253	2,812	17,661
Gypsum ..	Tons	6,496	8,567	4,974	3,714
	£	3,654	4,777	2,812	2,043
Hides and skins ..	Tons	116	106	100	97
	£	13,873	10,735	11,771	14,120
Linseed ..	Tons	267	225	162	284
	£	2,923	3,402	2,169	3,039
Live stock, oxen ..	Head	4,240	9,664	5,751	3,017
	£	20,218	44,871	34,303	20,110
Silk cocoons, in-	Tons	57	75	57	64
cluding waste	£	23,149	27,775	20,241	29,102
Spirits of all kinds	Gallons	72,915	67,023	59,069	72,732
	£	6,042	6,409	5,525	8,187

——		1910.	1911.	1912.	1913.
Vegetables ..	£	7,706	14,106	14,142	9,889
Wine, Commanderia	Gallons	20,539	21,405	16,798	15,430
	£	1,201	1,334	985	1,177
Wine, other kinds	Gallons	960,621	1,451,779	1,310,454	1,114,519
	£	26,618	52,351	44,370	41,883
Wool	Tons	329	276	230	235
	£	15,203	13,452	11,362	12,181
Bullion and specie ..	£	139,227	76,246	60,427	79,322

In 1914 the exports of merchandise were valued at £496,776; of bullion and specie at £53,463.

In 1915 the exports of merchandise were valued at £650,490; of bullion and specie at £53,463.

In 1916 the exports of merchandise were valued at £708,446.

TABLE II.—EXPORTS: PRINCIPAL DESTINATIONS

——	1910.	1911.	1912.	1913.
	£	£	£	£
Egypt	252,975	260,749	292,433	278,715
United Kingdom ..	138,839	169,347	242,255	120,713
British Possessions	994	1,767	8,818	6,249
France	66,019	88,279	64,592	91,424
Turkish Empire ..	94,759	85,109	55,406	59,860
Greece	18,398	22,059	41,916	40,511
Austria-Hungary ..	30,786	23,817	27,348	25,985
Italy	12,017	17,859	16,148	14,312
Germany ..	6,090	9,180	11,648	4,564
United States ..	1,175	1,224	2,157	1,968
Belgium ..	430	297	101	806
Russia	106	68	15	
Other countries ..	28,480	23,048	26,578	54,785
Total exports (including bullion and specie).	651,068	702,803	789,415	699,913

TABLE III.—QUANTITIES AND VALUES OF PRINCIPAL IMPORTS

——		1910.	1911.	1912.	1913.
Beer and ale	Doz. bottles	5,175	6,025	6,564	6,825
	Gallons	5,906	14,153	16,322	11,979
	£	1,601	2,485	2,510	2,606
Butter, including butter substitutes	Tons	138	132	122	149
	£	10,189	9,876	9,678	11,324
Cigarette paper ..	£	1,881	1,839	2,998	2,082
Coal	Tons	3,080	2,254	4,140	4,359
	£	4,195	3,053	4,634	7,712
Coffee, raw	Tons	203	189	203	230
	£	9,597	12,366	15,268	14,799
Cotton yarn and thread	Tons	176	363	406	254
	£	15,448	33,111	38,533	29,551
Cotton fabrics ..	£	37,698	64,673	87,902	65,402
Earthen and china wares, including bricks and tiles	£	4,044	4,859	9,114	3,621
Fish, dried, salted, except in tins	£	5,972	4,499	6,074	6,425
Flour and meal (wheaten)	Tons	4,965	5,749	1,654	2,756
	£	57,256	61,924	18,557	33,887
Glassware	£	6,159	4,758	5,561	7,425
Grain, rice	Tons	999	958	835	910
	£	9,467	9,754	10,480	10,028
„ wheat ..	Bushels	9,582	14,669	4,183	207
	£	1,844	3,462	951	51
Haberdashery and millinery	£	11,581	13,280	14,082	13,181
Hardware and cutlery	£	2,220	3,297	3,872	4,194
Hides and skins ..	£	1,221	2,364	2,400	3,620
Iron and steel, unmanufactured (including iron bars, rods, joists, &c.)	£	5,440	5,246	6,319	7,206
Leather, sole ..	Tons	109	132	191	132
	£	12,935	16,224	23,267	23,047
Machinery (including parts)	£	11,260	14,424	18,666	26,354
Oil, olive	Tons	177	30	2½	47
	£	17,232	1,415	88	2,052
„ petroleum ..	Gallons	402,809	596,540	395,084	525,498
	£	12,540	17,874	14,110	21,106
Sacks	No.	204,638	275,530	346,292	298,061
	£	5,926	8,248	11,015	10,666
Silk manufactures (including thread)	£	3,791	4,996	6,133	6,345

——		1910.	1911.	1912.	1913.
Soap	Tons	501	532	517	453
	£	15,371	16,790	16,176	14,910
Stores, Government and Military	£	17,690	15,771	17,929	31,312
Sugar	Tons	1,428	1,429	1,612	1,744
	£	24,568	23,297	29,741	25,608
Tea	Lbs.	21,619	19,569	22,128	22,254
	£	1,006	939	1,015	1,049
Tobacco, unmanufactured (including tumbeki)	Tons	227	210	263	248
	£	20,373	19,125	24,120	22,126
Wood and timber ..	£	25,023	14,776	26,700	22,108
Woollen manufactures (including yarn and thread)	£	20,867	26,263	30,054	26,566
Bullion and specie ..	£	95,638	88,416	104,692	55,807

In 1914 the imports of merchandise were valued at £496,744; of bullion and specie at £73,306.

In 1915 the imports of merchandise were valued at £588,019 of bullion and specie at £24,598.

In 1916 the imports of merchandise were valued at £967,780.

TABLE IV.—IMPORTS: PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN

——	1910.	1911.	1912.	1913.
	£	£	£	£
United Kingdom ..	118,203	144,481	169,277	176,755
British Possessions ..	2,116	3,142	5,876	6,196
Egypt	149,882	137,257	147,823	114,440
Austria-Hungary ..	67,237	73,029	91,031	89,385
Turkish Empire ..	100,007	71,837	79,079	72,363
Italy .. .	32,883	67,362	67,073	62,377
France	43,350	39,972	44,143	41,898
Greece	27,050	28,836	31,188	34,352
Germany	15,084	20,326	27,202	23,617
Belgium	9,994	9,722	9,594	14,238
Russia	7,628	11,161	7,416	14,193
United States ..	1,146	8,118	3,725	4,132
Other countries ..	13,900	20,184	22,742	21,199
Total imports (including bullion and specie)	588,480	635,427	706,169	675,145

TABLE V.—NUMBER AND NATIONALITY OF VESSELS (OTHER THAN THOSE ENGAGED IN COASTING TRADE) ENTERED AND CLEARED AT PORTS OF CYPRUS IN 1913

Flag.	Entered.		Cleared.	
	Number.	Tonnage.	Number.	Tonnage.
Turkish	452	14,707	453	15,062
British..	77	90,163	78	91,373
„ (Cypriot) ..	134	3,813	137	3,587
Greek	64	12,451	66	12,740
Austrian	55	110,411	55	110,421
Italian	43	38,463	39	37,224
French	24	54,655	24	54,655
German	6	9,917	6	9,917
Norwegian	5	6,422	5	6,422
Rumanian	3	3,361	2	1,935
Swedish	2	2,759	2	2,759
Danish..	2	1,905	2	1,905
Russian	2	1,516	2	1,516
Dutch	1	755	1	755
Total	870	351,298	872	350,271

Of vessels engaged in coasting trade, 2,179 (tonnage 448,136) entered ports of the island, and 2,197 (tonnage 446,465) cleared.

TABLE VI.—AGRICULTURE: QUANTITIES OF CROPS PRODUCED

——	1902.	1905.	1908.
Wheat, bushels	869,629	2,366,237	2,477,755
Barley „	1,332,210	2,888,642	2,532,797
Oats „	228,535	389,294	369,982
Cotton, lbs.	390,673	782,712	1,844,945

——	1910.	1911.	1912.
Wheat, bushels	2,103,121	2,218,774	2,176,497
Barley ,, ...	2,056,582	2,142,954	1,713,653
Oats ,, ...	499,374	479,070	366,509
Cotton, lbs.	2,438,817	3,455,724	3,648,274

NOTE.—In the year 1902 occurred the worst drought known in the recent history of the island.

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Maps

Cyprus is comprised in one sheet (Beirut, I. 36) of the International Map (G.S.G.S., No. 2758), published by the War Office, on the scale of 1:1,000,000.

The island was surveyed in 1882 by Captain H. H. Kitchener R.E., and a map on the scale of 1:63,360 (one inch to a mile) was published in 1885 by E. Stanford, Limited.

Another map, on the scale of 1:348,480, based on the one-inch map, but with the roads and railways brought up to a recent date is also published by Stanford.

There is a geological map, also on the scale of 1:348,480, by C. V. Bellamy, F.G.S., published in 1905.

PEACE HANDBOOKS.

The following is a complete list of the Handbooks prepared under the General Editorship of Sir George W. Prothero, late Director of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office.

Net Prices are given of all Volumes which have been published to date. Volumes X–XXV will be issued shortly.

*Books marked thus * contain sections on Geography and Economics as well as on History. Those marked thus § contain Geography and History only.*

(A) EUROPE.

Vol. I. Austria-Hungary (1).

New Nos.	Old Nos.		
1	(1)	History of Austria	2*s.* 6*d.*
	(2)	History of Hungary	
	(3)	Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary ...	
2	(4)	Bohemia* and Moravia*	2*s.* 6*d.*
3	(6)	Slovakia*	1*s.* 0*d.*
4	(4*a*)	Austrian Silesia*	1*s.* 0*d.*
5	(5)	Bukovina*	1*s.* 0*d.*
6	(7)	Transylvania* and the Banat*	2*s.* 0*d.*
7	(8)	Hungarian Ruthenia*	0*s.* 6*d.*

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ANATOLIA

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1920

Editorial Note.

In the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connection with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous enquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,
General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

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I. GEOGRAPHY, PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL

(1) Position and Frontiers

The name Anatolia (Turkish "Anadolu") is derived from the Greek word Ἀνατολή ("Sunrise," "East") which was used in the later Byzantine period to describe the Greek territories in Asia. In this ancient sense, the southern boundary of Anatolia was the Taurus Range, whose eastern portion was for long the frontier between the Byzantine and the Arab territories. By the Turks of to-day the name "Anadolu" is used in two different senses. Occasionally it covers the whole of the Ottoman possessions in Asia, and sometimes even Persia in addition, but commonly it means the peninsula of Asia Minor, up to an indeterminate line between the Gulf of Alexandretta and the Black Sea. It is in the latter sense that "Anatolia" is now generally understood by Europeans. In this volume Anatolia is treated as consisting of the sanjaks of Ismid and Bigha, and the vilayets of Brusa, Aidin (or Smyrna), Kastamuni, Angora, Konia, and Adana, as they were constituted before the war.[1] The area is about 158,500 square miles.

(2) Surface, Coasts, River System, and Lakes

Surface and Coasts

Anatolia consists of a lofty oblong central plateau, bordered on the north, the west, and the south by a

[1] From the standpoint of the ethnologist, the eastern half of the vilayet of Adana might on good grounds be included in Armenia, but for the sake of clearness it has been thought advisable to deal with the whole province in a single book. For the same reason the vilayets of Trebizond and Sivas are treated as wholly belonging to Armenia (No. 62 of this series), though parts of them might justifiably be regarded as falling under Anatolia.

rim of mountains, on the outer slopes of which is a fringe of coastland. The plateau is about 3,000 to 4,000 feet above sea level, and its surface is mainly composed of limestone, folded into ridges or penetrated by volcanic cones. The mountain rim is mostly of considerable breadth. On the north and south it is formed of chains parallel to the coast, the outermost of which generally fall abruptly to the sea.

On the west, however, the mountains slope gradually down to the coast for a hundred miles, and are separated from each other by river valleys, which provide avenues of communication between the coast and the interior.

It follows from the configuration of the land that the main routes across Anatolia have always been aligned roughly from west to east. The region, in fact, forms a natural bridge between the Balkan Peninsula and the interior of Asia, and has been used as such by merchants and soldiers from time immemorial. But there has never been much traffic between the Anatolian plateau and the north and south coasts.

The coastal region and the region of the interior present a sharp contrast. The first has more in common with southern Europe than with Asia. The second, in its surface, vegetation, and climate, betrays the fact that it is a western continuation of the mountains and steppes of Central Asia. The highlands of Asia Minor and those of Central Asia are practically identical in character; they consist alike of arid plains, studded with oases and salt lakes into which sluggish rivers flow, and fringed by mountains with parallel folds. The Anatolian Peninsula has been aptly described as "a bit of Asia set in a European littoral."

The central plateau may be divided, for the purpose of description, into three parts: (1) the Phrygian mountain region; (2) the Lycaonian steppe; and (3) the Galatian uplands.

1. The Phrygian mountain region extends from about the longitude of Ushak to about thirty miles east of Afium Karahissar, and is, indeed, continued to the

neighbourhood of Konia by the ridges which succeed the Sultan Dagh on the south-east. Though the mountains seldom rise to a great height above the general level of the plateau, they constitute a serious obstacle to traffic between the west coast and the regions next to be described, and the routes through them are few and devious.

2. The Lycaonian steppe stretches from the Phrygian Mountains on the west to the neighbourhood of Kaisari on the east, and from the Taurus Range on the south to the Tuz Geul on the north. This plain, which contains large tracts of salt desert, is for the most part extraordinarily flat, but is varied by a number of isolated mountains, almost all of which are volcanic cones. Along the southern fringe of the steppe, wherever there is water for irrigation, there is a considerable amount of cultivation; elsewhere the plain gives a bare subsistence to cattle and sheep.

3. The Galatian uplands border the Lycaonian steppe on the north, continuing upwards to the mountain rim, and stretching from Eskishehir on the west to Sivas on the east, beyond the limits of Anatolia as defined in this book. This region, although generally classed with the steppe, is quite distinct from it in character, and consists of a series of bare rounded downs, intersected by cultivated valleys.

The coastal region falls into three zones: (1) the Black Sea or Pontic zone; (2) the Ægean zone; (3) the zone of Karamania or the South Coast.

1. The Black Sea or Pontic zone comprises the mountain country, 60-90 miles in width, lying between the Black Sea, with the eastern part of the Sea of Marmara, and the central Anatolian plateau. The mountains are broken through by transverse valleys only at a few points. On the north, they generally fall sheer down to the sea; but small alluvial plains border the coast here and there, and the Peninsula of Bithynia is a plateau of no great height. Of the valleys, only those running parallel to the coast afford room for cultivation and facilities for communication.

The whole of the Pontic area is well wooded, and rich in minerals. The coast, however, is singularly lacking in natural harbours.

2. The western coastal zone is, in extent and importance, much the most considerable of the three. Its northern portion extends from the Dardanelles to the Phrygian mountain region, and from the western half of the Sea of Marmara to the northern rim of the Hermus basin, comprising the ancient Troas and Mysia. It is characterised by rugged mountains in the east, and by lower ranges, separated by fertile plains and valleys, in the centre and west.

The region south of Mysia takes its character from the great river valleys of the Hermus (Gediz Chai) and Maeander (Mendere), along which lie the historic routes from the west coast to the central plateau, *via* Afium Karahissar and Dineir. Between the parallel valleys of the Hermus and Maeander lies the smaller valley of the Cayster (Kuchuk Mendere). All these river valleys are fertile, and the whole district is economically one of the most valuable in the Near East.

The west coast of Anatolia is deeply indented, and has many sheltered gulfs and bays which are suitable for harbours.

3. The south coast zone consists mainly of the Taurus Range, which is for the most part a plateau lying at a height of 6,000 to 9,000 feet above sea-level. On its southern side it has a steep scarp, which generally falls sharply to the shore, but leaves room for a few alluvial deltas and the fertile plains of Pamphylia and Cilicia. The coast has several good natural harbours.

River System

Apart from the torrents which drain the outward slopes of the coastal mountains, the rivers of Anatolia either break through the mountain rim to the sea, or flow inwards to form marshes or lakes on the central plateau. The most considerable of the latter are the Akar Chai, east of Afium Karahissar, and the Charshembe Su, south of Konia.

The most important rivers of the north are the Kizil Irmak and the Sakaria, both of which have winding courses and drain large areas. On the west, the valleys of the Hermus and the Maeander are rich and populous regions. The chief southern rivers are the Sihun and the Jihun, which flow from the northern slope of the Taurus into the Gulf of Alexandretta. The lower courses of these two rivers open out into a delta region which is one of the most fertile districts in Anatolia, and contains the important town of Adana.

With these exceptions, the southern rivers are mostly mountain torrents, only useful for such purposes as floating timber and supplying power for mills.

Lakes

Anatolia contains many extensive lakes, the largest being the great salt lake Tuz Geul, in the desert tract to the north-east of Konia. Other considerable stretches of water are Beyshehir Geul and Egerdir Geul, to the west of the chain of the Sultan Dagh, and Akshehir Geul, to the east of that range.

Another lake district exists to the north-west of Anatolia, in the region of Brusa. The chief lakes here are Isnik Geul and Abulliond (Apollonia) Geul.

(3) Climate

In Asia Minor, three climatic regions, which differ widely from one another, are to be distinguished: (1) the north coast or Pontic province, with a moisture-laden atmosphere all the year round; (2) the central plateau, characterised by aridity throughout the year; (3) the west and south coasts, with a climate of the Mediterranean type.

1. In the Pontic climatic province, which includes the edge of the Black Sea and of the Sea of Marmara, moist northerly winds are constant, blowing in summer towards Mesopotamia, and in winter towards the Ægean and the Levant. In summer the temperature

in this area is not very high, but the weather is damp and sultry. The winter is damp and cold, and very snowy. The rainfall decreases considerably from east to west.

2. The climate of the central plateau runs to extremes. The winters are cold, with snow and severe frost; the summers dry, with clear skies, intensely hot days and cool nights. For the latitude, the mean annual temperature is low. The winter temperature varies much with the locality; in valleys and depressions it is much lower than on hillsides or plains at the same level above the sea. The prevailing north winds discharge their moisture on the Pontic area, and the rainfall on the plateau is small, except in districts lying near the mountain rim. The Phrygian mountain district, for instance, has a good deal of rain, which reaches it from the south and west. The wettest season on the plateau as a whole is spring, though in early summer violent thunderstorms and hail attack districts near the mountain rim. Towards the south and south-east, as the depression of Mesopotamia is approached, the spring and autumn rains are replaced by winter rains, and the heat in summer increases. The greater part of the central plateau has an annual rainfall of 8-14 inches (20-35 cm.).

3. Mediterranean climatic conditions prevail in the coastal areas of the west and south. In winter there are damp south and west winds, accompanied by a mild temperature and a copious rainfall, which enables the vegetation to survive the intense summer heat. In summer north winds prevail, which are very hot and dry when they reach the south coast.

The weather of Anatolia has an important effect on the soil. The fact that the seasons of heat and of moisture do not coincide retards the disintegration of the rock, and soil is formed slowly. On the other hand, in consequence of the violence of rainstorms, there is much erosion. Thus deforestation, or the neglect of cultivation, often leads to an extensive wastage of the available soil.

(4) Sanitary Conditions

The principal disease to which Europeans in Anatolia are liable is malaria. It is common in the low-lying portions of the west and south coasts, but comparatively rare on the central plateau, except in the neighbourhood of swamps. Europeans, especially those new to the country, suffer also from diarrhœa and occasionally from dysentery.

Outside malarious districts, conditions are generally healthy for Europeans. Precautions must, however, be taken against the sharp and sudden changes of temperature which occur everywhere in spring and autumn, and on the central plateau also in summer, and against such risks as are inevitably encountered in a country where scientific sanitation is unknown. Whether immigrants from northern Europe could be permanently acclimatised, and retain their vigour, is doubtful.

As regards the natives, malaria, tuberculosis, and syphilis are the chief diseases. Typhoid, smallpox, and rheumatism are also common, and epidemics of cholera and bubonic plague occur from time to time. The personal cleanliness enjoined by Islam, the healing power of the dry atmosphere, and the custom, almost universal in hot districts, of moving into *yailas* (tents or high-lying villages) in summer, do much to counteract the effects of the general filth.

(5) Race and Language

Religion and language rather than race, form the political and social dividing lines in Anatolia. The vast majority of the population is Moslem in religion, and the common language, for Moslem and Christian, is Turkish. Most of the Greeks, the Armenians, and the Kurds speak their own language as well, and the Turcoman and Yuruk nomads retain their ancient dialects, which are thought to resemble very closely the speech of the original Turkish conquerors of the country. But the character of these and other elements in the heterogeneous population of Anatolia cannot be

explained without constant reference to their history and religious institutions, and all these topics are accordingly discussed together in Parts II and III of this Handbook.

(6) Population

The distribution of settlements in Anatolia is conditioned by the character of the country, with its large uncultivable tracts surrounding and isolating patches of fertile soil. Villages crowd on each other in the most favourable places, widely separated from other groups by mountain or desert. Except on the coast, most of the towns and villages consist of one-storey or two-storey houses, sometimes crowded so closely together that the roof of one house is the area of the next, but sometimes surrounded by extensive gardens. There are no trustworthy statistics regarding the population of Anatolia, but the following figures may be taken as approximate for 1914:—

Vilayet.	Population.	Vilayet.	Population.
Constantinople (Asiatic side)	240,000	Angora	932,800
Ismid	222,700	Kastamuni	961,200
Brusa	1,626,800	Sivas	1,057,100
Bigha	129,500	Adana	422,400
Smyrna	2,500,000	Trebizond	1,265,000
Konia	1,069,000	Total	10,426,900

Since 1914 the whole population has suffered serious losses through war, and the Greeks and Armenians have undergone repeated persecution; while, to complicate matters further, there has been a considerable influx of Moslem refugees from Europe.

The Christian inhabitants of Anatolia, especially the Armenians, are very prolific, and, if left in peace, would probably soon outnumber the Moslem population, which, notwithstanding immigration from Europe, has of late tended to decline.

II. POLITICAL HISTORY[1]

Chronological Summary

1000-600 B.C. Greek colonies in Asia Minor.
546 B.C. Asia Minor conquered by Persians.
334 B.C. Asia Minor conquered by Alexander.
133 B.C. Roman Province of Asia.
A.D. 324-1453 Byzantine Empire.
Eleventh and twelfth centuries. Seljuk Turks in Asia Minor.
1245 (*circa*) Mongol invasion of Asia Minor.
1270 (*circa*) Ertoghrul at Yenishehir.
1288-1326 Osman I.
1326 Brusa captured by Ottomans.
1386 Conquest of Karamania by Ottomans.
1425 (*circa*) Nearly all Asia Minor under Ottomans.
1461 Trebizond captured by Turks.
1498 Cape route to East discovered.
Seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Power of Dere Beys.
1808-1839 Mahmud II; centralising policy in Asia Minor.
1869 Suez Canal opened.
1876-1909 Abdul Hamid II.
1894-96 Armenian massacres.
1902 Baghdad Railway agreement.
1908 Young Turk Revolution.
1909 Armenian massacres.

(1) Introductory

Ethnical Boundaries.—Anatolia is washed on three sides by the sea, but on the north-west and west the sea is too narrow, or the water-ways too easy, to establish a definite dividing-line between Anatolians and Greeks or Slavs. On the east the boundary between Anatolians and Armenians, Kurds, or Syrians is still more indefinite. Only on the north and south are clear lines of demarcation imposed by nature.

[1] This section owes much to the works of Banse, Ramsay, and Vambéry.

Origin and Composition of Population.—So far as our knowledge reaches, Anatolia has never, with the possible exception of the Hittite period, formed a single and complete political state, governed from a capital inside it. It has always appeared as a land of passage, a land-bridge, whose possession has been contested by States lying outside it. From this situation it follows that the population has absorbed in the course of history, and still goes on absorbing, many external elements. But it belongs to the genius of the land that all immigrant elements gradually die out, or lose their individuality and become merged in the Anatolian type.

Since the opening of the historical period, the ground stock of the Anatolian population, taken as a whole, has been the race called "Hittite," or "Armenoid," which has been ruled by many foreign masters, has learnt several languages in succession, has absorbed numerous foreign racial elements, such as Greek, Phrygian, Galatian, and more recently Turkish, but has always maintained its essential character and remained fairly uniform over the whole peninsula. Greek civilisation and the Greek language obtained a considerable hold on this population under the successors of Alexander the Great and the Roman Empire: and this hold was strengthened and extended by the Christian Church, which by the end of the sixth century of our era succeeded in producing a level uniformity of language and religious profession over the entire country. But beneath the veneer of Hellenism, whether Macedonian, Roman, Byzantine, or Ecclesiastical, the bulk of the native population has always appeared as Anatolian or Asiatic in type and mentality, in contrast with the European Greeks and other South European peoples. The pure Greek element, away from the vicinity of the west coast, has never been large. It is usual to speak of the Byzantine Anatolians and their modern Christian descendants as "Greeks"; but the term must be understood as connoting religion, language, political aspirations, and to

a certain extent civilisation, certainly not race. The majority of the present-day Greeks in Anatolia are of the same stock as the Moslems; the two are distinguished mainly by their religious profession, and by the mental and moral qualities engendered by Christianity and Islam respectively. The Greeks are Anatolians who have retained their Christianity. The Moslems comprise Anatolians whose ancestors embraced Islam, blended with a Turkish element, the strength of which varies in different regions—it is especially strong in the centre and south-east—and a sprinkling of races of pure blood, Turkish, Kurdish, Circassian, &c. These facts form the groundwork of any study, ethnological, social, or political, of the modern population of Anatolia. It should be noted, however, that the people themselves are quite unconscious of a racial identity. Their entire history, and the relief of the country, which breaks the population up into isolated groups, have tended to accentuate differences rather than to promote unity.

"*Osmanli*" *and* "*Turk.*"—"Osmanli" (Europeanised through the Greek as Ottoman) is a title claimed by the Turks of Anatolia and Thrace. It has no racial significance. It did not come into existence until two centuries after the conquest of Anatolia had been achieved by the Seljuk Turks. The original Osmanli were the "people of Osman," a Turkish chieftain who settled in the mountain district south and south-east of the Sea of Marmara. The successors of Osman rapidly extended their power, overrunning the north-west part of Asia Minor and the south-east part of Europe, and ultimately making themselves heirs to the Seljuk Sultans of Konia and leaders of the Turkish race and Empire.

The name "Osmanli," in these circumstances, became a sort of imperial designation. All Moslem subjects who felt loyalty to the Osmanli Sultans called themselves Osmanli. The title implies adherence to the governing religion and loyalty to the Ottoman Empire. It thus acquires true political application

and force. It expresses and sums up all that exists in the way of political and social unity and of loyalty to the dynasty among the separate Moslem races in Turkey. In theory, all Turkish subjects are Osmanlis. Thus a Kurd or a Circassian subject of the Empire may call himself "Osmanli," but not "Turk." In the first enthusiasm of the Revolution of 1908 the title was assumed by the Anatolian Christians, but the enthusiasm was short-lived.

In the name "Turk" several shades of meaning are to be distinguished. The name is often applied in Europe to the totality of the Moslem subjects of the Turkish Empire. This use is misleading.

(1) As affecting Anatolia, the name "Turk" first occurs in Byzantine and Arab historians, who use it indifferently of the Seljuk Turks and of the later bands of invaders (including those afterwards called Osmanli) who entered the country from the eleventh century onwards. As regards race and language, all these invaders were Turks, and the name was used as a racial designation covering all. Sometimes the Turcomans are distinguished from the Turks in the Byzantine histories; the distinction possibly corresponds to a sub-division[1]; it was certainly not racial. From the ethnical point of view this is the only correct use of the name "Turk" in reference to Anatolia.

(2) As the invaders settled down, and as sections of them became merged in the older population, the name "Turk" gradually became confined to the mixed Moslem population who lived in towns and villages. This is the connotation of the name "Turk" as used in the country at the present day. It is rather sharply defined as meaning the settled Moslem population of mixed Turkish and Anatolian blood, or of pure autochthonous descent, as opposed on the one hand to the nomadic or semi-nomadic Yuruks, Turcomans, and Kurds, and on the other hand to the settled Moslem immigrants who have entered the country recently

[1] See below, p. 19.

(Circassians, Rumeliotes, Cretans, &c.). In the south-east Turks and Arabs are sharply distinguished. As Turcomans or Yuruks settle down, they come in the course of a generation or two to be called "Turks."

We have therefore to note the paradox that the name "Turk" is now given in the country to a section of the population which has comparatively little Turkish blood in its veins, and withheld from or rejected by other sections, such as the Yuruks and Turcomans, who are apparently of pure Turkish blood.

The restriction of the name "Turk" to the settled population probably explains the "contemptuous" use of the name, common in the country. "Turk" has long been used as a term of abuse, *e.g.*, "Turk Kafa" means "blockhead." This is probably an echo of the nomad's contempt for his settled neighbour, which is characteristic of Turkestan or Arabia.

(3) In the last few years there has been a tendency, springing from political motives, to give dignity to the name "Turk," and to regard the empire as cemented and represented by the governing Turkish race, rather than by the Moslem religion—in other words, to establish a political and racial ideal in opposition to the Pan-Islamic ideal of Abdul Hamid. This is the sense in which the Young Turks (many of whom, be it observed, are not Turks at all) apply the name to themselves; and this is the sense in which the name "Turk" forms the basis of Pan-Turanian claims in so far as these are urged from the Ottoman side (*cf.* No. 57 of this series). The odd feature in these claims is that they are put forward, in the first instance, by the class described in the next section.

(4) As applied to the thin upper stratum in the Ottoman State, the *effendis* of the large towns and the Turkish official class generally, the term "Turk" has a somewhat different connotation. Racially and physically, this caste is quite unclassable. They represent a mixture of elements derived from Turkish land-owners, Albanian officers, Circassian women, kidnapped Christian children from Europe or Armenia,

Arabs, Greeks, Negroes, and renegade Poles. Their common bond is their religious profession, their politico-national pride, and, as the only remaining inheritance from their Turkish predecessors, a militaristic aggressiveness which makes them the scourge of their subjects and a danger to their neighbours. They are the only element in Islamic society which has adopted European ways of life, especially in dress. In character and outlook they stand in marked contrast to the ordinary Anatolian Turks. Among Englishmen who have lived long enough in Turkey to survive the glamour of first impressions, Turkophiles will generally be found to be thinking of class 2, Turkophobes of class 4.

(2) The Turkish Conquest

There are two aspects of the Turkish conquest of Anatolia which claim the consideration of students of modern conditions in Anatolia—the causes which led to its rapid and complete success and its effects on social and economic conditions in the country.

At the time of the Turkish invasions Anatolia was governed from the Byzantine capital of Constantinople. Coming from the east, the Turks had no difficulty in overrunning defences which had been shattered by centuries of war against Sassanians and Arabs, and making themselves masters of an empire weakened by internal corruption and dissension. Anatolia fell piece by piece into the hands of the Turks between the eleventh and fourteenth centuries. The racial affinities and original home of the various bands of invaders who successively overran Anatolia and each other during those centuries need not be discussed here. It is enough to say that the Turkish invaders came from Central Asia, and were the kinsmen of some of the Turkish-speaking tribes who still extend from the Caucasus to the Pamir Plateau.

The invaders were mere hordes of nomad warriors, adventurers who fought Byzantines or Crusaders, or who quarrelled among themselves, transporting the

custom of the steppe to the highly-cultivated soil of Anatolia. After centuries of strife a definite hegemony over large parts of the peninsula was established by the Osmanli. The capture of Constantinople, which commands the principal route from the west into the interior, confirmed them in the possession of Anatolia.

The Turks adopted Islam, and they appear to have combined a ruthless repression of opposition with a ready welcome to all who cared to embrace Islam. The Anatolian population went over to Islam in masses.

The change from Christianity to Islam was not indeed sudden or catastrophic. We have seen that the bulk of the Anatolian population, under a veneer of Hellenism, remained Asiatic in habit and outlook; and this population, while it has repeatedly proved amenable to just and competent administration by external Western authority (Macedonian, Roman, Early Byzantine), has never had any difficulty in submitting to Oriental rule or Ecclesiastical authority (Persian, Arab, Turkish). It has been pointed out by Sir William Ramsay that the Byzantine Government itself had been growing more Oriental century by century.

> "One dynasty overturned another, and each was less 'Western' than the preceding one. Phrygians, Isaurians, Cappadocians, and Armenians ruled under the style of Roman Emperors, till at length a purely Oriental dynasty of Osmanlis eliminated even the superficial forms of the West. The change (from Byzantine to Turkish rule) was not in all respects so great as we are apt to suppose. The language and the religion and the government of Anatolia reached at last the Oriental goal to which the genius of the land tended."

In such a propitious soil the process of Turkification cannot have been difficult. The manner and duration of the process are obscure, and historians throw little light on it. It was Armenians and "Greeks" who were most exposed to Turkish influence, while the Kurds in the east and the Caucasians in the north were less and more gradually affected. Even as between the two Christian peoples, it should be noted that

Great and Lesser Armenia, partly owing to the mountainous nature of the country, partly to the fact that they were more rapidly overrun, and that their population escaped decimation in protracted wars, were less exposed to Turkification than the "Greek" populations of the central plateau and coast-lands of Anatolia proper. Those districts became so Turkified in the earliest period of Turkish rule that in 1334 it was said that the only Greek city remaining in Asia Minor was Philadelphia. Among the causes of this extraordinary change must be reckoned the loss of political and religious control, which resulted from the rule of a succession of effete monarchs in Byzantium. The continued success of the Osmanli hordes had its effect in the complete demoralisation of the Anatolian population; and the cooling of Christian fervour after the Crusades opened the way to Moslem proselytism. Further, the declining Christian civilisation of Anatolia suffered from comparison with the brilliant culture of Seljuk Persia, which found an Anatolian home at the court of the Sultans of Konia. If the light of the Persian culture dazzled the eyes of the pious Crusaders from Europe, it is small wonder that the half-græcised Anatolian, deprived of both moral and material support from Byzantium, turned his eyes to the same light, and as time went on ceased to look on Osmanli domination with that horror which the advent of the Turk later aroused in Europe. In South-Eastern Europe, at the centre of Greek culture, the Turk represented the hated Asiatic spirit. In the outlying provinces of Anatolia he had less difficulty in imposing himself on a population already more than half-Asiatic.

Among the newly-arrived Turks, the notables settled in the towns, bringing masses of officials and craftsmen in their train, while the agricultural work on the estates granted to individual nobles was done by imported slaves and conquered Christians. At first "absenteeism," which more recently has been one of the drawbacks of Turkish agriculture, was no doubt the

exception; and until a century ago many landowners governed their estates in patriarchal fashion. In such a situation the effect of the privileges assured by the adoption of Islam soon made itself felt on the masses, and many went over to the Turkish faith. The weakness and helplessness of average Christian feeling can be judged from the fact that we find high officers in the Byzantine army, who fought as bitter enemies against the Turks, appearing presently as their co-religionists and fervent partisans. No doubt the Greeks who went over to Islam maintained their own language for a time; and there are said by Vambéry to be Moslems who still use that language in their prayers; but as a rule it was only those Greeks who remained Christian, and not even all of them, who retained its use. Where the Turkish element predominated, any opposition to it was of course out of the question; and, as time went on, forcible conversion on a large scale succeeded to the easy tolerance of individual Turkish leaders in the earlier period. It was the later Osmanli, rather than the earlier Seljuk princes, who carried on the work of Turkification with most energy and success. The Seljuks, in their political and cultural relations, looked to the east; the Osmanlis conceived the idea of a Turkish State astride the Straits. Those among the older population who resisted the new order perished or fled oversea; and the strong military and hierarchic constitution of the Turkish State reduced the remainder to a uniform level in a surprisingly short time.

Had the Christian population of Asia Minor not been divided by the sea from its co-religionists in the West, had it been able (like the Greeks of Europe) to lean for support on a continuous chain of similar religious systems, the Osmanlis might have found the task of Turkification much more difficult. So much might be argued from the analogy of the Slavs in Europe, who, though they flocked in crowds to Islam, yet continued to maintain intact their ethnical individuality and their language. In any case the Turkish

influence could not be so intense on the north-western frontier of the gigantic empire as in the centre and east, and could not produce the same denationalising effect. In Anatolia, on the other hand, the ground was already prepared for the coming transformation; and it has been assumed with much probability that before the end of the fourteenth century Anatolia had been Turkified to as great an extent as it is to-day.

In its effect, the Turkification of Anatolia is a historical curiosity. It is the process whereby a minority of invaders of a lower civilisation than the older population has been absorbed physically by the older population, but has in turn imposed its language, religion, habits, and aspirations on its subjects. Anatolia is now, and has been for centuries, the core of the Turkish Empire. All the Turkish possessions lying outside Anatolia and the adjacent strip of Thrace have for long been kept in subjection to the Turks with the blood of Anatolian soldiers.

(3) Effects of the Turkish Conquest

Racial.—From what has been said above it follows that little of the physical type of the true Turk can be looked for in Anatolia. From the beginning of the process of amalgamation the Anatolian peasant and townsman represented at the most a mixture in which the Turk was never an important ingredient; and, as time went on, the population continued to absorb an uninterrupted influx of Aryan and Semitic elements—Kurds, Persians, Lazes, Circassians, Georgians, Macedonians, Bosniaks, Rumeliotes, Tatars, Jews, and other smaller bodies. But these elements have done little to modify the characteristic Anatolian type. As a rule the new-comers do not intermarry with the older population; many of them fail to become acclimatised in Anatolia, and die out.

To sum up, the Anatolian Turk is of mixed race, springing from a union between a section of the Turkish invaders and the older population, and he is

more Anatolian than Turkish. This stock falls into two originally different, but now indistinguishable, classes:—

(1) The offspring of Turkish conquerors marrying women of the old population.

(2) A large proportion of the old population who adopted Mohammedanism.

Side by side with the Turks, as thus defined, two important groups are to be noted :—

(1) The descendants of those portions of the old population who resisted amalgamation with the conquerors and their Mohammedanised neighbours, and have conserved their orthodox faith to the present day. These are the Greeks, who are discussed below.

(2) The nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes of pure Turkish blood who are found in relatively small numbers in parts of Anatolia. These tribes extend over the southern mountains from Aidin to Diarbekr, and over large portions of the central plains. The population of the towns and settled villages consists of Turks, or, as they call themselves, Osmanli; the nomads and semi-nomads of Turkish blood are the Turcomans and Yuruks. The distinction between Turks and Turcomans is clear to the foreign observer, and is emphasised by the people themselves. The Turcomans and Yuruks are closer in character to the original Turkish invaders, for they are more distinctly central-Asiatic in physical type and in occupation. The Turks of the towns and settled villages approximate more in social type, and in their peaceful and law-abiding character, to a European population.

Generally speaking, the Yuruks are more truly nomadic than the Turcomans, whose winter and summer settlements are usually close together, while the Yuruks travel over a wider area. The real difference is that the Turcomans practise agriculture, which binds them to a particular locality, to a greater extent than the Yuruks. Whatever original tribal difference may

have existed between Turcoman and Yuruk, they represent to-day respectively the semi-nomad and the nomad, and their habits illustrate the manner in which the Turks as a whole—originally nomads—have gradually settled down and become merged in the old sedentary population.

The common hypothesis that the sedentary Turks of to-day are the descendants of the original Seljuk and Osmanli invaders, while the Turcomans and Yuruk nomads are the offspring of tribes who entered Anatolia at a later date, is disproved by all the evidence. The distinction between Turks and Turcomans goes back to the Byzantine historians of the Turkish conquest. There may have been an original tribal difference between the two; but any such distinction has been entirely supplanted by the much broader and deeper line of cleavage which has been described above. The question why some of the invaders mixed with the old population and settled down almost at once, while others remained of pure stock, and retain their nomadic habits till the present day, is a psychological as well as a historical puzzle. It is no doubt true that the nomads have been reinforced from time to time by fresh immigration of kindred tribes from the East.

Certain it is that the nomads retain the physical characters of the true Turk in a purer form than their sedentary neighbours. In appearance they are said to resemble the Turks of Azerbaijan, especially the Terekme and Karapapak tribes. Their dialect is likewise said to bear a striking resemblance to the language of Azerbaijan, both in peculiarities of pronunciation and in the retention of a stock of old Turkish words, which in Ottoman Turkish have been modernised or replaced by borrowed words from Persian or Arabic.

The fluctuation in the ethnical composition of Anatolia is continuous, because Anatolia is a bridge over which peoples must move. But in spite even of such recent immigration as that of Caucasian, Bosniak, and Rumeliote colonists—who, it is true, were Moslem-

ised before they entered the country—there has existed for centuries a stereotyped character which cannot be ignored. There is an unmistakable type, or series of similar types, which to some extent level down the racial and local divergence. In any case these divergences are slight. Vambéry has distinguished a northern, western, and southern type, mainly on the rather slippery ground of dialect; and it has been suggested that the old Anatolian ethnical core is stronger in the north and west than even in the settled population in the south. It is true that the "Greek" element in the physical type grows more pronounced as the west coast is approached; but the difference in physical character between the inhabitants of north and south, east and west, is negligible.

Social.—Together with this uniformity of physical characteristics, there is an even greater uniformity of intellectual and moral qualities and of social habits over the whole country. In a country marked off both by geographical conditions and by a pre-existing Greek culture from both Arabia and Central Asia, the effect of centuries of a Byzantinised Moslem civilisation has been to produce among the Anatolian Turks an individual type of social life and custom. In spite of the deep chasm dividing Moslems from Christians, the former came strongly under the influence of Byzantine and Græco-Anatolian culture. In the process of settling down among a people used to centuries of civilised life, the children of the steppe had to learn more than they taught. The influence of Persian and Arab culture on the Osmanlis is matter of common knowledge. So long as the Osmanli were a society of nomad warriors, the influence of the Seljuk culture of Persia held sway over them. The strong Persian element in their language and literature is derived from this phase of their development. Their conversion to Islam brought them likewise under the influence of Arab culture, which gave the Turkish State its strong hierarchic character, and stamped literature and the language of daily life with a deep Arabic impress.

Both these influences, and especially the second, are still operative. But there must also be included the Græco-Anatolian influence, which came more fully into play when the Ottoman State was finally established on the Bosporus, and masses of Christian Greeks were incorporated into the body politic and even into the race. The change in geographical conditions from Central Asia to the Anatolian peninsula imposed a similar change in dress and habits; Byzantine art combined with Persian models to produce the characteristic monuments of the early Turkish period, and Byzantine culture effected a subtle transformation in Turkish and Moslem ideas and customs. Among customs due to Byzantine influence we may quote the Ottoman's predilection for the "salta," or short jacket, which offends against the orthodox Moslem's insistence on a cloak which shall cover the outline of the body, and the fashion of shaving the beard, introduced by Sultan Selim I, and strongly disapproved of by other Mohammedans, in particular by the Turks of Central Asia.

Economic.—It is a common charge against the Turk that his genius is to destroy, not to build. A study of the economic effects of the Turkish occupation of Anatolia will enable us to test this statement, and clear the ground for a consideration of measures to improve the economic position of the country.

Asia Minor was regarded by the Romans as one of the richest portions of their empire. Its wealth was derived from the development of its natural resources, vegetable and mineral, which are immense, and also from its position astride the main highway between the Mediterranean world and Asia, which made it a great avenue of trade. In discussing the effects of the Turkish regime on the prosperity of the country, it is necessary to distinguish between these two sources of wealth. The Turks may or may not be held responsible for interference with the first. Causes over which the Turks had no control interfered with the second.

Deterioration had of course set in before the coming of the Turks. Over-taxation, misgovernment, and civil dissension during the Byzantine period must have exacted a heavy toll from the internal well-being of Anatolia, and the long series of wars with Saracens and Arabs must have disturbed the course of trade over the country. But the important point to note is that the Turks found Anatolia a settled agricultural and industrial country. They were responsible for its becoming to a great extent a country of nomads.

Many of the bands of Turks who entered Asia during and after the conquest were nomads. From the first a line of cleavage seems to have developed among the conquerors themselves, some of them settling with the older population in towns and villages, and practising crafts and agriculture, while others retained, and retain to this day, their nomadic habits. Agriculture implies settlement, and cannot flourish in a country overrun by nomadic shepherds and goat-herds. The result was that large stretches of fertile country went out of cultivation, and the century-long accumulation of agricultural skill was irretrievably lost. The forest wealth of the country suffered from the same cause. The goat keeps down forests by destroying the young trees, and the nomad does not scruple to set fire to large tracts of forest land to clear ground for pasture. Vast stretches of timber-bearing land have been, and continue to be, laid waste by these causes. Other economic effects have followed from the introduction of Central Asiatic modes of life. For example, the cultivation of the olive, a prime source of wealth in Mediterranean countries, is now confined to the few districts where Greeks predominate. The nomadic Turks prefer butter to olive oil.

While the Turks may be fairly charged with the impoverishment due to these causes, it should be noted, on the other hand, that the Turkish Government has done all in its power to suppress nomadism and to force or cajole the nomads to settle down. Where nomadism has been encouraged, as in Armenia, it was

done with a special purpose. The nomad is the particular enemy of the tithe-collector, and the Government has a special interest in suppressing him. Nomadism has long been disappearing, and will in the end disappear completely, apart from the central steppes, where it is the only possible mode of existence, and where the nomads are easily isolated.

The discovery of the Cape route, opening up sea communication with the Far East, heavily discounted the second source of the wealth of Anatolia, and the opening of the Suez Canal practically destroyed it. The Baghdad Railway, when completed, will restore the position of the country on an active trade route, and will continue and extend the work which has already been done by the existing railways in developing the country. The diversion of Far Eastern trade from the overland route to the sea routes has had as much to do with the impoverishment of Anatolia as the sins of the Turkish Government and the ineptitude of the Turkish people. It must not be forgotten, however, that one of the motives for the discovery of new routes to the East was the closing of the old land-routes owing to the Turkish conquests.

III. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

(1) Religious

Religious Organization

Mohammedanism is the established state religion; and the profession of Islam is the touchstone of loyalty as well as the guarantee of privilege. The Sultan, as Caliph, is supreme head, even if he holds the position illegally according to the letter of the Koran. The chief ecclesiastical dignitary is the Sheikh ul-Islam, who is a member of the Cabinet. It is characteristic of the political character of the Mohammedan Church that the main functions of the Sheikh ul-Islam are judicial rather than spiritual.

Mohammedans form the vast majority of the population of Asia Minor, and the term is used to include the members of many small sects like the Takhtaji and Ansarie, who are Mohammedans only in name.

A priesthood in the strict sense of the term cannot be said to exist in Mohammedan Turkey. The Ulema, however, or persons connected in one way or another with the official ministrations of Islam, form a separate class. The principal offices in connection with mosques, theological schools, &c., are to a large extent hereditary.

The temporalities of the State Church are controlled by the Ministry of Pious Foundations, or Vakuf, which has a separate budget of its own. The revenue of the Vakuf is principally derived from charges on, and reversionary interests in, real property which has at one time or another been consecrated to religious or benevolent purposes, and which is known as Vakuf. A large part of the urban property of the Empire is Vakuf.

The Orthodox Church in modern times has accepted the practice that, wherever there is an independent State, the Church within that State should have its own government. Owing, however, to historical reasons, there are three patriarchates within the Ottoman Empire—those of Constantinople, Antioch, and Jerusalem. It is sometimes held that the first of these has authority over the others, but the extent to which this is so in practice is very limited. The Anatolian Greeks are under the jurisdiction of the patriarch of Constantinople. There is a minority of Greek Uniats in communion with Rome.

With the Anatolian Christians, as we have seen, religion and nationality are identical. This conjunction has had important effects on the history of the Greek Church. Since 1453 the Greeks have always spoken with one voice; their mouthpiece has been their Church. They have been singularly tenacious of their rights, which have all clustered round their Church. In return the Church saved the race. They had privileges granted to them by Mahomet II immediately after the conquest of Constantinople. Throughout the centuries which have passed since his time, these privileges have often been confirmed, the latest formal confirmation being in the Hatti Sherif of Gulhane, of 1839, the Hatti Humayun, of 1856, and the Constitution of 1876. Among their most valuable privileges has been the right of the Patriarch to make representations on behalf of his flock to the Sultan and the Turkish authorities respecting the violation of any of the privileges, and to exercise legal jurisdiction over the members of his community in all matters in dispute among them. The concession was in accordance with mediæval practice not only in Moslem but in Christian States. It was not long, however, before the jurisdiction was limited to what now exists, *viz.*, to the right of jurisdiction in reference to marriage, succession, and questions of personal status. To maintain these privileges the Church has constantly been in conflict with the State. So long as by the Constitution the estab-

lished religion of the country is Mohammedanism, it is a necessity for the Christian communities that they should maintain their own courts. Monogamous family life is the basis of such communities; and, if the State does not recognise this, the Christians must be permitted to exercise jurisdiction in regard to such matters as bigamy and right of succession.

The Greek Church in Anatolia is miserably poor; the clergy are ill-paid, and the standard of education among them is very low.

The Armenian Church.[1]—The National Church of Armenia is called the Gregorian, because the conversion of the nation was largely due to Gregory, the Parthian, known as the "Illuminator," whose great work was accomplished about 300 A.D., when Christianity was adopted as the established religion. The Kingdom of Armenia was thus the first State to erect Christianity into the national faith. The Church has adopted only the decisions of the three great Councils —Nicæa, Constantinople, and Ephesus—as against the seven recognised by the Orthodox Church. The history of the Armenian Church is a long martyrology, and it has always maintained a powerful hold over the race. Armenians felt the influence of Hellenism very slightly. They were always iconoclasts, with a strong tendency to reject Trinitarian doctrines—traits which suggest a certain spiritual kinship with the Moslems.

The Armenian Patriarch has no territorial title—he is called "Patriarch of all the Armenians." He resides in Constantinople. While the government of the Church is in his hands, aided by his council, the spiritual head is the Catholicos, who resides at Echmiadzin in Russia. Although the majority of Armenians are found in Armenia, there is no province or important city in the Empire which is without them.

A large number of Armenians have gone over to the Catholic communion, and form a Uniat Community known as the Armenian Catholic Church. This com-

[1] See *Armenia*, No. 62 of this series.

munity has on several occasions enjoyed the protection of the French and Austrian Governments.

Protestant communities, mainly found as the result of the teaching of American missionaries, exist in many places.

(2) Political

Form, Character, and Methods of Government

Anatolia, like the rest of the Turkish Empire, is divided into vilayets, these into sanjaks, these into kazas, and these into nahies. A Vali or Governor-General, representing the Sultan, and assisted by a Provincial Council, is placed at the head of each vilayet. The minor divisions are subjected to inferior authorities (respectively Mutesarrifs, Kaimakams, and Mudirs), who are responsible to the Vali of the vilayet in which their division is included.

An exception to the general method of sub-division is formed by the so-called "independent" sanjaks, which are governed by Mutesarrifs reporting directly to the Minister of the Interior. The tendency of recent years (accentuated since the war began) has been to increase the number of these "independent" sanjaks by detaching ordinary sanjaks from the vilayets to which they were assigned. The feudal government of large tracts of Anatolia by independent chieftains or Dere Beys, in vogue in the early part of last century, has everywhere ceased, often to the detriment of the peasants, who have now no one to protect them from the Government officials.

In theory the official career is open to all subjects of the Sultan. In practice the administrative services are manned from a restricted, largely hereditary, caste, mainly Moslem (including, in Anatolia, some Circassians and Kurds), with a large number of Armenians filling the lower offices. The officials receive no adequate training, and are poorly paid, if paid at all. The result is that they are tempted, or inclined, to amass wealth from the proceeds of bribery and exac-

tion. Their exactions fall with impartiality on Moslem and Christian alike; and even the Moslem cannot secure justice except at a price in bribes which usually deters him from seeking it. Naturally, therefore, the Turk reduces his dealings with the Government to a minimum, and distrusts and shuns the officials.

Under Abdul Hamid government was centralised in the capital, and rested on a system of espionage and police coercion, which penetrated into every house in the country. Since the Revolution the local authorities have had a freer hand; but all power rested with the Committee of Union and Progress, which controlled Parliament and dictated all appointments.

The Young Turks made some effort to improve and cleanse the administration, not without success. After the Revolution the police in particular were for a time regularly paid, and their former methods of treating the peasants discouraged. But the deadweight of traditional usage, and the total absence of a class from which honest and efficient officials can be drawn, brought these efforts to nought.

That mutual confidence on which democratic government ultimately rests is absent in Anatolia, not only as between the different races and creeds, but as between the members of each race and creed. Although government now rests nominally on a democratic franchise, it appears inevitable that power will continue to be centralised in the hands of a despot or of an irresponsible oligarchy such as the Committee of Union and Progress. Capacity apart, the Anatolian population has no real belief in self-government. They long, without exception, for an honest and efficient administration. Whether they would prefer the moderate amount of honesty and efficiency which is all they can expect under the most enlightened native government, or the higher standard of administration and justice which they know to obtain in Egypt or Tunis, is a question which different Anatolians would answer differently. It is certain that in the years of

disillusionment which followed the Revolution the great majority of the natives would have welcomed any government but the Turkish. The success of British administration in Egypt, and the example set by foreign schools and hospitals, especially the American, have provided the natives with a standard by which to judge the similar efforts of their own Government.

(3) Public Education

Elementary education is nominally obligatory for all children of both sexes. Under the Provisional Law of October 6, 1913, all children from 7 to 16 are to receive primary instruction, which may be given in State schools, schools maintained by communities, or private schools, or, subject to certain tests, at home. The State schools are under the direct control of the Ministry of Public Instruction, which also provides for the inspection of schools maintained by the non-Moslem communities, &c. Besides these there survive a large number of Medressehs or theological seminaries, connected with religious foundations. The general level of efficiency in the State schools is low. There are a large number of foreign schools, mostly conducted by French, English, and American missionaries; but they draw the majority of their pupils from the Christian population.

The Mohammedan *bourgeoisie* can read, write, and count; few of them know any European language, except officials and residents in the coast towns, some of whom speak French. The Mohammedan peasants are totally illiterate. The best native schools are those maintained by the Greeks, who show by far the smallest percentage of illiterates. Most Greeks, even in country villages, are masters of the "three R's"; like the Armenians, they generally write Turkish in the characters of their own language. The Greeks and the Armenians are both interested in education; but the Greek rises above the Armenian in his appreciation of education as an end in itself. The Armenians and Greeks flock in large

numbers to the American schools and colleges, with the result that in most towns and villages in the eastern part of Asia Minor English-speaking Christians are found.

The American colleges have played a very important part in the development of an interest in education in Anatolia; and the influx of able students from the Balkans and from Southern Russia has given these colleges a position of considerable influence throughout the Near East.

Educated Turks are attracted by the literature and civilisation of the French, to the exclusion of other European nations. England and Germany make poor seconds.

(4) Social

(i) *Moslems and Christians.*—Social distinctions of the type familiar in Europe are absent; social life is thoroughly democratic. The sharpest line of cleavage in Anatolian society is that formed by religion. The chasm dividing Moslems and Christians is abysmal; even if a common environment produces an appearance of uniformity in regard to externals, yet, in respect of mental and moral qualities, and of attitude to the problems that affect Turkey or the outside world, the Moslem and the Christian represent two entirely different points of view.

In keeping with its diversified cultural origin, the social custom of the Anatolian population is a patchwork of Byzantine-Christian, Arabian-Islamic, and Central Asiatic elements on a solid autochthonous background. Age-long custom, determined by soil and climate, government by a caste which still retains traces of all the stages in its progress from the steppes of Central Asia to the rich inheritance of the Emperors of Byzantium, and the spiritual and social predominance of Islam fix the large traits of social life for old population and immigrant alike. It is often difficult to assign its origin to a particular custom or to prophesy regarding its retention or disappearance. Thus

the habit of moving into *yailas* in summer, which characterises a large part of the population, sometimes corresponds to the "semi-nomadic" stage in the settling down of true nomads, sometimes is simply the age-long habit of moving from winter village to summer village and back again which is imposed by the variety of climatic conditions in a limited area. Under one aspect, the custom is transient, and may disappear; under the other, it is a permanent way of life.

Islam, with its contemplative outlook, its dignified and courtly forms, its quiet submission to established authority, influences Moslem and non-Moslem alike; and even the Christian communities wear a strong Moslem aspect to the European eye. As an example, the seclusion of women, and their employment in all the drudgery of everyday life, while more pronounced among the Moslems, is also a Christian characteristic. Difference in religion brings out sharp contrasts in isolated particulars, but a common racial origin and a common physical environment produce a level uniformity of custom in regard to dwellings, dress, food, etiquette, industry, amusements, and superstitions, which overrules all divergences.

An external form of "Europeanisation" has made considerable progress in the social custom of Anatolia, affecting both Moslems and Christians; but, as between the two creeds, there exists an instructive difference of attitude to the culture of Europe. Moslems and Christians are united by the similarity of their Oriental culture; both alike are conscious of the deep chasm which divides their civilisation from that of Europe. But Christianity and political aspirations bring the Christian peoples into a certain sympathy with European ways. This sympathy expresses itself in varying ways with different individuals and classes. The educated Greek or Armenian adopts European manners as the outward symbol of his acceptance of the modern educated man's view of life. But if a Turkish official follows European customs in dress or other external matters, it is in order that he may challenge com-

parison, in the eyes of his fellow-Moslem, with the progressive Franks, and prove his capacity for leadership among the nations in the circumstances of modern times. To this end he is prepared to bow the knee to modernism in almost any form, even if he is not prepared to abandon his distinctive culture in the process.

Moslems.—Those classed as Moslems comprise a variety of races of varying degrees of orthodoxy, from the free-thinking Young Turk official, whose conformity to Islam is merely adopted for political reasons, at one end of the scale to the wild and retiring Takhtaji of the Taurus Mountains, who is outwardly a Moslem, but practises rites derived from pre-Christian paganism at the other. The vast majority are orthodox and pious Sunni Moslems, as a rule strikingly free from fanaticism (though many districts form exceptions), with a sprinkling of Shiahs represented by some of the immigrant Kurds and Kizilbash Turcomans. All the Moslems speak Turkish; generally speaking, among the peasantry only the Kurds and a few of the Circassians are bilingual.

Christians.—Leaving the Levantines (generally Roman Catholics) out of account, the principal Christian communities are the Greeks and the Armenians. They form the chief of a number of non-Mohammedan native communities, or *millets*, recognised by the Turkish Government, and granted complete religious, and a large measure of civil, autonomy.

After the capture of Constantinople in 1453, Mohammed II organised his non-Moslem subjects in communities under ecclesiastical chiefs, to whom he gave absolute authority in civil and religious matters, and in dealing with criminal offences (such as bigamy) which did not come under the religious law of Islam. This arrangement, designed to simplify the task of government, has had far-reaching effects on the political life of Anatolia. It established an *imperium in imperio*, which secured to the Christians a distinct position before the law, the free enjoyment of their religion, control over the education of their children,

and considerable autonomy in the management of their communal affairs. The *millet* organisation encouraged the growth of a separate communal life, which in its turn engendered a longing for separate national life. In Anatolia the Greeks and the Armenians are the main representatives of this tendency.

Greeks.—Physically, two types can be recognised among the Anatolian Greeks, corresponding to a diversity of origin. One is the old Anatolian type, descended from the Hellenised Christian population, which the Turks found in Anatolia on their entry into the country. The other corresponds to the type of Greek in Europe and the Ægean Islands, from which there has been continuous immigration throughout history.

Before the war the extension and importance of the Greek element in Asia Minor had been increasing year by year. They occupy the fertile coast-lands of the west and south, and to some extent of the north, in solid masses, and move slowly but continuously into the interior. Their native language, long neglected, is now carefully fostered, and nearly all Greeks speak it as well as Turkish. They spare no expense to secure teachers and give their children a good education. The Greeks of the west coast are skilled seamen and fishermen. In the interior the majority are engaged in agriculture, industry, and trade. The intelligent Greek has found a lucrative industry in the cultivation of fruit and vines, and the rearing of silk-cocoons and the spinning of silk is largely in their hands. Crafts requiring special skill in the towns are almost exclusively manned by Greeks. Like the Armenians, they engage not only in retail trade in the interior, but in commerce on a large scale in the coast towns. This gives them great influence in the economic sphere, and has enabled them to amass much wealth. A strong sense of community holds the Greeks together and increases their power. A leading trait is their quarrelsomeness, which brings them into continuous conflict with the Turkish authorities.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Greek population of Anatolia was reckoned at 1,300,000,[1] and given favourable conditions, would have increased rapidly. But the action of the Turkish Government during and after the Balkan War drove many of the Greeks oversea; and even sterner measures appear to have been adopted during the present war.

The great majority of the Greeks of Anatolia belong to the Orthodox Church, and are under the authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople in religious matters. The Greek Uniats, who recognise the Roman Pontiff as their head, are few in numbers.

Armenians.[2]—These exist (or existed before the war) as a settled population only in Armenia and in some parts of the adjoining vilayets. Only here do they live *en masse*. In Anatolia generally they belong to the Diaspora, and usually live in separate quarters of the towns. They practise all arts and crafts requiring skill and intelligence. They are distinctly more oriental than the Greeks; and the ordinary Turk is better disposed to the Armenians than to any other non-Moslem people. The majority belong to the Armenian or Gregorian Church. There are minorities of Catholics, under the authority of the Pope, and of Protestants, organised in a *millet* by themselves.

Relations of Moslems and Christians.—Loyalty to the Sultan and Caliph, a strong sense of political dominance, a firm conviction that, man to man, they are superior to the Christians—such are the leading political motives of the Anatolian Moslems. Their feelings towards their Christian fellow-subjects vary between non-committal friendliness and jealous hostility, and their general attitude is one of contemptuous toleration. As against their sense of superiority must be set the fact, of which the Moslems themselves are conscious, that they stand on a lower intellectual plane

[1] Another estimate gives 1,715,000; R. Puaux and P. L. Alaux, *Le Déclin de l'Hellénisme;* Paris, 1916. Sir E. Pears, *Turkey and its People*, 1911, gives 1,600,000.

[2] See *Armenia*, No. 62 of this series.

than the Christians, and cannot compete with them in trade and industry. Under normal circumstances the two creeds live together on terms of neighbourliness.

This does not mean that the Greeks and Armenians are satisfied with their lot. Whatever their racial origin, the important fact is that the Greeks regard themselves as the kinsmen of the European Greeks; and Pan-Hellenic irredentism has awakened hopes of union with Greece, especially on the west coast. The Armenians of Anatolia—or, at any rate, such as are capable of clear thinking—are under no similar illusion; but they share and support the political aspirations of their race, and have borne their share in its persecution.

This brings us to the subject of massacre, which is, unfortunately, the feature most familiar to Europeans in the relations of Moslem and Christian in Anatolia. Various explanations of the motives of the massacres of Armenians are fashionable in Europe, and vary from time to time as one European nation or another is friendly or hostile to the Porte. German publicists lay stress on the intrigues of Russia and England, who encourage Armenian revolutionaries, with the object of weakening Turkey, or giving an excuse for intervention. But the real motives, both under Abdul Hamid and under the Committee of Union and Progress, have been, on the part of the Government, the determination at all costs to maintain the dominance of the Moslem over the more intelligent and progressive Christian nationalities, and, on the part of an assenting public opinion, jealousy of the economic strength of the Christian element. It should also be remembered that, from the Pan-Turkish point of view, the Armenians and Kurds are a non-Turkish *bloc* separating the Osmanli Turks from the Turks of Central Asia.[1]

(ii) *Turks and non-Turkish Moslems.*—While the Anatolian Moslems form a solid block in opposition to the Christians, they are by no means a compact body

[1] See, in this connexion, *The Pan-Turanian Movement*, No. 57 of this series.

in respect of sentiment any more than of race. The main motives of feud or dissension are as follows:—

The Turks are the old settled Moslems, in contrast, on the one hand, with the nomads or semi-nomads, and, on the other, with the settled communities of recent immigrants. Between a settled agricultural population and roving groups of nomads there must always be some friction; and this is intensified in Anatolia by diversity of race and differing grades of religious orthodoxy, and often outlasts the settling-down of the nomads. The chief races who are still or have recently been nomadic are the Turcomans, Kurds, Yuruks, and Avshars. All these groups, and the Turks, live apart from each other, hold little communication, seldom intermarry, regard each other with dislike or contempt, and curse the religions of their respective fathers. The degree of attachment to the doctrine of Islam varies considerably in the different groups, although all are officially classed as Moslems, and none are officially treated as rayahs, like the Christians. The parts of the peninsula most affected by nomadism are the central steppes and the mountains of the south and south-east.

Similar causes of feud exist between the older settled population, including in this case the nomads who are in process of settling down, and the large numbers of *Muhajirs*, or immigrants of Moslem religion from neighbouring Christian States, who have been given land throughout Anatolia in recent years. The older inhabitants resent the intrusion of these immigrants, who occupy much land formerly available for pasture. Between the quarrelsome and predatory Circassian immigrants and their Turkish neighbours there is a standing feud everywhere. The Rumeliote *Muhajirs* are more popular. On their side the *Muhajirs*, who have one and all been induced to migrate to Anatolia with promises which are never more than half fulfilled, are unhappy and discontented; they pine for the homes they have left.

The situation in 1897 is well summed up in the

following passage from Sir W. Ramsay's *Impressions of Turkey* (p. 94 *sqq.*) :—

"One of the facts that are most striking to the traveller in Asia Minor is the interlacing and alternation of separate and unblending races. In half-a-dozen villages which you visit in the course of a day you may find four or five separate peoples, differing in manners, dress, language, and even religion, each living in its own village and never intermarrying with, rarely even entering, the alien village a mile or two distant. The broad distinction of Christian and Moslem is wholly insufficient, and even misleading. The Turkish peasants entertain a stronger hatred towards the Circassian, rigid and pious Moslem as he is, than towards the Greek or Armenian Christian; while they regard the Kyzyl-Bash or heterodox Turkmans with a mingled loathing and contempt, surpassing their worst scorn for the Christian. You often meet a Greek in a Turkish village, sitting in the Oda, apparently in quite friendly conversation with the people; but you will hardly ever see a Turk in a Circassian village, and rarely a Circassian in a Turkish village, or, if you do, he glares about, feeling himself an enemy among enemies."

IV. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(A) MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

(1) Internal

(a) *Roads*

Like every part of the Turkish Empire, Anatolia suffers from a lack of roads. There are two trunk routes leading to the Bosporus, one from Armenia through Angora, the other from Syria through the Cilician Gates and Konia, and in certain districts—notably the littoral of the Sea of Marmara and the neighbourhood of Smyrna—properly made roads are fairly numerous. But Anatolia cannot be said to have a road-system, means of communication between one province and another being extremely scanty. Moreover, even when two places are supposed to be connected by a metalled road, it often happens that only small stretches have been completed, the work having been divided among the villages on the line of route, some of which perform their task while others neglect it. It is also to be noted that a road once made is seldom or never repaired, so that a metalled highway may in a few years become a rough track, quite unfit for wheeled traffic.

In the following notes the roads of each vilayet or "independent" sanjak are treated separately.

Sanjak of Ismid.—The roads in the western part of the sanjak are dealt with in *Turkey in Europe* (No. 16 of this series). Three important roads converge in the eastern half of the province. South of Adjije the very important trunk route from Angora and Armenia meets the main road from Brusa and the Marmara coast, while, to the east of Ismid, the continuation of these roads is joined by one from Adabazar, Bolu, and

Gerede. Apart, however, from these highways, communications in the district are poor.

Vilayet of Brusa.—For a Turkish province, the vilayet of Brusa is excellently furnished with means of communication, possessing upwards of 1,400 miles of metalled roads. These are for the most part in the north, the chief centres being Panderma, Brusa, and Yenishehir. In the mountainous middle portion of the province there are only rough tracks, but the east is traversed by the highway from the Marmara basin to Konia and Syria. A branch road leaves this at a point a little south of Kutahia, and runs to Ushak and Alashehir on the Smyrna—Kassaba railway.

Sanjak of Bigha.—This small region, which includes the southern shores of the Dardanelles, has a comparatively good system of roads, mostly constructed for strategical reasons.

Vilayet of Aidin.—The roads here are above the average for Turkey, alike in number and quality. The chief centre of communications is Smyrna, from which metalled roads run in all directions except towards the south, where the Smyrna—Aidin railway renders them less necessary. In other parts of the province there are roads running from points on the railways to places of economic or commercial importance. The longest lead from Ahmedli, on the Smyrna—Kassaba railway, to Demirji, and from Aidin to Giova.

Vilayet of Kastamuni.—Considering its size, there are few good roads in this province. The main road from the Bosporus to Angora crosses its south-west corner, and there is a metalled road from Gerede to Adabazar and Ismid. Nearly all the other first-class roads run inland from the coast. Kastamuni, the most important centre of communications, is connected by metalled roads with the coast towns of Amasra and Ineboli, and by fairly good ones with Tashkeupri, to the east, and Kiangri, in the extreme south of the vilayet. From Sinope a first-class road runs southward to Boyabad. From Duraghan, in the south-

east of the province, there is a metalled road to Kavza, in the vilayet of Sivas, which is connected by first-class roads with Chorum (Angora), Amasia (Sivas), and Samsun (Trebizond).

Vilayet of Angora.—Though not in general well supplied with means of communication, the vilayet of Angora is traversed from end to end by the road from the Bosporus to Armenia, which is metalled almost the whole of the way. From a point near Mutesellin, from Kirshehir and from Kaisari, branch roads run to Yuzgat, an important centre of communications in the north-east of the province. Several roads radiate from Kaisari, and from a point on the Bosporus—Armenia highway, a few kilometres west of the town, a most important cross-road runs southward, joining the other great trunk route, from the Marmara to Syria, a little north of the Cilician Gates.

Vilayet of Konia.—This vilayet is crossed by the main road from the Marmara to Syria, but otherwise is badly provided with roads. From Adalia there is a road, metalled for most of its course, which leads to Buldur, and another running parallel with the coast to Teurush. From Konia a second-class road runs north-east to Avanos, passing through Nevshehir, whence there is a passable road to Kirshehir in the vilayet of Angora; but, at any rate till quite recently, this was the only road fit for wheeled traffic in the centre of the province, while the north has nothing but rough tracks. The road from Kaisari to Cilicia, mentioned above, runs for some distance near the eastern boundary of the province.

Vilayet of Adana.—The principal roads of this province are the two branches of the one from the Marmara region. This road forks at Karaman, in the vilayet of Konia, whence one branch leads to Adana, *via* the Tauric Eregli and the Cilician Gates, while the other runs to Selefke, near the coast, which is on the one hand connected with Akliman by a metalled road, and on the other with Adana by a road which runs near the coast through Mersina, and thence

proceeds to Adana through Tarsus. The former route from Karaman to Adana is the shorter, but the latter has the better surface. From Adana a metalled road runs southward to Karatash, and the trunk road is continued, through Missis, Burnaz Khan, and Payas, to Alexandretta, which lies just beyond the frontier of the province. The roads leading north-eastward into Armenia are indifferent.

In 1910 a French group formed a company, called the Société Générale d'Entreprise des Routes de l'Empire Ottoman, for the construction of roads in various parts of the Turkish Empire. It was calculated that their projects would involve the construction of about 5,500 kilometres of roads, over 2,000 of which were to be in Anatolia, and that the cost would be about £2,000,000, which, it was hoped, would be covered by a Turkish Government loan. It was soon found, however, that both the extent and the cost of the work had been greatly underestimated, and although some 300 kilometres of the roads were made, no final agreement with the Government regarding the terms of the concession had been reached when the European war began. The project was part of a large scheme which included the construction of railways in the Marmara region and in Armenia (see below, pp. 55-56).

(b) *Rivers*

There are numerous rivers and streams in Anatolia, but few are used for transport, and none could be made navigable for craft of any size except at heavy expense. Most of them have a rapid current, and dwindle to small streams in summer, while in winter they are dangerous torrents. Both for the country and for the investor it will be far more advantageous to employ capital on railway construction than on the development of water communications.

Of the rivers flowing into the Black Sea, the most important are the Kizil Irmak and the Sakaria. The former, though its upper reaches are in the vilayet of

Trebizond, flows for the greater part of its course within the boundaries of Anatolia, as defined in this book. It is of great volume, but very swift, and most costly works would be necessary in order to make it navigable. The Sakaria, which flows into the sea in the sanjak of Ismid, is used by small craft for 110 kilometres from its mouth. Schemes for canalizing the river have been the subject of negotiations between the Turkish Government and foreign companies, but no concessions have been granted. Numerous rivers in the vilayet of Kastamuni are used for floating timber, but none are suitable for larger vessels than the small native boats which carry local traffic.

In the Marmara basin the river of most economic value and promise is the Susigirli Chai, which enters the sea about 50 kilometres east of Panderma. For some distance it is navigable for steam launches, and for a time there was a regular service between the mines at Mikhalij (Mukalich) and the mouth. This, however, was discontinued before 1890.

Many of the rivers and streams flowing into the Mediterranean are used for floating timber, but the only ones which could be profitably developed as waterways are the Sihun and Jihun in the vilayet of Adana. Of these the Sihun has long been used for the transport of goods between Adana and Mersina, but the small craft engaged in this traffic have greatly diminished in number since the construction of the Mersina, Tarsus, and Adana railway. No use is at present made of the Jihun. There seems, however, no reason why both rivers should not be controlled or canalized, and rendered navigable, at least in their lower reaches, for small steamers.

(c) *Railways*

(i) *Existing Railways.*

The systems of the following railways lie wholly or partially in Anatolia: the Anatolian Railway (Société du Chemin de fer Ottoman d'Anatolie), the Baghdad Railway (Société Impériale Ottomane du Chemin de

fer de Bagdad), the Mersina, Tarsus, and Adana Railway, the Smyrna—Aidin (Ottoman) Railway, the Smyrna—Kassaba Railway (Chemin de fer Smyrne—Cassaba et Prolongement), and the Mudania—Brusa Railway. Each of these concerns is now a Turkish Société Anonyme, but in reality they are all under foreign control, the first three being virtually German undertakings, while British interests predominate in the Smyrna—Aidin railway and French in the remaining two. The terms of the concessions under which the lines are owned and worked vary considerably; but in March 1914, at the instance of the Turkish War Office, the Turkish Government decided to place all the railways on the same footing as regards their use for military purposes. Meetings of representatives of the companies were held, at which a German staff officer was present, and after discussion a scheme, based partly on the French and partly on the German system of mobilisation, was adopted. Questions of compensation and remuneration, however, were left over for negotiation between the several companies and the Ministry of Public Works. The main object of the scheme adopted was the concentration of troops and material on Constantinople, Panderma, and the Dardanelles.

The Anatolian Railway.—This company has its terminus at Haidar Pasha, near the entrance of the Bosporus, from which a line to Angora was completed in 1892. The original intention was to extend the line from Angora eastward, and eventually to Baghdad. This plan was, however, abandoned, and the company built a line from Eskishehir to Konia, which is now the starting-point of the Baghdad Railway. There is a branch from Hamidie (on the Haidar Pasha—Eskishehir section) to Adabazar, and in 1912 the company began an extension of this to Bolu. Since the beginning of the war a line from Angora to Yuzgat has been partly (perhaps completely) constructed. It is said to be of narrow gauge

and to be for Government account. Its principal object was, no doubt, to facilitate the military operations in Armenia. The relations of the Anatolian company to this line have not yet been ascertained. For further particulars of the Anatolian Railway, see *Turkey in Europe* (No. 16 of this series), where its finance, relations to the Turkish Government, and economic value are treated at length.

The Baghdad Railway.—The Baghdad railway starts at Konia, and runs through Eregli, the Taurus Mountains, and Adana, whence, crossing the Cilician plain, it goes eastward as far as the Amanus range (Giaur Dagh). According to the latest information (1918) the section through these mountains is not yet completed, only a narrow-gauge track having been laid. On the farther side of the range, however, the normal gauge is resumed, and the line runs southwards to the neighbourhood of Rajun, where it enters the vilayet of Aleppo. There is a branch from Kale Keui, near Osmanie, to Alexandretta.

The concession for the construction of the line was granted to the Anatolian Railway Company in 1889,[1] but the rights were transferred to a company styled the Société Impériale Ottomane du Chemin de fer de Bagdad, which, though nominally distinct from the Anatolian company, was under the same control, namely, that of the Deutsche Bank and its group. The term of the concession was 99 years. The share capital of the company was 15,000,000 francs (£600,000), of which the Anatolian Railway Company was bound to subscribe and hold 10 per cent., while the Turkish Government had the right to subscribe a like amount. The whole of the capital has been issued, and half is paid up. The railway was to be constructed in sections of approximately 200 kilometres in length, and it was intended that the whole line with its branches should be completed within eight years from the date of the convention. The track was to be single, but land

[1] See *Turkey in Europe*, No. 16 of this series, pp. 66, &c.

sufficient for a double line was to be acquired in the first instance, and the company is under an obligation to build a second line at its own expense as soon as the gross receipts reach 30,000 francs (£1,200) per kilometre per annum. An important clause in the concession gives the company the right of working all mines which it may discover within 20 miles of the axis of its line.

The Turkish Government guaranteed to the company an annual sum of 11,000 francs (£440) per kilometre constructed and opened for traffic, and a further annual sum for working expenses of 4,500 francs (£180) per kilometre. It was arranged that this kilometric guarantee of 11,000 francs should be capitalized, and that the Turkish Government should give the company State bonds bearing interest at 4 per cent., redeemable during the period of the concession. As the Government also undertook to provide a sinking fund at the rate of 0·0875 per cent., it was therefore bound to hand to the company bonds of a nominal value of 269,110 francs (£10,764) for each kilometre constructed and opened for traffic. The minimum issue price of the bonds, it was agreed, should be 81½ per cent. The convention contains a very indefinite provision to the effect that, as soon as the financial situation permits, the company shall issue bonds of its own to replace the bonds that have been issued to them by the Imperial Government.

The receipts of the line are apportioned between the Turkish Government and the company as follows:—

(1) The first 4,500 francs per kilometre goes to the company in relief of the Government's obligation to cover the working expenses up to this amount.

(2) The surplus above 4,500 francs per kilometre, up to 10,000 francs per kilometre, goes to the Turkish Government.

(3) Of any excess over 10,000 francs per kilometre the Government gets 60 per cent. and the company 40 per cent.

From the point of view of the concessionaires the bargain was a good one, provided that the bonds of the Turkish Government could be realised at a fair price. The bonds necessary to secure the kilometric guarantee on a section have hitherto been issued before work has been begun, so that the company has not been under the necessity of finding any money itself so long as it could succeed in placing the Turkish bonds upon the European market, and the liberal terms of the convention have given it an ample margin for doing this.

How far the arrangement was sound finance from the Turkish point of view is a matter of opinion. The amount of the bonds issued by the Turkish Government to cover the kilometric guarantee on the first section, from Konia to Bulgurlu, was 54,000,000 francs (£2,160,000) and for the next four sections the amount was 227,000,000 francs (£9,080,000), the interest on the whole being over 11,000,000 francs (£440,000) a year.

It is argued that the kilometric guarantee granted to the Anatolian railway was higher, and nevertheless that line has proved a source of profit to the Turkish Government. If agriculture develops quickly in the districts to be tapped by the Baghdad railway, the burden which the Turkish Government has undertaken may not prove insupportable, but the large amount of bonds issuable in respect of the guarantee must of necessity prove a hindrance to financial operations for other purposes.

The company paid dividends up to 5 per cent. regularly down to 1912, and at the end of that year's working had a reserve of over 6,000,000 francs (£240,000). The war has naturally affected its position disastrously, and at the meeting of the company held in February 1918 the Chairman stated that the receipts for 1916 had been nearly 15,000,000 francs (£600,000) less than those for 1915, and was silent as to the result of the year 1917. He stated, however, that the contract with the construction company had been denounced, and that

the railway company was in urgent need of financial help.

In estimating the prospects of the Baghdad railway within the limits of Anatolia, a distinction must be made between the sections west of the Taurus Mountains and those beyond. From Konia to the mountains the line runs for the most part over an unproductive tableland. Here and there, it is true, it touches fertile tracts, but in general the country is naturally unsuited to agriculture. In the neighbourhood of Konia itself the Germans have sought to supply the deficiencies of nature by the construction of large irrigation works, but hitherto the surplus produce of the district has been sent to Constantinople by the Anatolian railway, and the Baghdad line seems to have benefited little by the improvements. It is true that before the war the traffic receipts of the section from Konia to Bulgurlu, though not large, were steadily increasing; but it seems probable that for many years this section will be mainly important as a link between the Anatolian railway and the regions beyond the Taurus.

East of the mountains very different conditions prevail, for the line runs through the Cilician plain, which already yields rich crops of cereals and cottons, and, with the spread of modern methods of tillage and irrigation, should in the near future become one of the most flourishing districts on the Mediterranean seaboard. The prosperity of this section of the railway seems assured, especially as it is already connected with the two most convenient ports, Mersina and Alexandretta.

The Smyrna—Aidin (Ottoman) Railway.—This is the oldest railway in Turkey, the original concession having been granted in 1856. In 1914 the length of the company's lines was 607 kilometres, and a branch from the main line to Buldur, some 13 kilometres long, was under construction.

The main line starts from Smyrna, where the company have extensive warehouses and sheds, and a very

fine pier for large steamers. The general direction of the line is at first southerly, but near Azizie it turns eastward, and passing through Aidin follows the valley of the Maeander (Mendere) to Serai Keui. The line next runs along the valley of the Lycus (Churuk Su) and through the important pass of Chardak to the Lake of Aji Tuz. It then turns to the north-east until it again reaches the Maeander, the valley of which it follows past Dineir, whence it runs through Kechiborlu to Egerdir, on the lake of the same name. There are branch lines from Smyrna to Buja, a suburb; from Kasimir to Sedi Keui; from Torbali to Baindir and Ödemish, a line which has a branch of its own from Chatal to Tire; from Balachik to Sokia; from Gonjeli to Denizli; from Sutlej to Chivril. The branch to Buldur, which was being built in 1914, starts from a point about midway between Dineir and Egerdir. The gauge of all these lines is normal, the track single.

The original concession was granted to a British group for the construction of a line from Smyrna to Aidin. From time to time various extensions have been authorised, and in July 1914, after protracted negotiations with the Government and in the teeth of strong opposition on the part of the Germans and the Italians, the company was granted a new concession whereby it was empowered to construct 320 kilometres of new lines, and the navigation rights on lakes Egerdir and Beyshehir were conferred on it, in the case of Lake Beyshehir to be held jointly with the Baghdad Railway. The extensions contemplated were branches from Aidin to Mughla (95 kilometres) and from a point near Dineir to Sandukli (55 kilometres), the continuation of the Buldur branch to Kizil Kaya (some 90 kilometres), and a line from lake Egerdir to Lake Beyshehir (some 66 kilometres).

Under the concession of 1856 the Ottoman Government undertook to pay interest at 6 per cent. on the original capital. It failed, however, to fulfil this obligation, and in 1888 it was agreed that in

future the company should have no financial guarantee whatever from the Government. At the same time the term of its concession was extended, and conditions were laid down on which, when the concession expired, the Government might buy out the company. This agreement, and subsequent modifications of it, were, however, cancelled by the new convention made in 1914. The various concessions of the company were consolidated and their term was fixed at the year 1999. The right of purchase by the Government was waived, and the company became a Turkish Société Anonyme. Before this time the company was Anglo-Turkish. The share capital has always been firmly controlled by British owners. In 1914 the capital was £1,294,340 in £20 shares, fully paid up, and £3,369,478 in debentures of 4 to 5 per cent. The company has in reserve £505,600 of share capital, authorised but not issued, and unissued debenture stocks to the value of £201,056.

The railway has been of enormous benefit to Smyrna and the district through which it runs. Smyrna is one of the few ports in Turkey where the value of the exports exceeds that of the imports, a condition of affairs largely due to the Smyrna—Aidin railway. The most important goods brought by the railway for export are dried fruits (especially figs), cereals, valonia, olives, minerals, and a certain amount of cotton from the Aidin—Nazli district. Besides increasing the export trade of Smyrna, the railway has given an immense stimulus to the domestic commerce of the interior. Ten years ago it was officially stated that the tithes (taxes on produce) from the districts near its lines had on an average doubled thirteen times over since the creation of the company. A number of factories have been erected and new industries created along its route, and there has been a notable increase of the Christian population owing to the peace and security prevailing in adjacent districts. The railway has made the most of its opportunities, and of late years

was regarded by the Ministry of Public Works as the best managed line in the Turkish Empire.

Apart from the extensions which, as mentioned above, were sanctioned just before the war, the company is not likely to have much opportunity for enlarging its sphere. ' The Smyrna—Kassaba railway shuts it off from any considerable expansion to the north; to the east it is already trenching on the zone of the Baghdad Railway; and the Italian concessions on the Mediterranean coast preclude much development in that direction. The new lines authorised should, however, be of great value to the company and to the districts they will serve, especially the lines to the south, which will run through rich but undeveloped country, where the inhabitants were eagerly awaiting the advent of the railway.

The Smyrna—Kassaba Railway (Chemin de fer Smyrne—Cassaba et Prolongement).—The main line runs from Smyrna to Afium Karahissar, on the Anatolian railway, a distance of 421 kilometres, passing through Magnesia (Manisa), Kassaba, Alashehir, and Ushak. The branch lines are from Smyrna to Burnabat (5 kilometres), and from Magnesia to Panderma (282 kilometres).

The original concession was granted to a British company in 1863 for a line from Smyrna to Kassaba. In 1872 a further concession authorised the extension of the line to Alashehir, and in 1888 a third sanctioned the construction of a branch from Magnesia to Soma. In 1893 the Government, exercising the right of purchase which it had retained, bought out the British company for a sum of 35,850,000 francs (£1,434,000), and granted a concession for its lines to a Franco-Belgian syndicate which was at the same time authorised to extend the main line from Alashehir to Afium Karahissar. The extension of the Soma branch to Panderma was sanctioned by a concession of June 1910, which also authorised the construction at Panderma of modern harbour works; the line was opened for traffic in 1912.

The existing company has three separate financial arrangements with the Turkish Government. As regards the lines built when the railway changed hands, it has a right to half the gross receipts, the other half being set aside to meet the requirements of an issue of debentures, made in 1894, to cover the price paid by the Government to the old company. The annual sum required for this purpose is 2,310,000 francs (£92,400), the Government undertaking to make up this amount if half the company's profits fall short of it. The lines in question have been prosperous, and after 1909 it was not necessary for the Government to contribute anything.

On the extension from Alashehir to Afium Karahissar, the Government granted a guarantee of 18,881 francs (£755) per kilometre. This is the highest kilometric guarantee possessed by any railway in Turkey, and it has proved a heavy charge on the Government, an average of 3,300,000 francs (£132,000) a year having been paid to the company from 1908 to 1913. It has been suggested that the object of this extension was principally strategic; but however that may be, the line has not been profitable, and it is generally thought that the company, securely covered by its guarantee, has taken little trouble to increase the traffic of the line or to develop the resources of the region it serves.

In payment of the construction of the Soma—Panderma extension, the Government handed over to the company 4 per cent. Ottoman Government bonds to a total value of 38,916,000 francs (£1,556,640), or 204,821 (£8,193) per kilometre. The Government is responsible for the interest and sinking fund, and the issue is redeemable in 82 years.

The company's share capital is 16,000,000 francs (£640,000) divided into 32,000 shares of £20 each. There have been two issues of debentures. The first, which was to cover the price paid to the old company, was of the nominal value of 56,560,000 francs (£2,262,400), bearing interest at 4 per cent. and redeemable in 99 years. The second, of 70,000,000

francs (£2,800,000), at 4 per cent., redeemable in 95 years, was made in 1895 to cover the cost of the line from Alashehir to Afium Karahissar. The interest and sinking fund are secured by the kilometric guarantee.

The lines constructed by the original company have been of the greatest service to the regions of Magnesia, Kassaba, Alashehir, and Soma, and share with the Smyrna—Aidin railway the credit for the remarkable expansion of the export trade of Smyrna. They have greatly stimulated the production of fruits, especially raisins and olives, and in the last years before the war the population near the lines, which was largely Greek, enjoyed unprecedented prosperity.

The new line from Soma to the Sea of Marmara has opened up regions rich in agricultural and other resources. Parts of the country towards Panderma are inhabited by Bosnians and other Mussulman refugees from the western provinces of European Turkey, and these are industrious and skilful agriculturists. The returns of the first year's working of the line far exceeded all expectations. The line is of much strategic importance, and proved of great value to the Turks during the defence of the Dardanelles.

Although up to the present the line from Alashehir to Afium Karahissar has not been commercially successful, it should become one of the most profitable in Asia Minor, for it skirts a rich region south of the Olympus range which is wholly lacking in railways and good roads. It is in this quarter alone that any considerable expansion of the company's activities is possible. Various branches giving access to this region could be constructed, not only from the Alashehir—Afium Karahissar section, but also from the main line further west and from the Panderma branch. Lines from Ushak to Gediz and from Salikli to Geurdiz, Demirji and Simav, would open up a district which is both fertile and famous for its carpet manufacture. Balikhissar, on the Panderma line, would be a good starting-point not only for a branch running east into undeveloped country, but also for one going west to the

mining district of Balia. From Susigirli a little further north, a line might be built to Kirmasli and up the valley of the Adranos Chai.

The Mersina, Tarsus and Adana Railway.—The concession for this railway was granted in 1883, and in 1886 it began working. Its total length is only 67 kilometres. It was originally in the hands of a Turkish company, constituted in 1885, and under British and French control. The company intended to build extensions in the Cilician Plain and towards the Black Sea, but its attempts to obtain further concessions were strongly opposed by the Germans and proved abortive.

The railway had no guarantee of any kind from the Government, and though it helped to develop the country through which it ran, and increased the trade of the port of Mersina, it was not commercially successful. The original capital consisted of £165,000 in shares of £20 each, fully paid up, and £185,000 in 6 per cent. debentures. In 1892 a further issue of debentures, amounting to £44,850, was made in order to pay the interest on the old debentures. In 1899, as the condition of the company was still bad, an extensive financial readjustment took place, the interest on the debentures being reduced from 6 to 4 per cent. and preference shares being created to compensate the holders. When the changes were completed there remained £209,500 in debentures, but those actually issued amounted to only £193,540. The preference shares, of £2 each, represented a capital of £23,154.

Subsequently the railway slowly made profits, but in 1906 it came under the control of the Deutsche Bank, which, after buying through third parties as many shares as were on the market, bought out the interests of the French element in the company, and obtained a voting majority. A number of the shares and debentures in English hands were afterwards secured by the bank, which ultimately obtained about five-sixths of the share capital. The object of the Bank was to secure an outlet to the sea for the Baghdad railway, as the construction of the branch to Alexandretta was not yet

contemplated. In fact, by an arrangement between the two companies (which, of course, represent virtually the same interests) the Baghdad railway runs over the track of the Mersina, Tarsus and Adana company from Yenije to Adana, a distance of 14 kilometres.

The prosperity of the Mersina, Tarsus and Adana Railway depends on the amount of traffic which passes through the port of Mersina. Its prospects are therefore not very bright, for it is probable that Mersina will suffer increasingly from the competition of Ayas and Alexandretta.

The Mudania—Brusa Railway.—This line is of narrow gauge and only 41 kilometres long. Mudania is a small open port on the Sea of Marmara, near the entrance to the Gulf of Geumlek. Brusa, the administrative capital of the vilayet of that name, has a population of about 120,000 inhabitants, mostly Turkish. The railway is controlled by a Franco-Belgian group, to whom a concession for 99 years was granted in 1891. The company has no Government guarantee, as the line had been partly built by the Government before 1890, though never worked. The share capital, originally 500,000 francs (£20,000), has been raised to 3,825,000 francs (£153,000) by the conversion into shares of debentures which the company had issued. The railway has paid its way, but is of no great importance, though it would be easy to make extensions and branches which would vastly increase its value Very fertile and productive regions would be opened up by continuing the line to Ainegeul, with a branch to Yenishehir, or by building a line from Brusa westward to Lake Apollonia and Mikhalij. Hitherto, all proposals for expansion have been foiled by German opposition.

(ii) *Projected Railways.*

Chanak to Smyrna.—A narrow-gauge line from Chanak (Kale Sultanie) on the Dardanelles to Smyrna was to have been begun in 1914 by a French group

called the Omnium Enterprise Company of Paris. It was to run through Eren Keui, the plain of Troy, Ezine, Aivajik, Edremid, and Pergamum (Bergama), whence there was to be a branch to Dikeli. From Ezine a line was to be built, *via* Bairamich, Khan Bazar Kari, and Bigha, to Karabigha on the Sea of Marmara, and from Bigha a branch was to run to Panderma and Brusa. The company was granted certain rights of forestry on Mount Ida (Kaz Dagh), and a general concession of all mines within twenty kilometres of the axis of its line.

The railway was to be built for the account of the Government. Its purpose, in fact, was mainly strategic, its immediate construction being strongly urged by the German Staff at Constantinople, in view of the loss of Turkish islands off the west coast of Asia Minor. The projected lines, however, would also have opened up a very rich tract of country, which possesses mines, forests, and fertile agricultural lands capable of producing a great variety of crops and fruit.

Italian Railways.—Negotiations in 1913-14 between the Turkish and Italian Governments resulted in the grant of important railway concessions on and near the Mediterranean coast. The claims of the Italians came into sharp conflict with those of the Smyrna—Aidin railway, which was then seeking authority to build extensions towards the south, and it is generally considered that the compromise reached will prove very detrimental to the British company.

The railways for which the Italians received concessions fall into two groups—one based on Makri, the other on Adalia. From Makri a line was to run in a north-westerly direction to Mughla, where it would meet a projected branch of the Smyrna—Aidin railway. A second line was to run from Makri eastward until it reached the valley of the Xanthus river (Eshen Chai), where it was to fork, one branch running up the valley for some 20 kilometres, and the other down it for 35 or 40.

Adalia was to be the terminus of two lines. The first was to run to Kizil Kaya, which was also to be the terminus of a projected branch of the Smyrna—Aidin Railway. From Kizil Kaya there was to be a short branch to Fughla, 25 kilometres to the north-west, and a more important one following a south-westerly direction to Kaz Chiftlik, a distance of some 85 kilometres. The second line, starting from Adalia, was to run near the coast to Alaya, and from a point about 130 kilometres from Adalia a branch to Ak Seki, 50 kilometres to the north-east, was to be built. The total length of these Italian lines would be about 690 kilometres.

The commercial prospects of the lines from Makri seem doubtful. The country through which they would run is undeveloped, and it is improbable that the line to Mughla would divert much traffic from Smyrna to Makri. The harbour of Makri, however, which is one of the finest in the eastern Mediterranean (*cf.* below, p. 67), may have a commercial future before it. Lignite, chrome, and manganese, which have been worked to some extent, are found in the neighbourhood of Makri, and the finest forests in the province of Aidin are not far distant. Moreover, figs and vines of excellent quality grow well in these parts; while from the Xanthus district an increasing amount of traffic in agricultural and mineral products might be expected. Some time, however, would probably elapse before the projected lines yielded satisfactory returns.

On the other hand, the lines from Adalia would be of immediate economic value, the regions they would serve being extremely fertile. In the neighbourhood of Ak Seki and Alaya there are extensive forests, containing excellent timber; and there are known to be mineral deposits in these regions, certain coal-beds near Ak Seki being especially promising.

Zunguldak to Bolu.—The Deutsche Bank and its syndicate, which were recently in possession of the principal mines in the Heraclea coal region, were (1918) building a railway from Zunguldak to Bolu,

where it would connect with the Anatolian Railway. This line would afford a means of rapid communication between the Heraclea district and Constantinople, but in view of the proximity of the mines to the sea it seems doubtful whether it would carry much of their output.

(iii) *General Remarks.*

When the projects mentioned above have been realised, Anatolia will be provided with the main lines of an adequate railway system. Capital will still be needed, however, for the construction of branches to districts of particular economic importance.

Railway enterprise in Anatolia is so intimately connected with the system of kilometric guarantees that it may be convenient to consider the effects of that system as a whole. In general, it may be said that the guarantees have been a success. Except on the Smyrna—Kassaba Railway's extension, the sums which the Government has been called upon to pay have almost consistently decreased. The following table shows the amounts paid by the Government under these guarantees from 1908 to 1913:—

Year.	Anatolian Railway.		Baghdad Railway.	Smyrna–Kassaba Railway.
	Haidar Pasha–Angora.	Eskishehir–Konia.	Konia–Bulgurlu.	Alashehir-Afium Karahissar.
	£	£	£	£
1908	116,800	119,700	23,170	146,200
1909	102,000	119,700	20,300	153,000
1910	22,300	96,400	15,250	130,000
1911	Nil	41,900	9,500	115,000
1912	„	Nil	Nil	123,000
1913	„	11,500	16,600	127,000

It must be remembered that the Government, when not called upon for any part of the guarantee, shares

in excess profits. It is to be noted, however, that in 1912 the receipts of the Baghdad and Anatolian railways were swollen by military traffic occasioned by the Balkan wars, though in the following year they probably suffered through the consequent dislocation of trade. Since the European War began, the Government has derived very large sums from the excess profits of the Anatolian Railway; but as the traffic on this line has been mainly military, no great significance can be attached to this.

(2) External

(a) *Ports and Shipping*

Considering the length of its coast-line, Anatolia is very badly provided with ports. For this the supineness of the Turkish Government is, of course, partly to blame, but there is a singular lack of good natural harbours, especially in the Black Sea.

(i) *Black Sea Ports.*—The principal Black Sea ports which come within the scope of this volume are Sinope, Ineboli, and the ports of the Heraclea coal district.

Sinope has a population of 8,000, mostly Greeks. The roadstead, which offers good anchorage, even in winter, is the safest between the Bosporus and Batum. Vessels anchor in from 5 to 10 fathoms, and are quite sheltered from westerly and north-easterly gales.

The principal exports are wheat, seeds, tobacco, timber, and skins; the imports are colonial produce, coal, and hardware.

The port used to be visited at frequent intervals by ships of the Messageries Maritimes, the Austrian Lloyd Company, the Deutsche Levante Linie, and several Greek lines. Vessels of the Ellerman and Moss Lines also called occasionally.

Ineboli has a population of about 9,000, mostly Turks. The roadstead is open, but has some protection from a reef, and there is good anchorage in 3 to 4 fathoms.

Wool, mohair, skins, hemp, and cereals are exported; the imports are chiefly manufactured goods.

The ports of the Heraclea coal basin are *Zunguldak*, *Koslu Bay*, and *Heraclea*.

The port of *Zunguldak* belongs, under a concession, to the Heraclea Coal Company, though it is also used by other mining enterprises. In the northern part of Zunguldak Bay there is an artificial harbour, protected by a breakwater, alongside of which there are berths for two steamers in 25 ft. to 27 ft. of water. There are two coal cranes and a transporter which can load a vessel at the rate of 200 tons an hour. Vessels can also be loaded on the opposite side of the harbour, where there is a pier with a steam crane, the depth alongside being 25 ft. Near the harbour the Heraclea Coal Co. has its warehouses, screening plant, and the terminus of its light railway. Vessels requiring moderate quantities of bunker coal can load from lighters in the bay outside the breakwater.

At *Koslu Bay*, two miles south-west of Zunguldak, coal is shipped from a small pier into lighters, which are then towed to Zunguldak.

Heraclea or *Eregli*, twenty miles south-west of Zunguldak, has only an open anchorage, loading or bunkering being carried out through lighters.

(ii) *Marmara Ports.*—Excluding Haidar Pasha, which falls outside the scope of this volume, these are Ismid, Geumlek, Mudania, Panderma, and Chanak, the last being on the Dardanelles.

Ismid, the ancient Nicomedia, has about 13,000 inhabitants. Situated at the head of a long gulf, it is protected in all weathers. There are certain works of the Turkish Admiralty at the port, and in 1913, after negotiations between the Government and the Armstrong and Vickers group, a company was formed with the object, among others, of constructing at Ismid a large floating dock and building and repairing yards. [For particulars of this project see *Turkey in Europe*, No. 16 of this series.]

The port has little trade, the exports of the adjacent country being mostly shipped from Haidar Pasha.

Geumlek, a town of 5,000 inhabitants, though also in a sheltered position on the shores of a gulf, is of small account, and its naval yard is no longer used. If, however, communication with the lake of Isnik were improved and the region drained, the port would recover much of its former prosperity.

Mudania, with a population of 5,000, is an entirely open port, but as the terminus of the railway to Brusa it has latterly increased in importance. The railway company has a pier with 22 ft. of water alongside; but loading has generally to be done from lighters, though this method is impossible in bad weather. The exports, which nearly all go to Constantinople, are various, silk being the most valuable. For shipping the port is mainly dependent on the local services to and from Constantinople.

Panderma is now a large town, having developed very rapidly since 1912, when the railway from Soma was opened. The Smyrna—Kassaba Railway Company, which was granted a concession for the construction of a port, has built quays close to its terminus, and has improved the old breakwater, which gives protection from the north-west wind, the only one that is troublesome. Ships of moderate size can come alongside the railway quays; there is also good anchorage off the town in about 11 fathoms. The railway company is known to have contemplated the construction of repairing shops and a small gridiron or slipway for steamers up to 600 tons, but these works were not completed when Turkey entered the war.

The exports consist mostly of agricultural products of various kinds, but of late years increasing quantities of boracite have been shipped at the port. The imports are cotton and woollen goods, coffee, sugar, and hardware.

During 1913, apart from the local services between Panderma and Constantinople, 32 steamers called at the port. Of these, 18 were British and 4 German.

There is little doubt that Panderma has a prosperous future before it, especially if the projected railway connecting it with Bigha and Brusa is built (see p. 56). Hitherto the surplus products of the southern littoral of the Sea of Marmara have almost always been sent to Constantinople and forwarded to foreign parts from there, but the development of the port of Panderma will enable them to be exported direct.

Chanak (*Kale Sultanie*), a town of 22,000 inhabitants, is situated on the Narrows of the Dardanelles. It is the *pratique* station for all vessels passing through the straits; few, however, receive or discharge cargo at the port, which offers no adequate accommodation or facilities. In the last years before the war its export trade somewhat increased, the principal goods handled being grain, valonia, wine, skins, and pottery. The construction of the projected railway to Ezine and Smyrna (see p. 55) would doubtless bring more trade to the town, but its importance will probably always be strategic rather than commercial.

(iii) *Mediterranean Ports.*—The chief of these are Aivali, Dikeli, Smyrna, Marmarice, Makri, Adalia, Alaya, and Mersina. Ayas may rank with them in the future if its harbour is improved.

Aivali, which has a population of 60,000, is situated on the eastern shore of Aivali Bay, at the southern entrance of the gulf of Edremid. It provides few facilities for shipping, and vessels have to lie off the town, where, however, there is good and well-sheltered anchorage.

The exports consisted principally of oil, soap, hides, and flour. The districts of Aivali and Edremid yield the best edible oil produced in Asia Minor, and large quantities used to be bought by French and Italian merchants. The town of Aivali has several olive-oil mills and a few soap factories and tan-yards.

The oil industry has suffered of late years through the maltreatment of the Christian population, many of whom have been deported or enrolled in labour bat-

talions, while others have fled to the Greek islands. Recent information shows that, alarmed at the decline in the production of oil, the Turkish authorities have brought back some 4,500 Greek families to Aivali to carry on the industry, which at the time was apparently under German control. These repatriated Greeks, while receiving wages, are not allowed to live in their own homes, but are kept under official surveillance.

During 1911, 802 steamers, with a total tonnage of 133,356 tons, entered and cleared at Aivali. They were mostly small coasting vessels belonging to Smyrna.

Dikeli, which lies in a bay opposite the island of Mitylene, is a small port, from which the products of the rich districts behind the town and around Pergamum (Bergama) are shipped, mainly to the Greek islands or Smyrna.

Smyrna is situated at the head of the gulf of the same name. Before the European war it had a population of about 300,000, of whom some 140,000 were Christians, mostly Greek subjects of Turkey. The influence of the Greek element is very great; the Turkish inhabitants can generally speak Greek, while many of the Greeks do not know Turkish—a state of affairs unparalleled anywhere else in the Turkish Empire, except on one or two islands. After Constantinople, Smyrna is the most important city and port in the Ottoman dominions.

The water front is protected by a quay several miles in length. At the south end of the bay, parallel to the quay, is a concrete embankment, a mile and a quarter long and 60 ft. wide. The area between this and the quay is called the Inner Harbour. It is 40 acres in extent, and can be entered at both ends of the embankment. Its average depth is 34 ft., and there are 15 ft. to 18 ft. of water alongside the shore quay. Vessels making only a short call generally anchor outside the embankment or opposite the town, and load or unload by means of lighters.

Warehouse accommodation is not equal to the demands made upon it. The Quay Company, a French concern, had certain warehouses under control of the Customs, but their efforts to increase the number of these encountered the disapproval of the Ottoman Government—a particularly foolish attitude, since the Government was entitled to 50 per cent. of the company's net profits. The deficiencies on the quay were partly made up by the Smyrna—Aidin railway, which erected big warehouses and a pier close to its terminus at the north end of the town, and as a branch customhouse was established on the pier, goods brought down by rail could be shipped without passing over the quay at all. This aroused opposition on the part of the Quay Company and the local authorities, and as the Central Government naturally listened sympathetically to their protests, the railway company was much hampered in its attempts to make further improvements. Up to the entry of Turkey into the war no satisfactory settlement had been arranged.

The facilities for repairing ships or machinery are fairly good. There is a slip provided with power capable of lifting 500 tons, but no dock of any kind.

In time of peace there is always great activity in the port. The following table shows the numbers of the vessels entering and clearing from Smyrna in the years 1908-1912:—

Year.	Steamers.	Sailing Vessels.	Total Tonnage.
1908	2,933	4,347	2,819,960
1909	3,018	3,202	2,890,317
1910	2,661	4,004	2,477,733
1911	2,441	2,899	2,405,216
1912	2,448	2,587	2,254,037

It must be remembered that in September 1911 war broke out between Turkey and Italy, and that conse-

quently no Italian ships entered the port for the remainder of that year, or during 1912. Turkish shipping, too, was interfered with by the blockade of the Dardanelles and other enterprises of the Italian fleet. Moreover, in October 1912 Greece went to war with Turkey, and trade at Smyrna was further restricted.

In 1912 the number of British steamers entering the port was 363, representing a tonnage of 653,000. Of these, however, 168, with a tonnage of 333,000, were bound to or from Egypt, nearly all being vessels of the Khedivial Mail Steamship Co.

The export trade of Smyrna was larger than that of any other Turkish port, the value of the exports exceeding that of the imports. The figures for the years 1910-12 were as follow :—

Year.	Exports.	Imports.
	£	£
1910	4,444,000	4,061,000
1911	4,400,000	4,137,000
1912	4,000,000	3,788,000

The principal exports were dried fruits, grain, valonia, opium, olive oil, tobacco, liquorice root, wool, raw cotton, skins, and emery. The imports included a great variety of manufactured goods, coal, petroleum, leather, sugar, coffee, and rice. Fuller particulars and statistics of the foreign trade of Smyrna are given below (see pp. 107-108).

Smyrna is the terminus of the Smyrna—Aidin and Smyrna—Kassaba Railways, and the trade of the districts served by their lines passes almost entirely through it. In the past, moreover, many of the goods sent down by the railways had to be prepared and packed for export at Smyrna; this was notably the case with figs, which were handled in very large quantities. Of late, however, owing to the inadequacy of the accommodation and labour at Smyrna, it became

more usual for producers and merchants in the interior to despatch their goods ready for shipment, and the efforts of the Smyrna authorities, merchants, and Quay Company failed to check this practice, whereby the town suffered a serious loss. Besides serving as a port for the hinterland, Smyrna is a receiving and distributing centre for many of the islands off the coast, and for widely separated districts of the Mediterranean littoral of Anatolia. Goods from places as far away as Aivali and Adalia, whatever their ultimate destination, were generally shipped first to Smyrna.

The prosperity of the port rests on stable foundations, and is likely to increase as the rich country behind it is further exploited and provided with additional railways. The development of Marmarice and Makri and the construction by the Italians of railways in their neighbourhood might perhaps divert a little trade from Smyrna, but no serious harm is to be apprehended from that quarter. What Smyrna principally needs is the provision of adequate warehouse accommodation.

Smyrna used to be well served by steamship lines. Among British undertakings, the Wilson, Ellerman, and Cunard Lines, and the Khedivial Mail Steamship Co., touched regularly at the port, as did all the important continental lines plying in the eastern Mediterranean, such as the Deutsche Levante Linie, the Austrian Lloyd, the Messageries Maritimes, the Società Marittima Italiana, and the Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company. Smyrna was, of course, also visited by the vessels of numerous local companies, both Greek and Turkish, which operate among the islands and along the coast.

Up to the outbreak of the war Smyrna possessed no wireless apparatus, but its telegraphic communications were otherwise excellent.

Marmarice, lying in a well-sheltered bay at the south-west corner of Asia Minor, has an excellent natural harbour, which, however, is little used, the town being extremely unhealthy. Extensive drainage works will

have to be undertaken before the place can become commercially important.

Makri is in similar case. The port is situated at the south-east extremity of the Gulf of Makri, with complete shelter, and has the finest natural harbour in Asia Minor. The country round is rich and fertile. A certain amount of chromium, wood, and charcoal used to be exported, but the town, which is bounded on the landward side by a marsh, is so unhealthy that it is inhabited only in winter. If the Italians push forward their railway projects in this region (see above, p. 57), and take measures to improve the sanitary conditions, Makri will no doubt soon attain the importance to which its harbour entitles it.

Adalia, in the gulf of the same name, has a population of 30,000. The harbour is too small for any but small craft, and the anchorage off the town, in 15 to 20 fathoms, though good in summer, is unsafe in winter.

The exports of Adalia were wheat and flour, sesame and other seeds, live-stock, timber, and charcoal. The timber and charcoal were mostly sent to Egypt, the trade being mainly in Italian hands. Other goods went principally to Smyrna and the Greek islands, the latter taking large quantities of flour. Adalia had seven hydraulic flour mills, and most of the wheat brought down to the port was milled before shipment. The imports consisted chiefly of manufactured goods, mostly from the United Kingdom and the United States. The future of Adalia depends mainly on the success of the Italian schemes for exploiting the neighbouring districts (see above, p. 57).

Mersina has an open roadstead. Vessels anchor about a mile off shore in six fathoms with a stiff mud bottom. The anchorage, though exposed to winds between the quarters of south-west and east-south-east, is safe for ships in any weather, but lighters are apt to break adrift in winter gales. There are five piers. The most easterly, belonging to the Mersina, Tarsus, and Adana Railway, is 460 ft. long and 20 ft. to 35 ft. broad; the water is 10 ft. in depth at the end, shoaling

towards the shore; there are two lines of rail and two travelling steam cranes. The Customs pier is the principal landing-place; it is 240 ft. long and 20 ft. to 40 ft. wide; the depth of water at the end is 8 ft. On the pier is a light tram-line, and there are two small cranes. The other piers are small and unprovided with facilities for unloading or shipping goods.

In 1909, 645 steamers, of 797,433 tons in all, entered the port. Before the war the principal exports were cotton, cotton-seed and cake, cereals, sesame, and live-stock. The cotton went mainly to Italy, Spain, and Germany; the grain to other parts of Turkey; the animals to Egypt. The imports were miscellaneous, coal being one of the most important.

Several shipping lines touched regularly at Mersina, the chief being the Messageries Maritimes, the Austrian Lloyd, the Società Marittima Italiana, the Società Italiana di Servizi Marittimi, the Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Co., and the Khedivial Mail Steamship Co. Vessels of the Prince Line, the Asia Minor Steamship Co., and the Deutsche Levante Linie also called frequently at the port. Mersina had no wireless installation or submarine cable before the war.

Mersina has direct railway communication with the rich Cilician Plain, but its situation does not lend itself to the construction of an adequate harbour, and its importance is not likely to increase much in future. When Cilicia is properly developed most of its trade will probably pass through Ayas or Alexandretta.

The town of *Ayas*, in the vilayet of Adana, is situated at the north-east corner of Ayas Bay, a large inlet on the north-west coast of the Gulf of Alexandretta. Off the north coast of the bay, to the south-west of the town, there is safe anchorage in 4 to 10 fathoms, with good holding in stiff mud and complete shelter except from east and south-east winds, which seldom blow for any length of time. East of the town is a small harbour, protected by two ancient and massive moles. It is fast filling with sand, but still affords sufficient accommoda-

tion for small coasting vessels. The town itself is poverty-stricken and most unhealthy.

For some time the Baghdad Railway Company contemplated the construction of a modern port at Ayas, which was to be connected by rail with Adana; but when the Company acquired control over the Mersina, Tarsus, and Adana Railway, the project was shelved. Subsequently it was decided to build a branch to Alexandretta, and the Haidar Pasha Port Company, which is dominated by the same interests as the Baghdad Railway Company, obtained a concession for constructing a large new port at that town. In consequence the scheme for developing Ayas was definitely abandoned. Ayas Bay, however, offers so many attractions to shipping that it would probably compete successfully with Alexandretta if facilities for handling cargo were provided. Indeed, if current expectations regarding the economic future of the adjacent regions should be realised, both ports would soon become very prosperous.

(B) INDUSTRY

(1) Labour

(a) *Supply*

The supply of labour in Anatolia is scanty. This is partly due to the sparseness of the population, on which the military system and the frequent wars, especially those of the Hejaz and the Yemen, have been a severe drain. Another cause is the fact that the land is mostly in the hands of peasant-farmers, who live on their own produce, and have neither the time to work for others nor the means to hire others to work for them. Consequently, hired labour is little used in agriculture. At harvest-time, however, nomad gypsies and Kurds from the mountains offer their services as reapers, often contracting to cut all the crops of a village. In south and west Anatolia, moreover, where a great variety of agricultural products

is raised, the Christian peasants, who are industrious and intelligent, are willing to work as hired labourers on tasks requiring special experience and skill, such as the tending of the tobacco plant and the poppy, or of olive yards, vineyards, and fig gardens. They receive high pay, and as soon as the season for their particular work is over, they return home to cultivate their own lands. This system prevails especially in the vilayet of Aidin, where in 1912 men skilled in the care of the tobacco plant were paid as much as 6*s*. a day—an enormous wage for Turkey, and only obtainable, it must be added, under exceptional conditions.

It has always been a difficult matter in Anatolia to secure labour for the construction and working of railways. As a rule, the companies are bound by the terms of their concessions to employ native labour, if possible from the districts through which their lines run, for any work not requiring technical knowledge. Even for the roughest tasks, however, it has generally been found necessary to obtain labour from a distance; and most of the navvies employed on the railways come from the coastal regions of the Black Sea, many of them being Kurds. These men are hired in gangs, each under a headman, who is responsible for the maintenance of his gang at full strength—a necessary precaution, as the Turk is apt, after earning a few pounds, to throw up his job and go home, regardless of threats or remonstrances. Any work calling for the slightest degree of skill, such as masonry, is almost always performed by foreigners or native Christians, and on most railways all engine-drivers, stokers, mechanics, and clerks belong to one or other of these classes. Nevertheless, the prevalent opinion that the Turk is by nature incapable of becoming a skilled workman is not justified, for the Smyrna–Aidin Railway employed in their large workshops 400 Turks, whom they had engaged as boys and carefully trained, and who were not only intelligent, but also industrious and conscientious, whereas Christian workmen, though clever, are commonly unreliable and dishonest. It is

also to be noted that, after the Revolution, a Railway Engineers' Battalion was added to the army, and the recruits were sent to work on the railways, where they showed excellent promise.

The shortage of labour has affected the mining industry even more than the railways. Mining work is, in general, too severe and strenuous for the Turk, who, furthermore, has a rooted objection to leaving his native place and settling down elsewhere. Mine-owners have in consequence to rely almost entirely on Christian labour, especially for work underground.

In the towns the skilled artisans are mostly independent craftsmen, working for their own account. Any workmen they may employ are, with rare exceptions, Christians, and Christians generally do all the better-paid work in the few factories that exist. The labouring class is almost wholly unskilled, consisting largely of Turks who have come from the country to earn a little money for some special purpose—such as the purchase of exemption from military service—and who hire themselves out for the roughest kind of manual work, or as porters, doorkeepers, boatmen, and such like.

It is very unusual for women to work in factories, though at Brusa some are employed in the silk-spinning mills.[1] The domestic textile industries, however, some of which are important, are carried on mainly by women and girls, who work either for their own account or for merchants who provide them with materials. Women also commonly assist the men of their family in agricultural work of all kinds.

The Turkish Government has made little effort to regulate the supply or the conditions of labour. Apart from certain ineffectual stipulations in concessions to foreigners regarding the employment of native labour, its only important measure has been the passing in 1910 of a law forbidding strikes in establishments or institutions of public utility, and providing, in the case of

[1] See below, p. 75.

disputes, for mediation by the Ministry of Public Works, and, if this fails, for the holding of a conference, under the presidency of a delegate of the Ministry, between representatives of the contending parties.

(b) *Emigration and Immigration*

During the reign of Abdul Hamid, emigration from Turkey was most severely restricted; and the majority of those who left Turkish territory did so contrary to law. There was virtually no emigration on the part of Mussulmans, but a good many Christians managed to leave the country. Many thousand Armenians fled from Turkey to the Christian States in the Balkans, Russia, or the United States. These refugees were generally men, their families being left behind. After the Revolution some of them returned to Turkey; others sent for their families to join them in their new homes. Besides the Armenians, many Greeks, though from different motives, succeeded in emigrating. They were mostly young men from the seaboard, who found it fairly easy to get across to the islands or Greece, whence they generally went to the United States. A large number, however, after making some money, came home, and it is probable that the majority intended to do so. In 1906 and the following years there was a considerable emigration of Jews from or through Smyrna, mostly to South America.

The Revolution led to the return of a few Armenians; but, on the whole, it stimulated emigration among the Christians, especially the Greeks of western Anatolia. The main cause of this was the new law establishing what was called equality, whereby the Christians were for the first time made liable for military service. In 1910, 8,000 young men, the pick of the peasant class, left the district of Smyrna for America.

Since the Balkan Wars there has been a considerable decline in the Christian population along the

western seaboard of Anatolia. Thousands fled to escape the maltreatment to which they were subjected by the Turks at the instigation of the German Military Mission at Constantinople, who wished to make the region a military zone, and regarded the Christians as friends of the enemy. Forcible deportations were also carried out, this policy being in full vigour at the outbreak of the European War. The regions opposite Chio and Mitylene were treated with special severity.

While emigrants from Anatolia are almost all Christians, immigrants are almost all Mussulmans. These come from the European provinces which have been lost to Turkey since the war with Russia in 1877. This movement has gone on steadily, stimulated by religious propaganda and by official promises of grants of land and immunity from taxes and military service. All the lost provinces and islands have contributed a quota. Entire villages have often emigrated, taking with them their cattle and agricultural implements. The newcomers have settled most thickly along the Marmara littoral and near the line of the Anatolian Railway; while many of those who arrived after the Balkan Wars were planted by the Government in the country behind Smyrna. Though the authorities have often failed to keep their promises, many of the immigrants have been able to buy land, and have proved themselves a valuable element in the country, as they are industrious and their methods of cultivation are much more advanced than those usually followed in Anatolia.

(2) Agriculture

(a) *Products of Commercial Value*

In treating of the agricultural products of Anatolia, it is well to deal with the provinces separately, as the nature and quality of the crops and live-stock depend on the past history of each region, the character of the population, and the adequacy of communications, not

to mention climate and soil—factors which vary greatly in such a large and mountainous tract of country with so long a coast-line. It may broadly be said that agriculture flourishes most in regions near the railways and where the Christian element in the population is numerous. The railways enable the cultivator to find a market for surplus produce, and have largely removed the danger of famine, which formerly might arise after any year of bad weather. The Christians are, as a rule, far more industrious and intelligent than the Mussulman Turks, and alone possess the skill requisite for the successful cultivation of tobacco, poppies, and olives. Where they are numerous, a greater variety of produce is raised, and such districts are thus less dependent for their prosperity on particular meteorological conditions.

To avoid unnecessary repetition, it may be stated here that in the more fertile parts of Anatolia the raising of live-stock is of small economic importance. The peasants breed domestic animals—horses, asses, oxen, buffaloes—for their own use; but it is only in the high country of central Anatolia that stock-breeding attains the dignity of an industry. The Angora goat and the camel are the most valuable animals produced.

Sanjak of Ismid.—With a healthy climate, good railway communication with the capital, and a population consisting largely of Christians and Mussulman refugees from Europe, the province has of late increased rapidly in prosperity. About one-third of its area is under cultivation, the remainder being mostly covered with forests. Cereals, especially maize, and seeds are grown in large quantities. The province is particularly suited to fruit, which finds a ready market at Constantinople. Sericulture has been successfully introduced of recent years, being practised principally by Greeks and Armenians. Among other products of importance are tobacco, opium, honey, and wax; and poultry and eggs are sent in great numbers from Adabazar to Constantinople.

Vilayet of Brusa and Sanjak of Bigha.—The sanjak of Bigha may be treated along with the vilayet of Brusa, as the conditions of the two provinces are similar.

Although the communications stand in need of development, this region is one of the most prosperous in Anatolia. The parts near the sea are particularly fertile. The eastern and south-eastern parts lie on the central plateau of Asia Minor, Eskishehir being 2,600 ft., and Afium Karahissar 3,000 ft. above sea-level; but even here the soil is excellent for cereals. In the north and west the population is largely Christian, while in the highlands there are many Turkish immigrants from Europe. The most fertile tracts are along the Marmara coast; but much of this country is almost uninhabitable, as it is marshy and fever-stricken, especially between Brusa and Panderma.

In the north and west, wheat, barley, maize, beans, and seeds of all kinds are produced in increasing quantities. Opium, tobacco, and cotton are successfully grown, and a considerable amount of valonia is produced. Rice is also cultivated, especially round the lake of Isnik, but the peasants regard it with disfavour, as it requires marshy and therefore malarious ground. Olives and all manner of fruit grow well, their cultivation extending far into the interior; the district of Balikhissar produces some of the finest fruit grown in Turkey. The most valuable product, however, is silk. Schools of sericulture have been established at various centres by the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt; and whereas, some 30 years ago, Pasteurised silkworm-seed had to be obtained from France, the peasants now export seed thither and elsewhere. The centre of the silk industry is the city of Brusa, where a certain amount of silk thread is spun.

The high tableland in the east produces good grain-crops, and is specially celebrated for its barley, which is exported on a large scale, principally to England for the malting industry.

Vilayet of Aidin.—This is unquestionably the richest

province of Anatolia. Its communications, internal and external, are good; its inhabitants, among whom the number of Christians is exceptionally large, are hard-working and intelligent; its soil is fertile, and the railway companies have done their best to develop its resources and to introduce new methods of cultivation.

The vilayet raises a remarkable variety of agricultural products. Cereals of all kinds flourish; cotton is grown in various districts, especially at Aidin and Nazli; opium is produced in large quantities; the valonia oak is carefully tended; and, notwithstanding the irksome regulations of the Tobacco Monopoly, the cultivation of tobacco has of late years greatly increased. The province is justly renowned for its fruit, many kinds of which are plentiful. Fig gardens and vineyards abound, and are cultivated with great skill and success by the peasants. The quantity of figs carried by the Smyrna—Aidin Railway increased fivefold in the twenty years before the war. The vines cultivated are mainly those which produce raisins, several kinds of which are exported in great quantities. Another important product is liquorice, which grows wild and is particularly abundant along the Maeander River and its tributaries. The root, either dried or in the form of a paste, was largely exported to the United Kingdom and the United States. In 1913 it was stated by the British Consular authorities that the revenue of the province had risen from £1,000,000 to £2,000,000 in the space of 10 years; and though the increase was partly due to better methods of collecting the taxes, it was principally the result of the growing prosperity of agriculture.

Vilayet of Kastamuni.—This vilayet, mountainous in most parts, with poor communications, and a population almost entirely Mussulman, is the most backward in Anatolia. Much of the soil is fertile, but the peasants are generally content with raising the bare necessaries of life. There is a little export of agricultural produce from the coastal regions; but the products of the interior are nearly all consumed locally.

Wheat, barley, maize, chickpeas, gallnuts, and valonia are produced; and also, though only on a small scale, cotton and opium. Fruit grows well, but little commercial profit is derived from it. In the south and east the silkworm is bred, but this industry is not important. Among the animal products are wool, mohair, and skins.

Vilayet of Angora.—This province consists for the most part of a tableland more than 3,000 ft. above the sea. The great majority of the inhabitants are Mussulman Turks; the Christians are mostly Armenians. The soil is generally fertile, but the comparative coldness of the climate precludes the raising of many products that do well in the western provinces. The rainfall, which varies much from year to year, is of particular importance in this vilayet, which in general suffers from a lack of rivers and streams. The most prosperous regions are those traversed by the railway from Eskishehir to Angora and Kaisari.

Wheat is the principal crop. Barley comes next, the quality grown in the districts near the railway being particularly good. Oats, rye, millet, and various kinds of seeds are also cultivated. In the less elevated parts, rice, cotton, tobacco, and poppies are occasionally grown. The province produces good fruit, especially apples and pears.

The wide extent of uncultivated country lends itself to the rearing of cattle, sheep, and goats, especially the so-called Angora goat, which produces mohair. The mohair and wool of the vilayet are almost entirely sent to Constantinople, whence they are exported to foreign markets. Since the railway to Angora was built, the domestic manufacture of mohair and woollen stuffs has greatly declined. There is a large trade in dried or jerked meat. Camels, donkeys, and mules are bred in considerable numbers.

Vilayet of Konia.—This province, like Angora, lies on the central tableland of Asia Minor, except in the south, where the land slopes sharply down to the Mediterranean. Less than 10 per cent. of the popula-

tion are Christians; most of these live in the department of Adalia on the seaboard. Though the total length of the railways in the vilayet is considerable, means of communication are, on the whole, bad. In the west, north, and east, the soil and climate are much as in Angora; the south is more fertile and much warmer; in the centre there are a number of salt lakes, and the country round these is dry and barren. Agriculture generally is very backward, and, the population being sparse, much cultivable land is untilled. The greatest prosperity is seen in the south and near the line of the Anatolian and Baghdad Railways, where a large extent of new land has recently been brought under cultivation.

In the greater part of the province little is grown save cereals and seeds; but in the regions of Isparta, Buldur, and Adalia, cotton, opium, tobacco, valonia, olives, raisins, and other fruits are produced. In the north and east the peasants breed cattle, mohair goats, and sheep.

Vilayet of Adana.—This province falls into two well-defined areas. The western part is mountainous, rising abruptly from the sea to the Taurus mountains; the eastern part lies largely in the Cilician Plain, which is very fertile, though most unhealthy. Christians, principally Armenians, formed the most numerous element of the population before the war, but in all probability few are now left. Communications are more satisfactory than in most parts of Anatolia.

In the western half of the province, agriculture is not very remunerative, and the forests are the most valuable asset of this region. The Cilician Plain, on the other hand, yields a great variety of agricultural products, including wheat, barley, oats, rice, seeds, opium, sugar-cane, and cotton. The cultivation of cotton, for which the climate and soil are most suitable, increased rapidly in the decade before the war, and in 1912 the vilayet produced 110,000 bales of cotton and 35,000 tons of cotton-seed.

(b) *Methods of Cultivation*

In general, the methods of cultivation followed in Anatolia are most antiquated. The time-honoured wooden plough, little altered since the days of the Hittites, is commonly used; threshing is usually done by dragging over the corn a heavy sledge studded with flints; manure, though used in gardens and vineyards, and for certain plants, such as the poppy, which require special care, is rarely employed in the cultivation of grain crops. The peasant, in fact, seldom produces more than will satisfy the needs of himself and his family. Certain distinctions must, however, be drawn between various classes of the population and various districts. As a general rule, the Christian peasants are more skilful and intelligent, and readier to welcome modern improvements, than the native Turks; and in the western vilayets, they possess valuable traditional lore and show wonderful ability in gardening and the raising of particular products, such as grapes, olives, opium, and tobacco. The *Muhajirs*, or Mussulman immigrants from European Turkey, are likewise comparatively advanced in agricultural knowledge and methods, and their villages and fields can be distinguished at a glance from those of the native Turk by their orderly and prosperous appearance. Nevertheless, it is only in a few districts particularly exposed to foreign influences that really modern methods and implements have been adopted. Scientific cultivation, as might be expected, flourishes most in the regions traversed by railways, where the possibility of disposing of his surplus produce stimulates the peasant to increase his output. In such districts a light modern plough has found favour, and threshing, winnowing, and screening machines are beginning to be used.

The vilayet of Aidin, in agricultural methods as in other respects, is the most advanced. The railways have done their best to encourage the sale of agricultural machinery; and the Smyrna—Aidin

Company allows its stationmasters to keep a supply of fittings and duplicate parts for certain standard machines, which, in the total absence of skilled mechanics, would otherwise never be repaired when out of order. The same company has also made experiments in the growing of new crops, and has given instruction and distributed seed to peasants who wish to cultivate them.

The Anatolian Railway has done good work of the same kind. In the sanjak of Ismid it has experimented in new crops, and established three tree-nurseries. In the vilayet of Konia it has successfully introduced modern agricultural machinery, which is being increasingly used.

For some years prior to 1914, the neighbourhood of Adalia was importing a good deal of agricultural machinery from the United States. Modern methods and apparatus were also rapidly winning favour in the vilayet of Adana, where British steam-ploughs and threshing machines and American reapers were widely used, and certain farmers had begun to sow cotton by machinery.

Anatolia abounds in the remains of extensive irrigation works, dating from Roman or Byzantine times. With the advent of the Turks these fell into disuse, the result being the creation of large fever-breeding marshes. A few years ago there was virtually no irrigation in Anatolia, except for gardens near the towns, where rights to water are commonly sold along with land. When, however, the economic penetration of Anatolia by foreigners began, the need for scientific irrigation was soon realised. Several important projects have been considered, but only one, the Konia Irrigation Scheme, has so far taken practical effect. This was initiated by the Anatolian Railway Company, though the territory chiefly affected falls within the sphere of the Baghdad Railway. The capital was found by the Deutsche Bank. The undertaking was nominally carried out for the Turkish Government, but hitherto it has

remained in the hands of the Germans. The object of the scheme is to irrigate the unproductive plain south-east of Konia. The water for this purpose is derived from Lake Beyshehir and Lake Soghla or Kara Viran, and is brought down by canals and the River Charshembe, the flow of which has been artificially regulated. The distribution of the water in the Konia plain is controlled by an elaborate network of canals and dykes. Although the system is not yet complete, the main works were opened in 1914. They are stated to have been most successful; in 1915, 150,000 acres were brought under cultivation, and a report of the Turkish Ministry of Works, dated April 1917, states that in the region affected by the scheme the peasants' crops of wheat and oats have increased fivefold, even though antiquated methods of tillage are employed, while crops cultivated according to scientific methods under Government supervision have yielded fifteen times more than those previously raised on the same land.

Another project which has been much discussed, and which is said to have been revived lately at the instance of the Turkish Government, is the draining and irrigation of the marshes and lands round the Lake of Abullion (Apollonia). The district is naturally very fertile, but is now swampy and malarious. A similar scheme under consideration affects the region of the Lake of Isnik (Nicea), and the opening up of communications between the lake and Geumlek. All this region is also fertile and most unhealthy. It might be possible to make some use of the remains of the irrigation works and canals which existed here in the days of the Byzantine Empire.

In 1911-12 the firm of Sir John Jackson, Ltd., acting for the National Bank of Turkey, completed surveys with a view to controlling the Maeander and irrigating its valley. No works, however, were begun, though the scheme is of great importance. The valley is very fertile, but the devious course of the river is constantly changing, with disastrous results to

agriculture. It was computed that the accomplishment of the project would have brought a million acres of land under cultivation.

During the war the Germans initiated an ambitious scheme for draining and irrigating a large tract of the vilayet of Adana. It appears that the main purpose of the project was to drain the marshy country between the lower reaches of the Sihun and the Jihun, and then to water the area systematically from these rivers. Work was to be started in the autumn of 1917, but it is not known whether any substantial progress has been made.

(c) *Forestry*

It is only within the last half-century that the Turkish Government has made any effort to preserve from indiscriminate devastation the valuable forests which cover the mountain slopes in all parts of the Empire. The present administration of the forests is based on a law promulgated in 1870, though subsequently modified at various times. This measure places all forests, whether on State, communal, or private property, under the control of the Ministry of Agriculture, Mines, and Forestry; provides for the appointment of a staff of inspectors and keepers to supervise the felling of trees; specifies the conditions on which timber may be taken by Government Departments; fixes the taxes payable by private individuals who are granted permits to cut wood; and ordains severe penalties for unauthorised depredations. It is an admirable law, but, like most Turkish laws, has made very little difference. This is partly due to the slackness, ignorance, and venality of Turkish officials, and partly to the lack of communications, which renders impossible the effective supervision of many of the forests. There is still much unauthorised and wasteful felling of timber and stripping of bark; great damage is frequently caused by fires, which are not seldom started by incendiaries; tracts of woodland fall

into decay from sheer neglect; and there is scarcely a district where any serious attempt has been made to replace losses by planting young trees.

Notwithstanding the havoc that has been wrought, the forests of Anatolia are still of vast extent and great potential value. Every Anatolian province has large stretches of woodland, and in reviewing the country's forest resources it is convenient to take each separately.

Sanjak of Ismid.—The forests of this region have suffered very serious devastation, but considerable areas remain under timber in the districts of Kandra, Adabazar, and Geive. From the last-named district much walnut wood is exported to Constantinople. There are also forests near Ismid; the wood here is used chiefly for making charcoal.

Vilayet of Brusa.—This province has numerous beautiful forests, their total area being estimated at 23,000 square kilometres. Many of them, however, are neglected and almost unknown. The district of Ainegeul is the richest in timber, while near Gediz there is a large forest consisting exclusively of oak. The principal trees found are pine, fir, oak, elm, chestnut, beech, and hornbeam.

Sanjak of Bigha.—There are about 2,000 square kilometres of forest in the province. The forest of Eshelek, which covers 510 square kilometres, has been systematically exploited under the direction of the School of Forestry near Constantinople. Its principal product is oak, which has been exported in considerable quantities. Elsewhere coniferous trees are the most abundant, and there used to be some export of timber from the celebrated pine-woods of the Kaz Dagh region. Beeches, limes, elms, and plane-trees are numerous, and there are extensive and valuable plantations of valonia oaks. In normal times, large quantities of gall-nuts are exported. Better use has been made of the forests in this province than in most parts of Anatolia, but except around Eshelek there has been no serious attempt to apply modern methods.

Vilayet of Aidin.—There are about 6,000 square kilometres of forest in this province. The most thickly wooded areas are in the west and south-west, the neighbourhood of Makri being specially rich in excellent timber. The oak and the pine are the principal trees; near Makri cedars also flourish. In this district private undertakings have of late begun to exploit the forests, but the work is generally directed by natives who know nothing of scientific forestry. A few hydraulic sawmills, with vertical saws, have been erected, and in the town of Makri there is a small steam sawmill; but many of the trees felled are still sawed on the spot by hand. In the district of Davas there is also some exploitation of the forests, the timber being floated down the Ak Chai to the railway. Elsewhere in the province, however, the forests are subjected to the usual haphazard treatment.

Vilayet of Kastamuni.—About a third of the province consists of forest. The district of Bolu is especially rich in timber, all the mountains being well covered, particularly the Ala Dagh on the southern boundary of the province. The forests in this district, and also around Kastamuni and Sinope, have been to some extent exploited by the State. The principal trees are oak, beech, chestnut, elm, lime, and black pine. Considerable numbers of whorls, made of walnut wood, are exported.

Vilayet of Angora.—In this vilayet there are only four forests of note: those of Yaban-Abad in the district of Angora, Akdagh Maden and Sungurlu in the district of Yuzgat, and Chichek Dagh in the district of Kirshehir. They furnish the local peasants with firewood and charcoal. The most plentiful tree is the oak.

Vilayet of Konia.—This province has many rich forests; but they have been little exploited except in the region of Adalia. Here there are about 900,000 acres of forest, mostly covered with pine and larch.

Vilayet of Adana.—The mountainous regions in the west of this province contain fine forests of oak and

pine. They have been very wastefully used, but remain of great extent and value.

(d) *Land Tenure*

The conditions under which land is held in Anatolia differ in no material respect from those prevailing in other parts of Turkey. The subject is treated at length in *Turkey in Europe*, No. 16 of this series.

(3) Fisheries

It is illegal to catch or sell fish, or even to possess fishing apparatus, without a licence; and, in addition to the cost of the various licences, a tax has to be paid on the price of all fish sold. It is perhaps largely due to these restrictions that little systematic fishing is carried on; and although the Marmara, the Dardanelles, and the Mediterranean abound in excellent fish of many kinds, there are, except near Constantinople, no fisheries of more than local importance. Most of the rivers and lakes of the interior also contain good fish; but only in the vilayet of Brusa and the sanjak of Adalia are they caught in any number. There is everywhere a good deal of poaching by the peasants for their own needs.

(4) Minerals

(a) *Natural Resources*

The chief provisions of the Turkish mining law are given in *Turkey in Europe*.

Though the mineral resources of Anatolia have been very imperfectly investigated, enough information exists to show that they are both varied and valuable. Few mineral deposits, however, are worked, and the number of concessions granted for exploiting minerals gives an exaggerated impression of the extent of the mining industry, as many persons and companies have obtained concessions with the object of selling them to

others and therefore limit themselves to the minimum of work required by the law. Several causes have contributed to discourage mining—the badness of communications, the lack of coal in proximity to the chief mineral deposits, the heavy dues exacted by the Government, and the difficulty of securing labour.

The principal minerals known to exist in Anatolia are coal and lignite, lead, chromium, boracite (pandermite), emery, and meerschaum.

Coal.—By far the most important coalfield is that of Heraclea. The coal in this region was first mined successfully by a French company, the Société française d'Héraclée, which in 1896 obtained a concession for the construction and administration of a port at Zunguldak, the working of a number of mines, and the building of a light railway. The concession was to expire in 1846. For some time the company made no profit, but in the last few years before the war it did better. In 1912 it sold 513,900 tons of coal, at an average price of 16*s.*, f.o.b. at Zunguldak. Of this, 217,000 tons were supplied to ships' bunkers at the port, and 186,000 tons were shipped to Constantinople. Before the war there were several other companies working in the same area, but their total output was considerably less than that of the Société d'Héraclée.

Shortly before the war several of the mines of this region were bought by a Belgian syndicate, and others by a German company under the control of the Deutsche Bank and Hugo Stinnes, the coal magnate. In 1916 this company took over the mines of the Belgian group. It has since undertaken the construction of a railway from the coalfield to Bolu.

When war broke out between France and Turkey, the Turkish Government assumed control of the mines and other works of the Société d'Héraclée; and it afterwards bought up the harbour of Zunguldak. It also endeavoured to bring all the mines of the region under a single new company, which was being formed in 1917 by a group of German financiers, headed as usual by the Deutsche Bank.

There are small deposits of coal in other parts of Anatolia. Near Manjilik, in the north-west of the vilayet of Brusa, there are small workings, and prospecting in this area is being continued. Coal has also been found near Lapsaki on the Dardanelles, but these deposits have not yet been exploited. In the vilayet of Aidin coal is mined near Soma for the use of factories in that neighbourhood and at Pergamum. At Sokia and Nazli, in the Maeander Valley, there are workings which supply local needs; and at Makri a mine produces coal of good quality. It is reported that coal has been discovered near Konia, and is being worked by the local authorities.

Lignite.—Deposits of lignite are found in several parts. The so-called Panderma Lignite Mines, which lie between Kirmasli and Mikhalij in the vilayet of Brusa, formerly produced little, but during the latter part of the war sent more than 300 tons monthly to Constantinople. The lignite, however, is of poor quality, and has to be mixed with better lignite or coal before being used. The most important lignite mines in Anatolia are at Manjilik, in the same province, and belong to the celebrated Balia-Karaïdin Company, further particulars of which will be found below. From 1908 to 1912 the mines produced on an average 29,000 tons a year. In the vilayet of Aidin several deposits are worked. Near Soma mines have been opened during the war, and according to report produce very large quantities of very bad lignite, some of which, however, mixed with German coal, is burned by the locomotives on the Soma-Panderma Railway, while some is sent to Smyrna. At Sokia workings which were fairly successful before the war have, it seems, greatly increased their output. Here, too, the lignite is poor, but it is bought in Smyrna by the railways, the gasworks, and factories. Another deposit, near Nazli, has also been worked very vigorously since 1914, mainly by an American company. The produce, though said to be deplorably bad, commands a market in Smyrna. In contrast to the mines just mentioned, a

deposit of lignite recently found near Angora is said to be of good quality.

Lead.—Lead ore, usually containing silver and sometimes gold, occurs in many places, frequently in association with zinc. By far the most important mines are those of Karaïdin and Koja Gümüsh, near Balia-Maden, in the north-west of the vilayet of Brusa, which belong to the Société Anonyme Ottomane de Balia-Karaïdin, already mentioned as working lignite in the same neighbourhood. This company, which was established with French capital, took over the mines from the Société de Laurium, of Athens, in 1892, and has become the most prosperous mining enterprise in Anatolia. In the years 1910-1913, the dividend paid on its share capital averaged 23 per cent. per annum. During the same period the mines produced yearly on an average 12,900 tons of argentiferous "rough" lead, smelted on the spot, and 5,800 tons of blende, containing 41 per cent. of zinc. The mines are worked on the most scientific principles and with modern plant, and the company has built a Décauville railway from the lignite mines at Manjilik to Balia and Palamutlik, whence there is a good road to the small port of Akchai, which is used for the shipment of such of the company's products as are destined for overseas. It is stated that after the outbreak of the European War the mines were for a time shut down, but later, it appears, the company was given large contracts for lead by the Otttoman Government.

There are also very valuable deposits of auriferous and argentiferous lead in the Bulgar Dagh mountains, in the extreme south-east of the vilayet of Konia. The most famous mine in this district is that of Bulgar Maden, which has been exploited since 1825. It belongs to the State, and, perhaps on that account, has not been very vigorously worked, although the ore can be easily and cheaply reached by means of horizontal galleries. The ore contains 44.2 per cent. of lead, and 1,665 grammes of silver and 7 of gold to the ton; but owing to the primitive methods of smelting employed

a large proportion of the lead and silver is lost. The gold is separated from the silver at Constantinople, and of late years has surpassed in value the other products of the mine. There can be no doubt, however, that, with energetic and enlightened methods of working, the mine's yield of lead and silver would be very large. A German report on mining in Anatolia indicates that at Berektli Maden, some 60 kilometres north-east of Bulgar Maden, argentiferous lead has been worked with great success during the war. No particulars, however, are given.

Of the numerous other lead mines a few may be mentioned. At Karasu, in the sanjak of Ismid, the Société Minière Anonyme Ottomane de Karassou has since 1898 worked argentiferous lead and zinc. For some years prospects were satisfactory, especially as regards zinc, but the last few years before the war saw a great decline in the company's output.

Near the coast of the Dardanelles, some 16 kilometres south-west of Lapsaki, an English company was in 1914 conducting preparations for the opening of a lead mine. In the vilayet of Kastamuni there are abandoned workings of argentiferous lead at Kurei Nahas, south of Ineboli, which might be exploited successfully if improved means of transport were available; and in the vilayet of Angora there are at Akdagh Maden and Denek Maden, and in the Elma Dagh range, mines which are reputed to be rich in lead, but little work has been done in any of them for many years. During the war a very large number of concessions for the mining of argentiferous lead have been granted.

Chromium.—Chromite, the principal ore of chromium, is abundant in Anatolia, especially in the vilayets of Brusa and Aidin. In the former, the richest district is in the wild and remote country to the south of Mount Olympus. Though means of communication and transport are most primitive, several mines have been successfully worked in this region. The most celebrated are near Chardi, among them being the mine of Dagh Ardi, which until recent times produced

more chromium than any other in Anatolia. In 1908 prices in Europe fell, and since then there has been a marked decline in the production of the mines in the vilayet; in fact, one or two of the most famous seem to have been closed. The second great centre for the mining of chromite is the south-west corner of the vilayet of Aidin. A great many concessions have been granted here, but in most cases very little work has been done. The fall of prices in 1908, however, seems to have affected the mines in this region less than those in the vilayet of Brusa. In the last few years before the war one or two near Makri did particularly well.

It appears from a German report that since the beginning of the recent war chromite has been profitably worked at Denizli, which is on a branch of the Smyrna—Aidin Railway. It is also known to occur at several places in the vilayet of Adana—for example, near the coast south-west of Mersina, near Tarsus and the town of Adana, and close to the Baghdad Railway in the extreme south-east of the province. Some of the deposits have been worked, but, to judge from official statistics, with small success.

Chromium-mining in Anatolia has hitherto been handicapped by the fact that the mineral occurs most abundantly in districts that are particularly lacking in means of communication. If the Smyrna—Kassaba Railway Company builds branches northward of its main line, and if the schemes, mentioned above, for connecting Aidin and Makri by rail can be carried out, the expansion of the industry will be greatly facilitated, and it should become extremely prosperous. It is, in fact, possible that its position has improved during the war, for it is known that large quantities of chromite have been exported from Turkey to the Central Powers. The competition of New Caledonia, which has already done harm to Anatolia, will doubtless be felt severely, but the world's demand for chromium will probably soon become large enough to absorb the supply of both sources.

Emery.—The vilayet of Aidin is by far the most

important source of the world's supply of emery. The most productive area lies some 40 miles south-east of Smyrna, between Tire and Sokia, where a number of rich deposits are worked with great profit, especially those at Alajali, a few miles west of Tire, and Gümüsh Dagh, to the north of Sokia. There are also rich workings near Nazli, and further south, in the sanjak of Mughla.

Of the holders of concessions for emery by far the most influential is Ernest Abbott, an Englishman, who before the war was working several of the most lucrative deposits, including those of Alajali and Gümüsh Dagh. It is said that the industry has been injured by the invention of artificial abrasives, but this view is not borne out by the most recent statistics. The artificial products, in fact, are higher in price, and are used to supplement the natural supply. During the war a number of concessions for exploiting deposits of emery were granted.

Meerschaum.—Anatolia has almost a monopoly of the world's supply of meerschaum. Of late years the only deposits which have been worked are those near Eskishehir, which, however, yield very large quantities. They belong to the State.

Boracite (*pandermite*).—The mineral produced in Anatolia under the name of boracite is a hydrous borate of calcium, also and more correctly known as pandermite, a name suggested by the proximity of Panderma to the principal sources of the mineral. Pandermite is much used in the making of lenses and the manufacture of enamel. It is found almost exclusively near Susigirli, about 30 miles south of Panderma, on the Soma—Panderma Railway. The principal workings belong to an Anglo-American company, Borax Consolidated, Ltd. In the years 1908-12 the average annual production of raw pandermite was 11,500 tons. During the war, one or two concessions for mining pandermite in this region were granted.

Other minerals.—Many minerals besides those already mentioned are known to occur in Anatolia.

Few, however, have been systematically worked in recent times, and there is much difference of opinion, even among experts, as to the importance of many of the deposits that have been traced. In these circumstances, it seems advisable to limit comment to a few brief notes indicating where the more promising deposits have been found.

Antimony ore is mined at several places in the vilayet of Aidin, but only at Mesjidli was there any considerable production before the war. Several concessions have been granted for antimony mines in the districts of Ivrindi and Balikhissar, in the vilayet of Brusa, but up to the outbreak of the war the work done here was insignificant. Since 1914 the mineral has been vigorously worked at Chinlikaya, in the hilly country north of Nazli, in the vilayet of Aidin.

Mercury is one of the most promising of the less abundant minerals of Anatolia. It has for many years been profitably mined at Saib and Tepejik, in the sanjak of Smyrna and vilayet of Aidin; and, in the last few years before the war, a recently opened mine at Sisma, in the vilayet and sanjak of Konia, was doing fairly well. It is reported that during the war the Deutsch-Türkische Montangesellschaft bought or took on lease all Anatolian mercury mines that could be worked, and that it has opened a new one near Ödemish in the vilayet of Aidin. It is also stated that a particularly rich mine has been discovered near Ushak (Brusa vilayet).

Since 1914 nickel mines at Ak-Kaya, near the town of Kastamuni, have been worked by the State.

Iron and copper ores are found here and there, and a few concessions for working them have been granted, but before the war the output was negligible. It is stated that there is iron ore of good quality and easily accessible in the Beshparmak Mountains, near the mouth of the Maeander (Aidin vilayet).

Iron pyrites has been successfully worked at Malaj, in the vilayet of Adana, but is not of frequent occurrence.

Zinc has been treated above, under the heading of lead, with which it is commonly found.

Many concessions have been granted for working deposits of manganese, mostly in the western provinces, and it is thought that the output of this mineral may become very great. Hitherto, however, very little has been mined.

Near the railway from Smyrna to Kassaba there are deposits of sulphur, which, it is thought, could be worked very profitably. Sulphur has also been mined at Kechiborlu (Konia vilayet), on the Smyrna—Aidin Railway.

Salt, which is under the control of the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt, is produced and exported in large, though fluctuating, quantities. Rock-salt is mined at several places in the vilayets of Angora and Konia, but most of the Anatolian output of salt is derived from springs, lakes, marshes, or brine deposits, whence it is extracted by somewhat primitive methods. In the years immediately before the war the Anatolian vilayet with the largest production was Aidin, Konia coming second, and Angora third.

Various kinds of building and lithographic stone occur in Anatolia. Marble, of which many beautiful varieties are found, especially in the vilayet of Brusa, should become a source of much wealth to certain regions.

An Anatolian product of some note is fuller's earth, which is obtained in great quantities from the State-owned deposits at Michalijik, in the vilayet of Angora. It is also found in the vilayet of Brusa.

(b) *Output*

The following statistics of the output in 1910-11 of the principal minerals worked in Anatolia are based on Turkish official statistics, revised and amplified by a German expert. They are, nevertheless, only approximately correct, falling short in both complete-

ness and accuracy, but they are useful for comparison with corresponding figures for other parts of Turkey:—

Mineral.	Output in metric tons.	Value in £ sterling.
Coal	766,392	354,001
Lignite	41,226	14,385
Chromium	16,604	33,995
Emery	27,656	90,516
Meerschaum	115	61,306
Pandermite	11,352	75,636

(5) Manufactures

Apart from carpet-making, there is no manufacturing industry on a large scale in Anatolia. Factories of any kind are few, the system being in several ways repugnant to the principles and prejudices of the population: the employment of women, for instance, is restricted by the Mohammedan rule that they must be veiled in the presence of men; and though at Brusa a certain number of Mussulman women and girls work in the silk-spinning mills, they have to be carefully segregated and kept under strict supervision. In 1911, with the object of encouraging the establishment of factories, a law was passed exempting them from taxes and customs duties on machinery and raw materials. Manufacturing enterprises with a capital of £2,000 and 25 workmen were to be regarded as factories for the purposes of the Act. Nevertheless, factory industry remains less important than domestic handicraft, despite the regrettable decline of the latter in the districts traversed by railways, where the peasants find that it pays best to export their raw materials and to buy the cheap foreign goods that are now brought within their reach.

Manufacturing industry flourishes most in the sanjak of Ismid and the vilayets of Brusa, Aidin, and Adana. In the following paragraphs the provinces of Anatolia are treated separately.

Sanjak of Ismid.—This region possesses several small but growing industries. The chief of these is the spinning and weaving of linen. There are a few factories where linen for native garments is made, but most of the thread and cloth produced is spun and woven by hand in the homes of the peasants. The linen cloth is coarse, but is in considerable demand in Turkey.

Near the town of Ismid there are two large Government factories which work exclusively for the Army and the Navy. One manufactures fezzes, the other a coarse cloth for uniforms.

Carpet-making and embroidery are carried on, especially by Christian women. At Hereke, on the Gulf of Ismid, there is a well-conducted State school of carpet-making. It is attended by many women and children, both Mussulman and Christian. Very beautiful carpets are made in its factory, but, its immediate objects being educational and not commercial, the output is not large.

Vilayet of Brusa.—The town of Brusa is the centre of the silk-producing industry. Most of the silk, however, is exported, whether in the form of cocoons or as thread, which is spun in primitive mills. There used to be much silk-weaving in the district, but, owing to disease among the silk-worms some forty years ago, this branch of the industry almost disappeared, and only recovered very imperfectly when the disease was eradicated and the production of silk again increased. At present, the manufacture of silk fabrics is mainly a domestic occupation. In connection with the silk manufacture, a cotton industry of some importance grew up. This passed uninjured through the crisis which affected the production of silk, and to-day there is in the district a considerable manufacture of towels, kimonos, and other goods, in most of which silk is

mixed with the cotton. The work is generally done on hand looms, and is often embellished with embroidery, in which the native women are most expert. In some villages a kind of velvet, known in Europe as "Utrecht velvet," is made. The upland regions of the vilayet manufacture a thick woollen cloth, or felt, which is used for saddlery, horse-blankets, overcoats, and door-hangings. Good tanned leather is also produced in various parts. In the south of the province carpet-making flourishes. This industry is centred at Smyrna, and is treated below under the vilayet of Aidin.

Kutahia, in the east of the province, produces a small quantity of glazed tiles and pottery. The industry has long been established in the district, and was formerly famous, but the secret of the old colouring and glaze has been lost, and the present products are generally of poor quality. The best are the tiles, which have bold classical patterns, and are used with good effect in the decoration of public buildings. There is also in the province a small manufacture of meerschaum goods, mostly cigarette-holders.

Soap of good quality, made from inferior olive oil and the refuse of olives, is produced at Aivali and Edremid. The town of Brusa has several steam flour-mills.

Sanjak of Bigha.—Notwithstanding its favourable situation, there is little manufacturing industry in this province. Soap is manufactured in the south; there are a number of tanneries, for which the materials are plentiful; and Chanak still produces and exports a little pottery, though this industry has utterly fallen from its former prosperity and repute.

Vilayet of Aidin.—By far the most important manufacture in this province is that of carpets. The industry flourishes also in the south of the vilayet of Brusa and the west of the vilayet of Konia, but may properly be treated as a single whole with its centre at Smyrna.

The industry is an old one, the districts of Geurdiz, Kula, Ushak, and Isparta having long been renowned

for the fine rugs called Asia Minor carpets. Of late, however, it has developed rapidly under the stimulus afforded by the railways and other types of foreign enterprise. Much of its present prosperity is due to Englishmen. The carpets are nearly all hand-woven by women and girls who work in their homes, and who often possess much traditional lore in the art. It would be almost impossible to produce similar carpets elsewhere, except in parts of Persia, as the labour employed is not only highly skilled but very cheap, and the wool used is grown locally, and not being subjected to chemical treatment such as it would receive in European factories, retains certain natural oils which are essential to the peculiar excellence of the finished fabric.

In recent years the merchants of Smyrna have undertaken the supply of good thread to the peasants, and a number of modern spinning-mills have been established. At Smyrna, moreover, there are two factories for dyeing yarns; both are British enterprises, though the technical staff and the machinery are German. The merchants, too, have employed artists to design good patterns. The native workers have shown themselves very ready to make use of the advantages offered them and to adapt themselves to the requirements of the exporters. Over 60,000 work for the merchants of Smyrna alone. The remarkable expansion of the industry is illustrated by the statistics of the export of modern carpets from Smyrna: in 1901 the value was estimated at £284,000, in 1910 at £735,000.

Carpet-making has given rise to another industry, the spinning of Turkish-grown cotton, which is used as the backing or canvas of the carpets. Recently, however, this industry has developed independently, and much of the cotton is woven into towels and clothing, mostly, it is true, of a somewhat coarse texture. The chief centres of this manufacture are Magnesia, Aidin, and Nazli. A French company has a cotton-spinning mill at Smyrna; its output is partly consumed locally, partly exported to Bulgaria.

Though Smyrna is not an industrial centre according to European standards, its manufactures are more considerable than those of any other Turkish town. Apart from the enterprises mentioned above, it has an important manufacture of a very serviceable plain soap, made from the refuse of olives which have been pressed for oil, and from the inferior kinds of the oil itself. This industry flourishes to a smaller extent at Aidin.

At Smyrna, moreover, there is a cloth mill, under British control, which used to manufacture for the army; an ironworks, where tools, boilers, and machinery of various kinds are made; and a factory, owned by a British firm, for the extraction of tannin from the valonia acorn, 5,000 tons of its output being exported annually. An industry of some note is the manufacture of wooden boxes for figs and raisins; the cheap wood used comes principally from Austria and Rumania.

Vilayet of Kastamuni.—Little manufacture is carried on in this backward region. In the capital of the province and other towns a coarse cloth is made from wool and goats' hair; it is valued by the natives, who put it to various rough uses. In the west, coarse rugs are made, but are not in much demand. Sinope produces a little cotton cloth, and is celebrated for beautiful embroidery. At Sinope and Ineboli, and, in fact, all along the coast, there is a good deal of boat-building, sailing-vessels of several hundred tons burden being sometimes made. These are generally of primitive design but sound workmanship. They are mostly sold at Constantinople.

Vilayet of Angora.—Here also there is little manufacturing industry. The local weaving industry, once very extensive, has rapidly dwindled since the advent of railways made it profitable to the peasants to export their wool and mohair. At Sivrihissar a certain amount of knitted clothing is produced. Carpets are made in some parts, but the industry is not important.

Vilayet of Konia.—It is only in the west and south of this vilayet that any manufactures exist. The carpet-making industry of Isparta and its vicinity has already been mentioned. In the same region, especially at Buldur, there is an old-established manufacture of linen and cotton cloth, used by the natives for underclothing; this industry has of late increased. In the south of the province there is a considerable production of woven mats, some of which used to be exported to Syria or Egypt. In the same part wooden agricultural implements, used by the peasants, are made, and at Adalia there is some manufacture of bricks and tiles and of copper vessels.

Vilayet of Adana.—Of late years important industries have been introduced into this province. In the town of Adana there are two factories for spinning and weaving cotton, with 10,000 and 5,000 spindles respectively, and 180 and 50 looms. At Adana there is also a pressing and baling mill for cotton, which belongs to the Deutsch-Levantinische Baumwollgesellschaft. Tarsus has two cotton-spinning mills, employing respectively 20,000 and 6,000 spindles; one of them is worked by electric power. Small ginning mills are fairly numerous, Adana alone having 21. There are in the province a number of factories producing sesame oil or cotton-seed oil; one of the chief sources of the latter, at Mersina, is owned by a British firm. At Mersina, bricks and tiles are also made.

The development of all industries in the vilayet has been seriously hindered by the repeated massacres of the Christian population.

(6) Power

Before the war, electricity was used at Tarsus for street lighting and for working a cotton mill, but elsewhere in Anatolia it was practically unknown. As a general rule, the rivers and streams would be of little use in generating power, as they are swift torrents in winter and not much more than brooks in summer.

Some of the rivers in the north, however, have a more consistent flow, and might, perhaps, be utilised, though the initial expense would probably be great. At the town of Brusa there is sufficient water power to provide electricity for both lighting and the driving of machinery, and shortly before the war a German group was negotiating for a concession for the supply of electric light and power to the town. At Smyrna, the electrification of certain existing tramways and the construction of new ones were in contemplation.

(C) COMMERCE

(1) Domestic

(a) *Character of Trade*

In many parts of Anatolia there is virtually no commerce at all, the peasant producing all the food and clothing he needs, and often making his own crude implements. Even where opportunities of disposing of surplus products give a stimulus to his industry and ambitions, the consequent commerce is very simple. Whenever possible the peasant sells his goods in person at the market town of his district, so that with the money he gets he may at once buy what articles he wants. When, as is often the case, the nearest market town is a long way off, the peasants of a village generally organise an expedition after the harvest has been got in, and, often accompanied by their women, set out with a long train of carts and pack animals laden with grain, seeds, poultry, honey, skins, and the products of domestic manufacture. They bivouac at night, and on arrival at their destination camp in the market square. The more perishable goods are commonly sold by the women in the open market; their cloth and embroidery are sometimes disposed of in the same way, but more usually taken to the bazaar and bartered for yarns, Manchester goods, needles, and such-like. The grain and seeds are

sold by the men to local merchants, generally Greeks or Armenians, many of whom, especially in towns on or near a railway, are agents for houses at Smyrna or Constantinople. There are also Jewish merchants who buy skins, eggs, and poultry, which they re-sell locally, often hawking them round on days when there is no market; but this class is not numerous.

Autumn is the time when trade is most active, but country towns usually have two market days every week, when the peasants of the immediate neighbourhood come in to sell the produce appropriate to the season. The diversity of religions which prevails in most parts of Anatolia is a serious handicap on commerce—Friday being a holy day for Mohammedans, Saturday for Jews, and Sunday for Christians.

While Turkish merchants are few, there are many wealthy Turkish landowners in the interior who sell their crops regularly to the same buyers in Smyrna or Constantinople, for whom they often act as agents. They are usually very honest and straightforward in business. They frequently buy up the surplus produce of whole villages, which in this case is delivered at their farms and forwarded by them to the big firms at the great seaports.

Certain products of special value, such as opium, olive oil, cotton, and various kinds of seeds, are sometimes bought direct from the peasants by traders who travel from village to village, acting for their own account or for exporting firms. They often make advances to the peasants on their prospective crops, and a good deal of undesirable usury is practised under this guise. The Mussulmans, who are generally stupid and honest, expose themselves readily to sharp practice; the Christians are not only shrewder and more suspicious, but as a rule will deal only with co-religionists.

The goods purchased by the peasants are manufactured articles of various kinds, principally cotton fabrics and hardware, but of course the nature and extent of the demand varies much from district to district. The shopkeepers and small merchants of the in-

terior obtain their supplies from importers at Smyrna or Constantinople, buying in winter or early spring, either on sample or from stock, the quantity purchased depending on the prospects of the harvest. It is essential to the up-country retailer that his order shall be executed before the harvest is over, or he loses the custom of the big parties of peasants who come from a distance in the autumn. A careful study of his customers' tastes and prejudices is also more necessary than might be supposed in a country where wants are so simple. Among the peasant women, for instance, there are continually changing fashions in the colours and patterns of cotton goods, and the men have obstinate preferences for certain makes of agricultural implements. It is consequently important that the foreign manufacturer should supply exactly what is wanted.

(b) *Towns, Markets, Fairs*

Brusa is the only town of importance. It contains 85-90,000 inhabitants, of whom two-thirds are Turks, the rest Greeks, Armenians, and Jews. Its sulphur baths are much frequented, and it has considerable trade in silk, fruit, and wine.

The ports have been treated above, and the few other towns of note call for no special reference. They are mostly very small and ill-provided with modern amenities; such industries as they possess have been mentioned above; the general character of their trade has been sufficiently indicated in the last section, and any peculiar importance they may have in relation to foreign commerce will be pointed out below. Nothing need be added to what has been said about markets, and fairs properly so called are not known in Anatolia.

(c) *Organizations to promote Trade and Commerce*

There was a British Chamber of Commerce at Smyrna, but this appears to have been the only institution of the kind in Anatolia. Public exchanges are un-

known. Before the war, in short, systematic encouragement of industry and commerce was left almost entirely to the railway companies and other foreign undertakings.

For efforts to stimulate production and trade during the war, see p. 133 below.

(d) *Foreign Firms and Companies*

Foreign commercial houses are found only at Smyrna and a few other ports, and even in such places they are not numerous. Most of the foreign trade of Smyrna is carried on through native firms, which play a much more important and successful part here than in Constantinople. The native merchants and agents are generally Christians; they are clever and enterprising, but of late years many have been ruined through reckless speculation in prospective harvests and fruit crops. Of the European business houses the great majority are British, some of them having been in existence since the days of the old Levant Company. The most conspicuous firm is C. Whittall and Co., who do a large export business, and are renowned throughout Asia Minor. MacAndrews and Forbes, who control the liquorice trade, are also very influential. Of late years a number of business houses have been incorporated as British limited liability companies; these are not, however, always composed entirely of British elements. Among these concerns may be mentioned the Oriental Carpet Manufacturers Ltd. (capital £1,000,000), the Smyrna Fig Packers Ltd. (£250,000), the Ottoman Cloth Company (£80,000), the Ottoman Oil Company (£60,000), the Anglo-Anatolian Trading Company (£30,000), and the Anglo-Oriental Trading Company (£20,000).

For the foreign firms at Constantinople, through whom much of the trade of northern and central Anatolia is carried on, see *Turkey in Europe*, No. 16 of this series.

(e) *Methods of Economic Penetration*

The efforts of European capitalists to secure concessions for railways, public works, and mines have been sufficiently illustrated above. As for commercial penetration in the strict sense, the methods of Germany, which have been peculiarly successful, are described in *Turkey in Europe*, No. 16 of this series. What is there said, though German policy is the same throughout Turkey, applies in particular to Constantinople and its neighbourhood. Before the war Anatolia, for the most part an undeveloped country, had been influenced comparatively little by Germany's commercial aggression, and in the province of Aidin, which was economically the most advanced, British interests were paramount. Nevertheless, German trade was making headway in the districts served by the German railways, and even at Smyrna the competition of several continental countries was being felt by the old-established British houses. According to the British Consular Report for Smyrna for 1912, a local paper gave the following as the principal reasons for the growing success of Great Britain's rivals:—(1) Personal visits to Turkish markets and a thorough study of them on the spot by manufacturers; (2) the frequent supply of samples and regular despatch of travellers; (3) acceptance of the smallest orders; (4) the ungrudging replacement of unsatisfactory goods; (5) the grant of great facilities for payment; (6) co-operation between banks and shippers; (7) the quotation of inclusive (*c.i.f.*) prices; (8) combination of land and sea freights.

In 1911 it was reported by H.M. Consulate that the Hungarian Société de Commerce et de Banque had set up a showroom at Smyrna for samples of the products of firms for which it acts as agent, and in the same year a similar exhibition was established by the Rumanian Government. An attempt of the British Chamber of Commerce at Smyrna to organise a showroom for British goods met with insufficient support. In 1912 commercial missions from Spain and Russia

visited Smyrna to study the best openings for the trade of their respective countries. There appears to have been some danger that British traders would be content to rest on their reputation and would neglect to take measures to counter the progressive methods of their rivals.

(2) Foreign

It is impossible to give precise statistics of the foreign trade of Anatolia. Before the war it was nearly all conducted through three ports, Constantinople, Smyrna, and Mersina. Constantinople was the chief emporium for the north and centre, Smyrna for the west, and Mersina for certain parts of the south. It is safe to say that the goods exported and imported at Smyrna and Mersina were almost entirely of Anatolian origin or destination; but this was not the case at Constantinople, through which passed the exports and imports of many regions, both in the Turkish Empire and elsewhere. The real position of Anatolian trade was rendered yet more obscure by the method of grouping followed by the Customs authorities; thus, the returns for Mersina were not published separately, but formed part of a total to which Adalia and Alexandretta also contributed. Further, from 1911 to 1913 Turkey was at war, and the conditions of her trade were abnormal. It is consequently advisable to base all conclusions on the statistics for 1910-11, when the official Turkish returns were fortunately compiled according to the improved methods introduced after the reform of the Customs Administration in 1909. On the other hand, between then and 1914 Turkey lost much territory, including several islands which were treated as "dependencies of Smyrna," and for which separate figures were not quoted. In short, all that can be attempted is a rough estimate of the foreign trade of Anatolia eight years ago; while the value of the exports and imports of

particular regions can seldom be calculated at all, even those of coastal districts with ports of their own passing for the most part through Constantinople or Smyrna and figuring in the returns for these places.

(a) *Exports*

(i) *Quantities and Values.*—In considering statistics of Turkish exports, it must be remembered that tobacco, which is controlled by the Régie Ottomane des Tabacs, and certain other commodities controlled by the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt, are not included in the Custom House returns. In 1910-11 the value of the tobacco exported from Turkey was £2,842,000, and that of the articles controlled by the Council of the Public Debt £172,000. The sum of £3,014,000 should therefore be added to the total value of the exports as given in the Customs returns. For 1910-11 this was £20,072,000, distributed among the various districts as follows :—

	£	£
Constantinople—		
Stambul and Galata	1,993,000	
Haidar Pasha, Marmara and Dardanelles ports, and Zunguldak ...	2,316,000	
		4,309,000
Smyrna	4,444,000	
Dependencies of Smyrna (Aivali, Mitylene, etc.)	1,876,000	
		6,320,000
Alexandretta, Mersina, and Adalia ...	...	1,471,000
Trebizond and Dependencies (including Sinope and Ineboli)	...	1,654,000
Other districts (including the European provinces since lost)	...	6,318,000

It is possible to some extent to analyze the figures of certain customs districts with the help of statistics in British Consular Reports, which, for the year 1910, give separate returns for Adalia and Mersina. Their statistics for these places, which are derived from various sources, generally unofficial, are admittedly

only approximate; and in the case of Adalia they do not attempt a precise discrimination between exports destined for other parts of Turkey and those destined for foreign countries. On a rough estimate, however, the value of the goods shipped direct from Adalia to foreign countries may be put at £70,000. The exports from Mersina, nearly all of which came from the vilayet of Adana, were valued by H.M. Vice-Consul at £619,640.

A considerable proportion of the goods shipped from Constantinople proper, and most of those shipped from Haidar Pasha, must have come from Anatolia. It may therefore be estimated that the value of the export trade of Anatolia in 1910 was about £8,000,000, representing approximately 35 per cent. of the total export trade of the Turkish Empire, tobacco included.

The Custom House returns show that in 1910-11 the exports of Smyrna alone exceeded in value those of Constantinople and its dependencies. As they must have consisted almost exclusively of Anatolian products, and came moreover from widely separated localities, the following list of the most important gives a good impression of the character of the export trade of Anatolia as a whole, except that cereals would be more and fruit less prominent among the exports of the northern and central regions, which are mostly shipped from Constantinople:—

	£
Barley	243,000
Oats	23,684
Flour	79,574
Beans	80,000
Cotton	243,578
Cotton seed	53,816
Sesame seed	33,908
Tobacco	210,000
Opium	415,208
Poppy seed	52,871
Liquorice root and paste ...	150,626
Figs	591,263

	£
Raisins—	
Dried	982,765
Fresh, and fruit	62,300
Olive oil	74,166
Valonia	476,314
Valonia extract	23,706
Hides and skins	61,347
Eggs	33,502
Carpets	735,000
Emery	88,106[1]

(ii) *Countries of Destination.*—The following table indicates the shares of the principal European countries in the export trade of Turkey during 1910-11. The figures are those of the Turkish Custom House returns:—

	£
United Kingdom	4,882,000
France	4,003,000
Austria-Hungary	1,994,000
Italy	1,344,000
Germany	1,190,000
Russia	828,000
Other countries	5,831,000
	20,072,000

Corresponding statistics for other years are given in *Turkey in Europe*, No. 16 of this series, where they are compared with figures taken from the trade returns of the countries concerned. The exports to Germany were really larger than is indicated, a number of goods

[1] These figures are taken from a British Consular Report on the trade of Smyrna, where it is said that they are based on the returns of the Central Customs Administration of Turkey. The sums quoted, however, amount to considerably more than £4,444,000, which the Turkish Customs returns give as the value of the whole of Smyrna's exports for the year in question. The discrepancy is partly due to the fact that tobacco is included in the list; but even when allowance has been made for this, the total reaches £4,530,000, although many minor articles of export are ignored.

returned as going to Austria being destined ultimately for Germany.

Since 1909 the Turkish Customs authorities have not published particulars as to the destination or origin of the foreign trade of individual ports or even of the several customs districts. It is, therefore, impossible to say how much of each country's purchases from Turkey consisted of Anatolian products. An examination of various Consular Reports, however, shows that the goods shipped direct to the United Kingdom from ports which do not serve Anatolia accounted for only a small proportion of the British imports from Turkey. It is beyond question also that Smyrna had for many years been the chief centre of British commercial influence in the Ottoman Empire, and that in this region British trade had held its own well. It is certain, therefore, that Anatolia produced a very large proportion—probably more than half—of the Turkish goods taken by the United Kingdom.

Of the products despatched from the districts served by the Anatolian and Baghdad Railways, a considerable part was undoubtedly destined for Germany and Austria-Hungary. It should also be noted that Turkey's exports to the United States were large, the American official returns putting their value in 1910 at £2,817,000. The figure given by the Turkish Customs authorities is only £916,000, the causes of the discrepancy being that Turkey's exports to America consisted largely of tobacco, that many goods destined for the United States were shipped first to ports of other countries, and that carpets, which were sent to America in great quantities, were commonly valued when passing through the Turkish Customs at a much lower price than they commanded at their destination.

(b) *Imports*

(i) *Quantities and Values.*—The imports into Turkey in 1910-11 were of the value of £38,687,000, and

were distributed among the various Customs districts as follows :—

	£	£
Constantinople—		
Stambul and Galata	12,181,000	
Haidar Pasha, Marmara and Dardanelles ports, and Zunguldak ...	1,280,000	
		13,461,000
Smyrna	4,218,000	
Dependences of Smyrna (Aivali, Mitylene, etc.)	781,000	
		4,999,000
Alexandretta, Mersina, and Adalia ...	...	1,483,000
Trebizond and Dependencies (including Sinope and Ineboli)	...	2,382,000
Other districts (including the European provinces since lost)	...	16,362,000

Constantinople serves as a distributing centre for an enormous area, and it is impossible to estimate what proportion of its imports was destined for Anatolia, though it is certain that the figure would be considerable. Details of the import trade of Constantinople are given in *Turkey in Europe*, No. 16 of this series. British Consular Reports furnish separate figures for Adalia and Mersina. The value of Adalia's imports from abroad in 1910 may be estimated at about £136,000, while the Consular Report gives £611,890 as the value of the imports at Mersina. As in the case of exports, the statistics of Smyrna are the most illuminating. The following were the values of the principal imports in 1910-11:—

	£
Rice	94,300
Sugar	333,200
Coffee	138,000
Cotton :—	
Manufactures	857,000
Threads and yarns	226,000
Worsted yarns	12,600
Abbas and cloth	206,000
Other woollens	26,000

	£
Hides, undressed	141,276
Leather and dressed hides ...	58,100
Timber	101,790
Coal	53,100
Petroleum	109,860
Machinery and tools	100,000
Other iron goods	135,881
Copper	20,800
Glassware	40,625
China and earthenware ...	20,285
Dyes and colours	25,681

(ii) *Countries of Origin.*—The following list shows the principal sources of Turkey's imports and the value of their respective contributions in 1910-11, as estimated by the Turkish Custom House authorities:—

	£
United Kingdom	7,709,000
Austria-Hungary	6,957,000
France	3,572,000
Germany	3,542,000
Italy	3,316,000
Russia	2,543,000
Bulgaria	1,820,000
British India	1,760,000
Belgium	1,518,000
Egypt	1,058,000
United States	589,000

These statistics should be compared with Table X in *Turkey in Europe*, p. 126, which gives figures of Turkish imports in 1910 based on the trade returns of the countries of origin. Some of the more glaring discrepancies are explained by the fact that many goods are clandestinely admitted into Turkey without paying duty. The value of the imports from Germany and the United States was really much higher than that given above. Many goods shipped from Trieste and classed as Austrian were, as a matter of fact, German, and Turkey's imports of railway and

war material from Germany do not appear in the Custom House statistics. American goods destined for Turkey were generally sent through some port of western or central Europe, and it is therefore impossible to make a precise calculation of the value of Turkey's imports from the United States, though it is known to have been considerable.

There is no means of estimating accurately what part of each country's imports into Turkey was destined for Anatolia. British Consular Reports, however, often furnish statistics of British imports into individual ports, and the Constantinople report for 1910-11 fortunately gives a list, with both quantities and values, of British goods discharged at Constantinople during the year, the figures being supplied by the Customs. It is much to be regretted that no similar information is furnished in the Smyrna reports for the last few years before the war, especially in view of the importance of Smyrna to British commerce.

British goods imported at Constantinople in the year in question were of the value of £2,354,000, a figure which does not cover certain articles imported in trivial quantities. The principal items were as follows:—

	£
Cotton yarns	84,000
Cotton piece-goods	852,000
Cotton mulls, tulles, &c. ...	82,000
Army cloth and serges	264,000
Broadcloth *choka*	77,000
Other woollen textiles	17,000
Textiles of wool mixed with other materials	69,000
Hosiery, shirts, &c.	66,000
Coal and anthracite	143,000

As for Smyrna, a careful examination of the statistics of British imports into other parts of Turkey leads to the conclusion that the approximate value of the goods it received from the United Kingdom in 1910-11 was £1,300,000, or about 30 per cent. of

the total value of its import trade. That this figure is not far from the truth is borne out by statistics for the years 1906-8, which show that in these years British imports at Smyrna stood in almost exactly this proportion to its import trade as a whole. The principal goods imported from the United Kingdom were textiles and coal. In cotton goods, especially those of the better class, England held a commanding lead, though there was increasing competition from Italy, which was the chief supplier of flannelette, very little of this being obtained from Great Britain. The coarser kinds of woollen cloth—army cloth, or *abbas*, in particular—came principally from the United Kingdom, which also supplied most of the woollen underwear imported; but the finer dress cloths were supplied chiefly by France or Germany. The coal imported was mainly British, though for some years before the dislocation of Turkish commerce in 1911 continually increasing quantities were supplied by the Heraclea coalfield. The petroleum trade was in the hands of American and German-Rumanian companies. Belgium was the chief country supplying iron, Great Britain and Germany coming next.

Notwithstanding growing competition, the United Kingdom had held its ground well in the import trade of Smyrna. In northern and central Anatolia, on the other hand, the influence of the railways under German control was telling heavily in favour of the efforts of Germans and Austrians to get a secure hold on the trade of the country. It is significant that whereas at Smyrna Great Britain's share in the imports was about 30 per cent., at Constantinople it was only about 18 per cent.

(c) *Comparison of Exports and Imports*

Before the war, an established feature of Turkey's foreign trade was the striking excess of imports over exports. The causes of this, which have never been adequately explained, are discussed in Handbook

No. 16, p. 119. As regards this "adverse balance," Anatolia, so far as can be gathered, held a more favourable position than any other part of the Turkish Empire. At Smyrna, in particular, the exports regularly exceeded the imports in value. The latest figures available for comparison are the following:—

Year.	Exports.	Imports.
	£	£
1910	4,444,000	4,218,000
1911	4,400,000	4,137,000
1912	4,000,000	3,788,380

The balance in favour of the exports was even greater than these figures indicate. The value of the tobacco exported, which in 1910 was £210,000, should be added, and it is recognised that many exports were valued at much less than their market price. The British Consular Report for 1913 states that in each of the three preceding years the exports really exceeded the imports in value by at least £1,500,000.

The relation between Anatolian exports and imports passing through Constantinople cannot be calculated. It is significant, however, that in 1910-11 the exports of Haidar Pasha and the districts grouped with it were very much greater than the imports, and most of this trade was certainly Anatolian. Little can be gathered from the statistics for Adalia, as the foreign trade of that port passed largely through Smyrna; but it appears that at Mersina exports and imports nearly balanced. It looks, in fact, as if the exports of Anatolia as a whole were at least equal to the imports and perhaps in excess of them.

(d) *Customs and Tariffs*

Anatolian trade is, of course, subject to the same regulations as that of the Turkish Empire at large. See *Turkey in Europe*, No. 16 of this series, p. 128.

(D) FINANCE

(1) The Ottoman Public Debt

(a) *History up to* 1914

In September 1875, when the amount of the Public Debt placed outside the Turkish Empire amounted to about £T 190,750,000 (£173,500,000),[1] Turkey committed what in a private individual would have been an act of bankruptcy. She ordered the suspension from the following month of the payment of one-half of the interest and sinking fund on all her loans, excepting the Egyptian Tribute Loans, and the Loan of 1855, which was guaranteed by the British and French Governments.

The Six Contributions, 1879.—Various expedients were used to obtain money until after the Russo-Turkish War (1877-78), when the leading financial establishments in Turkey refused further advances unless those which they had previously made were secured. They suggested that six revenues (called the "Six Contributions"), paid to the Government, should be made over to a committee of local bankers, to be collected and administered by them. This condition was accepted in principle in November 1879. The Six Contributions were the revenues derived from tobacco, salt, wines and spirituous liquors, stamps, fisheries, and silk, subject to a reduction of one million sterling, but supplemented by the contributions payable to Turkey from Eastern Rumelia and Cyprus, and the tribute of Bulgaria.

The Porte and Abdul Hamid thereafter found that the borrowing of money from abroad without the consent of the local bankers was impossible, and further, it was desirable that old and new loans should be secured by a sound administration. Consequently, the original scheme required enlargement and amendment; it could not be left in the hands of local bankers. Accordingly, in October 1880, the Porte addressed the embassies of the various Powers concerned, suggesting

[1] £T1 = 100 piastres; £1 sterling = 110 piastres.

that the foreign bondholders should send delegates to Constantinople to discuss new arrangements. This invitation was accepted; the delegates came to an agreement with the Porte, and on December 20, 1881, the law known as the Decree of Muharrem was promulgated.

The Decree of Muharrem, 1881.—The issue of this decree was an event of high importance for Turkish finance. Under its terms there was called into existence, as from January 1, 1882, a Council for the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt. This Council, commonly known as the Public Debt, consists of seven persons. Six represent the British, Dutch, French, German, Austro-Hungarian, Italian, and Ottoman bondholders.[1] The seventh member, who is nominated by the Imperial Ottoman Bank to represent the privileged bondholders (the Galata bankers) is only entitled to sit until the extinction of the particular debt in which they are interested. The largest amount of foreign bonds being in British and French hands, it was decided that the office of president of the United Council of Foreign Bondholders (an office which is tenable for five years) should be held alternately by French and English subjects.

The principal liabilities as consolidated by the Decree of Muharrem stood at £T 125,250,958, consisting of:—

	£T
Priority Bonds (Galata bankers)	8,170,000
Loans, Series A, B, C, D[2] ...	101,448,410
Lots Turcs[3]	15,632,548
Total ...	£T 125,250,958

[1] The same delegate represented the British and Dutch bondholders.

[2] These loans covered the period 1858-1873, and were to be amortized in a stated order.

[3] These were of the nature of premium bonds, receiving no yearly interest, the drawings of which, however, were to be continued on a basis which gave to the holder 58 per cent. of the bonus and the interest due on each bond when it was drawn.

To provide the fixed annuity for the Priority Bonds and interest on the Series A, B, C, D, together with the corresponding sinking fund (viz., $\frac{1}{4}$ of the interest charge), it was necessary to find annually the following sums:—

	£T
Priority Bonds annuity	590,000
Series A, B, C, D—	
Interest	1,170,810
Sinking fund	292,702
Total ...	£T 2,053,512

There were, however, further liabilities, belonging to a different category, taken over by the new authority. These amounted to £T 71,778,260, and were as follows:—

	£T
The Loans guaranteed by the Egyptian Tribute	17,200,260
The Russian War Indemnity ...	35,310,000
Indemnities to private persons ...	268,000
The Floating Debt	19,000,000

The revenues originally conceded to the Ottoman Debt for collection and administration under the Decree of Muharrem were the following:—

(1) The monopolies of salt and tobacco.
(2) The revenues derived from stamp duties, spirits, fisheries, and the silk tax.
(3) The tribute of Eastern Rumelia.
(4) The tribute of the principality of Bulgaria, to be replaced by an annual payment of £T 100,000 from the tobacco tax (*dime*) until the amount of the tribute should be fixed by the Powers.
(5) The produce of the tax on pipe tobacco (*tumbeki*) up to the sum of £T 50,000.
(6) Any surplus of the Cyprus revenues.

(7) Any increase in the Customs duties resulting from the modification of the commercial treaties.
(8) Any increase of the revenues resulting from new regulations affecting patents and licences *(temettu)*.[1]
(9) Any sums which might be fixed as contributions due from Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro for the service of the Debt.

On certain revenues ceded to the Debt, the proceeds rose steadily from £T 983,000 in 1883 to £T 2,500,000 in 1913-14. The monopoly of tobacco was farmed out in 1883 to a society created for that purpose, the *Régie Co-intéressée des Tabacs de l'Empire*, from which a fixed yearly payment of £T 750,000 was obtained, as well as a fixed proportion of its profits. In 1907 the rate of the Customs duties was increased, with the consent of the Powers, from 8 to 11 per cent.; of the proceeds of these increases 25 per cent. was consigned to the service of the Debt. No funds were, in fact, obtained from the modification of the licence tax (*temettu*), but the amount payable in respect of pipe tobacco (*tumbeki*) has always been paid.

On the other hand, no contributions from Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro were ever assessed by the Powers. The claim on Bulgaria for tribute yielded nothing, and the tobacco dimes which were assigned in compensation did not regularly yield as much as £T 100,000 a year until 1908. The tribute from Eastern Rumelia, after various reductions (falling from £T 265,000 to £T 92,000) and temporary suspensions (1885-87 and 1896), was suspended altogether in 1908. Finally, the surplus of the Cyprus revenues, which was assessed at £T 114,680 per annum, was retained by the British Government for the service of the British share of the loan of 1855, which had been guaranteed by Great Britain and France.

[1] The *temettu* is a licence for carrying on an occupation or profession.

In compensation for the last-mentioned item, the Turkish Government has always provided £T 130,000 per annum by bills on the Customs, and to balance the other losses the debt eventually (in 1910) obtained from the Government all surplus revenues on the ceded dimes, over and above the amounts which it already had to collect and administer, up to £T 114,000.

The Decree Annex, 1903.—The second important date in the history of the Public Debt is that of the promulgation (1903) of the Decree Annex of Unification and Conversion, which was brought about in response to the insistent demand of the Debt Council for a reconstitution and simplification of the Debt. The main effects of the Decree were:—

(1) First, to get rid of the prior lien, dating from 1881, of the Priority Loan (into which the original Priority Bonds and Series A had been converted in 1890); this was effected by the repayment of the holders either in cash at par or in new Unified Bonds (see below) at par with a cash bonus of 6 per cent.

(2) The Decree aimed secondly at the creation of a new capital debt of £T 32,738,772, bearing interest at 4 per cent., and subject to amortisation at the rate of 0·45 per cent. per annum, in the place of the Series B, C, D, the bonds of which were to be exchanged for a new series of Unified Bonds at the respective rates of £70, £42, and £27 10*s.* per cent.

(3) Thirdly, the Government was given the benefit of 75 per cent. of any surplus remaining after payment of an annuity of £T 2,157,375, which was assigned for the service of the Debt and allocated as follows:—

	£T
Interest at 4 per cent. on the original capital of the Unified Converted Debt (including Converted Priorities) ...	1,691,000

	£T
Ordinary Sinking Fund on the Unified Converted Debt ...	196,000
Fixed annuity for Lots Turcs ...	270,375
Total ...	£T 2,157,375

Later Liabilities, 1908-1914.—In 1908, after the revolution, the Ottoman Government fell under the influence of the Young Turks. Unfortunately for Turkey, this era was heralded by the proclamation of the independence of Bulgaria (October 1908), the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria-Hungary, and the proclamation of the union of Crete to Greece. The new rulers of Turkey, encouraged by the Germans, began in self-defence to reform their army and fleet. This forced them to incur heavy expenses in armaments.

Up to the time of the revolution there existed no real budget, and the first constitutional budget appeared in 1909-10.[1] This budget, and all further budgets until the entry of Turkey into the European War, showed a considerable deficit. The receipts of the Ministry of Finance for the four years 1909-10 to 1912-13 were, in round figures, as follows:—

	£T
1909-10	26,990,000
1910-11	28,340,000
1911-12	30,374,000
1912-13	29,500,000

The deficits were as follows:—

	£T
1909-10	5,447,221
1910-11	9,678,683
1911-12	8,463,205
1912-13	8,608,569

To meet these deficits the Turkish Government could only resort to further loans. On July 4, 1914, according to a statement made in the Turkish Chamber, these amounted to £T 51,963,432, which, together with

[1] The Turkish financial year begins on March 1st.

the floating debt of £T 18,303,615, gave a total of £T 70,267,047 of increased liabilities.

Of these loans the most important was that of £T 11,000,000 at 4 per cent. advanced in 1911 by a syndicate of 32 Austro-German establishments.[1] Part of this loan, £T 7,040,000, was issued at 86¾ on the Berlin and Vienna markets, but the expenses of flotation reduced the nett yield to 81 per cent. of the nominal capital. The second part, amounting to £T 3,960,000, was in suspense at the time of Turkey's entry into the European War.

The total funded debt of Turkey in March 1914, exclusive of the floating debt, the residue of the Russian War Indemnity, the charge in respect of kilometric railway guarantees (see below), and the Docks, Arsenals and Naval Constructions Company's guarantees loan,[2] amounted to £T 151,656,007. This total includes debts of two classes:—

	£T
(1) Loans under the Decree of Muharrem	47,936,721
(2) Loans not under the Decree	
(i) Various Loans 1890 to 1914	85,738,180
(ii) Egyptian Tribute Loans	17,981,106

[1] It may be convenient to enumerate here the loans since 1881 in which the Deutsche Bank and its group are interested. These are as follows:—

		Capital outstanding March, 1914. £T
(1)	1888, Fisheries Converted, 1903 ...	2,459,842
(2)	1894, Oriental Railways	1,573,990
(3)	1903, Bagdad Series I.	2,346,454
(4)	1905, Tedjhizat-Askerie	2,469,566
(5)	1908, Bagdad Series II.	4,718,120
(6)	,, ,, III.	5,226,650
(7)	1911, Loan	6,756,002
		25,550,624

(1), (3), (4), (5) and (6) are secured on revenues administered by the Council of the Debt.

[2] For particulars of this company see *Turkey in Europe*, No. 16 of this series, p. 78.

The amount of the floating debt was in 1914 £T 37,800,000, composed as follows:—

	£T
(1) Old Floating Debt	19,500,000
(2) New Floating Debt	18,300,000

Results of the Decrees.—Apart from the constitutional reforms effected by the Decrees, new sources of revenue (as distinct from the Customs surtax and the surplus on the dimes already mentioned) have been assigned to the Debt at various dates since the Decree of Muharrem. It is not surprising therefore that the yield of the revenues collected steadily increased from 1882 to 1903; still less so that the increase became much more rapid after 1903, when the Government, as has been seen, obtained a direct interest in the efficient service of the Debt. The average of the gross yearly receipts of the ceded revenues for the first three decades of the Council's administration amounted to £T 2,280,000, £T 2,600,000, and £T 3,800,000 respectively, while the cost of administration, in spite of manifold difficulties, did not exceed 8 per cent. of the gross receipts on the average of those periods. The gross receipts for the year 1903–4 were £T 2,971,984. In 1911–12 they amounted to £T 3,910,150, or, with the Customs surtax, £T 5,061,335. Whereas at the close of the reign of Abdul Aziz (1876) the service of the loans had absorbed £T 13,000,000 out of a total revenue of £T 25,000,000, in the last years of the reign of Abdul Hamid the service of the loans was absorbing just over £T 6,000,000,—or, with the amount of sums payable for the kilometric guarantees (see below), the Russian Indemnity, and interest on short loans, about £T 8,500,000—on a budget of £T 25,000,000.

Up to the year 1903, £T 222,398 represented the total value of debts redeemed. In 1912–13 the sum of £T 621,610 was devoted to redemption. During the period 1904–1913 no less a sum than £T 4,329,028 was applied for that purpose. Further amounts, moreover, were devoted to the liquidation of the Lots Turcs,

with the result that, whereas up to 1904–5 the nominal value of drawn bonds was only £T 41,663, this steadily increased until in 1913–14 £T 79,755 were drawn.

The Decree of Muharrem was originally concerned solely with the Ottoman Debt as it stood in 1881, and the functions of the Debt Council are confined, as far as the Decree goes, to the administration of the revenues assigned for the service of that debt. But the Council of the Debt figured as a contracting party in nearly every loan contract made between 1881 and 1914, by virtue of the stipulation recurring in such agreements that the revenues hypothecated by the Turkish Government for the service of the new loans should be collected and administered on behalf of the creditors by the Debt Council. By 1891 the Turkish revenues administered by the Council on behalf of the new creditors were equal to those required for the service of the Muharrem Debt, and the new obligations of the Porte were increasing even faster than the Muharrem Debt decreased by amortisation. In fact, the only loans with which the Council is not concerned are the few secured by charges on Customs duties or similar revenues collected by the Imperial Ottoman Bank.

As long ago as 1889, the Turkish Government, recognising the utility of the Public Debt Department for its own purposes, joined with certain railway companies, to which the Government had granted kilometric guarantees, in requesting the Debt to take over the administration of the revenues which had been allocated for their payment[1]. In subsequent years the collection of other revenues was entrusted to the Debt; and probably if events had pursued a normal course, the Debt Department would have been made collectors of the whole of the revenues of the Ottoman Empire.

[1] For details of the kilometric guarantees, see above, pp. 46, 47, 52, 53, 58; see also *Turkey in Europe*, p. 67.

The work of the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt is declared by French, British, and other writers to have been a success in every way. Every year has seen its efficiency increased, the bondholders satisfied and better order introduced into the administration, collection and application of the public funds.

(b) *Development of Ottoman Public Debt during the War*

During the War the Public Debt of Turkey has on the lowest estimate been almost trebled. Germany has necessarily had to shoulder the main burden of financing her ally.

Loan Operations with Germany.—The first German advance took the form of specie actually despatched to Constantinople. The second, in which Austria-Hungary shared, was also in specie, but it was stipulated that the gold should be deposited in the lending country for account of the Ottoman Public Debt, and the loan was only made liquid by the issue of £T currency notes payable in specie six months after the signing of peace. Thereafter until August 1917, apart from mark and kronen credits, the advances were made almost entirely in paper currency, *viz.*, German Treasury notes (*Reichskassenscheine*) which were held by the Debt as cover for further issues of £T currency notes. Germany was pledged to provide means to pay all these issues in specie over a period of 11 years from the signing of peace. This guarantee, however, was quite ineffective to maintain the value of the notes, which depreciated in Turkey with great rapidity until a £T note was worth less than ¼ of a gold £T. A new device had to be found and the greater part of the August 1917 loan from Germany (£T 50,000,000 out of £T 56,500,000) was made in German Exchequer bills payable to bearer in £T at 3, 6 and 12 months. These were to serve as cover for another issue of notes redeemable by the eleventh year after the signing of peace, and might by agreement with the payee be themselves used to make

payments in Turkey, but they were also offered to the Turkish investors at 4 per cent., 4½ per cent., and 5 per cent. discount respectively, with the option of renewal on the same terms and the guarantee that they would be discounted by the Debt at any time. The amount sold was £T 17,000,000.

Finally in the spring of 1918 Germany refused to increase further the total sum of her liabilities in specie. The £T 36,500,000 required for the period March–August 1918 was therefore provided in the shape of £T 4,000,000 of marks for purchases in Germany and Austria-Hungary, £T 11,000,000 raised by Germany by the sale of marks for £T in Berlin, and an undertaking similarly to supply any part of the balance which the Turkish Government should fail to secure by an internal loan. The special feature of this internal loan was the obligation of payment of the interest in specie and the first half-year's interest in advance, the specie to be provided by Germany in return for a corresponding nominal amount of £T currency notes of any issue. Germany thus began at once to redeem her promise to provide for payment of the note-issues, and to some extent anticipated her promise by disregarding the different dates for payment of the different series. The internal loan was issued at par bearing 5 per cent. interest, but, purchased in the depreciated £T paper and paying interest in gold, it actually yielded a return equal to 20 per cent. in the first year and liable to fall only if and when the depreciation of the £T paper was corrected. The loan was also secured upon particular Turkish revenues. The total subscription from all sources was £T 17,977,000 leaving £T 3,523,000 to be lent by Germany.

Analysis of the War Debt.—Neither the items nor the total increase of the Public Debt during the war can be stated with certainty. The following account of the position in February 1918 is a combination of the figures given by Djavid Bey in the budget speeches of March 1917 and February 1918, as inter-

preted by the comments of the Constantinople correspondent of the *Oesterreichischer Volkswirt*:—

	£T
Pre-war funded debt	155,000,000
Advances by Central Powers:—	
Gold (Germany)	12,612,000
Gold (Austria)	2,167,000
Silver	2,600,000
German Treasury Notes ...	78,800,000
German Exchequer Bills ...	50,000,000
German advances in marks and £T	24,500,000
Austrian advances in kronen	12,500,000
Other debts (probably German)	30,576,000
Turkish military requisitions	19,245,000
Total ...	£T 388,000,000

On this table the following remarks must be made:—

The figure given by Djavid Bey for pre-war debt exceeds the official figures already quoted (p. 121) for the debt down to March 1914 (without the floating debt) by about £T 3,350,000, but it is not clear how the difference arises. The figures for loans in specie and Exchequer Bills are exact; the remaining figures of the table are approximations only; the total is the round total given by Djavid Bey. £T 5,000,000 of the total borrowed from Germany was re-lent to Germany as a currency loan.

It remains to consider the effect of the loan operations of the spring of 1918. It is not clear whether Djavid Bey included in his total of £T 388,000,000 the advances made by Germany in this connection. Assuming, as is probable, that he did not, the total debt in August 1918 would be approximately:—

	£T	£T
Total to end of February, 1918 ...		388,000,000
German loan in marks	4,000,000	
German loan in £T ...	11,000,000	
Internal loan	17,980,000	

	£T	£T
Balance due from Germany	3,520,000	
		36,500,000
Total, August 1918		... £T 424,500,000

To this total will have ultimately to be added a large sum in respect of arrears of interest due to Germany. The various loan agreements postpone actual payment of interest for eleven years after the signing of peace, but interest runs on each loan as and when the actual cash is provided, and is added to the capital debt. Thus, on the specie, mark, and £T loans it accrues from the date of the loans, and on the Treasury note and bill loans it accrues from the date on which the cash equivalent is supplied by Germany. In the eleventh year from the signing of peace, according to Djavid Bey, the annual interest on both categories of loans will be £T 11,000,000, and the arrears to be added to the capital debt, £T 51,000,000.

The figures given here also ignore the pre-war floating debt of £T 37,800,000 (p. 122), and it is not certain whether they include all the liabilities incurred by Turkey for munitions supplied by the Central Powers, and some minor loans for constructional purposes. Further, in 1949, Russia will become entitled by way of war indemnity to an annuity of £T 350,000 for 34 years.

The total amount of £T notes issued by the Turkish Government down to February 1918 appears to be about £T 135,000,000. Germany is under obligation to provide specie for their payment over the following periods from the conclusion of peace, *viz.*, after 6 months, £T 6,500,000; after one year a further £T 19,000,000; by the end of 7 years, half the total issue; and by the end of 11 years, the whole issue. The notes of each series are forfeit to the Turkish Treasury if not presented within a fixed period from the first date for payment of the series.

(2) Turkish War Budgets and Deficits

In presenting the estimates for the year 1918-19, Djavid Bey stated that the expenditure of Turkey since the commencement of war had been as follows :—

	£T
1914-15	59,000,000
1915-16	53,000,000
1916-17	83,000,000
1917-18	112,000,000
Total ...	£T 307,000,000

In these figures is included military expenditure to the following amounts:—

	£T
1914-15	19,000,000
1915-16	17,000,000
1916-17	32,000,000
1917-18	56,000,000
Total ...	£T 124,000,000

The Budget estimates for the year 1916-17 were for a revenue of £T 23,000,000 and an expenditure of £T 39,700,000, leaving an estimated deficit of £T 16,700,000. The actual expenditure was £T 83,000,000, producing an actual deficit of £T 60,000,000. The Budget estimates for the year 1917-18 were for a revenue of £T 23,584,165, and an expenditure of £T 43,304,511, leaving an estimated deficit of about £T 20,000,000. The actual expenditure was £T 128,058,659, producing an actual deficit of more than £T 104,000,000. The Budget estimates for the year 1918-19 were as follows:—

(1) Estimated revenue: £T 33,965,698 (Budget figures),[1] £T 37,016,694 (Commission figures).

(2) Estimated Expenditure: £T 51,762,761 (Budget figures), £T 51,402,327 (Commission figures).

The estimated deficit is thus between £T 14,000,000

[1] The Budget figures are more likely to prove correct.

and £T 17,000,000, which, with estimated extraordinary expenses of £T 60,000,000, makes a total estimated deficit of at least £T 74,000,000.

The 1918-19 Budget is claimed by Djavid Bey to constitute a reform in three respects: first, in the collection of the taxes; secondly, by the increase of certain existing taxes; and thirdly, by the creation of new taxes.

(3) Taxation

It is estimated that, when the Turkish public revenue stands at £T 25,000,000, at least 40 per cent. of this total arises from charges on agriculture, or, more strictly speaking, on the agricultural classes. It must further be remembered that the yield of the principal source of revenue, namely, the agricultural dime, represents for the most part an amount received by the Government from tax-farmers to whom the right of collection is sold. Nominally, the tax is 12½ per cent. on the gross produce of the peasants' crops; but the peasants have never escaped with a payment of less than 20 per cent. Again and again this system has been condemned as too heavy a charge on the peasant, and as leading to grave evils. Even where before the war the dime was collected by the State, the employees of the Government were guilty of very gross extortion and favouritism.

Out of a revenue of £T 25,000,000 the following contributions are burdens on the agricultural population:—

	£T
Dime (agricultural)	5,383,000
Taxes on cattle	1,655,000
Impôt foncier	2,435,000
Produce of Civil List lands ...	620,000
Contribution of the Banque Agricole	770,000
Total ...	£T 10,863,000

Djavid Bey, in his speech on the 1918-19 Budget, announced that the Government had decided to collect

the dimes directly.[1] He stated that this method had already been applied in certain districts, and had given good results in increase of revenue, and that it was hoped to establish a basis which might lead to an eventual transformation of the dime into a direct land tax. Before the war the tax generally brought in between £T 5,000,000 and £T 6,000,000. It figures in the new budget, under the new system, as estimated to bring in for the present year £T 8,500,000. In 1917-18 the dime had figured in the budget as expected to produce £T 4,100,000, and Djavid Bey stated that in consequence of the partial application of the new scheme, and owing to the enhanced value of the crops collected, the sum actually realised had been over £T 14,000,000. He further added that although in the present budget the dime figured at £T 8,500,000, it was expected to realise more than £T 12,000,000, even after the deduction of expenses of collection (which he estimated at 10 per cent.).

The taxes on cattle (*aghnan*) have been doubled, and their estimated yield is £2,500,000; in 1917-18 the estimate was £T 1,160,000. Before the war £T 1,660,000 was the estimated and £T 1,200,000 the actual yield.

The Impôt foncier has been increased by 50 per cent., and reorganised; it is now estimated to yield £T 2,100,000; in 1917-18 the estimate was £T 1,700,000. This revenue is mostly derived from a direct tax on real property in the cities, which up to the time of the war was very irregularly paid, and led to great abuses. The tax is supposed to be based on a State valuation, which in theory is revised every seven years. Before the war it amounted to about 8 per cent. on the assessed yearly rental. It has been increased twice since 1914.

[1] It is not known whether the dimes hitherto collected by the Council of the Debt are also to come under the new system of direct collection by the Government. It appears unlikely that the Debt would be subjected to such treatment, for a considerable portion of the dimes collected by the Debt is required for the kilometric guarantee of various German-controlled railways.

The dimes, the cattle tax, and the Impôt foncier together represent about 40 per cent. of the total estimated revenue. The following further taxes in the new budget call for special notice:—

(1) The Temettu tax (*droit de patente*), estimated in the budget of 1917-18 at £T 370,000, is now estimated at £T 750,000. This is owing to an increase of rate and the inclusion in taxation of all foreigners and all Sociétés Anonymes.

(2) The so-called tax of exoneration is new; it is a payment for military exemption, levied from those who are not called upon to serve under arms for various reasons. It is proposed later to apply the tax to all foreigners, and even on a higher scale.

(3) The exemption tax is an amount paid by persons called up for military service, who wish to avoid serving. The law as to this tax has been considerably modified since the beginning of the war. In pre-war time it was generally estimated to bring in £T 6,000,000.

(4) The tax on salt is tripled. The revenue under this head is thus raised from £T 500,000 to £T 1,500,000.

(5) The new Customs tax on exports is estimated to produce £T 2,400,000. Djavid Bey stated in his speech that in the previous year Germany had taken £T 12,000,000 of exports, and Austria £T 2,000,000. The estimate of £T 2,400,000 appears very high, as the export duties vary from 3 per cent. to 10 per cent., only one article, tobacco, being charged at 10 per cent. It is unlikely that Germany, under present circumstances, will increase her imports from Turkey, or that the excessive prices charged by the Turks for foodstuffs can be maintained.

Among other objects of new taxation are tobacco, cigarette paper, playing cards, and matches.

It is proposed to tax war profits, and also to take toll of coffee, tea and sugar by a consumption tax.

Taxation of alcohol is also under consideration. Finally, it would appear that the Government will refuse its consent to the renewal of the monopoly of tobacco in favour of the Régie.

(4) Banking

Up to quite recent times, branches of large Turkish or foreign banks did not exist in Anatolia outside the chief seaports. In the interior there were only small local bankers, mostly Armenians, with a few Greeks. When, however, the Anatolian railway was built, and central Anatolia began to be actively exploited by foreigners, the Imperial Ottoman Bank appointed agents and correspondents at many inland towns. It met with little competition until 1906, when German banks were first established at Constantinople. The Deutsche Orient Bank at once extended its activities to Anatolia, opening branches and establishing agencies at a number of places, mostly on the Anatolian and Baghdad railways, an example followed with energy by the Wiener Bank-Verein. The Deutsche Bank, on the other hand, though transacting a certain amount of business through the German-controlled railway companies, did not appoint agents of its own outside Constantinople.

Besides the banks mentioned, the Banque d'Athènes had much influence in Anatolia, especially at the ports, where shipping and trade were largely in the hands of Greeks, who here as elsewhere showed a strong preference for dealing with Greek undertakings. In the inland towns, the bank, though it had numerous correspondents, was less important. The Banque de Salonique, in which Austrian interests were strong, had a branch at Smyrna.

The competition between the Imperial Ottoman Bank and its foreign rivals proved of great benefit to the Anatolian merchant. As long as its supremacy was unchallenged, the Imperial Ottoman Bank conducted its business on narrow and old-fashioned lines,

but when the German banks appeared, offering very attractive terms and ready to transact many kinds of business on behalf of their clients, it had to meet them on their own ground.

For further particulars regarding the banks mentioned, see *Turkey in Europe*, No. 16 of this series, pp. 134-136.

(E) GENERAL REMARKS

Recent Development of Industry and Commerce and Future Possibilities

Just before Turkey's entry into the European War the economic prospects of Anatolia seemed bright. Its losses in men during the Italian and Balkan Wars had been more than made up by the influx of refugees from Europe. The inhabitants generally had been aroused to the advantages to be gained from industry and enterprise. Many of the vexatious restrictions of the old regime on personal liberty had been removed. The means of communication were continually being improved and extended; modern methods of cultivation were finding ever-increasing favour; and numerous concessions had recently been granted for the exploitation of mines and the construction of works of public utility. The least promising feature was the character of the Government, with its violent nationalist ambitions, exemplified by the persecution of the Greeks along the western seaboard. It is, however, likely that but for the war this fanatical policy would soon have been abandoned, as its disastrous economic consequences must speedily have become apparent; indeed, as was mentioned above, they are now realised, and even in the stress and excitement of the war efforts have been made to retrieve the blunder.

What has been said in the preceding sections refers almost entirely to the situation of Anatolia before the war. In order to estimate the future possibilities of the country, however, it is necessary to take into account the course of events during the last five years.

In this period the prospect has, of course, changed completely. Foreign interests have been confiscated and often destroyed. The resources of the country have been placed at the disposal of the military authorities, who have seized the crops and live-stock at their discretion. The population has suffered enormous losses; the Mussulmans have mostly been drafted into the army, whose casualties have been very heavy; the Armenians have nearly all been massacred; and, of the other Christians, some have been slaughtered, some deported, some enrolled in labour battalions, some put to forced labour in the unhealthy plains of Adana, where many have perished, while those who escaped these fates have fled in large numbers to the Greek islands.

Simultaneously with these blows to Anatolian prosperity came a vastly increased demand from the Central Empires for Anatolian products of all kinds. The Young Turks at once resolved to turn this opportunity to account, but instead of fostering a natural export trade they passed a "New Law of Imports and Exports," creating Export Committees, Food Committees, and other similar bodies, whose ostensible purpose was to requisition all agricultural produce, part of which was sold to the natives and part to Turkey's allies, in each case at extortionate prices, these operations being performed under colour of protecting the peasants and preventing speculators from amassing unreasonable profits. The profits, as a matter of fact, have mostly gone into the pockets of members of the committees and their friends; and, when the scandal was debated in the Turkish Chamber of Deputies, it was urged that the creation of Turkish capitalists, by whatever means, was to the economic advantage of the Empire. The Government, having imposed an *ad valorem* duty on all exports, had a strong motive for upholding a system which kept prices high. It is known that huge fortunes have lately been made, especially at Constantinople, where even Greeks and Armenians have shared in the plunder. Nevertheless, the exports to Germany and Austria increased rapidly; for the six months from

September 1, 1916, to February 28, 1917, those to Germany were valued at £2,253,000, and those to Austria at £686,000; whereas in his Budget speech on March 7, 1918, Djavid Bey, the Turkish Minister of Finance, stated that in 1917-18 the exports to Germany were worth £10,900,000, and those to Austria £1,800,000.

The Government, however, did not limit itself to the artificial raising of prices, but also took vigorous measures to stimulate production. At Smyrna, Brusa, and Eskishehir committees were formed to study the best means of improving agriculture. A German specialist was engaged to give advice as to the development of native industries, especially the production of silk, wool, and olive oil. Experts from Austria were commissioned to report on the forests, and a new forest law is said to have been under consideration. At Constantinople the Government established a new meteorological station, which was to telegraph its observations to all parts of the Empire. A hundred and fifty students were entered at the cost of the State at the agricultural college at Budapest; and sons of soldiers killed in the war were sent to Germany to learn how to make and work motor ploughs. Great efforts were made to extend the use of agricultural machinery, which is exempt from customs duty. The Ministry of Commerce and Agriculture ordered large numbers of agricultural machines in Germany and Austria, an example followed by the Banque Agricole and the Commission d'Alimentation. The sale of agricultural machinery from Germany has also been vigorously promoted by several companies, such as the Anatolian Railway Company, the Deutsch-Levantinische Baumwollgesellschaft, which is established at Adana, and deals in machines for use in cotton growing, and the Anatolische Industrie- und Handelgesellschaft, which operates at Adana, Konia, Smyrna, and Constantinople. It was hoped that the efforts of these agencies would be followed by a great increase in the area of cultivated land. Notwithstanding the artificial character of the present development of agriculture,

its results will probably be permanent and beneficial, for the demand for Anatolian products will remain very great after the war.

While the exports of Anatolia have increased, imports have naturally declined. From September 1, 1916, to February 28, 1917, the total imports of Turkey from Germany amounted to only £558,000 in value, and those from Austria to only £868,000; and these were, of course, practically the only foreign supplies obtainable. The shortage of manufactured goods has been particularly felt, as the native manufacturing industries have mostly fallen into decay. Feverish efforts have been made, both by the Government and by private undertakings, to establish new industries and to enlarge and revive old ones. It has already been mentioned that during the war mining concessions have been granted in great numbers. At Angora the old pottery industry has been revived, in the vilayet of Kastamuni the flax and hemp industry. There are several new companies, generally with their headquarters at Constantinople, for establishing factories for textiles. The production of sugar has been strenuously promoted, especially in the neighbourhood of Konia, which is becoming a centre of great economic activity. There, and also at Eski-shehir, concessions have been granted for the supply of electric light and power.

It is worthy of remark that, as the war went on, the views of German experts on the future of Anatolia seem generally to have become much less sanguine than they were when Turkey entered the struggle. Thus Dr. Mohr, of Berlin, fears that the export of foodstuffs from Anatolia can never be largely increased, though he is more optimistic regarding the prospects of mining, which, he says, would make immediate and marked progress but for the lack of communications and the vexatious restrictions of the mining law. Another authority, Gustav Herlt, on the other hand, holds that recent research has shown the mineral resources of Anatolia to be smaller than was supposed, and maintains that in every branch of industrial enterprise, agriculture in-

cluded, the shortage of labour and the indolence and conservatism of the natives will for long stand in the way of any substantial advance. Such pessimism was, of course, not universal among Germans who knew Anatolia, but that expression was given to it by writers of some repute at a time when the German hold on Turkey seemed quite firm should serve as a warning against extravagant estimates of the economic and commercial importance of the country.

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ARMENIA

AND

KURDISTAN

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Editorial Note.

In the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connection with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous enquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,
General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

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I. GEOGRAPHY PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL

(1) Position and Frontiers

The terms Armenia and Kurdistan have never been strictly defined, but Armenia is now generally used to denote the six Turkish vilayets of Van, Bitlis, Erzerum, Diarbekr, Mamuret ul-Aziz (Kharput) and Sivas. For present purposes, however, it is taken as including certain adjoining regions which contain a considerable Armenian population—viz., the vilayets of Trebizond and Adana (Cilicia), which is sometimes called "Little Armenia," and certain portions of the Transcaucasian (Russian) governments of Kars, Erivan, and Elisavetopol, which are often spoken of as "Russian Armenia."

Kurdistan is generally taken to mean that area which contains the largest Kurd population—*i.e.*, portions of the vilayets of Van, Diarbekr and Mosul—but there are Kurds throughout the whole length of the Taurus range, from Adana to the Turco-Persian borderland west of Lake Urmia (Urumia, Urmi).

Armenia and Kurdistan, according to this definition, form a region about 325 miles wide from north to south, and about 475 miles long from east to west, lying roughly between latitudes 36° 30′ and 41° north, and longitudes 36° and 45° east, and extending from Samsun on the Black Sea to Alexandretta (Iskanderun) on the Mediterranean, and from Kars in Transcaucasia to Urmia in north-west Persia, the total area being between 160,000 and 170,000 square miles. The region is bordered on the west by Anatolia, on the north by

the Black Sea, on the east by Transcaucasia and Azerbaijan, and on the south by Syria and Mesopotamia.

(2) Surface, Coast, River System and Lakes

Surface

The whole of this region is mountainous, being a continuation westwards of the great Iranian plateau, which is here bounded on the north by the Pontic and on the south by the Taurus range. The Armenian plateau stands at an average height of from 4,000 to 6,000 ft., and above it there rise vast mountain masses, notably Ararat (17,385 ft.), one of the most majestic peaks in the world; and Sipan Dagh (13,700 ft.), an extinct volcano. Between the ranges, which run east and west parallel to one another, there are plains or valleys, sometimes broad and fertile, sometimes rugged and narrow. On the whole the country is treeless, owing partly to centuries of reckless destruction by invaders, and partly to the blighting of all enterprise under Ottoman rule. There remain, however, considerable, though dwindling, woodlands in several parts of the northern vilayets (see pp. 53-55).

Coast

On the north the coast consists of a narrow strip of low country, with Trebizond as its most important town and a number of smaller ports.

The most important ports on the Mediterranean are Mersina and Alexandretta (Iskanderun).

River System and Lakes

The mountain ranges with their heavy accumulations of snow are the source of many streams, including the great rivers Tigris and Euphrates. The eastern

branch of the Euphrates, the Murad Su, rises near the base of Mount Ararat; the western branch, the Kara Su, descends from above the plain of Erzerum. The Greater Zab rises north of Bashkala and joins the Tigris below Mosul. Of the rivers which flow into the Black Sea, the most important are the Chorokh Su and the Yeshil Irmak. The Jeihan Irmak rises in the Anti-Taurus and flows into the Mediterranean. The Araks (Araxes, Aras) rises south of Erzerum, circles round Ararat, and flows into the Caspian, south of Baku.

Van (1,300 square miles) is the most important lake, 5,270 ft. above sea-level. Other lakes are Lake Sevanga or Geukcho (about 6,000 ft. high) and Lake Urmia (about 4,000 ft. high).

(3) Climate

The climate is bracing all the year round, but on the higher levels of the plateau the winter is long and the cold severe. The summer is short, very dry, and hot. The temperature at Erzerum varies from 10° F. to 84° F. The rainfall is light (about 20 in.), and there is a high proportion of cloudless days and nights.

The Black Sea coastline has a milder climate. It is shut in by the high ranges to the south, and is thus protected from the cold plateau winds and moistened by the soft sea breezes.

(4) Sanitary Conditions

On account of general ignorance and official indolence, sanitary conditions, as elsewhere in Turkey, are in a very backward state. With rare exceptions, there are no sewage arrangements, and household garbage is generally emptied in the streets. The water supply varies greatly in purity and abundance. Where it comes from springs, it is pure and good; but in most places it is quite unsuitable for human use.

Typhus, typhoid, Asiatic cholera, small-pox, tuberculosis and syphilis are prevalent everywhere. Malaria is prevalent in all the low lands of the country, and eye, ear, nose, and throat troubles are common everywhere. Infant mortality is believed to be over rather than under 50 per cent. among the Moslem population, but among Armenians it is considerably lower.

(5) Race and Language

The *Armenians* originally occupied the north-eastern portion of Asia Minor. There are at present both Aryan and Semitic types of physiognomy to be seen among the Armenian peasantry, and it appears to be established that the original indigenous (or proto-Armenian) population of the plateau, which had an admixture of Assyrian and Jewish elements, was fused with the Aryan peoples (Scythians and Cimmerians), who invaded the Caucasus and Armenia in the seventh century B.C. These elements, together with the sub-arctic climate of a highland home, have contributed to produce a remarkably vigorous and virile stock, a people who have maintained a distinct national consciousness for 2,500 years, although for the greater part of that period they have been not only without political unity but bitterly persecuted. Lord Bryce considers them to be "in point of industry, intellect and energy, the equals of any of the European races."[1]

From the seventh century B.C. onwards the language of the Armenians was predominantly Indo-European, although it has borrowed from the Persian.

The *Kurds* can be traced back to the Gutu ("Warriors"), an important Turanian tribe inhabiting the mountains above Assyria. They coalesced with the Medes after the fall of Nineveh, and became gradually Aryanised by the immigration into their

[1] Introduction to Buxton's *Travel and Politics in Armenia.*

high plateau of Aryan tribes in enormous numbers. There were before the war more than a million and a half Turkish, in addition to about 800,000 Persian and about 50,000 Russian, Kurds; the majority are tent-dwelling nomads, but an increasing number are pastoral, living in villages in winter and encamping in summer.

The language of the Kurds is known as *Kermanji*. It is a Persian patois with a considerable mixture of Semitic and Turanian elements. There are two important dialects: the *Zaza*, which is spoken in the western Dersim country and is apparently unintelligible to Kermanji-speaking Kurds, and the *Guran*, which is nearer to Persian than Kermanji.

There are various other elements in the Armenian population, and of these the chief are the following:—

The *Yezidis* are hardly to be distinguished from the Kurds. Their headquarters are at Jebel Sinjar, east of Mosul, although they may be met with almost anywhere throughout the region.

The *Circassians*, or Cherkesses, had their original home in the Caucasus, whence they emigrated into the Turkish empire rather than submit to the Russians. The defence of their independence under their chief Shamyl brought them prominently to the notice of Europeans. Being Moslems, they were readily received by the Porte, and settled in Asia Minor, where they are widely dispersed.

The *Lazis* are mostly confined to their own country of Lazistan, between Trebizond and Batum. They are akin to the Georgians of Transcaucasia, but are Moslems.

The *Nestorians*, *Syro-Chaldeans*, or *Assyrians*, are a Christian people, largely Semitic, who inhabit the eastern portion of Kurdistan and the western shores of Lake Urmia. They are subdivided into smaller tribes, among which are the *Jelus*. They have a capacity for culture, which indicates that they might play a leading part in the reconstruction of the land if not too much reduced by the war.

(6) Population

Distribution

The figures which are given here are, except for the last table, derived from pre-war estimates, and must be taken as approximate only, from whatever source they may come.

It is probable that the figures for the Armenians are too low rather than too high, since the existence of a capitation tax tended to make the Armenians conceal rather than exaggerate their own numbers.

Turkish Statistics

Armenia and Kurdistan		
Erzerum	... ...	645,700
Kharput	... ...	575,200
Diarbekr	... ...	471,500
Bitlis	... ...	398,700
Van	... ...	379,800
		2,470,900
Asia Minor		
Adana	... ...	422,400
Sivas	... ...	1,057,500
Trebizond	... ...	1,265,000
		2,744,900
Mesopotamia		
Mosul	... ...	500,000
Total (Turkish)	...	5,715,800

Russian Statistics

Elisavetopol	... ...	1,117,200
Erivan	... ...	1,034,800
Kars	... ...	403,000
Total (Russian)	...	2,555,000
Grand Total	... ...	8,270,800

Statistics of the six Armenian Provinces of Turkey,[1] compiled in 1912 by the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople.

	Population.	Per cent.
Turks	666,000	25·4
Kurds	424,000	16·3
Other Mussulman Races	88,000	3·4
Armenians	1,018,000	38·9
Other Christian Races—		
Nestorian, &c.	123,000	4·8
Greeks, &c.	42,000	1·6
Other religions—		
Kizibashis	140,000	5·3
Zazas, &c.	77,000	2·9
Yezidis	37,000	1·4
	2,615,000	100·0

Statistics relating to the Armenian population of Cilicia (Little Armenia), compiled by the Armenian Patriarchate.

	Armenian Population
Sis	9,500
Adana	37,900
Hadjin	21,200
Payass	11,000
Beria (Aleppo)	22,000
Germanicia (Marasche)	37,500
Ulnia (Zeitun)	21,000
Firnuze	7,016
Aintab	35,000
Antioch (Antakia)	15,500
Melitene (Malatia)	23,000
Yozgad	41,000
Gurun (Kurine)	18,500
Tephrice (Divrik)	11,300
Tarantia (Darende)	7,000
	318,416[2]

[1] According to Turkish statistics, the total population of the six provinces is 3,528,400. The Kurdish population is much underrated by the Armenian Patriarchate. A Russian estimate in 1914 gave the number of Kurds in the two vilayets of Van and Bitlis as about 473,000.

[2] According to Turkish statistics, the total population of these districts is 422,400.

The following statistics refer to the Armenians in Russia, published under the Kerensky Government, 1917.[1]

1. Erivan	464,000
2. Alexandropol	194,000
3. Kars	115,000
4. Tiflis	393,500
5. Shusha	222,000
6. Kansak	198,000
7. Baku	117,000
8. Batum	57,000
9. Daghistan (Derbent, Armavir, Vladikavkaz, &c.)	60,000
10. Astrakhan, including Siberia and Turkestan ...	21,800
11. Bessarabia, with Petrograd, Moscow, Kiev, Kharkov, Rostov, Odessa, Crimea, &c.	82,000
Total	1,924,300

There are also large numbers of Armenians in the United States, in India, and in Egypt, many of whom would return to their national home if local autonomy were guaranteed to them.

Towns

The chief towns of Armenia are Trebizond, an important town on the Black Sea; Erzerum; Bitlis, near Lake Van; Diarbekr, a great centre of communication; the port of Alexandretta (Iskanderun); and Adana in Cilicia.

Movement

It is estimated that the Armenians once numbered over twenty millions, and the steady reduction of the population in modern times must be attributed almost entirely to Turkish persecution in one form or another.

During the war, and as a result of the deportations and massacres of 1915, Lord Bryce estimated in 1916[2]

[1] These figures are nearly double those given in the Russian census of 1897.

[2] See Blue Book, *Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.*

that, of a total Armenian population in Turkey of about 1,800,000 before the war, 600,000 were massacred, 600,000 were deported, 300,000 remain in Armenia and 300,000 survive in Constantinople, Smyrna and other parts of Turkey, or in adjoining territories as refugees. Of the 600,000 who were stated to have been deported to Mesopotamia in 1915, the latest estimate received from Aleppo (December 1918)[1] puts the number of survivors at 90,000 only.

The Kurds have also suffered very severely from the vicissitudes of the war.

[1] From Alfred Backhouse, agent of the Lord Mayor's Fund.

II. POLITICAL HISTORY

Chronological Summary

B.C.

833-645 (*circa*) Period of Biainian Kings (about Van and Mount Ararat).

645-331 (*circa*) Armenia under Medes and Persians.

331-317 Armenia under Alexander and the Seleucidæ.

317 Accession of Ardvates, who makes Armenian Kingdom independent.

66 Tigranes II, "Great King," surrenders to Pompeius. Armenia becomes a client State to Rome.

A.D.

66 Nero crowns Tiridates King of Armenia.

115-117 Armenia a Roman province (conquered by Trajan; client Kingdom restored by Hadrian).

212 The Sassanid dynasty in Persia supplants the Arsacidæ. Beginning of long conflicts between Persia and the Armenian States.

276 (*circa*) Tiridates and the Armenians accept Christianity from Gregory the Illuminator.

387 and 429 Temporary partitions of Armenia between the Kings of Persia and the Emperors Theodosius I and Theodosius II.

491 Armenian Patriarch refuses to accept Canons of Chalcedon. Breach with Byzantium and with Rome.

637 Battle of Cadesia gives Persia and dominion of West Asia to the Arabs.

856 (*circa*) Armenian Kingdom of Ani becomes important.

1071 Byzantine Emperor Romanus Diogenes defeated by the Seljukian Turks, who acquire Armenia.

1080 Foundation of Armenian Kingdom in Cappadocia.

1335 Mongol invasion. A party of Uniats leaves Armenian Church for Roman.

1514 Armenia conquered by the Ottoman Turk Selim I. Armenians organized into a *Millet*.

1639 Erivan (with seat of Patriarchate) becomes Persian.

1802 Georgia becomes a Russian province.

1828-29 Russia obtains Erivan and the region of the Caucasus. Migration of Armenians into Russia.

1831 Protestant influences (especially from America) in Armenia, chiefly educational.
1862 Constitution (with Central and Provincial Councils) promulgated for Armenia.
1877 Armenians in Russia helping in the war against Turkey.
1878 Treaty of Berlin. The Powers press for reforms in Armenia.
1880 Identical note of Powers to Porte concerning reforms.
1881 Assassination of Alexander II. Depression of Armenians.
1883 Germany refuses to join England in enforcing reforms.
1894-96 Armenians (accused of revolutionary schemes) attacked by Kurds. The Powers protest. Wholesale massacres. Russia refuses to support England in putting pressure on the Sultan.
1904 Massacres in Mush district.
1908 Revolution in Turkey. The Armenians support the Young Turks.
1909 Deposition of Abdul Hamid. Massacre of Adana, &c., by the Committee of Union and Progress.
1914 Schemes of reforms stopped by outbreak of war.
1915 Massacre of Armenians on a larger scale, by the orders of the Turkish Government and with the tacit approval of the Central Powers.

Historical Sketch

The name *Armenian* (or a cognate expression) is first found in the cuneiform inscriptions of Darius Hystaspes. The kingdoms of Ararat, Minni, and Ashkeraz are named in the book of Jeremiah. "Minni" is supposed to be Armenia. Other designations are Hagasdan (used by the people themselves) and Urardu (Ararat). The earliest known kingdom is also called Biainas, and had for its capital Van. From the earliest times, the great plateau which generally, though with many changes in boundaries, is called by the name of Armenia, has been in subjection to whatever Power has held dominant sway in the Middle East, with intervals of independence. The Armenian language is Indo-European, but it is generally held by ethnologists that an early people (called proto-Armenian) with a Semitic admixture of Assyrians and Jews, were, in the seventh century B.C., conquered by an Aryan race which imposed its language on the

population, but never became the predominant ethnic element.

(a) *Periods of Armenian History*

The periods of Armenian history may be divided as follows:

(1) *Early Independence.*—The first period is that of the Biainian Kings, also called Khaldians,[1] ruling from Van over the district of Mt. Ararat, from about 833 B.C. to about 645 B.C. We have cuneiform inscriptions of Sarduris, the founder of the dynasty. These kings warred with the great Assyrian monarchs, and some of them were extensive conquerors, who also developed the country by constructing roads and canals. Their language is said to be neither Aryan nor Semitic. They were probably overthrown by Cyaxares the Mede.

(2) *Period of Subjection to Medes, Persians, and Greeks, circa* 645 *to circa* 284 B.C.—Armenia was a satrapy of the Median and Persian Empire, and was after 331 placed by Alexander under governors subject to him and his successors. In the division of his Empire, it fell to the Seleucids.

(3) *Independence and Power under Tigranes and his Successors.*—The Governor Ardvates, however, made himself independent of their rule, though Antiochus the Great tried to re-establish the Græco-Syrian supremacy. Armenia had been divided into Greater and Lesser, both of which provinces were, after 190 B.C., with the concurrence of Rome, allowed to keep their autonomy. But the great time of Armenian independence and empire began with Tigranes II (94-56 B.C.), who established a new capital at Tigranocerta, and made himself master of Mesopotamia. For a short time the ruler of Armenia held the position of King of Kings. But his alliance with Mithradates, King of Pontus, led to the fall of his dominion, after the victories of Lucullus and Pompeius (69 B.C. and 66 B.C.).

[1] Not Chaldeans.

(4) *Under Rome and Parthia as a Client State.*—The Roman conquest did not put an end to the Kingdom, which became a client State, acknowledging alternately and partially the headship of Rome and of Parthia. In 66 A.D. Nero crowned a King of Armenia with his own hand, but the subjection was not permanent. The reduction of Armenia to provincial status by Trajan was one of the exceptions to the rule against extensive conquest laid down by Augustus. Armenia was, however, abandoned by Hadrian. But all through the time of the early Roman Empire, Armenia constitutes an open question; and an expedition into Armenia is an incident in every dispute as to the Eastern frontier of the Empire.

(5) *Under the Sassanids (Revived Persian Empire).*—About 212 A.D. the Parthian or Arsacid Empire was supplanted by the revived Persian, or Sassanid, under Ardshir (Artaxerxes). This implied considerable invigoration in the one Oriental Power that proved a formidable rival to Rome. The Sassanid dynasty was more aggressive in attachment to the Zoroastrian religion than its predecessors had been. The Armenians remained under Kings belonging to a branch of the Arsacid family. When King Tiridates and his people, by the preaching of Gregory the Illuminator, became Christians (before 284 A.D.), religious animosity between Persia and Armenia was added to national antipathy. At the same time, there was no cordiality between Armenia and the Roman Empire (divided into East and West from 395 A.D.). In 387 A.D. and again about 429 A.D. agreements were made for a division of Armenia between the Emperor and the Persian King. The Armenian Kings counted for little. The Arsacid dynasty was practically abolished in 428 A.D. But the Byzantine claims were from time to time asserted. The Armenian *theme* was large in size if uncertain in loyalty; though many Armenians, such as Narses, who reconquered Italy for Justinian, rose to high places in the service of the Empire. After 450 A.D. the failure

of the Council of Chalcedon to secure ecclesiastical unity began to lead, here as elsewhere, to that weakening of the bonds of the Empire which rendered the Eastern provinces an easy prey to the advance of the Arabs. Syria, as well as Egypt, succumbed to the division in the Church. Meantime, Persia was overrun and the Sassanid dynasty overthrown by the Moslems at the battle of Cadesia in 637 A.D.

(6) *Division under the Seljuks, Mongols, &c. Mediæval Kingdoms.*—During the fifth, sixth, and seventh centuries, Armenia was divided into many small States, some of which, especially that of Ani, near Kars, attained to power and significance. This State was favoured by the Caliphs, and Ashot, of the Bagratid dynasty, was allowed by them to hold the title of King, though his father had been a martyr for the Christian faith (856 A.D.). He and his successors were supreme over many tributaries and on very friendly terms with the Byzantine Emperors, of whom one at least, the warrior Emperor, John Zimisces, was himself an Armenian. Their dominions extended from the Caspian to the Valley of Mush, but their authority suffered from the insubordination of dependent rulers (especially those of Georgia), the rivalries in the Armenian aristocracy, and the want of ecclesiastical union with the Emperors. Yet they maintained the Christian cause against Moslems of various races for some centuries, and the later Cilician Kingdom, which kept up its connection with Western Christendom and followed a crusading policy, was an offshoot from that of Ani and Kars. The ruins of Ani show both the military and financial strength of the dynasty and the artistic skill of their builders, the architecture being rich and impressive, "denoting a standard of culture which was far in advance of the contemporary standards in the West."[1] The claims passed over, towards the end of the fourteenth century, to the Lusignan family, which also

[1] H. F. B. Lynch, *Armenia*.

held (1192-1489) the titular Kingdom of Jerusalem and the real one of Cyprus. Their rule in Cyprus was for a time firm and prosperous, and many Armenians settled in the island.

During this period the prevailing regime in Armenia seems to have been one of numerous native nobles and foreign adventurers, at times coalescing under a particularly strong leader or succession of leaders. "Some were vassals of the Greek Emperor, some of the Caliph; some were Moslems, some were Christians; some were Armenians, and some were Kurds; some were descendants of Arabian Emirs and their servants." This more or less feudal regime was modified to an important degree by the pressure of the Seljuks, and the resulting tendency of many Armenians to move farther westwards towards Sivas and south-westwards towards Aleppo. The seal was set on this process by the Emperor Basil II transplanting the dynasty of Van to Sivas (1021 A.D.), and by the removal to Cilicia, in the reign of the Emperor Michael IV, of the kingdom founded in Cappadocia by Ruphen in 1080. The result was a great diminution in the Armenian nobility left in the old "Armenia." These centuries of struggle among themselves and with the Kurds and Seljuks sufficed almost entirely to eradicate them, leaving the Armenians constituted as a peasant population, with a marked proportion of persons engaged in commerce and rudimentary industries, and with the clergy as the leaders in the country.

In 1071 the Emperor Romanus Diogenes was defeated by the Seljukian Turk, Alp Arslan. Armenia first formed part of the Seljuk Empire, then broke up into a number of petty States, and after the coming of the Mongols (1235)—the most barbarous of its invaders—was for nearly 300 years the prey of nomad pastoral tribes, who destroyed all settled agriculture. In 1514 Selim I added Armenia to the dominions of the Osmanli Turks, who had been established in Constantinople since 1453.

(7) *Under the Ottoman Turks.*—The Government of the peoples under Turkey was reorganized soon after this date, and communities called *Millets* were established, each under its own religious head, who had some powers of civil jurisdiction and administration. The chief official of the Armenians recognised at Constantinople for this purpose was the Archbishop of Brusa, though the recognised Patriarch of the whole Armenian Church was (after 1441) the Katholikos of Echmiadzin (Vagarshabad) in the province of Erivan, which, in 1639, was ceded to Persia, and in 1828 to Russia. This system encouraged the growth of a community life, but degraded whatever spiritual character the priesthood still possessed. Objections to clerical government were made in the middle of the nineteenth century, and by the arrangements of 1862 (as will be shown later) the Armenians under Turkey were supposed to be under an elected council of 140 representatives, mixed clerical and lay, the Patriarch being officially president. A more definite, if only a titular, form was thus given to national aspirations. In 1914, however, the local government, as in other parts of the Turkish Empire, was practically in the hands of the *valis*, each over a *vilayet*. Associated with the vali is a *moavin*, responsible directly to the Minister of Finance at Constantinople. The valis are appointed by the Sultan. During the disturbances of the last decade of the nineteenth century, a promise was made that the moavins should be non-Moslem, and that there should also be non-Moslems directing affairs in the lesser districts.

(b) *Factors of Armenian History*

The history of the Armenian people down to comparatively modern times explains both the extent of the sufferings to which they have been, and still are, continually exposed, and the extreme difficulty of finding any effectual remedy. There are three points closely connected together, which may be briefly

examined in turn. (1) Through forced or voluntary migrations, the Armenians have been dispersed abroad in many countries, and thus have had little power of united action for resistance or reform; (2) their religious position has been peculiar to themselves, and has placed them outside the pale of any of the leading Churches; (3) although a few of their number have risen to high posts in the civil administration under the Turks, the Armenians have been, especially in the last quarter of a century, objects of jealousy and dislike, on religious, commercial, and personal grounds, to those who have the rule over them and desire their exploitation or extermination.

(1) *Dispersion.*—In the time of the Arab invasions, numbers of Armenians migrated to Constantinople and the regions near, where many acquired rank and influence. Some of the strongest of the Byzantine Emperors were of Armenian descent, and in industrial life the Armenians obtained wealth and status through their artistic skill and businesslike habits. The desolation of their land by Turks and Mongols led to a great depopulation, to remedy which, Idris, a Kurdish minister of Selim I, settled Kurds in the vacated homesteads. The Ottoman policy favoured the Kurds as a semi-independent bulwark against Persia, and as capable of maintaining, in addition, a feudal authority over the Armenians. Thus, though the Kurds were not yet the deadly enemies to the Armenians that they became later, their influence was naturally against Armenian unity. In the sixteenth century the Persians invaded Armenia, and in 1604 Shah Abbas transported many thousands of Armenians to Ispahan. They engaged early in trade with India, and received in 1688 privileges from the Company of London Merchants to the East Indies. After the Turco-Russian War of 1828-29, many Armenians (it is said 40,000) who had come to look on Russia as a protectress, migrated into Russian territory. There was a similar migration after 1878. A considerable number settled in the United States.

It is almost needless to say that in the Levant Armenians are to be found everywhere, and that they have the reputation of finding out where and how money is to be made. The virtues and vices of successful traders and artisans are to be expected in a race of superior capacities cut off from attachment to the land. The rise of the Armenians in wealth and in general importance to the European Powers coincides with the lack of political power and (in Turkish lands) of personal security. Their importance to Russia was at first of an industrial and commercial, later on of a military, character. Even in Turkey, where until 1908 they could not bear arms, or associate on equal terms with the ruling class, they could hold useful and lucrative offices, even some recognised as hereditary, such as the Mastership of the Mint. Peter the Great of Russia had encouraged them to settle in his country, in order to prosecute and to teach the manufacture of silk. But Armenian relations with Russia became more intricate with the Russian advance in Asia, from the beginning of the nineteenth century. In 1802 Alexander I made Georgia, which had been under Russian influence since 1783, into a Russian province. In 1828, by arrangement with Persia, Russia obtained Erivan, and with it the ecclesiastical capital (Echmiadzin) of Armenia. By the Treaty of Adrianople (1829), Russia acquired much of the Caucasus region, along with some recognition as protectress of Christians under Moslem rule. In the later wars Kars was three times taken and twice lost by the Russians. The third time (when Loris Melikoff, a soldier of mixed Armenian and Georgian race, and in Russian service, captured it from the Turks in 1877) it was retained.

Meantime, during the period 1811-41, while Mehemet Ali was making the position of the Sultan uncertain, not only in Egypt but in Constantinople itself, Turkey began to rely for a time on Russia for the continuance of her existence, and the influence of

Russia had at least to be tolerated by the Porte, when she upheld the privileges of the Christians. The Crimean War naturally changed the aspect of things, and it can hardly be said that the Powers collectively have justified by superior effectiveness in the cause of toleration the degradation of Russia from her rôle of protectress. But Russia, though not so strongly bound to Armenia, either by racial or by religious ties, as she was to the Jugo-Slavs, has at least afforded an asylum and many careers to Armenian immigrants, and the Turkish dislike of Armenians, which led to the massacres, may have been connected with a dread of Russian encroachment. It is believed that the Tsar Alexander II had some project of an autonomous Armenia under Russian protection, but his assassination in 1881 put an end to any such scheme. The policy of his successor was not pro-Armenian, but in 1900 Russia is again found pressing the need of reforms on the Turkish Government. About the years 1900 to 1904, however, the Russian Government roused the Tatars of Transcaucasia to attack the Armenian population there. Russia disliked the independence of the Armenian Church, and professed to fear a revolutionary movement among her Armenian subjects.

The attempt to russianize the Armenians under Russian rule, and the general character of this rule, tended to make the Armenians—even after the ruin of the hopes aroused by the Young Turk revolution—look to Constantinople. The harsh treatment of the Armenians by Russia in the late war, and the existing state of Russia, have prevented the growth of any pro-Russian sentiment since 1914.

(2) *Religion.*—The Armenians adopted Christianity some forty years earlier than did the Roman Emperors, for King Tiridates was converted by Gregory the Illuminator before 284 A.D. It has also been remarked that the Armenian Church did not accept the canons of the Council of Chalcedon, and therefore was more or less separated from both Eastern and Western Christendom, and *a fortiori* from the Nestorians, who

maintained with some intellectual and spiritual vigour the other (Dyophysite) side, which was also branded as heretical at Chalcedon. But some of the peculiarities of Armenian Christianity must have originated earlier and have become accentuated by separation. The Gregorian (national) Armenians acknowledge the authority of the First Three General Councils only; they disapprove of reverence paid to images and pictures. They have their own saints, martyrs, and ritual. As in Russia, the Black Clergy, or celibates, are distinct from the White, or married village priests.

During the period of the Turkish advance attempts towards reunion with the Orthodox Church were made, while similar efforts were made towards reunion between East and West. But all such schemes proved ineffectual. A large body of Armenians were, however (from 1335), brought under Roman obedience as Uniats. Their Roman Catholic Patriarch was recognised by the Pope in 1742, and a Roman Catholic *Millet* was recognised by the Porte in 1830, though its numbers were not very considerable. This movement tended, of course, to cool the sympathy of Russia, to whom the Eastern Christians generally were beginning to look for support. In 1828 Echmiadzin became Russian, and two subordinate patriarchates subsequently came under Russian control. A third element in Armenian Christianity is the Protestantism which has spread under American influence, although the educational missions of Americans are not generally directed to proselytism, but encourage the maintenance and enlightenment of all national systems of belief and cult. In 1846 the Patriarch anathematised Protestantism; an Evangelical Church of the Armenians was then formed, and, through British influence, recognised as a Protestant *Millet*. The Armenians have generally shown staunch adhesion to their faith under persecution from many quarters.

(3) *Persecution.*—The Armenians had suffered persecution from Zoroastrians, from the eastern Orthodox Emperors, and from Moslems, but only in a spasmodic

way till comparatively recent times. In fact, it is difficult to separate the elements of religious fanaticism, racial jealousy and dislike, and political apprehensions, which have combined to produce the massacres of 1894-96, 1904, 1909, and 1915, though there can be no doubt that the rage of Moslems against religious rivals was deliberately stirred up by political authorities, who played on the fear of Armenian revolutionary action. From 1878 the task of protecting the Armenians from religious persecution and political oppression may be said to have been transferred from Russia to the Powers collectively. England incurred, however, a special obligation in this respect, in that her occupation of Cyprus was declared, in a special defensive treaty with Turkey, to have been made (*a*) in order that England might assist the Porte against future encroachments or the retention of Kars, Batum, and other Asiatic provinces provisionally occupied, and in introducing necessary reforms, to be agreed upon later by the two Powers, into the government, and (*b*) for the protection of the Christian and other subjects of the Porte in these territories. In the Treaty of Berlin, Article LXI, is the important provision that

> " the Sublime Porte undertakes to carry out, without further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the Circassians and Kurds. It will periodically make known the steps taken to this effect to the Powers who will superintend their application."

This is based on Article XVI in the Treaty of San Stefano (which, of course, was to bind Russia and Turkey only). By the Articles of the Treaty of Berlin following LXI, the Porte promised complete religious liberty, with protection of sacred places and persons.

In June 1880, since Article LXI and other Articles of the Treaty of Berlin had been practically ignored by Turkey, identical notes were presented by the

representatives of the Six Powers to the Porte. They declared that

> "all the reports furnished by the agents show that the state of these provinces is deplorable; . . . they are convinced that only united and incessant pressure on their part will induce the Sublime Porte to fulfil its duties in this respect. . . . I consider it my duty to call your most serious attention to the grave responsibility the Porte would incur by any fresh delays in the execution of the measures, &c., &c."

To these representations no satisfactory answer was returned. Unfortunately for the Armenians, the assassination of their friend Alexander II occurred (as already stated) in 1881. An anti-Armenian policy was now adopted in Russia, and in 1883 the refusal of Bismarck to apply coercion from Germany was sufficient to check for the time the efforts of the Powers for reform to be initiated by the Porte. Nationalists in Armenia could now expect no external assistance, and looked rather to internal intrigue. An excuse was thus afforded to the Turkish Government to avoid the execution of treaty obligations by the revolutionary action of certain Armenian societies, which had originally grown up as a lay opposition to the conservatism of the official clerical leaders, and which had centres in the Caucasus, London, Paris, Switzerland, and elsewhere, inspired by and confident in the spirit of "nationality." The means used against the propaganda were such as struck against many who had no share in them nor any disposition for violent action. A free hand was given to Moslem mobs in Van, Kharput, Malatia, and Trebizond to attack Armenian Christians in their homes or ordinary resorts, and to kill all who would not abjure their faith. The fierce nomad Kurds had become bitterly hostile to the Armenians since the adoption by Abdul Hamid, after the Russo-Turkish War, of the policy of setting the two peoples against each other. Arms were distributed among the Kurds, who were then let loose upon the peasant population. Turkish irregular troops were called out, and the hideous results followed of which

the record is abundant and trustworthy. In two days of June 1896, 6,000 to 7,000 Gregorian Christians were massacred in Constantinople alone. "In all, more than 100,000 men, women, and children had perished."[1] Large numbers of deportations also took place.

Meantime, Great Britain, France, and Russia had issued remonstrances to the Porte, and in May 1895 a scheme of reforms for Armenia had been submitted to it for consideration. Russia, however, refused to agree to coercion. The direct complicity of the Sultan is proved by the obvious organization of the massacres and by the fact that Roman Catholics and Orthodox Greeks had not been among the victims. It should be noted that most of the population, including the clergy and the Armenians under American influence, had no share in the national propaganda, and that many respectable Moslems tried to use their influence against the massacres.

There were more massacres in 1904 in the district of Mush, but the rise of the Young Turk party, concentrated in the Committee of Union and Progress, with its assertion of liberty and toleration, and the New Constitution of 1908, aroused Armenian hopes. The deposition of Abdul Hamid, however, in 1909, was followed by the massacre of Adana, for which a pretext was found in the pretensions of a small section of Armenians to complete independence. This massacre was part of the reactionary revolution projected by Abdul Hamid and resulting in his fall. But the extermination of the whole Armenian people was a later project, attributable to the Government of the Young Turks, whose high aims had speedily retreated into the background.

The Armenians, allowed to bear arms since 1908, had fought for the Turkish Government in the Balkan Wars, yet when war against Russia was declared by Turkey in 1914 they were regarded with suspicion, and were consequently disarmed. Thence ensued mas-

[1] Bryce, *Treatment of Armenians*, p. 624.

sacres on a larger scale than ever, and affording an outlet both to Moslem zeal and to German industrial and commercial expansion. In these it is estimated that 600,000 Armenians perished.[1]

(c) *Historical Note on the Kurds*

The ancient Gutu (Assyrian Gardu or Kardu), the first-known ancestors of the Kurds in the mountains north of Assyria, seem to have maintained their independence throughout the period of the Assyrian Empire; their name appears on cuneiform inscriptions on an equality with the Syrians and Hittites and other peoples of Western Asia. The Gutu were conquered by Cyrus, and furnished a contingent of men to the Persian army. They appear in Xenophon as the Carduchi who opposed the return of the Ten Thousand. Subsequently, they passed under the domination of the Macedonians, the Parthians, and the Sassanians. Their most flourishing period was in the twelfth century, when, under the Kurdish Saladin the Great and his successors of the Ayyubite dynasty, Kurdish chieftainships were established from Khorasan to Egypt and Yemen.

After the defeat of Shah Ismail of Persia by Sultan Selim the "Grim" in 1514, the Kurdish historian Idris was entrusted with the organization of the conquered territories. Idris did not attempt to break up the clans or depose hereditary chieftains. He merely divided the territory into Sanjaks, with the chiefs as governors. No further change took place until after

[1] Bryce, *Treatment of Armenians*, p. 651. Later evidence has raised this number to about 1,000,000. In the latest massacres the Nestorian or Syrian Christians suffered with the Armenians. These had migrated into Armenia to escape the ravages of Tamerlane during the last part of the fourteenth century. A body of them settled on Lake Archag (the so-called Chaldeans were a later secession). They received some kind of recognition from Pope Julius III (1552). In Armenia their chief settlements have been near Lake Urmia and in the Hakkiari district, where there were frightful massacres and deportations in 1915.

the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-9, when the Kurds, who had spread as far as Angora, attempted to free themselves from Turkish control. They were subdued by Reshid Pasha in 1834; their towns were garrisoned, and the local chieftains superseded in many places by Turkish Beys. Another rising took place in 1843, but was completely suppressed. In 1880-81 Sheikh Obaid-ullah attempted to set up an independent Kurdish principality under Turkish suzerainty. But Obaid-ullah soon placed the Turkish Government in a difficult position, by making an inroad into Persia; and Turkey withdrew her support from a movement which she had first regarded as a useful counterpoise to Armenian nationalism. It was fear of the latter that moved the Porte, in 1891, to raise a body of Kurdish irregular cavalry, and to follow the disastrous policy of urging the Kurds to attack the Armenians, with whom, until the Armenian nationalist movement began, they had lived without serious quarrels, and in the bond of common hostility towards Turk and Persian.

III. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Introductory Note

For modern conditions—as they are or were lately supposed to be—the source to which one would naturally look is the Constitution sanctioned by the Porte in 1862, and printed *in extenso* at the end of Mr. H. F. B. Lynch's *Armenia*. Mr. Lynch remarks, however, that "the General Assembly of the Armenians met regularly in Constantinople until 1892. Some of the Provincial Assemblies still continue their meetings. But the Constitution is [1901] practically in abeyance, owing to the strained relations at present existing between the Palace and the Armenians." Still, the document is instructive, and some of its chief articles will be quoted or epitomised below. A few years ago the National General Assembly, previously Gregorian only, opened its doors to the Protestant Armenians, who then began to attend its sessions. This is the strongest evidence of national unity yet afforded.

Another set of reforms was drawn up by the Great Powers and imposed on the Young Turk Government in 1914; the chief point of these was to be the appointment of inspectors-general over groups of vilayets. But the declaration of war stopped any attempt to realise the scheme.

(1) Religious

Neither in the Constitution nor in practice have religious questions been entirely separate from the political and educational.

Fundamental Principles of Constitution of 1862

Article 3.—"The duties of the nation are to care for the moral, intellectual, and material wants of its

members, to preserve intact the creed and traditions of the Armenian Church, to diffuse equally the knowledge necessary to all men among the children of both sexes, of all classes, &c., &c."

Chapter I—The Central National Administration

Article 1.—The Patriarch of Constantinople is declared to be the President of all the National Assemblies and the representative of their executive authority, and in particular circumstances he is the medium of the execution of the orders of the Ottoman Government.

Articles 2-7.—Regulate a very elaborate system for the choice of the Patriarch (from a list made by the Religious Assembly, from which is made a shorter list by the Political Assembly, the Sublime Porte being asked to confirm the choice).

Articles 8-16.—Competence of Patriarch (extensive powers over officials; yet obliged to act with "competent Assemblies" and with a patriarchal bureau).

Articles 17-23.—Election and functions of the Patriarch of Jerusalem.

Article 24.—*National Religious Assembly.* "Fourteen worthy ecclesiastics."

Article 25.—Selection, by General Assembly, of members of Religious Assembly from list presented by General Religious Assembly.

Article 26.—Dissolution once in two years.

Article 28.—Duties "to develop in the nation the religious sentiment, ... visit from time to time the national schools," &c.

Articles 29-31.—Special Religious Assemblies, final appeal to Œcumenical Patriarch (at Echmiadzin).

Articles 32-35.—*Educational.* "All monasteries are obliged to promote the moral improvement of the nation. Hence each one, according to its capacity, should have a seminary, or library, or printing office, or hospital, and other similar useful establishments."

(2) Political

Articles 36-43 of the Constitution provide for a *Political Assembly* of twenty laymen well acquainted with the national affairs and with the laws of the Government. It comprises Councils and Committees: Educational, Economic, Judicial, for Monasteries, Financial, on Wills, on Hospitals, on "Quarters."

Articles 57-84, on *National General Assembly* and its functions (20 ecclesiastical deputies, elected by clergy in Constantinople; 40 deputies from provinces; 80 deputies from Quarters of Constantinople—total 140).

By *Article* 65, all who pay 75 piastres as national tax have votes for a lay deputy.

Chapter II: Articles 85-89.—General Laws for Assemblies and Councils.

Chapter III: Articles 90-93.—On *National Taxation*, general and special: distribution and collection for Constantinople by Political Assembly, General Assembly, and Councils of Quarters.

Chapter IV: Articles 94-98.—*National Provincial Administration*. Provincial Assemblies, each under its Metropolitan.

Chapter V.—Arrangements for revision.

It is noticeable that this Constitution differs from European Constitutions in the absence of any close connection between representation and taxation. There are financial and economic bodies, but their function seems to be rather to control sales, keep accounts, and arrange assessment, than actually to levy taxes. The principle is laid down (Article 90) that "every member of the nation who is of age and capable of earning money is bound to participate in the national expenditure by paying a tax. This tax is annual, and the basis of its distribution is the capacity of the individual." But there is nothing apparently in the nature of an annual budget presented to any assembly, nor of amounts demanded by a responsible finance minister. The phrase, however, "until the national

taxation be fixed in the provinces" (Article 98) seems intended to suggest a future system of parliamentary taxation. Another peculiar point is the large preponderance given to the Armenian element in Constantinople above that of the provinces.

In the opinion of competent travellers, before the massacres of 1915-16, the Armenian question was practically a Kurdish question; the problem was not so much to maintain a fair amount of religious toleration on the Turkish side and of submissiveness on the Armenian, as to reduce within the bounds of law and order the tribes of Kurds, who are a perpetual threat both to Moslem and to Christian civilisation. But the Sultan's system of arming and using the Kurds as an instrument against the Armenians has probably rendered nugatory any schemes by which those people might have been deprived of their dangerous powers. It may be noted, however, that the Kurds have little more than a tribal consciousness, without any nationalist policy; and during the 1915 massacres some of the Kurds of the Aleppo vilayet and of the country between Kharput and Erzingan showed themselves friendly to the Armenians.

(3) Educational

Religious and moral education is to be directed in the national schools by the National Religious Assembly (Constitution of 1862, Article 28). The educational functions of monasteries are recognised by Article 48, which puts them under a Special Council. According to all accounts, the Turkish Government has discouraged education in the Armenian language everywhere. Hence the scope given to the American missionaries, whom the Government, as a rule, were afraid of opposing, and who endeavoured, generally, to educate without denationalizing. It is said to be the fact that a considerable number of the best educated Armenians (as well as persons of other subject races) have received instruction in the American colleges. There are also Roman Catholic schools to which the

Uniat Armenians and sometimes other denominations have access.

There are in some parts of Armenia a good many schools of various types, some of them supported by private benefaction. In spite of the provision for clerical inspection, the teachers are generally lay. In Van, when Mr. Lynch visited that region, boys were being taught languages, literature, mathematics, and natural science, also music. Girls were mainly taught by women. Although some of the establishments were church schools, they were all, including the private schools, under the regulation of a Turkish Minister of Instruction. The schools were primary, secondary, and collegiate, but owing to the poverty of the people the length of the educational course was generally short. Russian influence was strong. In other parts Gregorians and Catholics, both boys and girls, attended the same schools. The censorship of the Press is still an obstacle. In some few quarters German influences prevailed, the Armenian teachers having had part of their education in Germany.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

(1) Popular Opinion and National Sentiment

The popular opinion of so widely-diffused a people as the Armenians is not easily gauged, nor can we confidently speak of national sentiment among a race which has never constituted a single and comprehensive State. Nevertheless, there is among the Armenians a strong feeling of national fellowship. Whether this is accompanied with either the desire to coalesce into a national State or the capacity for maintaining a State if once created, opinion among experts is much divided. Unlike the Greeks or the Italians, or even the Serbians, who have nourished for centuries a common stock of traditions and aspirations especially connected with particular territories, and so furnishing a material basis for a centralized political community, the Armenians have no local

nucleus nor definite area of homeland. Nor have they a Mecca, Jerusalem, or Rome; and, though they have similar memories of persecutions, they do not bear common allegiance to one Church. They have, however, developed an intense devotion to old Armenia, while the divisions between Gregorians, Roman Catholics, and Protestants are tending to disappear. There is no religious fanaticism among the laity, and little, apparently, among the clergy. The Armenians therefore are capable of a larger religious toleration than is often found in persecuted peoples, and this fact may stand them in good stead in the future.

(2) Expansion and Future Development

These depend very much on the extent to which, by voluntary migrations, the Armenians may become the dominant people in a definite area. Their commercial and artistic faculties are everywhere acknowledged, and as mechanics they are excellent. They have, in spite of many centuries of non-military status, shown military ability (as in the Russian and Turkish Wars, and even in some places during the latest massacres); and although, for the most part, the Turco-Armenian peasantry have, through insecurity, been heavily handicapped, they have also, under more favourable circumstances, achieved success in agriculture.

IV. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(A) MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

(1) INTERNAL

(a) *Roads, Caravan Routes, Paths, &c.*

ARMENIA possessed at the outbreak of the war a considerable mileage of so-called carriage roads, but these were, speaking generally, in a bad state of repair. The advent of the Young Turks to power in 1908 was the signal for the initiation of many schemes of internal economic improvement, and a contract was entered into in 1910 with a French company, the Entreprise des Routes d'État, for the repair of existing roads and the construction of new roads in Armenia and elsewhere at a total cost of about £2,000,000. The roads to be constructed were: (1) Trebizond—Erzerum (begun in 1913),[1] (2) Erzerum—Erzingan—Sivas—Samsun, (3) Erzerum—Van, (4) Erzerum—Bitlis, (5) Erzerum—Rize, (6) Kerasund—Karahissar—Erzingan, (7) Erzingan—Kharput. Only a small part of the programme, however, had been executed when the war broke out.

The principal road systems in Armenia are:—

(1) The road from Erzerum to Trebizond, which is part of the ancient caravan route from Persia to the Black Sea, and passes through Bayazid, Erzerum, Baiburt, and Gumush-Khane, *via* the Zigana, Vavuk, and Kop Dagh passes. The highest point on this road is 6,000 ft., and the passes are under deep snow during the winter.

(2) The road from Samsun to Baghdad, *via* Sivas, Mezre, Arghana Maden, Diarbekr, and Mosul. This is the greatest trade artery of the country.

(3) The road from Sivas through Kaisarie to Adana and the Mediterranean. Only a small portion of this road is in Armenia.

[1] See *infra*, p. 38.

During the war the Turks, at German instigation, made a certain number of the more important roads suitable for motor traffic, and work of a similar nature was also done by the Russians during their occupation of Erzerum, Trebizond, and the surrounding country.

Apart from carriage roads, all over Armenia there are roads which can at most times of the year be used by the *araba* or ox-cart. This, the chief means of transport, is a two-wheeled cart drawn by a team of from two to four bullocks, and capable of taking a load of from 7 to 11½ cwt. Buffaloes are also used, and can draw larger loads than bullocks, but require more care in management.

In the mountainous districts transport is conducted by means of pack animals, and the tracks used by these are numerous and can be relied on. They have been used from time immemorial as means of communication, and need no keeping in repair, for, if they are damaged, a diversion is readily found. They are described in detail in various handbooks.

Mountain paths and tracks, only known locally, also connect the various villages with each other and with the summer pastures. They can nearly all be used for pack transport, especially if the animals are lightly loaded. Porters are seldom used for long marches.

(b) *Rivers and Waterways*

Although Armenia abounds in rivers, there is practically no inland navigation, except upon Lake Van. The opinion has been expressed that stretches of many of the rivers might be made navigable, and that the blighting rule of the Turk is responsible for the absence of any attempt in this direction. This opinion should be accepted with reserve. In most of the rivers, owing to the configuration of the country, the current is swift, and though in spring they are very full they dwindle in summer to small streams, so that, while money spent on their improvement with a view to irrigation would probably prove profitable, an inland

navigation scheme would prove expensive and unremunerative.

The only river upon which there is any navigation is the Yeshil Irmak, which is used by boats from its mouth as far as its confluence with the Germeli Su, a distance of about 100 miles.

The Euphrates between Kemakh and Keban Maden is used for floating timber down-stream. The Tigris from Diarbekr is used for the transport of goods and occasionally passengers down-stream on rafts called *keleks*, made of wood supported on inflated skins. At the journey's end the skins are deflated and taken up-stream again on pack animals. The river is also used for floating timber.

Lake Van, an important inland water, six times the size of Lake Geneva, has been navigated from the earliest times, and there are normally about 80 sailing boats plying on it. The type of boat is small, from 30 to 55 ft. long and 15 to 20 ft. beam. It is built of oak or ash, carries a huge lug sail, and will take a load of about 20 tons. A small motor-boat for the conveyance of mails was put on the lake in 1909.

(c) *Railways*

Although schemes for the construction of railways in Armenia, in common with the rest of Asiatic Turkey, had begun to take definite shape between 1908 and 1912, railways had not actually penetrated the country when war broke out. Even now they have only entered it on the north-east.

Armenia is approached by two systems of railways: the Turkish (gauge 1·46 m., approximately the British standard gauge of 4 ft. 8½ in.) on the west and the south, and the Russian (gauge 5 ft. and 3 ft. 6 in.) on the east.

The *Turkish* lines are:—

1. The Anatolian Railway, Haidar-Pasha—Eski Shehr—Angora. An extension for strategic purposes *via* Yozgad in the direction of Sivas

was partly constructed during the early years of the war. When Russian efforts in the war slackened after the Russian Revolution, work on this extension seems to have been discontinued.

2. The Baghdad Railway, which starts from the terminus of the southern arm of the Anatolian Railway at Konia, and runs parallel with the general direction of the south-western and southern boundaries of Armenia for many miles. Up to the present it has only penetrated Armenia as far as Nisibin (whence it is to be extended to Mosul), but it is likely to have a considerable influence upon the direction of Armenian trade in the future, particularly if a branch line is built to Diarbekr and Arghana Maden, as was intended in the original scheme. Since 1914 a Decauville track has connected the copper mines at Arghana Maden with Diarbekr.
3. It is stated that a Decauville tramway has been constructed from Ula Kishla through Kaisarie to Sivas. This is probably preliminary to the construction of a standard gauge railway. Only the last 60 miles or so of this route lie within Armenia.

The *Russian* railways entering Armenia are:—

1. A line from Sarikamish to Erzerum (gauge 3 ft. 6 in.). This line, which has been completed during the war, is an extension of the Tiflis—Kars—Sarikamish line (5 ft. gauge), which was opened for traffic as far as Sarikamish in 1913. The line was being extended from that point to the Turkish frontier before the war, but it is probable that its construction was always intended to serve strategic rather than economic purposes. It was being continued by the Russians past Erzerum to Erzingan, but work was stopped on the Russian retirement from Armenia.

2. A line (gauge 3 ft. 6 in.) running west from the Tiflis—Julfa—Tabriz line (gauge 5 ft.) at Shah-Takhtai (Shahhtakhtinskaya, Shakh Takhti), entering Armenia near Bayazid and running as far as Kara Kilissa. Construction was being continued towards Erzerum up to March 1917. A branch from this line was started from Bayazid, down the valley of the Bende Mahi, to the head of Lake Van at Arnis. This had reached a point 26 miles from Arnis before the end of March, 1917.
3. A steam tramway was recently in course of construction from Takau, at the south-west corner of Lake Urmia, to Rayat, just inside the Turkish border, near Rowanduz. It was expected that this line would be ready for traffic by September 1917. From Takau there was a steamboat service across the lake to a point on the north-eastern shore opposite Tabriz, where a branch from Sufian, on the Julfa—Tabriz line, comes down to the lake.

Projected Railways.—In April 1914 a concession was granted to a French company, the Régie Générale de Chemins de Fer et de Travaux Publics, for the execution of a comprehensive scheme of railway construction in Armenia. In return for the negotiation of a loan of 800 million francs to the Turkish Government through certain French banks, the company was empowered to build the following lines:—

1. A railway connecting Samsun, Sivas, Kharput and Arghana.
2. A railway connecting Arghana, Bitlis and Van.
3. A railway from Erzerum to Trebizond.
4. A railway connecting Erzerum with Erzingan and Sivas.

These lines were to be completed within 10 years. The concession gave the company the reversion of the ports of Samsun and Trebizond (*see* below) in the event of the lapsing of the agreement then in existence with the National Bank of Turkey.

A glance at the map will show that, if the railways contemplated by the concession were built, Armenia, except for the south-eastern districts of Van vilayet, would be well supplied with good internal communications; but beyond the construction of a few miles of the permanent way from Samsun towards Sivas, nothing had been accomplished when war broke out.

In September 1911 a preliminary contract for the construction of a railway from Kerasund to Karahissar (75 miles) was entered into between the Government and a representative of the Franco-Turkish Bank.

(d) *Posts, Telegraphs, and Telephones*

Particulars of the Turkish postal system have been given in *Turkey in Europe*, No. 16 of this series. There was before the war no telephone system in Armenia for civil purposes, but all the important centres were connected by telegraph lines. Bashkalah was a centre for telegraphic communication with Persia.

(2) External

(a) *Ports*

Trebizond.—Though Trebizond is one of the most important of the Turkish Black Sea ports and the chief outlet for a considerable trade from as far east as Tabriz in Persia and as far south as Mosul, very little had been done before the war toward making it a serviceable port. A certain amount of work had been begun, including the construction of an iron pier, and in 1911 an option was granted to the National Bank of Turkey for the construction of a harbour, in connection with which surveys were made by the English firm of Sir John Jackson, Ltd.; but nothing tangible had been accomplished. Trebizond remained practically an open roadstead down to the time of its occupation by the Russian forces, and the only construction in the nature of a breakwater was a mole 150 yards in length extending east from Kalmek Point, on the west side

of the bay, and affording shelter for small craft. In stormy weather steamers were compelled to take shelter at Platana, about 8 miles west of Trebizond.

The Russians during their occupation constructed a breakwater, which is reported to have made the harbour safe for vessels of any tonnage in any weather, even when a strong north wind is blowing. They also improved the facilities for handling cargo. Before the war all goods were loaded and discharged at a small jetty about 175 yards long, by means of lighters capable of carrying about 30 tons. The jetty was equipped with two small cranes and had a depth of about two feet of water alongside. The Russians completed and extended the pier which had been begun, and laid water-pipes down to the harbour.

Until recently Trebizond was equally badly served on the land side. The only means of communication with the interior was the so-called carriage road from Erzerum, which had fallen into bad repair. It was being remade before war broke out, and work had been completed as far as Sevislik (18 miles from Trebizond). It is stated that this road has been repaired by the Russians and is now fit for motor traffic all the way to Erzerum. A motor road and railway have also been constructed along the coast, connecting Trebizond with Batum, the Black Sea port for Baku on the Caspian. Both of these communications with Batum were built for strategic purposes, and it is improbable that either will be of great commercial value.

The population of Trebizond is about 60,000. The industries of the town are confined to the manufacture of linen cloth and silver filigree work, tanning, and a little weaving of cotton, silk, and wool. Tobacco and filbert nuts are normally the chief articles of export, the nuts coming from the Lazistan and Elevi districts as well as from the Trebizond sanjak itself. It seems probable that the trade of Trebizond will decrease with the development of Armenia. The construction of a railway to Erzerum would involve crossing high passes, and the cost would be very heavy. It is likely,

therefore, that the railways will in general run east and west, following the direction of the valleys, and that trade will be drawn to Samsun rather than to Trebizond.

The following is a list of the principal steamship lines which called at Trebizond in 1912:—

Nationality.	Name of Company.	Service.
Turkish ..	Gumushlian Co.	Weekly.
„ ..	Mahsusseh Co.	„
„ ..	Terekki Co.	„
„ ..	Gourji Co.	„
French ..	Messageries Maritimes N. Paquet & Cie.	Called fortnightly at Trebizond and Samsun, and at Kerasund and the smaller ports only on their return journey.
Italian ..	Società Nazionale Italiana di Servizi Marittimi	Normally a fortnightly service, much diminished in 1912 on account of Turco-Italian War.
Austrian	Oesterreichischer Lloyd	
British ..	Bell's Orient Line (Moss Steamship Co. and the Ellerman Line had called by way of experiment prior to 1912)	Irregularly.
German ..	Deutsche Levante Linie (about 1907 the Norddeutscher Lloyd also called)	
Greek ..	Pan-Hellenic Steam Navigation Co.	
Rumanian ..	Danube Co., of Galatz Kanake Co.	
Russian ..	Compagnie Russe de Navigation à Vapeur Sochum	

In 1913, 643 steamers (total 1,004,241 tons) and 5,284 sailing vessels (mainly Turkish, total 27,577 tons) entered and cleared at Trebizond. These figures were slightly below the normal, owing to the Balkan War.

Kerasund.—This town lies about 70 miles west of Trebizond, on a promontory projecting northward. There are two anchorages. One, in a bay to the westward of the point, has a depth of from 8 to 10 fathoms, and is generally used by steamers calling at Kerasund, as the Customs House is on this side. It is, however, exposed to westerly winds. The other, facing eastward in Demir Kapi bight, has a depth of 12-13 fathoms, and is sheltered from the west and north-west.

A hilly road, suitable for wheeled traffic, but in a state of disrepair, leads from Kerasund to Karahissar in the interior and thence to other parts of Asia Minor.

The population of Kerasund consists of about 24,000 Turks, Greeks, and Armenians. The trade of the town is in the hands of the Armenians.

Most of the shipping lines which call at Trebizond call also at Kerasund.

Samsun.—This port is still an open roadstead, the nearest point at which vessels can anchor being a quarter of a mile from the shore, where the depth is 3 fathoms. Three-quarters of a mile out the depth is 6 fathoms. The anchorage is unsafe in winter, owing to northerly and north-easterly winds. There is an iron pier, 160 ft. long, for the Customs House, and other piers, 100 to 250 ft. long, some of which have cranes.

An option for the construction of a harbour was granted by the Turkish Government to the National Bank of Turkey and, in connection with this, a survey was made by the English firm of Sir John Jackson, Ltd. It was estimated that the harbour would cost £900,000. Nothing, however, had been done before war broke out.

At present the only means of communication with the interior is the road to Sivas, part of the old trade route between Baghdad and the Black Sea. This was suitable for wheeled traffic before the war, and has since been made into a good motor road.

The population of Samsun is about 36,000. There are no manufactures of importance in the town, the

chief business being of the usual forwarding and agency kind.

Other ports on the Black Sea doing a small trade are Rize, Ordu, and Tireboli. None of these was equipped as a port when war broke out, but it is probable that at Ordu something has since been done for strategic reasons, the roadstead being a good one and communication with the interior less difficult than from Kerasund.

The following return shows the nationality and tonnage of the vessels calling at the ports in 1912:—

——	Trebizond.	Samsun.	Kerasund.	Ordu.	Rize.	Tireboli.
1. Steamers—	Tons	Tons	Tons	Tons	Tons	Tons
Turkish	411,903	401,022	319,037	342,436	204,634	80,576
French	232,032	230,897	93,504	103,216	—	—
Austro-Hungarian	191,520	190,683	189,613	48,777	176,180	—
Russian	169,535	92,908	119,194	118,511	160,623	76,465
German	56,268	60,310	29,259	8,272	—	—
British	5,196	1,738	—	—	—	—
Italian	2,065	3,671	5,954	—	—	—
Greek	1,835	2,907	1,182	1,063	689	—
Rumanian	1,542	681	470	—	940	—
Persian	1,084	1,084	542	542	—	—
	1,072,980	985,901	758,755	622,817	543,066	157,041
2. Sailing vessels—	Tons	Tons	Tons	Tons	Tons	Tons
Turkish	25,036	11,670	12,331	6,640	9,908	10,095
Russian	113	240	280	116	364	—
Greek	—	144	192	—	389	—

German shipping at Trebizond in 1913 had increased to 82,507 tons, and, the Italian steamers having recommenced their service, the Italian total rose to 46,759 tons. Turkish shipping fell to 250,918 tons.

(b) *Cable and Wireless Communication*

When war broke out Armenia was not connected by cable with any foreign country except Russia (at Batum), nor was there any wireless installation in the

country. The land line from Constantinople to Batum, which passes through Samsun and Trebizond, has been in existence for some years.

(B) INDUSTRY

(1) Labour

(a) *Labour Supply*[1]

Emigration.—Emigration from Armenia to Russia, Turkey, and the United States has been very active for many years past. Three distinct causes have operated in different localities:—

(1) By far the most important was the Turkish persecution of the Armenians. Besides being subjected to recurrent massacres, Armenians have been for years systematically dispossessed of their land by the State in favour of Mohammedans. Taxation, also, fell very heavily on them, and they were liable to constant raiding by the Kurds, for which no redress was obtainable. Oppression was greatest in Van and Bitlis vilayets where, at the end of last century, the most fertile soil was in Armenian hands but was steadily passing to Mohammedans. In Bitlis vilayet in 1906 they possessed only one-tenth of the land that was originally theirs. Whole villages once Armenian had become Kurdish, and the desire to emigrate was so widespread in Bitlis vilayet in 1907 that little sowing was done.

In 1908 the Turkish Revolution kindled new hopes among the Armenians, and many returned. In that year 40,000 Armenians entered Turkish Armenia from Transcaucasia alone (4,000 to Erzerum, 7,000 to Van, 4,000 to Bitlis). The returning emigrants brought back money and an improved knowledge of agriculture and crafts, and consequently there was a marked increase in the revenues. In Bitlis vilayet the tithes increased from £T 25,000 in 1907 to £T 70,000 in 1911.

By 1911, however, the Kurds were raiding

[1] For estimates of population see *supra*, pp. 6 to 8.

freely again, especially in the more distinctively Armenian vilayets of Van and Bitlis. The loss of Turkish prestige in the Balkan War further encouraged Kurd lawlessness, and in 1913 the Armenians were rapidly emigrating to Russia and America, more than 7,000 passing a single Russian frontier post between January and October of that year. Agrarian spoliation was becoming more pronounced, and Armenian houses in the more remote districts were being systematically handed over to Kurds by the Turkish authorities.

(2) In Erzerum vilayet, where Kurdish aggression was less menacing, the lack of industrial enterprise caused a considerable emigration up to 1912. In 1910 the numbers were estimated at over 5,000 each for Constantinople and for Russia, and rather under 5,000 for America. In Trebizond vilayet unemployment was less felt, owing to the comparative prosperity attending the cultivation of tobacco and nuts and poultry-rearing. In 1912 the Balkan War checked emigration by reducing the man-power of the country; and there were even complaints that new industrial enterprises in Trebizond failed for want of labour.

(3) A succession of bad harvests and the failure of the orange crops in 1910 led to a rapid local emigration from Rize district to Russia, Constantinople, and the Balkan countries.

Finally, after the Russian invasion, all the Mohammedan population fled. There were said (1918) to be 100,000 fugitives at Angora, and 80,000 at Konia (probably Turks).

Immigration.—There has been immigration of Moslems from Russia and from European Turkey. Such immigrants have been encouraged by the Turkish Government by grants of from £T 18 to £T 30[1], according to the size of their families, and by immunity from taxation for five years. Their numbers rapidly

[1] Turkish *lira*, normal value 18*s*.

increased at the close of the Balkan War, as the State sent to Armenia Mohammedans emigrating from the lost Turkish territories in Europe. In Sivas alone 171 families were thus settled by the State, Armenians being dispossessed in their favour.

Seasonal Emigration.—In agricultural districts which had easy access to a market, there was formerly a seasonal migration of labourers for the harvest only, and there were other temporary removals towards the large western towns of Asia Minor for periods varying from 6 months to 5 years, at the end of which the workmen would return home with their earnings. Except for the tribal organization of the Kurds, a loose communal organization was the only existing form of association. Labourers from the same district would form gangs for emigration purposes, and places left empty by death would be filled from the same locality under the control of the local headman. A seasonal emigration took place for 8 months of every year from Lazistan (the district between Trebizond and the Russian frontier) to Batum and the Caucasus, or to Constantinople and the Balkan States. These men were at home for the 4 winter months only, and the agricultural work was left to women. The numbers of the Lazis are much reduced by their addiction to the vendetta.

(b) *Labour Conditions*

Up to 1908 Armenian workmen were not allowed to travel freely. They might emigrate on payment of an emigration tax, and the communally organised seasonal emigration was permitted, but individual travel either for commercial purposes or in search of employment was prohibited. The abolition of these restrictions was expected to have a beneficial effect, but the outbreak of war put an end to the short-lived hopes of industrial prosperity. Strikes are prohibited by the penal code, and, speaking generally, such labour legislation as existed in Armenia before the war was of a purely

negative character, tending to repress rather than to encourage. Harvest wages were from 1*s.* to 1*s.* 4*d.* per day.

(2) Agriculture

The areas of cultivated and uncultivated land in Armenia are approximately as follows:—

Vilayet.	Arable.	Mountains, barren lands, forest and pasture.	Total.
	sq. miles.	sq. miles.	sq. miles.
Van	12,000	5,000	17,000
Erzerum	8,700	13,400	22,100
Sivas	18,000	11,000	29,000
Bitlis	7,500	5,500	13,000
Mamuret ul-Aziz ...	7,250	6,250	13,500
Diarbekr	11,800	3,700	15,500
Trebizond	2,664	9,723	12,387
	67,914	54,573	122,487

In addition, there are in Erzerum 3,400 square miles of cultivable land not yet cultivated.

(a) *Products of Commercial Value.*

Vegetable Products.—The chief crops cultivated in Armenia are tobacco, filberts, and cereals. Cereals have been to a great extent ousted in the Black Sea area by the Samsun-Bafra tobacco, the excellent quality of which makes its cultivation profitable. Moreover, in the interior, where the richer cereal-growing plains are situated, heavy wheeled carts and pack animals have hitherto been the only means of transport. This difficulty, combined with the general insecurity of the country, discouraged the farmers from increasing their production for outside markets. The inland regions might be made to yield ten times as much agricultural produce as they do at present.

Cereals. Wheat, barley, rye, and millet are grown

generally, oats in many districts, maize more especially on the coast ranges of the Black Sea (where it is practically the only grain crop), rice in the valley of the Chorokh, the districts of Malatia and Kharput, at Akra and Amadia, and also to a small extent at Sairt, Diarbekr, Mardin and Nisibin.

The vilayet of Bitlis, which includes the fertile plains of Mush and Bulanik, produces a particularly excellent wheat, but communications are so scanty that no attempt is made to do more than satisfy the local demand for grain. In spite of this, there is always a considerable surplus, which is left to rot in the underground storehouses. Millet is the most common crop because it requires the least attention. The same conditions prevail in the vilayet of Van.

The fertile regions in the vilayets of Diarbekr and Mamuret ul-Aziz produce, even under the existing unfavourable conditions, a large surplus of wheat, which is stored in warehouses protected from the weather by coverings of straw and liquorice branches, and can thus be preserved from 5 to 10 years. In times of bad harvest, large demands are made on these reserves by neighbouring vilayets. Diarbekr sows annually about 166,667 cwt. of wheat and 83,333 cwt. of barley, obtaining on the average a ninefold return.

The vilayet of Sivas could readily convert its cereal production into a source of wealth. In 1913 its wheat harvest amounted to 79,000 tons, valued at £500,000. The crops of the vilayet are rich; the sanjaks of Sivas and Amasia in particular grow a valuable variety of wheat.

The vilayet of Erzerum grows sufficient wheat and other grain for its own consumption.

The vilayet of Trebizond is the poorest in cereals, the chief crop, maize, barely supplying local needs for 8 months of the year.

Filberts[1] probably rank next to tobacco in economic importance. They are grown extensively along the

[1] *See* also below, p. 70.

Black Sea coast within 30 miles of the sea, especially round Kerasund, where they cover 460 square miles, and where their cultivation is almost the sole industry. They require little attention, and are highly remunerative, being rich in oil and of a good flavour.

The output of nuts doubled between 1903 and 1909, the trees having been improved by grafting, and the increase was continued up to 1914. The yield in 1913 was 48,240 tons. In dry years the output decreases. The distribution of the nut harvest in 1912 was as follows:—

	Tons.
Trebizond and the district to the east	8,330
Kerasund	13,320
Tireboli and Elevi	6,660
Ordu	4,440
	32,750

Tobacco[1] is the chief product of economic importance. It is grown in all parts of Armenia, but the best qualities and greatest quantities are cultivated in the Samsun, Platana, and Trebizond districts. Two kinds are grown. The Samsun-Bafra variety, with small but very aromatic leaves, commands a high price; the Trebizond-Platana variety has large leaves and a bright colour, but its market price is much lower.

The output of tobacco from 1910 to 1913 was as follows:—

	Tons.
1910	1,550
1911	2,340
1912	2,700
1913	1,540

The smaller output in 1910 and 1913 was due to dry weather, which reduces the quantity of the crop, although it improves its quality.

The tobacco industry employs four large firms at Alexandria (Egypt), Trebizond, and Platana.

[1] *See* also below, p. 70.

Vegetables, fruit, and vines.—Vegetables of all kinds and all European fruits grow abundantly throughout Armenia. The white haricot bean of Trebizond has an excellent reputation on the European market. It is chiefly grown at Trebizond, Platana, and Ordu, and is the only vegetable exported. Vineyards are general and wine is made in all the vilayets for local consumption. The best grapes grow in the Van district, where wine and brandy are made on a small scale, with good promise for future development. Of late years there has been a small export to Europe of dried fruits, especially raisins, and of almonds and apricot stones from Diarbekr and Mamuret ul-Aziz. The orchards of Sivas vilayet export their fruit to Constantinople, but the trade is much hampered by the slowness of caravan transport. Rize was once noted for its orange crops, but the cultivation was diminishing before 1914, owing to bad weather.

Asphodels are grown for the sake of their roots, which are made into a shoemaker's polish called *tcherish.*

Flax and hemp are grown in the neighbourhood of Van and Erzerum. The normal annual output of linseed in Erzerum vilayet is from 1,000 to 1,500 tons.

Gall-nuts are collected from the stunted oaks of the Kurdish hills.

Gums, especially gum tragacanth, grow wild in the vilayets of Diarbekr and Trebizond. Gum tragacanth is brought down by Kurds from the hills and sold for export to Europe.

Madder is grown round Mush and Bitlis and is used for native dyes.

Opium is largely grown in the vilayet of Mamuret ul-Aziz and to a much less extent in Sivas. The crop from the Malatia district gives the highest percentage of morphia.

Sesame is grown in the neighbourhood of Diarbekr and Mardin.

Valonea was formerly grown for export, but its cultivation appears to be declining.

Yellow-berries are used by the natives for dyeing and are also exported.

Yunga, a kind of lucerne, is grown near Sivas.

Animal Products, Cattle and Sheep Rearing.—The raising of enormous flocks of sheep and goats on the mountain slopes and of large herds of cattle in the lower districts (chiefly in Erzerum vilayet) forms the chief industry of the nomad and semi-nomad Kurds, and was the principal source of prosperity of the Diarbekr, Van, Bitlis and Erzerum districts. Many of the nomad Kurds go into Mesopotamia to find pasture for their herds in the winter, while others come down to Armenian villages in the plains. Years ago the Turkish Government quartered them upon Armenian villages in return for payment of the *Kishlak* or "winter quarters" tax. This custom is urged by the Kurds as a justification for their winter raids.

Both goats' and sheep's milk is used for making *ghi*, a clarified butter, and goats' hair is used by the Kurds for tent-making. In Diarbekr the Angora goat is reared for the sake of mohair, which, together with wool, forms a valuable export of the vilayet.

In 1906 Van was said to contain over 3,000,000 sheep, but their number has since been much reduced. Every spring merchants from Constantinople, Syria, and Egypt visited the Diarbekr and Bitlis districts and made large purchases of sheep and goats, which they took by road to their destination. Erzerum cattle go to Trebizond for the Constantinople market.

A good breed of *horses* has from ancient times been reared on the pastures of the Armenian plateau, but of late years the export has been inconsiderable.

Buffaloes are reared in the lower stretches of the Tigris and a few *camels* are found in Diarbekr vilayet.

Mules are used as pack animals, especially in the hilly districts.

The live-stock of Diarbekr before the war was estimated to be approximately as follows:—

Buffaloes	8,000
Camels	2,000
Cattle	20,000
Donkeys	40,000
Goats	330,000
Horses	40,000
Mules	23,000
Sheep	815,000

Poultry rearing is an important industry in the vilayet of Trebizond. One of the chief centres is Fatza. The eggs are a valuable article of export, about 20,000,000 being sent annually to Samsun for shipping. The Trebizond egg is of small size, but this defect could be removed by a better choice of hens and by better feeding.

Honey. Apiculture flourishes in Erzerum, Mamuret ul-Aziz and Diarbekr. The excellent honey is all consumed locally, but wax is exported. In Van vilayet wild honey is carefully collected by the peasants and frozen for market into stiff white blocks.

Silk. Sericulture was increasing steadily in the vilayets of Diarbekr and Mamuret ul-Aziz before the war. In Diarbekr a large number of mulberry trees had been planted, and the pests which had brought the silk industry to a standstill for so long had been successfully combated. Sericulture was also being successfully initiated in the vilayets of Trebizond and Sivas before 1914. Mulberry plantations had been made at Erzingan, Gumush-Khane, Ordu and Trebizond, and plans were laid for plantations at Baiburt and Rize. Amasia was the most productive centre, its output in cocoons being 200,000 kg. in 1910 and 250,000 kg. in 1911. Other small centres were Charbamba, Bafra and Tokat.

(b) *Methods of Cultivation*

Armenia, in common with the rest of the Turkish Empire, still employs primitive methods of cultivation. The farmer is satisfied with a wooden plough, a team of oxen and buffaloes, a sickle for reaping, and a primitive threshing machine. In the vilayet of Trebizond even the native plough is little used, the cultivators breaking their ground with a two-pronged heavy fork, which is actually more efficacious.

In the cultivation of cereals the custom is to plough the ground, to sow broadcast, and then to leave the fields to the effects of sun, rain, and wind. No hoeing is done, and no manure is used. When the crop is ripe, in July, it is reaped with the sickle, about 12 inches of stalk being left, and after remaining in stooks for two or three days is thrown on the threshing floors. These are platforms of beaten earth, about 14 yards in diameter, where the corn is bruised and cut up by a wooden implement studded with flints, which resembles a rude sledge, and is drawn by oxen. The broken stalks, *saman* (the *bhoussa* of India), serve as fodder for cattle; the grain, winnowed by the simple method of throwing it up in the air to rid it of chaff, is ready for the mill and for storing. The fields are sown for two years in succession, and then left fallow for two years. Alluvial lands are ploughed deep by means of a heavy wooden plough, often drawn by as many as 20 oxen and buffaloes.

Wheat is sown in September as well as in the spring. It shoots before the snow falls, is protected by the snow during winter, and makes early and strong growth in the spring. This wheat gives better and earlier crops than the spring-sown wheat.

For the opium crop the ground, after being deeply ploughed, is repeatedly hoed, a process considered by the peasant equivalent to the use of manure. The ground lies fallow for three years between two sowings.

Tobacco is sown in April from seed collected the previous autumn. The young plants need careful rearing in well-manured beds until they are 6 inches high, when they are planted out in lightly tilled fields. The harvest begins in June and continues until the end of August. The upper leaves, known as *doruke*, which are picked last, produce the finest quality of tobacco.

Filberts are grown from shoots, which need a light loam and a dry subsoil, and are planted in clumps of seven in the autumn. The shrubs bear at four years, and are most productive at about eight years, when the annual yield of each is from 16 to 24 lbs. of nuts; they cease to bear at 20 years. The nuts are of three kinds, almond shaped, pointed, and round. Of these the first are the most valuable, the last the most numerous. The nuts are sorted by revolving screens, broken by stone mills and dried in the sun. The shelling effects a saving of 50 per cent. on freight and employs several thousand people for six months.

In the vilayets of Bitlis and Diarbekr a demand for agricultural implements of a simple kind was appearing before the war, but the purchases were on a very small scale. In the Erzerum district merchants had begun to import implements from Russia and the United States.

The Agricultural Department had established a model farm seven miles from Erzerum, and a model dairy farm near Trebizond. For the first-named they imported in 1911 a British steam threshing machine and a straw chopping machine, but without a competent engineer the machines could not be kept in proper repair.

A demand for modern agricultural implements in the interior would certainly follow on the opening up of communications and the creation of markets for the produce of the plateau. The Armenian is a good cultivator, industrious, progressive, and intelligent, and would take readily to improved methods had he an incentive to grow more than suffices for his needs.

In 1911 the Government founded at Gumush-Khane an institute for instruction in sericulture.

Irrigation.—The need for a system of irrigation is especially felt in those districts where a superabundance of water in the spring is followed by a drought in summer. Various schemes have been proposed from time to time, but lack of energy on the part of the Government, lack of capital, and the indifference of the inhabitants have prevented their execution.

The gardens round Van are irrigated by water-cuts, or by underground water-courses called *karez*, the water supply being drawn from two small mountain streams and a canal which connects with the Khishab river.

The marshy plains of Mush and Bulanik, fertile regions producing an especially good variety of wheat, have aroused the interest of foreign enterprise. A hydrographical commission surveyed the Mush plain in 1910 with a view to using the waters of the Euphrates for irrigation, and a concession is said to have been granted to a foreign company, but no work was undertaken. In the same year a Government engineer was employed to survey the plain of Erzingan, but here again no irrigation works were attempted. In 1913 the local administrative council of the vilayet of Erzerum was prepared to grant a concession for a scheme to regularise the flow of the Euphrates at the head-waters with the idea of creating a reserve for the summer, but the necessary capital was not forthcoming, even for the preliminary survey.

(c) *Forestry*

Afforestation is very little practised in the Turkish Empire. The Armenian forests, except in the Trebizond vilayet, have long since been cut down for timber. Goats browse all over the uplands, and, together with the charcoal burners, effectually prevent the growth of anything higher than scrub. Wood is so scarce that *tezek* (dried manure) and dry thistles are used as fuel in the villages.

Little or no improvement in the administration of Turkish provinces has taken place since 1903[1], so that presumably the timber resources of Armenia are now considerably less than were described in that year. Particulars were as follows:—

Vilayet of Erzerum.—In the west of the vilayet denudation is less complete than in the east, a few forests still existing in the less populous districts. Throughout Bayazid sanjak and central Erzerum there are no trees except a few poplar and willow plantations, carefully protected for building purposes. The cazas of Terjan Rhinous and Passin contain a few scrub-woods which are used for fuel. The city of Erzerum obtains oak from the Kop and Massat ranges near Baiburt, and deal from the cazas of Tortum and Nariman. The pine woods of Ispir and Kiskin are rapidly dwindling, as also are the oak woods of Kighi, though less rapidly. Erzingan obtained in 1903 good supplies from the mountains of Palumer and Refahie, where there are thirteen forests of considerable extent.

Vilayet of Trebizond.—The following areas were under forest in 1903:—

	Acres.
Trebizond District	330,110
Tireboli ,, ...	154,210
Kerasund ,, ...	206,950
Samsun ,, ...	219,030
Lazistan ,, ...	269,000
Gumush-Khane ,, ...	225,000
	1,404,300

Two steam saw-mills, in which British capital was interested, were at work in the Kerasund district in 1903.

The trees of the Trebizond vilayet are the ordinary deciduous varieties and pines.

Vilayet of Sivas.—A few forests were still to be

[1] The latest information available is contained in the *Report on Mining Industries and Forestry in Turkey in* 1903.

found in Sivas vilayet in 1903, in the caza of Ladik and the sanjaks of Amasia, Tokat, and Karahissar, but they were being rapidly destroyed.

The same process of denudation has gone on in Diarbekr, Van, and Bitlis vilayets. Most of the larger towns, such as Sairt and Bitlis, have to import firewood from a distance. The fact that houses, when not of stone, are generally built of mud, is due to the scarcity of building timber.

(d) *Land Tenure*

The Turkish system of land tenure is described in *Turkey in Europe*, No. 16 of this series. The Turkish Government does not recognise the right of the Christian Church in Armenia to hold land, and consequently the Armenian Church has often been dispossessed of its property, which in any case must be held by trustees.

(3) Fisheries

Throughout Armenia good trout and other fish abound in the streams and rivers, but the catch is consumed locally. Sturgeon, often of enormous size, are caught in the Araks and the Yeshil Irmak, and are made into fish-pastes for local consumption, while their roes are used for caviare, as in Russia.

In Lake Van is found a small fish known as *darekh*, generically a mackerel but resembling a herring. These fish are caught in large numbers in spring at the mouths of the rivers flowing into the lake. They are salted and sold in neighbouring districts, but some are exported.

On the Black Sea coast porpoises are caught in large numbers, and from them the fishermen of Trebizond, Surmene, and Rize extract oil, which is exported in large quantities to France, Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey. Anchovies are the staple food of the poor in the vilayet of Trebizond, and at certain seasons the catch is so abundant that, in addition to

the large quantities exported to Constantinople and Europe, the fish is used as manure.

The revenues from fisheries are administered by the Imperial Ottoman Debt Council.

(4) Minerals

Armenia is rich in mineral deposits. Many mines are known to exist, but very few are now being worked.

All mines are State controlled. The salt mines and deposits are under the administration of the Imperial Ottoman Debt Council, and their revenues form a State monopoly. Smuggling, however, takes place on a considerable scale. Mining laws are described in *Turkey in Europe*, No. 16 of this series.

Vilayet of Diarbekr.—The ancient copper-mines of Arghana Maden consist of a group of six mines, of which only three were working before the war. One was owned by natives of the district, the other two were leased to them by the State. From 1892 to 1911 the output of black copper amounted to 19,025 tons, the maximum output for one year being 1,502 tons in 1903. England took the bulk of this. Lack of capital and local deforestation have adversely affected the working of the mines. In 1895 Italian engineers attempted to apply the Manhess system, but without success, owing to lack of funds, and up to the outbreak of war the working was of the most primitive character, the ore being extracted by Kurdish labourers with handpicks. Since 1914 the mines have been served by a Decauville railway to Diarbekr, and more scientific methods have probably been adopted.

Iron, silver-lead, gypsum, coal, chalk, lime, jet, and rock-crystal also exist in Diarbekr vilayet, and of these the iron, gypsum, lime, jet, and rock-crystal are worked by villagers for local use.

This vilayet has only one deposit of salt, at Lijji.

Vilayet of Van.—Seams of coal exist at Seivan, Shattakh, Akchi-Chai, and Bashkala. At Bashkala the coal is partly exposed, and the seam is from 40 to 50 ft. thick.

Two lead mines, at Chukh and Julamerk, have been worked by the State to obtain material for the making of bullets. Between Bashkala and Kochannes, at Andanis in the Taurus, there are valuable State mines of orpiment (sulphide of arsenic). Iron, copper, and borax have been found. There is a silver-lead mine at Berko.

At Kordsot a rich deposit of petrol was worked for a time by a European concessionary, but his death brought the enterprise to an end.

The vilayet possesses a beautiful red granite, used in the past for building, and has quarries of lime, chalk, and gypsum of fine quality.

Gold mines, now abandoned, exist in the Shirwan Dagh, south of Lake Van.

Salt is found in the vilayet, but only in sufficient quantities for local needs.

Vilayet of Bitlis.—Here there is little known mineral wealth. The mountainous districts have hardly been prospected. Natives constantly report discoveries, but nothing is known of their value. In the Sassun district, west of Bitlis town, there are iron mines, now being worked by primitive methods. Copper, lead, and sulphur have been worked by natives at Sassun. Traces of gold and silver have been found at Sairt and Khairwan, and of iron and lead at Kharzan.

The vilayet has salt deposits, fed by springs, and wells of salt water. These suffice to supply not only the whole vilayet of Bitlis, but also the vilayets of Diarbekr, Mamuret ul-Aziz, Mosul, and Van. The salt forms in pans, by evaporation, in 8 or 10 days. All the work connected with it is done by Kurds, in the primitive manner of their ancestors. Rock salt occurs frequently in the vilayet, but the deposits are quite unexploited. The richest salt mines are at Mush, which is said to have sufficient salt to supply all Europe and Asia.

Vilayet of Erzerum.—This vilayet is fairly rich in minerals. Between 1908 and 1910 many *permis de*

recherche were granted, but in 1910 lignite and copper mines only were being worked.

Lignite of poor quality was worked at Kheneke, Sivishli, Kukurtlu, and Vartik. The output in 1910 was as follows:—

	Tons
Kheneke (caza of Nariman)	1,300
Sivishli (caza of Erzerum)	860
Kukurtlu (caza of Erzerum)	120
Vartik (caza of Terjan)	86
	2,366

This material can be used only in coal stoves, which were being imported from Trebizond for the purpose, in consequence of the high price of wood and *tezek* (dried manure) as fuel.

Coal measures are undoubtedly extensive in Erzerum. In addition to those already mentioned, the deposits of Kara Khan and Hortuk, in the caza of Ispir, were long worked in primitive fashion, and there is a better bed of lignite at Sivishli, 5 miles north-east of Erzerum. At Lizghiaf, in the Tortum caza, coal has been found of much better quality than that of Kara Khan.

A concession for lignite mining over an area of 250 acres near Baiburt was granted in 1911 to six local traders, but the mine is not thought likely to be productive.

Copper was being mined at Konkez, Penek, and Gobal Kom. The output of copper in 1910 was as follows:—

	Cwt.
Konkez (caza of Kiskin)	15
Penek (caza of Terjan)	15
Gobal Kom (caza of Passin)	15
	45

Diadin has sulphur springs which deposit rock containing 18 per cent. of sulphur, and sulphur mines

exist at Dauta, 4½ miles from Diadin. Sulphur also exists at Bayazid.

At Ilija, near Erzerum, there are beds of diatomite, which yield a large percentage of silica.

Silver exists in the north, and iron at Kighi.

The vilayet has many salt springs and pans, and has also mines of rock salt.

Vilayet of Trebizond.—Of the 75 mines known in the vilayet of Trebizond, 21 are held under *firmans* granting exploiting powers, and 43 *permis de recherche* have been issued for the rest. Copper, silver-lead, zinc, iron, and manganese are the chief deposits. Though labour until the Balkan War was cheap and easily procured, difficulties in obtaining fuel and lack of communications arrested development. The output appears to have been chiefly from the surface ore. The copper was used for the local industry of the coppersmiths, whose number diminished in proportion as the imports of modern hardware increased.

The following mines were working spasmodically:—

Arlana.—Silver-lead; said to be rich; lying idle in 1913 owing to dispute about ownership.

Halisuri.—Yielded 54 tons of red copper ore in 1902.

Kalanema, Elehu, and Fol.—Copper pyrites, argentiferous galena, and zinc-blende.

Gumush-Khane.—Silver (argentiferous galena); closed owing to deforestation.

The firm of D. Sebuch & Th. Swan held seven concessions for copper and silver-lead in 1903.

Zinc was being mined at Ma Pavri in the Lazistan district in 1901, when the output was 1,700 tons.

Manganese was mined at Pir Aziz, near Kerasund, in 1901, the output being 470 tons. It also occurs near Rize and Surmene, but not in sufficiently large quantities to repay exploitation.

Kissarna and Surmene have mineral water springs; the waters are bottled and sent to Constantinople.

Vilayet of Mamuret ul-Aziz.—This vilayet possesses few mineral deposits of importance except the silver mines at Keban Maden, abandoned in 1885. The Ottoman Government, in their anxiety to continue the working, had tried to modernise the system, and had established four American furnaces, but when the supply of fuel from the forests of the neighbourhood had been completely exhausted, the mines had to be closed down. Galleries of 4-5 miles, connected by galleries of 2-2½ miles, are evidence of the extent of the workings. The resources of the mines are said to be practically inexhaustible.

Silver-lead mines in the caza of Palu were working in 1903.

Coal exists at Palu, but the deposit lies in a hollow and is difficult of access. There are also coal-seams at Komur Khan near the Euphrates, and there is a coal mine at Tchimich Kezek on the banks of the Menzur Chai, a tributary of the Euphrates. This mine, 37 miles from Keban Maden, might profitably be exploited in the future for the benefit of the silver mines, to which it could be linked by means of the river.

Gold has been found near Kharput.

There is one deposit of salt, at Bulanik, south-west of Malatia.

Vilayet of Sivas.—A rich mine of alum used to be worked by the State near Karahissar. After local requirements had been satisfied, an export to other provinces of the value of £T 2,000 was still possible in 1903. No later information is available.

Copper occurs near Sivas town, at Yildiz Zara, Karahissar, Amasia, and Tokat. A very favourable analyst's report was made on the Tokat mine in 1903. Permits were granted more than 10 years ago, but nothing was done.

Silver-lead deposits mixed with antimony occur near Zara and Karahissar. An important deposit was worked in 1903 by the Asia Minor Mining Co., a British company, at Lidjessi, and another at Gemin Bel in the caza of Enderes, but no reliable later

information is available. The State worked unprofitably a deposit at Hadji Keui, in Amasia sanjak.

Iron deposits of good quality exist between Zara and Karahissar, and iron pyrites is found near Sivas and in the sanjaks of Tokat and Amasia.

Coal of fair quality occurs near Karahissar and Zara and Zile, and coal of an inferior quality at Kardashlar. Lignite has been found at Amasia.

Asbestos of very good quality is found near Zara, excellent hydraulic limestone near Hamidie, and marble at Amasia.

Large and rich deposits of arsenic are found in the caza of Zara.

The vilayet has numerous salt springs, which supply the whole vilayet and also adjacent sanjaks. The salt water is collected in reservoirs and passed into pans, where the salt is deposited. Near Tuz Hissar a rock salt mine was discovered in 1889. This is known to be rich, but is only superficially worked.

(5) Manufactures

Modern manufacturing methods are very little known in Armenia. Various small industries are carried on in the open bazaars and at home, mainly to supply local needs. There is a small export of native cotton cloth from Trebizond, chiefly to Constantinople. Some native-woven cloth is also sent to Alexandria, and considerable quantities to Aleppo and Mosul.

Textiles.—A weaving mill for cotton cloths was established in 1911 at Trebizond by a British subject; but, though the output found a ready sale, the business did not thrive, and in 1913 the mill was idle for the greater part of the year.

A characteristic and widespread textile industry is the weaving on hand-looms of *manussa*, a native cotton cloth, which is made into the light native garments worn at Aleppo, Diarbekr, and Mosul. The special centres of this industry are Arabkir, Marsovan, Amasia, Trebizond, and Zile. Native cotton cloths are also woven at Van (from raw cotton imported from

Persia), at Tokat (printed cotton cloth), at Erzingan (where Turkish towelling is a speciality), at Amasia (from English yarn), and at Mezre and Trebizond. A few native hand-looms weave cloth and mohair at Van and Shattakh. In Erzerum vilayet native cotton is woven in the cazas of Ova, Kighi, Khinis and Keskhine. A coarse hand-woven white cloth called *ketan* is woven at Rize and Trebizond, and to a smaller extent at Mush, for native shirting; it is also sent to Aleppo and Egypt, the export being about 100,000 pieces annually. *Ketan* is sometimes dyed red, and this kind is made especially at Mush and Bitlis. A strong coarse cotton cloth is made on hand-looms in houses at Sivas.

More limited in area, but more valuable, is the thriving silk industry of Diarbekr, where native cocoons are reeled and the produce woven. This industry long declined on account of pests affecting the silkworms, but these have been overcome and a brisk revival has taken place. Silk goods are made to a much smaller extent at Van, Mezre, Trebizond, and Erzingan. Velvet goods are made at Van.

Woollen goods are hand-woven in the cazas of Ova, Kighi, Khinis and Keskhine, and there is a small woollen factory at Trebizond. At Shattakh, in the Van vilayet, and in the Keskhine district, Persian shawls are successfully imitated; they are woven from the fleecy underwool of the sheep. Round Geurun a mixed wool and cotton product known as *shal* is made. This is much in demand locally, and began to be exported in 1907. A finer kind of *shal*, made from goats' mohair, is woven at Van.

Linen cloth is woven at Trebizond, and excellent fishing-nets are also made there and exported to Russia and Rumania.

Carpet-making is a widespread home industry. The productions of many districts—Kara Kilissa, Tortum, Baiburt, Terjan, Diadin, Diarbekr, Van—are excellent and artistic. The town of Sivas is also a centre for carpet-making. It has a branch of the Oriental

Carpet Manufactures, Ltd., of Smyrna, originally Italian, but now a British company with a capital of £600,000. In 1910 this company paid a dividend of 20 per cent., and it has entered into association with the Persian Carpet Co. Its carpets are much in request in Europe and America. The Kurdish women make rugs and mats, known as *kellim*, generally of bad quality.

The use of German aniline dyes has latterly gained ground, displacing the native vegetable dyes, with very detrimental results to the beauty and durability of the textiles.

Embroidery is a winter occupation of the women. The work is done on wool or linen in silk and tinsel, and shows great artistic skill. For purposes of export it is customary to use the fabric of the country to which the work is to be sent, instead of the hand-woven native cloths. In certain districts the dress of the people is covered with embroidery. Van is especially noted for its embroidery and tapestry.

Stocking-knitting is a considerable industry at Sivas.

Metallurgy and metal-work.—Tokat has foundries for refining copper from the Arghana Maden mines.

The Armenians excel as workers in metals. The coppersmiths and ironworkers of the Trebizond and Erzerum vilayets in particular are very skilled craftsmen, as are also the silver filigree workers of Trebizond; the latter, however, were fast disappearing before 1914, their work being ousted by cheap European jewellery. Erzerum had at one time a thriving rifle industry, but this was prohibited by the Turkish Government in the 'nineties. The Kurds are good swordsmiths and skilful makers of modern firearms. Diarbekr coppersmiths make utensils from the produce of the Arghana Maden mines.

Tanning and leather-work form an important industry in the Erzerum vilayet. Erzerum and Erzingan possess tanneries; shoes, saddlery, and yellow

leather goods are made throughout the vilayet, and, to a smaller extent, throughout Armenia. A tanning industry was being established in Van vilayet in 1911. The preparation of furs is an industry of Erzerum vilayet.

China and glass works exist at Diarbekr, and Mush has a special pottery industry. Rough pottery for local use is made in the bazaars, but finer goods are imported.

Dye-works.—Diarbekr has a dye-works, and madder is prepared at Bitlis and Mush. Natural dyes are being superseded by imported anilines.

Linseed oil refineries exist at Van, Erzerum and Erzingan, the oil being used for lighting.

Distilleries.—Amasia has flourishing brandy distilleries. Wine and brandy are also made in the Van district.

Soap is made in Trebizond and also at Van from the saline deposits of the lake.

There are *flour mills* at Diarbekr, Zara, and elsewhere; those at Sivas and Amasia are worked by turbines, and water-power is used by many.

The preparation of *jerked beef* (*pasderma*) is an industry of Erzerum vilayet. The meat is dried in the sun, and there is a small export to other Turkish provinces.

Lime-works have been started at Trebizond, but have not attained any great success or threatened the importation of lime from Marseilles.

Slate-works were about to be started at Trebizond with Turkish capital in 1912.

(6) Power

Armenia possesses peculiar natural advantages for the development of water power by means of turbines. All the rivers have a considerable fall, but the fall is not uniform, long open and almost level reaches alternating with narrow gorges down which the water rushes to the next step of the plateau. By damming the heads of the gorges reservoirs could be formed and

the great inequality in the flow of water before and after the autumn rains be equalized; and, owing to the great elevation of the plateau, the same river might be capable of supporting power stations at different stages of its course. In addition to the production of power, such control of the rivers would make local irrigation schemes possible and might become of great importance for the irrigation of Mesopotamia.

Lake Van is an immense reservoir of power. The edge of the southern watershed is in some places only a few yards from the lake and the fall is very steep. Power could be obtained by tunnels bored through the rim of the watershed up to the bed of the lake.

(C) COMMERCE

(1) Domestic

(a) *Towns, Markets, &c.*

For *Trebizond* and *Samsun*, see above, under Ports, pp. 37, 40.

Amasia is the centre of one of the richest districts of Asia Minor, producing excellent wheat, wine, tobacco and opium. It is also of industrial importance (*cf.* pp. 61, 62, 64).

Arabkir, an industrial centre, also exports fruit, especially raisins.

Baiburt is an important agricultural market for western Erzerum and the outlet for a fertile plain.

Bashkala was formerly a thriving town, with an important weekly market, at which in addition to the local merchants of Sairt, Erzerum and Amadia, there might be found traders from Aleppo and Mosul, importers of European goods from Constantinople, and caravans of grain and fruit from Persia and Russia.

Bitlis is of very little commercial importance, owing to its inconvenient situation and to political unrest. It was formerly a market for the wheat, barley, and millet of the Bulanik district, and for fruit from

Sairt, but even before 1914 there was a tendency for these districts to obtain their supplies from Mosul and Diarbekr.

Chambashi is an agricultural and distributing centre.

Charshembe is an agricultural centre, and possesses a caviare industry.

Diarbekr.—This important town is the seat of Government for the vilayet and also the trading centre of the surrounding vilayets. Cereals, fruit, flocks, and produce of all kinds enter the market. Exports for overseas go either to Samsun or to Alexandretta for shipment, but in the absence of accurate statistics it is not possible to indicate the division of trade between the routes. The copper of the vilayet takes the Samsun road to be refined at Tokat. Cattle and sheep, the latter from the Dersim country, from Erzerum, Bitlis, Van, Mush, Jezire, and Palu, pass on to the great market of nations at Aleppo, as also do hides and skins, wool, mohair from Angora sheep reared in the Jezire district, and clarified butter (*ghi*). Wheat is carried by *keleks* (see p. 34) down the Tigris or by caravan to Mosul and Baghdad. Trade in silkworms' eggs, cocoons and raw silk reeled in the town had revived greatly before the war.

Erzerum, a town of great strategic importance, is the chief centre of the sheep trade, supplying Diarbekr for the Aleppo market. It lies in an undeveloped grain-producing district.

Erzingan is an important industrial centre (*cf.* pp. 62-4).

Kharput (*Mamuret ul-Aziz*) carries on a transit trade between the north and Diarbekr in cotton and cotton goods, cereals, silk and wine.

Malatia is an important opium centre and a trading station on the route from Sivas to Samsun.

Marsovan is an agricultural market town and the chief collecting place for the yellow-berry.

Mush is the centre of a fertile wheat-producing plain.

Sivas is the centre for a well-cultivated corn-producing country, and has a market for well-bred Circassian horses from Azizie.

Tokat has an important copper-smelting industry, and is also a market for tobacco, maize and fruit.

Van is the chief agricultural market of its vilayet. It is to some extent a manufacturing centre (*cf.* pp. 61-4), but its importance in this respect has declined.

(b) *Organizations to promote Trade and Commerce*

The Banque Impériale Agricole, which is controlled by the Minister of Agriculture and has branches at Sivas and Van, makes loans to farmers at 6 per cent. interest. Before its foundation agriculturists borrowing money had to pay 30 or 40 per cent. interest to usurers.

(c) *Foreign, especially British, Interests*

British undertakings in Armenia have been limited to various small mining and manufacturing enterprises, which have had little success, and in many cases had been abandoned before 1914. Great Britain and France had some years ago almost a monopoly of the Erzerum and Trebizond trade, but have now lost this position, in spite of the excellent French shipping services from Marseilles to Samsun and Trebizond. Moreover, Great Britain even before the war was losing her leading position in the supply of cotton goods, &c., for the following reasons: (i) her reluctance to grant long credits; (ii) her failure to meet the demand for cheap quality goods; and (iii) her lack of direct intercourse with Armenian buyers by means of commercial travellers. French capital was interesting itself in the construction and control of an extensive railway and road system (*cf.* pp. 32, 36).

Down to 1914 German influence had not penetrated Armenia to any great extent. Germany was, however, looking to the section of the Baghdad Railway which

falls within the country to give her a footing in the southern part of Diarbekr vilayet, and was projecting the encouragement of cereal and cotton cultivation in that district in connection with her plans to exploit the produce of Mesopotamia (*cf. Mesopotamia*, No. 63 of this series, pp. 125-6). She was making excellent progress as a supplier of imports, and much slower progress as a buyer of exports. Russia's interests in Armenia have been chiefly strategic and commercial. She was formerly one of the chief suppliers of Armenian imports, but she was not making so great progress as Austria-Hungary and Germany. Austria-Hungary was progressing very rapidly both as supplier and purchaser. Italy's commercial relations with Armenia suffered in consequence of her war with Turkey. Belgium was a large supplier of imports, and the United States a large buyer of Armenian exports. Turkey was on the whole maintaining her position as the chief supplier of Armenian imports, the fall in 1912 being abnormal and due to the Balkan War; but she was yearly taking a smaller proportion of the exports.

(2) Foreign

(a) *Exports*

Details of the exports for 1912 from the Black Sea ports are given in Table I of the Appendix (p. 80). The following tables show for 1909, 1910, and 1912 (i) the gross export to Turkey and to foreign countries; (ii) the export to Turkey; and (iii) the foreign export exclusive of Turkey. It will be seen that the percentage of the exports sent to Turkey declined from 31 in 1909 to 26 in 1910 and 17 in 1912.

(i) Gross Export Figures, including Persian Transit Trade

—	1909	1910	1912
	£	£	£
Samsun	1,807,560	1,979,730	1,699,530
Trebizond	579,720	798,050	644,340
Kerâsund	323,300	544,470	550,920
Ordu	82,600	133,770	131,740
Rize	24,230	26,160	19,120
Tireboli	18,700	33,300	30,050
Totals	2,836,110	3,515,480	3,075,700

The Persian transit trade in 1909, 1910, and 1912 was probably considerably under £20,000 in value.

(ii) Exports to Turkey

—	1909	1910	1912
	£	£	£
Samsun	540,030	598,420	331,340
Trebizond	300,150	228,200	107,980
Kerasund	19,430	16,000	46,830
Ordu	11,470	44,210	42,850
Rize	19,500	20,730	11,750
Tireboli	250	9,160	8,000
Totals	890,830	916,720	548,750

(iii) Exports to Foreign Countries

—	1909	1910	1912
	£	£	£
Samsun	1,267,530	1,381,310	1,368,190
Trebizond	279,570	569,850	532,360
Kerasund	303,870	528,470	508,090
Ordu	71,130	89,560	88,890
Rize	4,730	5,430	7,370
Tireboli	18,450	24,140	22,050
Totals	1,945,280	2,598,760	2,526,950

The chief countries of destination apart from Turkey were:—

—	1909	1910	1912
	£	£	£
United States ..	374,810	651,730	655,310
Austria-Hungary ..	455,090	698,100	648,590
France	294,710	418,760	424,250
Germany	253,850	322,130	303,990
Russia	134,970	223,830	214,950
United Kingdom ..	71,200	87,630	118,070
Italy	42,650	4,830	28,460
Belgium	16,990	18,200	17,500

The export of *tobacco* is the most important source of Armenian wealth, for prices have steadily risen, and the quantities exported have also increased. The distribution of the export in 1912 and 1913 was as follows:—

—	1912	1913
	Tons.	Tons.
Alexandria	1,060	542
Holland	374	160
Germany...	173	664
Great Britain, Aden, Cyprus and Malta	46	69
Other countries, chiefly Austria and the United States	22	48

There is a good deal of smuggling. The chief centre of export is Samsun.

Filberts.—In 1910, 10 per cent. of the export of filberts went to Turkey and 15 per cent. to Egypt. The remaining 75 per cent. went to the United States, Italy, France, Austria, Germany, &c. By 1912 Germany had increased her import to 1,853 tons out of the total of 3,895 tons exported. The centres of export are Trebizond, Kerasund, Ordu, and Tireboli.

Sheep and goats.—The sheep export from Trebizond to Constantinople for slaughter by no means represented the total export, for large flocks of sheep and goats went from Diarbekr vilayet by caravan to Aleppo, and some of these would eventually be exported from Alexandretta. The value of the exports from Erzerum, Diarbekr, and Van vilayets in 1912 and 1913 was:—

—	Erzerum.	Diarbekr.	Van.	Totals.
	£	£	£	£
1912 ...	150,000	90,000	54,000	294,000
1913 ...	200,000	150,000	63,000	413,000

Cattle.—Erzerum exported a value of £50,000 in 1912, and £75,000 in 1913.

Besides the *hides and skins* shipped from the ports some went by caravan to Aleppo, partly for Turkey and partly for foreign countries. The sheep, lamb, and goat skins exported from Trebizond in 1912 went chiefly to the United States and France. The value of the hides and skins exported from Erzerum, Diarbekr, and Mamuret ul-Aziz vilayets in 1912 and 1913 was:—

—	Erzerum.	Diarbekr.	Mamuret ul-Aziz.
	£	£	£
1912	22,200	32,500	31,500
1913	23,000	39,000	32,200

Wool and mohair were exported partly by Samsun and Trebizond, and partly by caravan to Aleppo and Basra. The value exported from Diarbekr vilayet in 1913 was £70,000.

Butter or *ghi* was sent from Diarbekr vilayet to Aleppo, and about half of it eventually reached Egypt.

The export from Diarbekr vilayet in 1913 was £60,000 in value.

Opium, flour, cereals, yellow-berries, and black-berries, and most of the *cocoons* were exported from Samsun only. The export of *valonea* from Diarbekr vilayet amounted to £13,000 in value in 1908, but the trade has since ceased. Similarly, the export of *walnut whorls and walnut-wood* had almost entirely ceased by 1914. On the other hand, *porpoise oil* was being exported in increasing quantities to the Balkan countries and Turkey.

Eggs.—It was estimated that 50,000 cases of eggs were exported in 1911 from Samsun; 15,000 from Trebizond; 9,000 from Kerasund; and a smaller number from Ordu. The egg export of Trebizond is capable of great development.

White haricot beans are a promising article of export. The chief countries of destination are Turkey, Egypt, the United States, France, Spain, and Greece.

(b) *Imports*

Details of the imports at the Black Sea ports for 1912 are given in Table II of the Appendix (p. 81). The following tables show for the years 1909, 1910, and 1912 (i) the gross import; (ii) the import from Turkey; and (3) the import from foreign countries, excluding Turkey:—

(i) Gross Import Figures, including Persian Transit Trade

—	Samsun.	Trebizond.[1]	Kerasund.	Ordu, Rize and Tireboli	Totals.
	£	£	£	£	£
1909 ...	950,000	1,352,450	226,900	318,430	2,847,780
1910 ...	1,124,040	1,372,750	243,600	343,260	3,083,650
1912 ...	1,089,480	1,541,730	325,800	332,650	3,289,660

The Persian transit trade in 1912 was estimated at about £160,000; statistics for 1909 and 1910 are not available.

(ii) Imports from Turkey

—	Samsun.	Trebizond.	Kerasund.	Ordu, Rize and Tireboli.	Totals.
	£	£	£	£	£
1909 ...	346,400	400,220	135,400	164,040	1,046,060
1910 ...	352,720	339,770	125,130	167,880	985,500
1912 ...	364,070	559,180	179,050	163,280	1,265,580

Turkey's share in the supply of Armenia's imports has on the whole increased. This was especially the case at Trebizond in 1912. The figures for 1913, which are available only for the port of Trebizond, show that Turkey improved her position as chief supplier to that port, contributing £515,189 out of the total value of £839,349. Her percentages of the total imports were approximately 36·7 in 1909, 32 in 1910, and 37·1 in 1912.

(iii) Imports from Foreign Countries

—	Samsun.	Trebizond.	Kerasund.	Ordu, Rize and Tireboli.	Totals.
	£	£	£	£	£
1909 ...	603,600	952,230	91,500	154,390	1,801,720
1910 ...	771,320	1,032,980	118,470	175,380	2,098,150
1912 ...	725,410	982,550	146,750	169,370	2,024,080

The chief countries of origin apart from Turkey were:—

——	1909	1910	1912
	£	£	£
Austria-Hungary ...	284,290	437,910	454,490
Russia	437,390	446,910	429,470
United Kingdom ...	367,960	442,260	425,710
France	236,630	311,970	298,540
Germany	58,940	160,570	148,650
Belgium	61,010	101,220	93,710
Italy	207,470	61,590	91,350
United States	25,920	36,020	33,930
Other countries	122,110	99,700	48,230

It will be seen that Germany has made the most rapid progress in her exports to Armenia, having increased them from under £60,000 in 1909 to nearly £150,000 in 1912. Next to this Austria has made the most notable progress, ousting Russia and the United Kingdom in 1912 from their leading position in 1909 and 1910.

Cotton goods are imported chiefly at Trebizond. At the beginning of the century Great Britain was almost the only supplier of cotton textiles and yarns, but by 1912 Austria, Germany, Belgium, and Italy were all competing and securing a growing trade. In particular, *basen*, a cheap heavy-weight German cotton cloth, was gaining ground. In 1912, a bad import year, the decrease in the value of the import of British cotton goods amounted to £93,000. The growth of foreign competition in the cotton industry is, however, best shown by a comparison between the supplies of cotton goods at Trebizond in 1908 and 1912:—

——	1908	1912
	£	£
From Great Britain ..	60,000*	119,400
„ Austria-Hungary .. .	1,500	16,880
„ Belgium	500	8,280
„ Germany	800	6,600
„ Italy	6,800	5,440

* Plus a large proportion of the £81,700 supplied by Turkey.

If we include cotton yarn, we find that Great Britain supplied one-half of the total import at Trebizond; on the other hand, at Samsun she supplied only about one-ninth; at Kerasund about one-third; and at Ordu less than one-tenth.

Hardware and iron.—Before the war Great Britain supplied nearly all the large Samsun import, but Belgium and Germany chiefly supplied Trebizond. German-made goods, labelled "Made in England," were appearing on the market.

Woollen goods.—France was the chief supplier. Great Britain supplied 19 per cent. of the total import at Trebizond in 1906, and 21 per cent. in 1912.

Sugar.—In 1912 at Trebizond Austria furnished three-fifths and France one-third (a great decrease). Russia and Egypt supplied the rest. Great Britain has been completely ousted from this trade.

Flour and cereals.—Russia was the chief supplier of flour and maize.

Petroleum.—Russia delivered three-quarters and Rumania one-quarter of the Trebizond import of 1912.

Other imports at Trebizond.—Great Britain was the chief supplier of soap; France had a monopoly in slates and hydraulic limestone; cement came half from France and half from Belgium; Germany supplied most of the china, half the enamel ware and three-quarters of the aniline dyes; Austria-Hungary sent most of the leather and leather goods. Russia and Germany were beginning to prove serious rivals to Great Britain in the supply of raw copper for manufacture at Trebizond.

(c) *Persian Transit Trade*

Until 1906 a considerable volume of Persian exports and imports passed through Trebizond, but this trade has since greatly declined in consequence of internal troubles in Persia and of the improvement in communications between Russia and Persia. According to the British Consular Reports its value, imports and

exports together, was £1,006,060 in 1906, £459,140 in 1907, and £177,089 in 1908. No adequate British statistics are available after 1908. An Italian Consular Report on trade at Trebizond in 1910-14, estimates the average annual value of the Persian import *via* that port at £325,000 and of the export at £63,500, but these figures appear to be too large. This trade did not greatly benefit Armenia and its loss is of small importance.

(D) FINANCE

(1) *Public Finance*

Turkish taxation falls much more heavily upon the Armenian than upon the Mohammedan population. Until 1908 the former paid a poll tax in respect of their exclusion, as Christians, from military service. Among the Kurds the large privileged class of Ashirat is liable neither to taxation nor military service, and it is doubtful if the Kurds in general pay any regular taxes. Serious abuses exist in the collection of the taxes, and both tax-farmers and Turkish officials extort large sums for their own benefit. In the districts most exposed to Kurdish oppression regular taxes are paid by the Armenians to the Kurds in addition to the State taxes or, less often, in substitution for them.

The chief Turkish tax is the tithe, which used to be collected in money when agricultural prices were low and in kind when they were high. Second in yield is the sheep tax, which is nominally a payment for the right of pasturage, all pasture lands being Government property. Other taxes are the road tax, the salt tax, the house tax (levied also on cattle sheds, sheep pens, &c.), the succession duty of 10 per cent., the emigration tax and taxes on hay, brushwood and the right to use *tezek* (dried manure) for fuel.

In 1913 the four chief taxes, *viz.*, tithe, sheep tax, road tax and salt tax, produced a total revenue of

£1,342,094 in the six vilayets of Erzerum, Bitlis, Diarbekr, Sivas, Mamuret ul-Aziz and Van, nearly two-thirds of this total being derived from the tithe and more than half the remainder from the sheep tax. The total Turkish expenditure in these vilayets in the same year was £1,405,268, distributed as follows: army, £633,707; finance, £225,747; Home Office, £220,740; gendarmerie, £176,326; education, £47,841; public works, £48,211; religious uses, £39,299; agriculture, £13,397. Detailed figures of revenue and expenditure for these vilayets will be found in Tables III and IV of the Appendix (p. 82). Statistics for Trebizond are unfortunately not available.

(2) *Banking*

The chief banks are:—

The Imperial Ottoman Bank, with branches at Trebizond, Samsun, Ordu, Sivas, Erzerum, Mezre, Van, Diarbekr, Bitlis and Kharput.

The Bank of Athens, with branches at Samsun, Amasia, Sivas.

The Banque de Salonique, with a branch at Samsun.

The Banque Impériale Agricole (p. 67), with branches at Sivas and Van.

(E) GENERAL REMARKS.

The existence of three races, of which the two more backward were always in coalition, actively or passively, against the more advanced, has been an all-important factor in the economic development of the distinctively Armenian and Kurdish vilayets, *i.e.*, Van, Bitlis, Diarbekr, and to a less extent Mamuret ul-Aziz, Sivas, and part of Erzerum. In Trebizond vilayet there were before the war no Kurds and comparatively few Armenians, so that the conditions found in varying degrees in all the other vilayets were not present there. The Kurds have in some places adopted sedentary modes of living; but, when Kurdish agricul-

turists are found in possession of well-tilled land, the inference is that they have taken over Armenian property. They have little idea of progressive agriculture, they despise shopkeeping, do not, as a rule, even grow fruit, and have no schools. The nomad and semi nomad Kurds, of course, are still more backward; the rearing of herds, the making of *ghi*, the collecting of galls and gums, and the weaving of tents, rugs and shawls by the women, are their only occupations. They cut wood indiscriminately; and the wilder tribes have the nomad shepherd's hostility to villages and village life. Their military prowess and the supineness of the Turk have made them of more practical account than the Turks, who, if they were not State officials, used to occupy an intermediate position as agriculturists and small shopkeepers, less enterprising, intelligent and industrious than the Armenians. Therefore the transference in this almost purely agricultural country of more and more land from Armenian to Turk and Kurd has meant a gradual economic deterioration. Much land has fallen out of cultivation, or is cultivated greatly below its capacity, while among the Armenians themselves enterprise has been discouraged by the insecurity of life and property.

Apart from racial troubles, Armenia has suffered, in common with all Turkish provinces, from the stagnation produced by Turkish misrule. Schemes of development have not been wanting, but nearly all suffered shipwreck through lack of security, of communications, of capital and of any adequate economic incentive. Commercially the Armenians were long hampered by the decree forbidding them to travel abroad, which was abrogated only in 1908. While this was in operation Armenians could not get into direct touch with foreign suppliers, and were dependent on Constantinople and Aleppo agents, who granted them long credits.

Given political security, development of communications, and the influx of the necessary capital, Armenia might become a large exporter of cereals, fruit, wine

and silk, as she is already of tobacco, nuts, opium and eggs. It has been stated that the sugar-cane could be successfully grown. Owing to her water-power and to her sheep-rearing industry, she should be able to make herself self-supporting in respect, at any rate, of wool and woollen goods, and modern industrial enterprise should enable Erzerum to use part of her own flax for the manufacture of linen, instead of merely exporting linseed. As regards minerals, Armenia must always suffer from the shortage of a really useful coal, but with the improvement of communications something might be done in the more accessible localities. Afforestation schemes should form a part of any plans for the improvement of the country, in order to secure a supply of fuel and building material, and also to maintain the fertility of the soil.

APPENDIX

TABLE I.—EXPORTS FROM THE BLACK SEA PORTS IN 1912.

Article.	Samsun.	Trebizond.	Kerasund.	Ordu.	Rize.	Tireboli.	Totals.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
Beans	—	24,660	1,270	1,370	1,560	410	29,270
Carpets and rugs	—	13,250	—	—	—	—	13,250
Cereals	30,950	—	—	—	—	—	30,950
Cocoons	20,150	—	620	—	—	—	20,770
Eggs	130,940	32,150	5,420	12,300	—	—	180,810
Filberts	—	225,800	503,570	97,000	—	26,000	852,370
Fish (cured)	—	4,130	1,070	120	280	50	5,650
Flour	40,120	—	—	—	—	—	40,120
Fruits, nuts and vegetables	58,630	15,580	7,790	4,100	2,120	80	88,300
Gums	—	4,350	—	—	—	—	4,350
Guts	5,120	5,830	590	—	—	—	11,540
Hemp seed and linseed	31,580	690	150	530	—	—	32,950
Hides and skins	82,350	20,730	13,100	420	220	1,270	118,090
Native manufactures	43,150	7,380	—	—	11,240	—	61,770
Opium	101,520	—	—	—	—	—	101,520
Porpoise oil	—	4,170	6,120	430	320	160	11,200
Provisions, jerked beef, &c.	9,260	20,180	220	60	720	—	30,440
Sheep and cattle	—	82,190	2,530	540	—	—	85,260
Teherish (shoemaker's paste)	—	6,000	—	—	—	—	6,000
Tobacco	1,066,730	140,000	—	1,050	—	—	1,207,780
Wax	—	2,720	2,000	1,530	40	520	6,810
Wool and mohair	45,890	2,570	—	10,370	90	—	58,920
Yellow-berries	5,720	—	—	—	—	—	5,720
Sundries	27,420	31,960	6,470	1,920	2,530	1,560	71,860
Totals	1,699,530	644,340	550,920	131,740	19,120	30,050	3,075,700
Carpets (Persian transit trade)	—	—	—	—	—	—	13,250
Total of Armenian exports	—	—	—	—	—	—	3,062,450

TABLE II.—IMPORTS AT THE BLACK SEA PORTS IN 1912.

Article.	Samsun.	Trebizond.	Kerasund.	Ordu.	Rize.	Tireboli.	Totals.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
Building materials	29,760	38,030	12,520	1,400	3,200	1,000	85,910
Chemicals and drugs	12,220	5,530	2,810	700	210	—	21,470
China and glass	4,950	12,870	2,890	310	300	—	21,320
Clothing and haberdashery	14,880	33,670	6,260	2,260	2,050	—	59,120
Cotton goods and yarns	128,850	452,590	54,460	71,510	27,230	4,320	738,960
Foodstuffs	178,920	412,880	140,650	34,400	85,920	27,790	880,560
Hardware and iron	160,850	60,520	6,900	4,360	2,330	200	235,160
Hides and skins	54,570	9,350	14,350	2,120	1,620	1,110	83,120
Leather and shoes	17,200	39,500	9,290	—	—	—	65,990
Matches	18,000	20,030	3,010	2,800	2,100	1,200	47,140
Metals (copper and zinc)	37,550	28,440	3,300	2,390	470	—	72,150
Nails, wire, &c.	8,270	14,360	910	—	—	—	23,540
Paper	6,200	11,000	220	140	120	—	17,680
Petroleum	56,480	24,000	6,270	1,870	5,000	650	94,270
Sacks, canvas, &c.	22,330	16,120	5,650	160	230	—	44,490
Silks and velvets	3,620	13,010	4,570	—	—	—	21,200
Soap and perfumery	20,000	17,830	7,190	3,240	460	—	48,720
Spirits, wine and beer	7,850	12,500	2,690	680	150	—	23,870
Tobacco	2,000	11,000	3,800	1,200	1,300	680	19,980
Watches and jewellery	3,270	8,390	1,580	800	—	—	14,040
Woollen goods and yarns	150,700	39,000	11,800	1,460	7,750	1,020	211,730
Miscellaneous	151,010	261,110	24,680	9,670	11,820	950	459,240
Totals	1,089,480	1,541,730	325,800	141,470	152,260	38,920	3,289,660

TABLE III.—YIELD OF THE FOUR CHIEF TAXES IN ARMENIA (EXCLUDING TREBIZOND) IN 1913.

	Tithes.	Sheep-tax.	Road-Tax.	Salt-tax.	Totals.	
	£T	£T	£T	£T	£T	£ sterling.
Erzerum	230,769	53,103	11,208	68,237	363,317	326,985
Bitlis	78,858	36,347	6,895	40,680	162,780	146,502
Diarbekr	134,760	63,947	8,197	—	206,904	186,214
Sivas	335,422	79,582	28,897	55,668	499,569	449,612
Mamuret ul-Aziz .	127,422	26,978	6,272	—	160,672	144,605
Van	58,513	36,580	2,881	—	97,974	88,176
£T	965,744	296,537	64,350	164,585	1,491,216	—
or £	869,170	266,883	57,915	148,126	—	1,342,094

TABLE IV.—TURKISH EXPENDITURE IN ARMENIA (EXCLUDING TREBIZOND) IN 1913.

	Erzerum.	Bitlis.	Diarbekr.	Sivas.	Mamuret ul-Aziz.	Van.	Totals.	
	£T	£T	£T	£T	£T	£T	£T	£ sterling.
Army ...	285,573	49,971	93,238	117,071	76,880	81,386	704,119	633,707
Finance ...	46,959	31,606	31,418	71,838	41,979	27,030	250,830	225,747
Home Office...	25,064	22,998	117,032	23,721	31,275	25,177	245,267	220,740
Gendarmerie	37,093	38,220	37,423	50,995	32,187	—	195,918	176,326
Public Works	9,196	3,859	6,426	27,152	5,330	1,605	53,568	48,211
Education ...	9,120	5,498	9,768	13,721	10,451	4,598	53,156	47,841
Religious uses	7,332	7,148	5,662	11,156	7,842	4,526	43,666	39,299
Agriculture...	8,157	535	767	4,436	657	333	14,885	13,397
£T	428,494	159,835	301,734	320,090	206,601	144,655	1,561,409	—
or £	385,645	143,851	271,561	288,081	185,941	130,189	—	1,405,268

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A special map of Armenia (G.S.G.S., No. 2894) has also been issued by the War Office in connexion with this series (November, 1918).

The special map mentioned in the foregoing note having been withdrawn from circulation, the enquirer should observe that the area which is the subject of this book is covered by the map of Eastern Turkey in Asia, published by the Royal Geographical Society, from whom it can be obtained, price 8*s.* 6*d.* (mounted), or 11*s.* 6*d.* (bound in case with explanatory text).

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ARABIA

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Editorial Note.

In the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connection with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous enquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,
General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

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I. GEOGRAPHY PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL

(1) Position and Frontiers

Arabia proper is a peninsula of south-western Asia, bounded on the west by the Red Sea, on the south by the Indian Ocean, and on the east by the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf. The northern boundary embraces the great Nefud Desert, lying between latitudes about 28° and 30° north, but it is an open question whether or not there should also be included the Hamad or Syrian Desert, north of the Nefud. Physically and ethnographically there is little distinction to be drawn between them, but the social and political relations of Arabia are in many respects peculiar. The peninsula is in fact so much cut off from the rest of Asia by the Nefud that it is practically of an insular character. For the present purpose, therefore, Arabia is to be understood as limited on the north by a line drawn from the head of the Gulf of Akaba to the mouth of the Shatt el-Arab, and therefore as lying between 12° 30′ and 30° north latitude and 34° 30′ and 60° east longitude. It occupies an area of approximately 1,000,000 square miles, more than half of which lies within the tropics.

In the south is the settlement of Aden on the coast of Yemen, a British possession comprising the following divisions: (1) the peninsula and isthmus, or Aden proper, (2) Sheikh Othman and the surrounding district, (3) Little Aden peninsula, (4) the island of Perim. The total area of the settlement is about 80 square miles, with a population of over 46,000. The Aden Protectorate has an area of about 9,000 square miles, and a population of over 100,000.

(2) Surface, Coasts, and River System

Surface

A conspicuous physical feature of Arabia is the range of mountains running parallel to the western coast, rising in Midian on the north and in Yemen on the south to a height of over 8,000 ft. The fall towards the Persian Gulf is long and gradual, while that towards the Red Sea is short and steep; the highest land-levels, therefore, are in the west. Nejd, the central part of Arabia, has a mean elevation of fully 2,500 ft., but the only notable exceptions to the general eastward decline are the mountains of Oman, where the summits of Jebel Akhdar are as high as the mountains of Midian and Yemen.

Arabia consists otherwise mainly of desert or steppe. Of deserts there are four main varieties, distinguished by their type of surface:—

(1) *Dana*, the comparatively hard gravelly plain, covered at intervals with parallel belts of sand, which stretches across the greater part of eastern Arabia. It is very barren, but is likely to hold ground-water at a depth which can be reached by well-sinkers.

(2) *Nefud*, a continuous area of deep sand blown into high sand-banks or dunes. The usefulness of this part of Arabia varies according to (*a*) the frequency and proximity of the dunes, (*b*) the nature of the sand, (*c*) exposure to winter rainfall. If granitic, with a regular though small rainfall (as in the northern Nefud), the surface is comparatively compact, and during some months is covered with pasture. If wholly of sandstone or limestone it is softer and less productive, but with some vegetation in the spring. Vegetation only fails entirely in a region of slight and uncertain rainfall, such as the great southern desert (Ruba el-Khali, or "Quarter of Emptiness"), the eastern half of which is partly *nefud* and partly *dana*.

(3) *Ahkaf*, very soft dune country with comparatively narrow trough-intervals between continuous

high sand-billows. The western part of the Ruba el-Khali is called *ahkaf*, but this is possibly only a local name for heavy *nefud*.

(4) *Harra*, a surface of corrugated and fissured lavas or scoriæ, overlying either plain or mountain. It is very bad going, but generally occurs only in patches, which can often be avoided. There are *harra* tracts in the west central region, the best known being that of Kheibar, north of Medina.

In addition to these varieties of desert proper, Arabia contains great tracts of steppe country. These have a hard or dusty surface, with occasional natural water-holes and permanent coarse vegetation in hollows, and are the chosen home of the camel-breeding nomads. There are vast stretches of steppe to the west of Nejd; but elsewhere the comparatively fertile central plateau is surrounded by desert.

Within this ring of desert and steppe lies an elevated core of varying fertility, which may be divided into three groups of more or less connected oases:—

(1) *Jebel Shammar*, south of the northern Nefud. Its chief town is Hail, and its oases owe their existence to the drainage from two lofty ranges, Jebel Aja and Jebel Selma.

(2) *Kasim*. The fertility of this district, which lies between Jebel Shammar and Nejd proper, is mainly due to the constant underground and occasional surface flow of the great Wadi Rumma. Its chief towns are Anaize, Boreida, and Rass.

(3) *Nejd*, by far the most extensive group, covers, with its steppe intervals, some 10,000 square miles. It consists principally of a more or less continuous chain of oases, lying either upon or under the flanks of the plateau of Jebel Toweik. The present capital, Riad, lies in Arid, the central oasis.

The other fertile tracts of Arabia form an outer but by no means continuous ring on or near the coasts, the zone of fertility being widest in the mountainous region of Yemen in the south-west.

In the east, the desert and steppe are interrupted only in Hasa and Oman. In the former is a chain of oases at some distance inland, of which the richest are those of Hofuf and El-Katif. In the latter is the populous coastal plain known as Batina, across which a number of fertile valleys descend from the heights of Jebel Akhdar to the Gulf of Oman.

In the south, the back-country of Hadhramaut contains several deeply-sunk valleys where water is very abundant in the subsoil. In Yemen, a zone of almost continuous fertility extends northwards from the Aden back-country to Asir and the frontiers of Hejaz.

The fertility of Yemen decreases as its level declines from the main ridge, but perennial vegetation is found in the valleys to a distance of about 200 miles from the Red Sea coast.

In Hejaz the isolated oasis again becomes the only support of settled life. There are patches of cultivated land in hollows and wadi beds between Mecca and the Wadi Hamdh, but practically none north of this wadi except the oases of Kheibar and Teima.

Coasts

Between the Red Sea and the mountains is a low sandy strip (Tihama) fringed with coral reefs. In Asir it is sometimes thirty miles in width, but in Midian and the extreme south the hills fall almost into the sea, and the aspect of this coast is nearly everywhere desolate in the extreme. There are no good harbours, only roadsteads, and the approaches to these are often rendered difficult by shoals and reefs. In the southern half of the Red Sea there are numerous small islands near the Arabian coast, a few of which, such as the Farsan group, support a fishing population. Perim, a British possession, is a volcanic island in the Straits of Bab el-Mandeb.

In south-western Arabia there are patches of fertile country along the coast at the wadi-mouths. East of the Straits of Bab el-Mandeb, as far as the mouth of

the Wadi Hadhramaut, the hills still fall abruptly towards the coast, but farther east they are lower, the fertile wadi-mouths are less frequent, and, as Ras el-Hadd is approached, the desert reigns unbroken.

Along this southern coast there are no good harbours except that of Aden. The coastal strip varies in width, and is usually an arid waste of plain and low sand-hills. The Kuria Muria islands, twenty-five miles off the south-east coast of Oman, are a British possession.

The most fertile stretch of the Arabian coast, the Batina district of Oman, lies between Ras el-Hadd and the mouth of the Persian Gulf. The harbour of Muscat admits the largest vessels to an almost land-locked shelter, and there are other smaller but secure ports. From Ras Musandim to Katif the shore is low, but occasionally palm-fringed and cultivated, while from Katif to the mouth of the Shatt el-Arab there is an almost continuous stretch of steppe-desert. The important pearl-islands of Bahrein, which support a population of over 100,000, lie between Katif and the peninsula of El-Katr (Gattar). At the north-west of the Persian Gulf is the excellent harbour of Koweit, a place which furnishes the best ships and is the native place of the best sailors of these seas. Numerous shoals and reefs render the navigation of the Gulf itself difficult and dangerous.

River System[1]

There are no rivers in Arabia which flow perennially from source to mouth. There are, however, numerous wadis, or river beds, which carry the floods (*seils*) after rainstorms, and there are perennial streams in the mountains of the south-west and south-east, and in Nejd, but none of these reach the sea.

The wadis which originate east of the western watershed are mostly long and shallow. The longest is the Wadi Rumma, which starts near Medina and runs north-eastwards through Kasim to the Shatt el-Arab.

[1] See also p. 46 below.

In its central course, where its underground drainage supports a large settled population, it is a wide depression from two miles to 500 yards in width. The *seil* may be from six to nine feet deep after heavy rain in the eastern *harras*. Between the towns of Anaize and Boreida is a natural sand-dam, which often holds up storm-waters for some months in a large lagoon.

The chief wadi of Nejd is the Hanifa (called in its upper course the Wadi Heisiya) which runs from Jebel Toweik in a south-easterly direction, but probably never reaches the Persian Gulf. Where its ground moisture rises near or to the surface, as at Riad, it creates oases, and its valley is the heart of the district of Arid. Both the Wadi Hanifa and the Wadi Rumma carry water at all times beneath their beds, which can be reached by wells at varying depths.

In south-western Nejd the province of Wadyan Dawasir owes its fertility to the great Wadi Dawasir, which is believed to rise in the plateau of Asir. Very little is known of its course, but it is probably a continuation of the Wadi Bisha of Asir.

The largest valleys in Oman are those of the Wadi Semail and the Wadi Halfein. The former is densely populated, and it and the Batina coast are the principal seats of date cultivation in Oman. The latter is the largest valley, and drains southward to the Indian Ocean.

The deeply sunk wadis by which the plateau of Hadhramaut is intersected have a generally northerly or north-easterly trend, until they lead into the main wadi, which makes an immense easterly to south-easterly curve of over 500 miles on its way to the Indian Ocean. Though not perennial they are remarkably fertile, for water is very abundant in the subsoil throughout the system; this is especially true in the case of the main Hadhramaut wadi, where vast reservoirs of water are available near the surface. The last hundred miles of the wadi, however, are dry, owing to the absorption of the water higher up for irrigation purposes.

The western side of the Yemen plateau drains towards the Red Sea through several wadis, while others flow eastwards and lose themselves in the sand. In Asir, too, are numerous, fertile valleys, the largest, the Wadi Bisha, with its tributary the Wadi Shahran being in the east. The most important wadi in Hejaz is the Wadi Hamdh, which unites two main channels from the ridge, one draining the Kheibar Harra, the other the Aweirid Harra. The first gives Medina its underground water and extensive oasis; the second supplies the palm-groves of El-Ala. Generally, however, the wadis of Hejaz produce very little fertility, and in the northern part of the district (Midian) practically none.

(3) Climate

The climate of Arabia, thanks to its extreme dryness, is generally healthy and invigorating. Travellers in the desert or mountains often suffer more from cold than from heat, and snow is not infrequent in the highlands of the north. In the interior the nights are cool, even in the hottest months, and on the highest plateaux the daily range of temperature is enormous. On the coast, however, the heat is usually oppressive, Jedda, Hodeida, and Muscat being among the hottest towns in the world.

Like Persia and Egypt, Arabia is exceptionally dry and rainless, and only in Yemen and Asir are there sufficient periodic rains for cultivation. Elsewhere the most favoured region is the northern Nefud with Jebel Shammar, but the rainfall here is less than that of the Egyptian Delta. Over the rest of the central mass and the greater part of the southern desert rainfall is almost entirely lacking.

The Midian highlands get rather more rain than the Egyptian Delta, and the rest of the Hejaz rather more than Middle Egypt. In Mecca and Medina, as well as farther north, heavy rains occur during thunderstorms. In the Hejaz lowland the mean annual

temperature is nearer 90° than 80° F. (about 30° C.). Mecca is exceedingly hot in summer, but Medina, with a mean temperature of little over 70° F. (21° C.), is healthy throughout the year.

The climate of the Tihama region of Asir is as hot as that of Hejaz, but the inner country is on the whole cooler. On the Yemen coast the heat is very oppressive, and there is very little rainfall. The maritime ranges and mountain plains have a moister climate, but at the higher elevations the air becomes more healthy and bracing. Further inland there are late summer as well as early spring rains, and this favoured district is particularly suited to the cultivation of coffee. The plateau beyond it, in which the city of Sana is situated, is much drier, and is usually cool and pleasant. The eastern range is hot and has a scanty rainfall, which decreases eastward.

The climates of the various zones in the Aden Protectorate are similar to those in Yemen. The coastal district of Hadhramaut is intensely hot and enervating, while in the narrow valleys of the wadis of this district the temperature is also very high, with less regular rains than those of the western watershed.

The coast of Oman, from Muscat southwards, is as hot as that of Hadhramaut. In 1912 the highest temperature at Muscat was 114° F. (45½° C.), and the minimum 64° F. (17½° C.). The Batina coast to the west is cooler, but fevers are common in the autumn. Many of the higher towns and districts on the coastal side of the Hajar watershed enjoy a fresh and temperate climate. The average rainfall at Muscat is 4 in., but in the interior heavy rains sometimes cause devastating floods.

The climate of the greater part of the Persian Gulf coast is not unlike that of Muscat, but in the northern districts, such as Koweit, it is distinctly cooler. Healthier desert conditions prevail in the interior of Trucial Oman, Hasa, and the Sultanate of Koweit, but the islands of Bahrein are more malarial and less healthy than the mainland. In January and February

the Gulf is distinctly cold, and there is occasionally frost at Koweit. The average rainfall on the Arabian side is about 5 in.

The greater part of central Arabia has a healthy, temperate climate, with a very scanty rainfall, and is often extremely cold.

(4) Sanitary Conditions

The climate of Arabia, with its extreme degree of dryness and its constant sunshine, is for the most part very healthy, and the population as a rule enjoy considerable freedom from epidemic diseases, in spite of the entire absence of any sort of sanitation or drainage throughout the country. The coast and those districts bordering on it are less healthy, owing to their greater degree of humidity, which, added to the great heat, produces in various parts, e.g., Mecca, Kheibar, the coast of Hadhramaut, conditions leading to malaria and intermittent fever.

The annual influx of pilgrims from all parts of the Mohammedan world at the time of the *Haj* naturally means that the port of Jedda, where the pilgrims disembark, and the places on the road to Mecca, suffer to some extent from imported diseases.

(5) Race and Language

Race

The Arabs belong to the Semitic race, and are not entirely confined to Arabia; they form a large proportion of the population of Syria, Mesopotamia, and northern Africa, as well as of the country to the east of the Persian Gulf. In these countries, and also in the coastal districts of Arabia itself, they have mixed much with other races—Jewish, Phœnician, Turkish, Negroid, Hamitic, &c.—but the inhabitants of the interior of the peninsula are the nearest existing approach to the pure Semitic type.

Physically they are one of the finest races in the world. They possess, too, a high degree of intelligence, but are deficient in organizing power and capacity for combined action, while they have an instinctive dislike of all kinds of governmental control. They are generally dignified, polite, and good-natured, but at the same time suspicious, revengeful, untruthful, and avaricious. The most hospitable and trustworthy of the Beduins are found among the largest and best-knit tribes, especially among such as form part of a federation under the control of one of the greater Emirs or the King of the Hejaz. Some of the lesser tribes, on the other hand, have the worst of reputations for treachery and cruelty. The townsmen of Hejaz and Kasim are very unwarlike, but those of the Yemen highlands are as sturdy fighters as any of the nomads.

There are several thousand Jews in Yemen, who have their own quarters at Sana and other inland towns, and there is also a considerable British Indian element at Mecca, Jedda, Aden, and Muscat.

Language

The Arabic language is spoken throughout the peninsula, but considerable dialectal differences exist in different parts. The purest Arabic is spoken in Nejd, and next in purity comes the Arabic of the Jebel Shammar region. In Hejaz the language is not equally correct; in Hasa, Bahrein, and Oman it is decidedly influenced by a foreign element called Nabataean, while in Hadhramaut it merges into a Himyaritic or African dialect.

(6) Population

The population of Arabia cannot be estimated with any degree of accuracy, but the following figures are believed to be approximately correct:—Hejaz, 1,000,000; Asir, 1,500,000; Yemen, 1,000,000; Aden Protectorate, 100,000; Hadhramaut, 150,000; Sul-

tanate of Oman, 500,000; Trucial Oman, 80,000; El-Katr (Gattar), 25,000; Bahrein, 100,000; Hasa, 150,000; Koweit, 50,000. These figures include both the settled and the nomadic population, and in the case of Hejaz five-sixths belong to the latter class. In addition to the above, the settled population of Nejd is estimated at 250,000, and that of Jebel Shammar at 20,000; while the Beduins of the central north, east, and south number possibly half a million. These estimates give a total of between five and six millions.

No part of Hejaz is thickly populated, but its deserts are the home of many great Beduin tribes, and it contains several of the most important towns in the peninsula. Mecca, the largest town in Arabia, has a permanent population of about 70,000, including 12,000 Indians. The inhabitants of Medina, not including the cultivators of the surrounding oasis, number 40,000, and those of Jedda 30,000.

The settled population is much more numerous in Asir, where the main constituent is a highland farmer element living in the valleys of the upper wadis. The available descriptions of inland settlements suggest, however, that they are merely villages with chains of dependent farmsteads and groups of huts distributed along the valley bottoms and sides. As in Nejran, the Jauf of Yemen, and Hadhramaut, these settlements serve as nuclei of tribes with fringes of unsettled clans, which roam the intervening steppes and mountain heights in search of pasturage.

The Yemen highlands are the most populous part of Arabia. The inhabitants are for the most part settled and occupied in agriculture or trade. The majority live in close-set villages, while great tracts of mountain land are intensively cultivated. To the east of the highlands is a scattered pastoral population, but the Great Desert, stretching from Yemen to Oman and from Hadhramaut to Nejd, is, so far as is known, totally uninhabited.

The population of Sana, the capital of Yemen, has decreased in recent years. At present its inhabitants

probably number about 20,000; Hodeida has over 40,000, Menakha 7,000, and Taiz, Yerim, Dhamar, and Ibb (Epp) about 4,000 each.

The settlement of Aden has a population of some 46,000, the Protectorate of upwards of 100,000.

In Oman the Batina coastal strip contains several populous towns and villages, but the most thickly peopled district is the region of the Wadi Semail. Semail itself, an important settlement in the wadi, is merely a group of twelve adjoining unwalled villages, extending along the valley for ten miles. In the north-western district of Jau is the fertile Baraimi oasis, with a population of over 5,000. The population of Muscat fluctuates, but in winter, when the town is full, its total population numbers about 10,000.

In Trucial Oman, i.e., the coastal region from Ras Musandim to El-Katr, the chief towns are Sharga, with 15,000 inhabitants, Dibai, with nearly 20,000, and Abu Dhabi, with over 6,000. In El-Katr the two principal settlements on the coast are Doha (El-Bida'a), with about 12,000, and Wakra, with about 8,000 inhabitants, and the small islands of Bahrein have a regular population of about 103,000. Two-thirds of the population of the Hasa province are settled, and mostly inhabit the oases of Katif and Hasa, the largest town of the latter being Hofuf. The settled population of the Sultanate of Koweit is estimated at about 37,000.

There is only a very small nomadic element in Nejd proper, and the great Beduin tribes which owe allegiance to its Emir range for the most part outside its boundaries. Riad, the capital, has probably less than 10,000 inhabitants. The only populous district of central Arabia is Kasim, in the Wadi Rumma depression, which has a settled population of about 50,000. There are over fifty urban and village settlements in Kasim, including the two towns of Boreida and Anaize, with over 10,000 inhabitants each, while Rass has some 3,500. The settled population of Jebel Shammar, about 4,000 of whom inhabit Hail, are concentrated between

Jebel Aja and Jebel Selma. The Beduins who recognize the present Emir of Hail do not exceed 20,000 in number, and consist of the pastoral sections of the Shammar tribe.

II. POLITICAL HISTORY

Chronological Summary

Tenth century (middle) Seizure of Mecca by Jafar.
1200 (*circa*) Hasanid dynasty established at Mecca.
Sixteenth century Yemenite Powers established.
1517 Selim the Grim seizes Egypt.
1538 Arabian coast towns occupied by Turkish fleet.
1540 Aden taken from the Portuguese.
1599 Yemen occupied by the Turks.
1741 Oman supports the Al Bu Said dynasty.
1750 (*circa*) Foundation of dynasties of Koweit and Muscat.
1782 Bahrein dynasty founded.
1798 Great Britain concludes a treaty with Sultan of Muscat.
1811 Reaction against the cleansing of the " Holy Places."
1819-42 Egyptian troops occupy Nejd.
1827 Mohammed ibn Abd el-Muin el-Aun becomes Grand Sherif.
1830 Ahmed Idrisi comes from Mecca to Sabia.
1837 Death of Ahmed Idrisi.
1839 Great Britain's first occupation of Arabian territory.
1840 Revival of Turkish power in Yemen.
1847 Abdah Shammar establish an independent Emirate in Hail.
1849 Return of the Turks to highland Yemen.
1850 The Saud Emirate revived.
1853 The dynasties of the Trucial coast recognised as autonomous.
1868 Sheikhdom of El-Katr becomes independent.
1871 Turkey occupies El-Hasa.
1872 Turkey occupies Doha.
1882 Aun " er-Rafik " becomes Grand Sherif.
1892 The five Trucial Chiefs accept British Protectorate.
1902 Kaaiti Sultan established.
1905-6 Turkey sends aid to the Emir of Jebel Shammar against the Emir of Nejd.
1908 Husein nominated Grand Sherif by the Porte.
1910 Hail ceases to control the Nefud. Advance of Idrisi checked.

1913 Province of Hasa snatched from Turks by Emir of Riad.
1914 Sheikh of Koweit breaks with Turkey. Emir of Nejd breaks with Turkey.
1915 Husein negotiates with Great Britain.
1916 Revolt of Husein.
1917 Hail ceases to encroach on Hejaz. Disappearance of Turkish authority from North-West Arabia.

The Autonomous States of Arabia.—Arabia has never owed common allegiance to any single authority, either within or without, since the decay of the Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad. From the early sixteenth century to our own day, however, the Ottoman Sultans have exercised an influence which, at one time or another, but never simultaneously or continuously, has affected most habitable parts of the peninsula, except the south-east, in varying degrees. One other external Power has obtained a footing in Arabia during the past two centuries. This is Great Britain, whose influence for half a century past has been at various points in conflict with, and has often prevailed against, the Ottoman. Besides these two external authorities, there exist at the present moment, either in independence or under the influence of one or the other, certain native princedoms: (1) the Sherifate of Mecca, now styled the Kingdom of Hejaz; (2) the Idrisi Principality of Sabia in Asir; (3) the Imamate of Sana in Yemen; (4) the Emirate of Hail in Jebel Shammar; (5) the Emirate of Riad in south Nejd; (6) the Sheikhdom of Koweit; (7) the Sheikhdom of the Bahrein Islands; (8) the Sheikhdom of El-Katr; (9) the domain of the five "Trucial Chiefs" and their dependents; (10) the Sultanate of Muscat in Oman; (11) the Sultanate of Kishn and Sokotra, the Kaaiti Sultanate of Makalla and western Hadhramaut, and the Kathiri Sheikhdom of eastern Hadhramaut; (12) the autonomous chiefs under treaty with Aden, who occupy the south-west angle of the peninsula.

Long as this list is, it does not exhaust the existing autonomies in Arabia, there being many tribal

communities, settled, half-settled, and nomadic, which give effective allegiance to none of the above, but only to their own chiefs. These are to be found mainly in the back-country of Yemen, in the Asir highlands, in the interior of Oman, and all round the northern fringe of the Nefud Desert, which divides Arabia proper from the "Syrian Desert" or Hamad. In this last region account must be taken of three tribal groups especially, whose activities tend to encroach on parts of Arabia proper—the Saadun chiefdom among the Muntafik, the Hadhdhal chiefdom among the Amarat, and the Shaalan chiefdom of the Ruwalla. The last is established in the oasis of Jauf, on the northern edge of the Nefud, and has designs on Jebel Shammar to the south. The other two belong to the great Anaize group of tribes, which dominates the Syrian Desert, and makes it one in general social character with central Arabia.

This parcelling of the peninsula among many autonomous States is of immemorial antiquity. The peculiar geographical conditions of the country hardly admit of settled life, except in oases isolated by desert, or in wadis divided by rugged and comparatively barren ridges; and it is only by virtue of some peculiar source of wealth, some spiritual idea, or, lastly, some external strength, that larger territorial dominions have been established and maintained here and there.

To understand the position and claims of those existent to-day, it is necessary to review very briefly a long period stretching back to the thirteenth century. By that epoch the whole peninsula had come to accept, in theory, the one religion of Islam, but with much variety of dogma and practice. Shia tenets had prevailed in highland Yemen and its back-country, as well as among some Beduin tribes of the centre, in Hasa, and even, to some extent, in Hejaz and Medina itself; and Oman had become mainly Ibadhi. The overlordship of the Abbasid Caliphs of Baghdad had become ineffective; and with its decline two of the most important princedoms, which survive to this day, had

established autonomy. These were a "Grand Sherifate" in Hejaz and an Imamate in Yemen.

The *Grand Sherifate* was the tardy fruit of a general movement in favour of Alids against Abbasids, which had been developing in various parts of the Caliphal Empire for some generations past. About the middle of the tenth century, after a long period of misrule, during which Mecca, under Abbasid pro-consuls of ever-decreasing social standing, and the tyranny of one "Emir el-Haj," or Turkish *condottiere*, after another, had come to supersede Medina in importance, the city was seized for good and all by a Hasanid Emir el-Haj named Jafar. Two sons of his and a grandson retained the power for nearly a hundred years before the direct line expired and the Sherifate passed to descendants of Jafar's brother. Born thus of an Alid anti-Abbasid movement, and fostered by the rivalry of the heretical Fatimite Caliphs of Egypt, the early Sherifate had even less orthodoxy than real independence of external powers, Ayyubid or Fatimite; and not till about the year 1200, when a strong Sherif from the Juheina country, named Katada, nineteenth in descent from the Prophet, executed a *coup de main* and established the Hasanid dynasty, which still rules Mecca to-day, did it acquire any considerable show of one or the other. Its orthodoxy, however, was suspected of Shia tendencies for some centuries to come; nor was its political independence ever complete, for an economic reason which has always governed, and still governs, the fate of Hejaz and, especially, Mecca. The land cannot support its native population above a Beduin standard of comfort, much less provide food to support the annual cosmopolitan influx of pilgrims, or revenue to ensure their safety and well-being. When the Abbasids could no longer help, Hejaz, after abortive attempts to base itself on Yemen, had to have recourse to Fatimites and Mamelukes, who, on occasion, occupied Mecca. Consequently, when Selim the Grim possessed himself of Egypt in 1517, Hejaz hardly required the appearance

of a Turkish emissary and escort to compel its submission to the Ottoman Empire and its continuance under the predominant influence of the lords of the Nile Valley.

Meanwhile *Yemen*, though much better able than Hejaz to support itself, had been going through much the same political evolution. When the Abbasid rule ceased to be effective, it fell under the influence of Fatimites, of Ayyubids, of Mamelukes; but its greater distance from the seats of settled Moslem power in the north, its self-sufficiency, and its strong infusion of Shia creed caused its autonomy to be more real. That autonomy, however, was very far from a unity. Sunnites of the Tihama fought Shias of the highlands for supremacy, and petty Sunni princes and local Zeid Imams were arrayed against each other all through the centuries from the ninth to the thirteenth. When a strong power was established at last in the Tihama, and extended to Taiz and Aden, the struggle resolved itself into one between the Sultans of Zebid and the Zeidi Imams of Sana. The last had continued and enlarged the domain of an elective spiritual leadership, instituted originally as far back as the beginning of the tenth century in the extreme north-east of the highlands, beyond Saada, by Ali Kasim er-Rassi, a Hasanid, descended in the seventh generation from the Prophet. These rival Yemenite powers were sufficiently well established by the sixteenth century to prevent the country falling automatically to the new lords of Egypt; and, although the coast towns were occupied by an Ottoman fleet in 1538 (Aden was not taken from the Portuguese till two years later), it was not before the very end of the century (1599) that the Turks could occupy Yemen as a whole. The rule they then established lasted, however, only forty years, and had no other permanent effect than to break Sunnite power in the Tihama. In consequence, from 1630 onwards for two centuries the Zeidi Imamate maintained as united a sovereignty as Yemen has ever known.

Thus came into being three of the existing Arabian Powers—the Sherifate of Mecca, strong in the cosmopolitan sanctity of Hejaz; the Imamate of Sana, supported by the exceptional resources and exclusive heresy of Yemen; and the Ottoman occupation, based on the fighting force of the Turk and his Sultan's claim to the Caliphate.

Turkish Claims.—The last of these Powers had endured in Yemen, as we have seen, for little more than one generation. In Hejaz, for some centuries to come, it was to exercise an absentee suzerainty, hardly realised except during the presence of the Emir el-Haj at the annual pilgrimage, and frequently discredited by periods of revolt. Nevertheless, on the strength of complimentary or precautionary letters sent by various Arab chiefs to Turkish generals, both Suleiman the Magnificent and Mohammed III claimed all Arabia for the Ottoman Empire; and their claims have supplied a basis for the inclusion of the whole peninsula in the "irredentist" programme of twentieth-century Young Turks. In any case, whatever direct sovereignty the Turks had claimed in the sixteenth century diminished throughout the two succeeding centuries, till, in the closing years of the eighteenth and the opening years of the nineteenth, it disappeared altogether for a while before the onset of the Wahabites. Though, after a little more than a decade, it was nominally restored in Hejaz, renewed in Yemen, and extended over Nejd and Hasa, by the arms of the Viceroy of Egypt, in reality its revival is not to be dated until after 1840. Meanwhile there had come into existence another of the larger native autonomies which still survive—the Emirate of Nejd.

The *Emirate of Nejd* arose out of, and relies upon, the natural tendency of certain oases, isolated in the centre of Arabia, less from one another than as a group from all other settled lands, and too lean to stand alone, to follow a common exclusive way of political life. About the middle of the eighteenth century a particular spiritual idea germinated in the

central district of Arid through the revivalist predications of Mohammed Abdul Wahab, and fructified by the enthusiasm and practical ability of Mohammed ibn Saud, the Sheikh of Deraya, the principal local township. This idea was ascetic, involving the reduction of ritual and practice to the most primitive simplicity, and was accepted readily by an isolated population, whose social organization and habit of thought were of the simplest. Persuaded that its own was the one and only way of right, which it was incumbent on God's chosen to force upon the rest of Islam, this oasis folk and their dependent Beduins, hardy, bellicose savages, pushed out into Arabia in all directions at the end of the century to bear down societies of easier habit and looser cohesion with the fervour of Wahabite conviction. At the head of the new scourges of God marched first the son and then the grandson of the first convert; and rapid successes from Kerbela to the Red Desert, and from Oman and Hasa to Hejaz, confirmed the Wahabite Emirate to the House of Saud. But Islam is wider than Arabia, and the mass of the faithful, both Sunni and Shia, living under conditions very different from those of Nejd, was not prepared to tolerate such " cleansing " of the Holy Places, and from 1811 onwards reaction took effect. The Nejd folk were pressed back into their oases by Egyptian arms, and from 1819 to 1842 Nejd itself was occupied intermittently by regular Egyptian troops. Neither Wahabism, however, nor the Saud Emirate was more than scotched. The latter transferred its capital some miles down Wadi Hanifa to Riad, and came definitely into its own again about 1850; and since that date it has continued to flourish, except for a temporary eclipse of some fifteen years' duration before 1902.

The *Emirate of Jebel Shammar*, the only other considerable autonomy of central Arabia still surviving, is much younger, as an autonomous principality, than the Emirate of Nejd. It began, indeed, in a gradual assertion of independence by one of the latter's vassals during the dark days of Egyptian occupation.

By 1847 a sheikhly house of the Abdah Shammar, the Beni Rashid, had thrown off all external allegiance, and constituted an independent Emirate in Hail. Though thus derived from Nejd, and owing, perhaps, to Nejd its idea of Emirate, as it certainly did its Wahabism, the Jebel Shammar principate rests on a different social and economic basis. It holds, and has organized, a district which has been for ages the metropolitan *pied à terre* of a great Beduin society, now Shammar, but once Tayi; and it has focussed that society on itself at a point which is a necessary halt on the shortest road from the Shia holy cities and Baghdad to Medina or Mecca. Since the first century of Islam the Persian Haj caravans have emerged at Hail from the Northern Desert, and have there recruited their forces to face the fatigues and dangers of the other half of their road. Their passage gives Jebel Shammar a political relation with the outside world and an economic resource which the Emirate of Nejd has repeatedly tried, but with no lasting success, to divert to itself by forcing the Hajis to take longer routes to southward.

The rivalry of these Emirates of the south and the north has made history in central Arabia for more than half a century past. Hail naturally tends to look for any extraneous support to the lords of Irak; Riad *faute de mieux* to the lords of the Persian Gulf. The power of the Emir of Nejd is based on the larger territory, but one so poor and savage that he must always seek to extend his sway to richer Gulf lands. The Emir of Jebel Shammar is better assured of his revenue, but not of home-grown food. In the geographical interval between the two lies their chief bone of contention, the oases of Kasim, strung out along the middle course of the Wadi Rumma on the easiest trans-peninsular route from the head of the Persian Gulf. Given to commerce, the home of the Ukeil[1] carriers who travel all northern and central Arabia and Syria as well, rich and progressive in comparison

[1] See below, pp. 73 and 90.

with the settlements of south and north, the self-governing townships of Kasim do not wish to be appurtenances of either Emirate. Whenever dominated by the forces of one, they obstinately favour the other. During the past half-century their territories have seldom been free of both, and have often supplied the two with a battle-ground.

Persian Gulf States.—Little older, and in some instances younger, than the Emirate of Nejd are the principal Sultanates and Sheikhdoms along the Arabian shore of the Persian Gulf. The elder of the existing dynasties are those of Koweit and Muscat, both of which go back to the middle of the eighteenth century; that of Bahrein dates from 1782; the five ruling sheikhs of the Trucial coast, long under British influence, have been recognised as autonomous since 1853; and the Sheikhdom of El-Katr has been free from dependence on Bahrein since 1870. All these chiefs have now fallen under British domination to such a degree that, although seldom interfered with in the internal administration of their principalities, they are controlled in all matters of external relations, and to a great extent maintain their dynasties and authority only by grace of their alliance with us. None has ever wielded effective rule over any considerable territory. Even the Sultan of Muscat's authority loses validity a day's march from the coast-line of Oman, and becomes null in the long south-western extension which he claims. The sources of these chiefs' power in their respective districts are as follows :—

(*a*) *Koweit* owes importance to the possession of a bay which is the nearest silt-free harbour to the Shatt el-Arab region, and is favourably placed in regard to the trans-peninsular route, *via* Kasim, mentioned above. Until recently it was the one important port through which commodities to and from Central Arabia could pass without subjection to the exactions and inconveniences of Ottoman regulations. It is a principal centre of dhow-building, and

takes great part not only in the Gulf pearl-fishery, but also in sea-going trade.

(*b*) *Bahrein, El-Katr,* and the *Trucial Chiefdoms* alike depend on the pearl fishery, the first named having the lion's share both of production and of transit trade.

(*c*) *Muscat,* with its dependent ports (the only ports with natural advantages on the south-east angle of the peninsula), is the outlet of the largest district of continuous fertility in Arabia, except the south-west (Yemen and Aden Interior), and the inlet for the most numerous settled population which purchases more than bare necessities.

Great Britain.—British power first established a political footing in Arabia in virtue of a treaty concluded with the Sultan of Muscat in 1798. But it did not take any Arabian territory into permanent occupation till 1839. Nor, by the seizure of Aden at that date, did its policy contemplate territorial gain any more than it did by making its treaties with the Gulf chiefs, but was bent only on policing the Eastern Seas by the establishment of a half-way fortress on the Red Sea route to India. To this end it believed control of nothing more than the harbour of Aden would suffice, and Great Britain long remained wholly indifferent to the back-country, in spite of its relation to the best port in south-west Arabia as a source of supplies and exporter and importer of commodities. This policy has had in the end to be modified, and some British control is now exerted over the chiefdoms of the south-west Arabian angle (*cf. Persian Gulf,* No. 76 of this series).

The Idrisi.—Youngest of the dynasties ruling more than one town and its district is that of the *Idrisi of Sabia.* The present Idrisi himself has raised his family above the standing of other local sheikhs in the southern Tihama. His house is not of Arabian origin, or ancient nobility, or early settlement in

Arabia. His grandfather, a native of Fez, after residence in Mecca as a teacher of doctrine, first brought the name to Sabia in 1830. He found in the contiguous district of Abu Arish a Sherifial sheikhdom, maintaining relations with Mecca and with the Egyptian power, and at constant feud with highland Asir, at that time more or less united against the Egyptian invaders by its Wahabite sympathies under the chief of the Beni Mugheid. Eleven years later, when the Egyptian troops, after many unlucky expeditions into Asir (which, however, enfeebled the Highland League), were finally withdrawn, the ruling sheikh of Abu Arish advanced down the Tihama, and succeeded in occupying parts of it as far south as Mokha, till the return of the Turks in earnest in 1849.

What happened later to bring about the supersession of the Abu Arish sherifs by the house of Ahmed Idris of Sabia, who had died in the odour of sanctity in 1837, we do not exactly know; but it is certain that this house, owing largely to the renown of its founder's tomb and *tarika*, did come to inherit the dominant position after 1850; and the present Idrisi, who frames his territorial ambitions on the precedent of Sherif Husein of Abu Arish, the conqueror of the Yemen Tihama, appears to regard himself as the lineal successor of the latter. For two generations, however, the house enjoyed very limited local authority, and it was only in the present century, when Mohammed, the representative of the third generation, returned to Sabia, after completing his education and marrying two wives in the Nile valley, that aggrandisement began. Idrisi succeeded in focussing on himself the sturdy anti-Turk spirit of not only his own Tihama district but some highland tribes of south Asir. For a time he enlisted even the Imam of Yemen in his league, and became a serious danger to the Turkish power. A check, administered with the help of the Emir of Mecca in 1910, and the defection of the Imam, relieved the situation for the Turks; but help from the Italians during the Tripolitan war, and Mohammed

Idrisi's own power with his tribesmen, based on a carefully nurtured belief in his personal sanctity and miraculous gifts, and also on a rude but real talent for organising an administration and collecting revenue, kept him in the field and formidable. When war broke out between Turkey and Great Britain he had failed lately to come to terms with the former, and was ready to renew his rebellious activities; but he could no longer count on any but the tribesmen of his home district, Mikhlaf el-Yemen, and the adjacent Tihama.

III. POLITICAL CONDITIONS

It remains to be seen how, under these Principalities and Powers, Arabia stood at the beginning of the war with Turkey (October 1914), and in October 1917, the date up to which this history has been brought.

Consequences of Turkey's Entry into the War

When the Ottoman Empire entered the war it was in possession, more or less continuous and effective, of the whole Red Sea littoral from Akaba to Mokha, with the single exception of the Idrisi's territory, a stretch of about a hundred miles from Shukeik to Wadi Ain. The Ottoman holding extended inland about a hundred and fifty miles on an average; but its connection with the main body of the Empire was slender and precarious. The Hejaz Railway, prolonged in 1908 to Medina, belied the political hopes of its projectors, owing partly to its serving but a third, and that the most desolate section, of Ottoman territory in Arabia, partly to great difficulties of maintenance and working. It had brought no economic growth to the Peninsula, creating no increase of population or wealth along its course or at its terminus (it has hardly affected Medina at all); and, far from becoming the backbone of Ottoman territory in Arabia, it marks its uttermost eastern fringe. The oases of Teima and Kheibar, intermediate between Hejaz and Jebel Shammar, were held, not by the Turks, but by Ibn Rashid of Hail; inland Asir was not effectively occupied by them except at and near Ebha and Muhail;

and northern Yemen, the home of the mediatised Imam, and all the region east of Sana, were free of them altogether. The Turks had no other holding in the Peninsula; for the province of Hasa had been snatched by the Emir of Nejd in the spring of 1913, and their occupation of Doha (El-Bida'a) in El-Katr, never recognised by us as effective, had terminated shortly afterwards. Nor, though they claimed Koweit, had they ever been allowed to take it. For ten years past, however, they had been obtaining predominant influence in the Emirate of Jebel Shammar, and latterly had concluded an agreement with the Emir of Nejd to the effect that, since *de facto* he was occupying Hasa, he should hold it *de jure* as vassal "Vali of Nejd."

Dangers of a "Holy War"

War with Turkey entailed on Great Britain and her Allies certain potential dangers in and from Arabia. The most serious (looming not in the Arabian Peninsula alone) was that the strenuous efforts then being made through the Porte by the Central Empires to arouse Moslems to a general Holy War would be responded to by the Arabs. Whether this result should ensue or not, and in whatever degree, there was every likelihood that the Turks would try to organize on their Arabian littoral impediments and perils to the British trunk sea-route to the East. Lastly, if they were left in control of all their holding in western Arabia, then Aden, the East African possessions of the Allies, and even those in the Middle and Farther East, would be dangerously accessible to the enemy.

British Alliance with the Grand Sherif

In search of a local ally to combat these dangers, Great Britain naturally turned to the Grand Sherif. The metropolitan position of his city in Islam and his own authentic holy lineage would make a refusal by him to countenance Holy War against the Allies

very effective; and, if he declared against the Turks, the geographical position of his principality would render almost impossible the materialisation of the other two dangers. Furthermore, Emir Husein was known to desire independence for the Meccan Sherifate. In the eighteenth century that independence had been attained in all but name; but successive occupations of Mecca by the Wahabites and the Egyptians had set back the clock. The first prince of the present ruling branch of the Katada House, Mohammed ibn Abd el-Muin el-Aun, appointed in 1827 by the Egyptian Viceroy, had to trim his sails very close to the wind; and it was not till his fourth son, Aun " er-Rafik," obtained the Sherifial throne in 1882, after seeing a brother murdered and his own house dispossessed for two years by a rival branch, that the Sherifate began to recover prestige.

Husein, nominated by the Porte in 1908, began his reign by astutely undertaking for his foreign master military operations which served equally his own purpose of weakening native rivals, Ibn Saud and Idrisi. That done, and the Porte laid under an obligation, the Grand Sherif steadily encroached on the domain of the Vali of Hejaz, till by 1913 his was the most effective power not only in the rural districts but also in Mecca and Jedda. In the summer of 1915 Husein opened negotiations with Great Britain, and in June 1916 raised the standard of open revolt. By the end of 1917, when he had borne the title of " Malik " of Hejaz for more than a year, and successfully presided over two pilgrimages, Turkish authority had disappeared throughout north-western Arabia from Kunfuda to Akaba, except at Medina, in its immediate environs, and along the railway line of communication from the north; and over most of that area it had been replaced by the power of Husein. In Mecca and southern Hejaz generally the King's rule rests on a traditional local loyalty, and among most of the other tribesmen who have supported him there exists some vague sentiment of Arab nationalism; but the

old problem of Abbasid and Fatimite days demands the same solution to-day in a land where the margin of subsistence is so infinitesimal that any agrarian taxation at all would extinguish it. The leading urban communities have been accustomed for ages to be paid by, not to pay to, the Government; and the social standard of the mass of the population is so low that no administration can expect elasticity of customs receipts.

The New Kingdom of Hejaz

The new Kingdom of Hejaz has not yet been delimited on any side, and it is difficult to indicate even its approximate boundaries. On the north and east, where it runs out into unsettled country, its extent will probably always vary with the shifting allegiance of moving tribes. At present its northern limit has to be left vague, though many communities both in southern trans-Jordan lands and in the western parts of the Syrian desert have made offers of adhesion to King Husein. Southwards the King claims the inland territories up to the head of Wadi Bisha, and also the coast to beyond Kunfuda. South of these two points lie respectively the independent highland Asiri tribes, in the midst of whom the Turks are entrenched at Ebha and Muhail, and the home domain of Idrisi. Neither those southern tribes nor the Idrisi recognise the King of Hejaz as overlord, though some of the Asiris, e.g., the powerful Beni Mugheid, have been at various epochs in friendly relations with Sherifs of Mecca. There are Wahabite tendencies in the inner Asir highlands, which increase eastward, and form a serious barrier between Sherifial influence and the Zeidist population of highland Yemen.

The Emirate of Nejd

On the east of Hejaz lie the domains of the central Emirs. Neither Hail nor Riad has acknowledged any

suzerainty of Hejaz; nor does the King seriously claim it, although he has an old dispute with Ibn Saud about overlordship of Kasim and also of the eastern sections of the Ateiba tribe. With these latter, seeing that they range within the western confines of his oases, the Emir of Nejd desires to be able to deal at discretion. Since, however, this Emir definitely broke with the Turks in 1914, and engaged himself by treaty to have the same friends and enemies as Great Britain, he has maintained friendly, if formal, diplomatic relations with King Husein.

The Emirate of Jebel Shammar

The Emirate of Jebel Shammar, on the other hand, was, in October 1917, actively hostile to King Husein, as well as to ourselves and to Ibn Saud, and openly allied, or even subject, to the Turks. The Emir, Saud ibn Abd el-Aziz er-Rashid, accepted the title of Pasha, as well as men, armament, and supplies, from our enemies. In so doing he but developed a policy instituted by his grandfather and followed by his father, to help whom against the Emir of Nejd, and to recover Kasim, Ottoman forces were sent from Irak in 1905 and 1906. Ibn Rashid's own power, however, has shrunk of late both territorially and economically. With the loss of Jauf to the Ruwalla Anaize in 1910, Hail has ceased to control the Nefud; with that of Teima in 1917 it has ceased to encroach on Hejaz. Ibn Rashid's attempt in 1915 to overrun Kasim and Sedeir resulted in no permanent occupation; and both these districts have since reverted to his rival. Of late, large sections of his own Shammar have been operating with his enemies; and the townsmen of Hail, with the oasis folk of the neighbourhood, and even members of his own house, have become antagonistic to him. Nor have his relations with other pro-Turk chiefs, such as Ajeimi Saadun of the Muntafik, and Ibn Hithlein of the Ajman, continued cordial.

Wahabism

The Emirate of Nejd sprang, as we have seen (p. 19), from Wahabism, and still derives its strength from this creed—originally the creed of a simple, almost savage, people. There is no society in Arabia more primitive than the Nejdean oasis folk, except some tribes on the northern and southern flanks of the eastern part of the great South Desert; and the Saud family is well ahead of its subjects in civilization. This point requires attention, in view both of the present political state of the Emirate and the question of its possible extension through Saud ambitions. It probably cannot be extended permanently except where Nejdean Wahabism already exists or social conditions are such as to permit its propaganda; and its hold on its provinces will vary with the fervour of their adhesion to the Nejdean creed. Further, in proportion as its expansion brings its rulers into relations with non-Wahabite or non-Moslem peoples, the loyalty of the fanatical oasis folk of south Nejd grows cold.

Such is the normal situation of an Emir of Nejd and such the normal tendency of the reigning Emir's subjects. But under abnormal conditions of religion, when the Islamic world is profoundly disposed, by defeat or some less obvious cause, towards an ascetic revival, the expansive capacity of Wahabism may easily, as in the past, change the political map of Arabia. Rude though the Nejdeans be, their practice expresses the spirit of theistic unity in greater purity and vigour than that of any other considerable Moslem community; and, when Islam is searching its heart for the reason of God's manifest wrath, the eyes not only of simple zealots in Arabia but of intellectual puritans in India, Egypt, and Syria may turn once more to that stronghold of primitive faith. Beduins everywhere are ready to be roused to an outburst of fanaticism for the one God; and at such a moment an able Emir of the Saud House might again seize the opportunity to issue from his remote oasis and purge the borderlands. Kasim and Hasa would accept unwillingly; Jebel

Shammar, being more genuinely Wahabite, would fall an easy conquest. In the central western borderland, the Asir highlands, there is constant sympathy with Wahabism. Mecca and Medina hate Wahabis, as do Irak, Koweit, and, most of all, Yemen; but the last alone could hope to be beyond reach of the purge. Oman (at least, the northern part) would not be unsympathetic.

Consideration of Hasa has carried our survey across the peninsula to the shore of the Gulf. It will be convenient, therefore, to complete it on that side before dealing with what lies south of Hejaz.

Boundaries of Nejd

The Emir of Nejd claims, by right of recent conquest, and of intermittent possession in the latter part of the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth centuries, all the Gulf shore from the Jafura desert (about latitude 24°), which bounds the range of the Ahl Morra, to the northern limit of the Ajman country (about latitude 29°). Here he marches with territory claimed by the Sheikh of Koweit. Ibn Saud, however, does not occupy effectively the fifth part of this strip of some three hundred miles, but only the Hasa group of oases towards the south of it, with the ports of Katif and Ajer. Of his hold on the northern part, the Ajman *dira*, the most that can be said is that he has made a solitude and called it peace.

Koweit

The Sheikh of Koweit's territorial claim is not much more substantial. Outside a twenty-five-mile radius from his capital, he rules nominally on the west up to the wells of Hafar, where he meets the equally nominal jurisdictions of Ibn Rashid on the north-east and of Ibn Saud on the south-west. To the north of his capital, a post at Safwan, formerly Turkish, gives him more real hold up to a sixty-mile radius, which includes the large but desolate island of Bubian. The present

ruler of Koweit, Sheikh Salim, has inherited from his father and brother, besides an innate distaste for Wahabism, a certain lack of cordiality towards Ibn Saud and his rule in Hasa, which began in resentment at the latter's treatment of the Ajman in 1915. But, so long as both rulers maintain their present treaty relations with the British Government, they are not likely to encroach on each other's territories. Since the late Sheikh Mubarak's definite renunciation of relations with the Ottoman Power in 1914, Koweit has enjoyed an autonomy guaranteed by Great Britain, whose Indian Government maintains a political officer with exclusive and effective power to guide external policy. The Sheikh's internal power still rests on the commercial importance of the harbour of Koweit.

Bahrein

About Bahrein there is little to say. Though its Sheikhs have taken steps from time to time to extend their dominion beyond their home group of islands, there is no longer any question of the principality being capable of expansion, or existing on other resources than the pearl fishery in the Gulf. Being dependent commercially on Bombay and at the mercy of the sea-power dominant in the Gulf, Bahrein may be relied on to continue for some time on its present economical and political lines; although in the not remote past it used to betray, more than any other Treaty State in the Gulf, a desire to be emancipated from British control, by invoking either the political influence of Turkey or the economic help of Germany.

The Katr Peninsula

The Katr Peninsula is recognised by the British Government as independent alike of the Sheikh of Bahrein and of Ibn Saud, as well as of the Ottoman Power, whose claim was based on occupation of the single town of Doha from 1872 to 1913. It is regarded officially as subject to the chief Sheikh of the house of

Thani; but, though the latter is held responsible for any acts of piracy or other international offences committed by men of Katr, he has very little effective authority outside Doha town. There is no frontier-line agreed upon, much less delimited, between his nominal realm and that of Ibn Saud; but, on the south, it has been settled that Khor Odeid belongs to the Trucial Chief of Abu Dhabi. El-Katr is a barren promontory springing out of steppe-desert, and ranged by very savage and miserable nomads. Except to be able to control the latter, who sometimes vex Hasa, and to use it as a pearl-fishery base, no one would wish to acquire it; and it has neither claim nor capacity to extend its autonomous territory.

The "Pirate Coast"

The personalities of the Five Chiefs of the "Pirate Coast" (or "Trucial Oman") change very rapidly, expectation of life being short in their communities. Their power, relative to one another and to that of Oman proper, which lies in the rear of all and in undefined territorial relation to them, depends on the ruling personalities even more than on the shifting politics of Oman; it is therefore of little service to discuss the actual distribution of their authority or the validity of their respective territorial claims. It suffices to say that Sharga, where the British Political Agent resides, is the only one of the Five Chiefdoms which extends across the peninsula or has any provincial dependencies. It claims to march with the Sultanate of Oman at Khor Khalba, and to include all the Oman promontory except the apex, Ras el-Jebel, which is nominally subject to Muscat. But, of its four provinces, the two principal, El-Kheima and Shameilie, are, in reality, independent of its control; and its Sultan's pretension to be paramount over the whole "Pirate Coast" is repudiated by the other four Chiefs, and not recognised by Great Britain. Of the others, Abu Dhabi claims a considerable territory on its

north-west, reaching to Khor Odeid, and including all that lies between the intervening Gulf shore and the Great Desert; but this is a lean region of no social or political importance. Dibai (Debei, Dhabi), Ajman, and Um el-Kaiwein have each a small zone of territory, in which Great Britain recognises the undivided authority of their respective chiefs. All the Five Chiefdoms have acknowledged, under the treaty of 1892, their inclusion in the same sort of British semi-protectorate as Bahrein and Koweit.

Oman; the Sultanate of Muscat

In Oman proper, which, from the commercial point of view, is potentially, though not actually, the most important district in the peninsula after Yemen, we encounter a complicated political problem. Nowhere in Arabia does greater discrepancy exist between the sovereignty officially recognised by Great Britain and the sovereignty recognised in the country itself—between, that is, the pretension and the exercise of rule. The Sultan (or Seyyid) of Muscat claims to be overlord of all Oman territory, except the Trucial Chiefdoms just discussed and two comparatively small districts isolated in the north-west—the oases of Baraimi and Mahadha. With these exceptions, his claim extends over all the habitable south-eastern part of Arabia, continued by a strip 500 miles long, on the south coast of the peninsula, which includes the Dhofar district. In actual fact, however, he controls nothing beyond the coastal districts of Muscat and the Batina. Everywhere else practical independence has been the rule, except at rare intervals, ever since the present Al Bu Said dynasty established itself; and since 1913 it has been patent, inasmuch as the southern interior has formulated it under an elective Imamate. The hereditary dynasty of Muscat has never satisfied, and does not satisfy, the requirements of the Ibadhis (an offshoot sect of the Kharijites) that the political

lord paramount should be also a spiritual chief or Imam; and that, since the latter must be a man of exceptional religious competence, he cannot be born but must be elected to his position. The Ibadhi sectaries constitute the majority of the Oman population, and hold the southern districts, which are the more populous and wealthy, to the almost complete exclusion of other creeds. The northern districts are preponderantly orthodox Sunni, though of a dour "literalist" colour which has inclined certain elements of the population to accept Wahabism; but there are also Ibadhis among them.

At first, in 1741, all Oman went with the founder of the Al Bu Said dynasty, in order to secure the expulsion of the hated Persians and their *protégés* the Ya'rabi Imams; but hardly had the immediate end been achieved than the religious divergence described above broke out into a civil conflict, which roughly, though not exactly, followed the dividing lines between Ibadhis and the rest, and between south and north, but was based primarily on descent. The one part was known as the Hinawie, claiming to be aboriginal settlers from the Yemen and Kahtan, and professing the Yemenite desire for Imamic government; the other part, the Ghafirie, comprehended the Arab tribes of later immigration, known as the Nasiri or Adnani, who are indifferent to Imams, accept the Sunni Caliphate, and will conform to non-spiritual powers. These two parties exist at this day in full activity. The contempt of the former for the actual Seyyid of Muscat has been reinforced by the spectacle of successive Seyyids (to whom the Ibadhis have always denied the title "Imam"), falling more and more completely into commerce with and dependence on foreigners and Christians; and they have set up an Ibadhi Imam, whose authority is acknowledged throughout the back-country of Muscat and Matra, including Rostak, and in all the south country except at a few coastal points held by detachments of the Sultan's troops. Nothing prevents this Imam from establish-

ing himself in the Sultan's capital except the barrier interposed by an Indian force entrenched at Beit el-Felej, near Matra. The Ghafiri faction, strong in the Batina, has broken away in the interior out of contempt of the Sultan's weakness, dislike of the restrictions imposed through him on the arms traffic, and the general Arab instinct for self-government, and as little as may be of that. But it does not accept the Ibadhi Imam. The general result is that there is very little government in the interior either south or north, but least in the north; weak government by the Sultan along the coast, in virtue of British support; and little hope of his dynastic claim to single rule over Oman being more capable of realisation in any future that can be foreseen than it has been in the past.

The Kaaiti Sultanate

Nothing on the south coast between the sea and the Great Desert matters till Aden and its Treaty Chiefs are reached, except the Kaaiti Sultanate of Shehir and Makalla and its relations with Hadhramaut. This Sultanate is a very new minor power, whose establishment some forty years ago, and consolidation since, have been due very largely to assistance, armed and other, from the British. Originally a small inland clan of lower Yafa, the Kaaiti rose to importance, at the invitation of the Hadhramaut Seyyids, as protectors of the ports of Makalla and Shehir, in which task of protection British ships helped them in the 'seventies of last century. Their development into a ruling caste, independent of their Seyyid patrons, was effected largely by the wealth and energy of the late Awad, who had been, like many other Kaaiti for generations back, in the Hyderabad service as *Jemadar*. He assumed the title Sultan for the first time in 1902, and obtained a footing in the western part of the middle Hadhramaut valley in satisfaction for a large debt, repudiated by the Kathiri

Sultan of Seyyun, but sustained by the British. There the question stands. All the Kaaiti realm is claimed in virtue of earlier prescription by the Kathiri federation, which still holds the eastern part of the middle Hadhramaut; but this last is a Beduin power, poor and primitive, under which the Hadhramaut Seyyids are recalcitrant and the cultivators uneasy. The Kaaiti are rich, progressive, and intimately connected with British eastern possessions and the Dutch Indies. They are upstarts; but the retention of power for two or three generations is a good title to Arab rule, if not to admission to Arab aristocracy.

The Treaty Tribes of the Aden Protectorate

The Treaty Tribes of the Aden Protectorate need not detain us. Great Britain recognises their independence, both of one another and of all external powers, admitting no claims either of the Turks or of the Imam of Sana, on the southern side of the frontier or of its extension in an east-north-east direction into the Great Desert. Thus Hadhramaut, though not attached by treaty, is regarded as falling within the British sphere and debarred from any political connection with Yemen. On the other hand, the districts of Harib and Marib have never been included in that sphere, although, since they have not owed allegiance for some centuries to any Yemenite power, they have been free to enter the treaty group had their local rulers so desired. Although there are differences of opinion, often issuing in desultory warfare, about the relations of some clans to one or another of the recognised tribal groups whose chiefs accept British subsidies, no treaty chief is recognised as paramount over the rest, or over any of his fellows. The Abdali Sultan, for example, although his proximity to Aden and the fact that Great Britain first acquired a title to the Aden Peninsula from his house place him in a peculiarly intimate relation with us, is recognised as

lord of Abdali territory only; and the courtesy salute to which, in common with the Fadhli, Kaaiti, and Amiri Sultans, he is entitled does not imply overlordship over any other treaty chief.

Yemen

Yemen is the only province in Arabia still effectively occupied in major part by the Turks. This fact renders it very difficult to deal satisfactorily at present with the question of the Imam's territorial title; for, apart from what he claims (his pretensions extend, in fact, even outside Yemen into our Aden Protectorate and Hadhramaut), it is hardly possible to distinguish his actual holdings from those of his "protectors." There are, for example, districts or tribal groups which repudiate the Turks, but might accept an Imam wholly independent of them, e.g., in the Yemen interior; others, which accept the Turks but, except under duress, will have nothing to do with the Imam, e.g., small Ismailie and Dawadie tribes along the Hodeida-Sana road and most of the northern Tihama districts; others, again, which accept neither Imam nor Turks, e.g., the Zaranik of the southern Tihama, or the large Yam group in the north-eastern interior. Nothing but the continuous pressure of a foreign force, such as the Turkish for half a century past, has ever produced any administrative unity in Yemen or the semblance of Imamic control of the whole province. Difficulties also arise from the antagonism of many elements among the highland Zeidis towards the Imam, and their momentary adhesion either to the Idrisi or to some rival candidate for the Imamate. The schism between highlands and lowlands is constant and profound, based, as it is, on a religious antipathy, which is reinforced by a general difference of racial origin and by strongly contrasted conditions of life. Within these two large territorial divisions there exist, as indicated already, many lesser tribal antipathies. While, however, a native-ruled

Yemen, one and undivided, is hardly to be contemplated as a stable State, the establishment of two native States to include the whole province is not impossible.

The bond of an exclusive schismatic creed, which will always keep the tribes of the Yemen highlands together as against their neighbours, is not existent in the Tihama. The common profession of Shafei Sunnism, which these lowland tribes share with those of the Aden interior at one end of their territory and with those of Asir at the other, will be ineffective to overcome tribal particularism. The tendency will be to break up into several groups, of which the Zaranik will dominate the south, the Ahl Absie and Kuhra the centre, the Beni Suleil and Beni Keis the Wadi Mur district, and the Waazat the extreme north.

Asir and the Idrisi

Lastly, in the remaining district of Asir, we are confronted by the enigmatic figure of the Idrisi. He is a stranger of Moroccan ancestry, with an evident negroid strain of blood, a miracle-worker and saint by inheritance, but of very secular mind, a capable organiser, administrator and general. He has no territorial rights by prescription except in the Mikhlaf el-Yemen district of the Tihama, of which the centre is his home province of Abu Arish, with his capital, Sabia, and his ports, Jeizan (Gesan) and Midi. The Tihama tribes (small units), lying immediately north of this as far as Shukeik, and south of it as far as Habl, are permanently his tributaries. From the tribesmen north and south of these points as far as Kunfuda (Kumfida) on the one hand and Wadi Ain on the other, he can collect taxes intermittently, and so also from certain inland tribes of the central and southern Asir highlands; but from these last, it is safe to say, only if the alternative is the payment of heavier dues to the Turks. The stronger highland tribes, such as the Rijal el-Ma, Zahran, Beni Mugheid, &c., which

can keep themselves free of Turkish requisitions, send the Idrisi presents from time to time, as a precautionary measure.

Future of Arabia after the War

Such is the varied political complexion of Arabia to-day. It is hardly possible for the social organization of the peninsula to become much more uniform in any circumstances that can be foreseen at the moment. No non-Moslem power could establish or maintain a general control over it; and, when Turkey is no longer a power, there will be no other to take its place. Among its own native princes none could prevail over the rest without so much foreign help that his overlordship would be unreal and regarded as non-Islamic. Much more than half Arabia is the desert or semi-desert home of very primitive people, incapable of economic development; and geographical conditions make so strongly for particularism that even a network of railways and trunk roads, made and maintained by a State supported in turn by some outside Power (for lack of any other possible support), would probably do little to overcome it. So far as human foresight can tell, the peninsula is likely to remain parcelled out internally among a number of autonomous States as it is at this day, even if it should become in the future the exclusive political sphere of one external Power.

IV. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(A) MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

(1) Internal

(a) *Roads and Caravan Routes*

Communication by land between Arabia and neighbouring countries is difficult, because along the junction of the peninsula and mainland there is the double barrier of the broad sandy belt of the Nefud and the rolling steppe country of the Hamad or Syrian desert. A further obstacle is the turbulence of the nomad tribes who roam over these two regions.

The routes to and through Arabia are determined by geographical conditions and the pilgrimages. Trade and strategic considerations are of secondary importance in this connection, and industry is almost negligible.

Geographical conditions prohibit almost all intercourse across the great southern desert, though caravan lines skirt it and run from south-west to north-east across the peninsula to the north of it. In the regions of the central north, as said above, the Nefud and Hamad interfere with communications. The deep valleys of wadis, or intermittent streams, impede intercourse from north to south in the northern part of the Red Sea littoral, and, to a lesser extent, in the west and south-west.

The pilgrimages form the great link between Arabia and the outer world. Mecca and Medina, the Holy

Cities for orthodox or Sunni Mohammedans, attract a large number of pilgrims annually. A quarter of a million visit Mecca, and perhaps 100,000 or more Medina. Shia pilgrims, in smaller numbers, visit Baghdad, Kerbela, and Nejef, in Mesopotamia.

The chief land routes pursued by pilgrims are from Mesopotamia, Syria, and Egypt.

From Mesopotamia there are five main routes, starting respectively from Nejef or Baghdad, Samawa, Suk esh-Shuyukh, Zobeir, and Koweit. The first of these, 882 miles in length, runs by Hail (403 miles), and usually nowadays by Hayyanie, where the wells have been cleaned and fortified by the Government. Before the war this route used to bear a double pilgrim traffic of Sunnis bound for Mecca and Shias on their way to the Mesopotamian shrines. The most important trans-peninsular route, 867 miles in length, runs from Zobeir *via* Rikai wells to Boreida (379 miles), and thence to Mecca. The route from Samawa to Mecca, *via* Leina wells and Boreida, is 853 miles in length. All five routes cross the desert, and are rendered difficult and often dangerous by scarcity of water, while the route from Suk esh-Shuyukh is particularly unpopular on account of Beduin attacks.

From Syria, many pilgrims are now brought down by the Hejaz Railway as far as Medina, whence the journey to Mecca is about 248 miles. Caravans from Syria to the interior, for trade purposes or for the conveyance of food supplies, all proceed *via* Jauf el-Amr, and, nowadays, *via* Hayyanie.

From Egypt, caravans starting from Cairo used to cross Sinai to Akaba, and thence skirt the Red Sea coast to Yambo and thence to Mecca (697 miles). This is an easy camel track, but in its southern sections is infested by Harb Arabs, and is now little used.

The foregoing routes, however, bring only a minority of the pilgrims. The majority from India, Java, the Straits Settlements and Africa, come by sea to Jedda. Consequently, the most frequented road in Arabia is that which leads from Jedda to Mecca

(55 miles). It has been fortified by the Turkish Government, and, though unmetalled, has a fairly good surface. Though at present it is not used by carriages, it might be so utilised, and it has been suggested that it would be possible to set up a service of automobiles with wheels specially constructed for movement over sand.

Next in importance to the pilgrim routes are the roads of the comparatively fertile and settled district of southern Arabia. The main routes are those connecting Aden, Sana, and Hodeida. One, 173 miles long, which runs from Sana to Hodeida, is for the first 25 miles of its course, to Boan, the only made road of any considerable length in Arabia. Another runs from Sana to Aden (227 miles), *viâ* Lahej, and could be used by wheeled traffic for 40 miles. Taiz is the centre of tracks for Aden, Mokha, and Yerim.

The remaining intra-peninsular routes in Arabia are (1) the coastal routes, which skirt nearly the whole peninsula, and which, in the comparatively populous regions of Asir, Yemen, and Oman are linked up with inland routes connecting the chief markets, and (2) the trans-peninsular caravan routes leading to the central oases. These last all run from the south-west to the north-east, leaving untouched the great trackless desert of Ruba el-Khali in the south-east.

The coastal tracks along the west and south may be conveniently divided into five sections. The first section, Akaba–Jedda (667 miles), coincides as far as Rabuk with the pilgrim route from Egypt. Branch tracks connecting with the Hejaz Railway run from Muweila to Tebuk, Wejh to El-Ala, Wejh to Medina, Yambo to Medina, and Rabuk to Medina.

The second section is Jedda–Hodeida (621 miles), *via* Lith, Kunfuda, and the port of Loheia. As far as Loheia this is a little-known track, traversing hot and arid regions; but between Loheia and Hodeida it becomes an easy route, much used by Turkish troops. In this region there are inland routes from Mecca to Ebha, *via* Taif (350 miles), and from Ebha to Wahla,

via Shabein, the outlet of the populous Asir district; between Darb and Loheia there is a parallel track further inland, passing Sabia and Abu Arish.

The third section, Hodeida–Aden (287 miles), is little used as far as Mokha, the sea route being preferred.

The last two sections, Aden–Makalla and Makalla–Lashkara afford the only means of land communication known to Europeans along the edge of the great sandy desert of Ruba el-Khali. From Aden to Makalla the coast is so unhealthy that an inland route *via* Nisab, coming down to the coast again at Balhaf, is preferable. By this route the distance from Aden to Makalla is 413 miles.

The fifth section, Makalla–Lashkara (993 miles), forms the connecting link between Hadhramaut and Oman, traversing for the most part barren and desolate country, and passing only a few small ports. An inland route connects Makalla with Terim (211 miles), in the fertile valley of the Wadi Hadhramaut.

At Lashkara the comparatively settled and populous Oman district is reached. The chief roads here are:—

(1) Muscat and Matra—Abu Dhabi (322 miles), following the sea coast up to Sohar, then turning inland and passing Baraimi.

(2) Muscat and Matra—Rostak—Dhank (193 miles).

(3) Muscat and Matra—Baraimi *via* Nizwa and Ibri (294 miles).

The journey between Muscat and Matra (2 miles) is usually made by boat.

The southern shores of the Persian Gulf are skirted by a route from Ras el-Kheima *via* the Baraimi oasis to the large and fertile Hofuf oasis (592 miles). This again is connected with the north at Koweit by two routes, one passing Katif and the other Nta.

The central routes, apart from their pilgrimage uses, are not important for trade purposes. The two best known are that from Jauf el-Amr (Jof) to Hail

(293 miles), *via* Hayyanie, a route used by caravans from Syria which supply the wants of the central Arabian oases, and that from Hail to Boreida and Riad (383 miles), also chiefly used by traffic supplying local needs.

Two tracks leading south-west, said to be in regular use but little known to Europeans, are the Riad–Sana route (821 miles), *via* Makhlaf, and the Tamra–Sana route (691 miles), *via* Bisha.

(b) *Rivers*[1]

There are no permanent rivers in Arabia; the intermittent streams are known as wadis. The main watershed lies about 100 miles east of the Red Sea. To the east of this are long and shallow rivers, which would be possible lines of communication, but to the west there are rapid streams with high banks which impede transit from north to south. This is especially the case in Midian, where the deep wadis are very numerous, as the country receives some of the Mediterranean rain supplies. They cut up the country right up to the coast into detached blocks, between which communication is difficult, so that caravans either follow a narrow route close to the sea or are forced back to the valley of the Hejaz Railway. In Hejaz the wadi valleys have more gradual slopes, and facilitate communication between Medina and Yambo and between Mecca, Rabuk, and Jedda. In Asir and Yemen also the valleys aid lateral communication. In the Aden interior the upper reaches of the wadis are deep and precipitous and hinder intercourse, while in Hadhramaut this characteristic is so pronounced that they resemble cañons. There are scarcely any wadis beyond the Wadi Hadhramaut until the Batina is reached, where the wadis are useful in aiding access to the interior. In the Persian Gulf littoral wadis are again almost entirely absent.

[1] See also above, p. 5.

(c) *Railways*

The only railway in Arabia is the southern section of the Hejaz Railway, from Ma'an to Medina, 526 miles in length. It is a single line (gauge 1·05 metre), with insufficient sidings. It was constructed very rapidly, with the result that the lines were not well laid and the embankments are not very secure, while the bends are often sharp and the gradients steep. Between Tebuk and Kalat el-Muadham some curves have a radius of only 125 metres, and some gradients are as much as 1·8 per cent. In the south steel sleepers are used instead of wood, and, ballast being inadequate, the trains are liable to derailment. A few miles north of Medain Sali shifting sand sometimes causes the same trouble. For the northern part of the railway German and French experts were employed; but these were not allowed further south than El-Ala. Beyond El-Ala, therefore, the defects in construction are exaggerated, and in 1914 the average speed of a train in the El-Ala—Medina section did not exceed 9½ miles an hour. If, as is probable, the rolling-stock has now been pooled with that of the narrow-gauge line of the Chemin de Fer de Damas–Hama et Prolongements, the approximate total stock would be 30 to 50 locomotives, 180 passenger coaches, 40 brake wagons, 700 box wagons, 600 trucks, and 40 tank wagons. Among the large engines were 8 Krauss and 4 Henschel engines, which consumed large quantities of fuel and water. Engine tubes were liable to be damaged by the large percentage of mineral matter contained in the water. Before the war it was customary to change engines at Damascus, Deraa, Ma'an, Tebuk, Medain Sali, and Medina. The general carrying capacity of the railway is now diminished by the necessity of taking with each train large supplies of wood and water; nearly 50 tons of wood and, in summer, 4 tanks of water are required for each train. Originally, coal was consumed, and was imported at Haifa for the purpose. The chief stations after Ma'an are Tebuk, Kalat el-Muadham (the highest point on

the line, and the station for Hail), Medain Sali (beyond which only Moslems may travel), El-Ala, and Hadie. Most of the stations are merely solitary blockhouses, without food supplies, often without water, and insufficiently protected against raids. The head offices are at Damascus, and Ma'an has a repairing shop.

Certain of the Arab tribes were made responsible for the safety of the railway. For this service they received a yearly subsidy from the Porte, which, however, normally kept small garrisons along the line.

Relations to Government.—The scheme for the Hejaz Railway was put through mainly by the instrumentality of Izzet Pasha, a favourite of Abdul Hamid, who organised a High Commission to raise the necessary funds. Construction was begun in 1901, and in 1908 the line was opened as far as Medina. The original plans provided for its extension to Mecca by 1910; the Young Turk Revolution, however, removed Izzet Pasha, the new Government was unwilling to incur further expense, and these causes, together with the determined opposition of the Sherif of Mecca and the Harb Arabs, brought construction to a standstill. The purpose of the railway was ostensibly purely religious, to enable pilgrims to travel easily and quickly to the Holy Cities; but in point of fact it was also military, and was intended to strengthen Turkey's hold on Arabia.

Finance.—The capital required was raised partly by voluntary contributions from Moslems all the world over, and partly by the allocation to the Hejaz fund of certain taxes and stamps, of 10 per cent. of the fees of officials at the Holy Places, and of the proceeds of the sale of the skins of sacrificed sheep. By 1908 the fund had reached £3,200,000, of which £1,000,000 represented voluntary contributions. The cost of construction from Damascus to El-Ala, including the branch line from Haifa to Deraa, and rolling-stock, stations, officials' pay, &c., amounted to about £2,250,000. From El-Ala onwards the construction was wholly in the

hands of Turks, and reliable statistics of cost are not available. As the building of the line progressed, the Government employed more and more soldiers in the work of construction, and these received their ordinary pay from the War Office, although extra pay, contract premiums, &c., were disbursed from the Hejaz fund.

No separate statistics are available for the Arabian section of the Hejaz Railway. For the total length of the line (1,523 miles) the gross receipts in 1911-12 were £254,581, and in 1912-13 £268,178. The greatest profits were obtained in the Haifa–Deraa section, and any estimate based on the total receipts would be very misleading for the Arabian portion, where conditions are abnormal, and profits could hardly be expected. Pilgrims' tickets cost only 36*s.* for the five days journey from Damascus to Medina, whereas by caravan the journey would cost about £45 and take two months. Voluntary contributions fell off after 1908, and the European engineers and other employees were gradually dismissed, whereupon the locomotives rapidly deteriorated.

A narrow-gauge railway has recently been constructed from Aden to Sheikh Othman for military purposes.

Possibilities of Extension.—Three extensions of the Hejaz Railway have been projected[1] :—

(1) Medina—Mecca. The distance covered would be about 280 miles, and the cost was estimated at about £950,000. Two routes were considered, one to the south following meridian 40, which was the shorter, but was considered to be impracticable on account of the engineering difficulties outside Medina, and the other to the south-west, *via* Rabuk, in which the chief obstacle was shifting sand. Construction was begun at both Rabuk and Medina, but was abandoned.

(2) Ma'an—Akaba. This extension would enable Egyptian pilgrims to profit by the Hejaz line, but would

[1] Austrian maps of 1916 showed a projected extension to Kunfuda *via* Jedda.

be very costly on account of the nature of the ground. Its construction involves strategic as well as economic considerations, for it would afford rapid land communication between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.

(3) Ma'an—Jerusalem, *viâ* Jericho and Es-Salt. This would open up the isolated district south-east of the Dead Sea.

It has long been intended to construct a line between Mecca and Jedda for the use of the pilgrims who land at the latter port. A survey was made in 1911, but three successive wars have postponed construction. Such a line would meet with opposition from the Arab tribes, who either supply camel caravans or rob them.

Important for the internal development of Yemen is the Turkish Government's project for a line from Hodeida to Sana, with an extension to Amran. This line was to be constructed simultaneously with a harbour at Ras-el-Kethib (*see* p. 56), about ten miles north of Hodeida, and the harbour and town were to be linked up by a metre-gauge railway. The length was stated in the British Consular Report on Hodeida for 1909 to be about 200 miles; if this is correct the line would perhaps follow the valley of the Wadi Saham. Stuhlmann, however, writing in 1916, stated that the short route was rejected in favour of a very circuitous one, passing Zebid, Taiz, and Yerim, and that a further branch was contemplated from Hodeida to Hogeila, at the foot of the precipice on which Menakha stands; he quoted an estimate of the total length, including extensions, as about 450 miles. The estimated cost of the shorter 200-mile railway was about £1,500,000. The survey was made by a French banking group, including the Banque Française pour le Commerce et l'Industrie (Banque Rouvier). A French company was formed with the title of Compagnie Ottomane du Chemin de Fer Hodeida, Sana, et Embranchements, and in 1909 was granted a concession for the construction of the railway and harbour. A 4 per cent.

Turkish loan for £T1,000,000[1] was placed on the Paris Bourse in March, 1911, at 92 per cent.; interest and sinking fund up to the year 2009 were secured by a mortgage of £T40,987 on the revenues of Hodeida and Gebane (the terminus of the harbour line from Hodeida to Ras el-Kethib). Construction was begun, and about five miles had been laid at Rās el-Kethib when the Italo-Turkish war broke out. Hodeida was bombarded by the Italians and part of the material destroyed; to appease French anger it was made known that Italian capital also was involved, and that the company would obtain compensation from the Turkish Government. The *Deutsche Levante-Zeitung* in 1915 reported that construction was at a standstill, and concluded that the building material had been removed, since no reference was made to it by the crew of the "Emden" when they visited Hodeida.

A line from Jedda to Sana was proposed by French capitalists. Its chief purpose would be military.

A line from Aden to Sana was suggested by an Indian firm, but the proposal was not favourably received. It would be considerably longer than the short Sana–Hodeida line, and would divert to Aden a considerable amount of the coffee trade.

Wider schemes for railway development have been mooted from time to time; for their realisation it would be essential to secure European financial co-operation, European assistance in construction and management, and good understanding with or control of the nomad tribes; in certain districts it would probably also be necessary to bore artesian wells in order to provide a reliable water supply. These schemes fall into two groups:—

(*a*) British Schemes. Two routes have been suggested for a trans-Arabian railway:—

(i) From Akaba to Koweit, and thence across Persia to India. It has been estimated that the journey from Port Said to Koweit

[1] The Turkish pound is worth about 18*s*. *See* p. 110.

would take 52 hours *viâ* Jauf, which would be the head-quarters of the line. The cost was estimated (probably too low) at £5,000,000.

(ii) From a point opposite Port Sudan to Koweit or Bahrein.

(*b*) Turko-German Schemes. There were two proposals:—

(i) The linking up of the Baghdad and Hejaz lines. Such a connection would be valuable for strategic reasons only, and would therefore be very costly.

(ii) The extension of the Hejaz Railway to some port on the Indian Ocean. Aden was originally suggested, but would now be probably replaced by Sheikh Said or by some point between Sheikh Said and Makalla.

From the point of view of the development of Arabia the construction of a trans-Arabian railway in the north would probably have no very far-reaching effect.[1] It would facilitate imports to central Arabia from the Gulf Ports and from Haifa or Cairo, but these must always be limited. The extension of the Hejaz Railway southward to the Indian Ocean would probably be far more beneficial to the country at large. It would connect by rail the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, and would offer excellent trade facilities between south-eastern Asia, eastern Africa, and Europe, competing with the Lower Egypt and Suez routes, especially in post and passenger traffic. Moreover, it would open up the fertile and little-known districts of Asir, and, if properly managed, would contribute powerfully to the establishment of order in precisely that part of the peninsula (Yemen and Asir) where there are the greatest possibilities of future

[1] The question of improved railway facilities in Arabia is moreover dependent upon that of the railway development of Mesopotamia. The establishment of a trunk line connecting Baghdad with a Syrian port would render the British schemes above mentioned, and to a less degree the Turko-German schemes, of secondary importance. See *Mesopotamia*, No. 63 of this series.

development. Aden would, of course, be the best possible terminus on account of its world trade, but political difficulties would be great, for such a choice would strike a heavy blow at Hodeida, and, to a less extent, at Jedda. It would be essential to secure the removal of Moslem restrictions on non-Moslem traffic and intercourse; this would be easier to gain if the main line track passed east of Mecca *via* Taif, and were connected with Mecca only by a short branch, which could remain subject to Moslem interdictions.

In default of any large scheme, the construction of the Sana-Hodeida, the Medina-Mecca, and the Mecca-Jedda lines are all more or less desirable. From the economic point of view the Medina-Mecca extension, which would pass through very barren country, could only have important consequences if it led to Mecca being supplied from Haifa instead of from Jedda, which seems hardly probable.

(d) *Posts and Telegraphs*

There are postal services at those ports which have sea-borne communication with foreign countries, viz., Hodeida, Aden, Muscat, Matra, and Jedda.

Internal postal communication, except for limited areas around the larger towns, is entirely dependent on caravans. There are no regular services, and deliveries are intermittent and precarious. At Sana and Menakha post-offices have been established by the Turkish Government, and a post leaves Hodeida weekly for Taiz, &c. At Aden, Muscat, and Manama there are regular postal services under the Indian Government. There was an overland postal service between Hofuf and Basra. Koweit has no postal facilities, although it greatly needs them.

The telegraphic service is more advanced. From Hodeida telegraph lines run north-east to Sana, north to Loheia and Midi, with a branch to Kamaran Island, and south to Mokha and Perim, partly overland and partly by cable. Sana, besides being connected with Hodeida, has a telegraph line to Mokha, which has

been deflected eastward in order to pass Dhamar, Yerim, and Ibb. From Ibb a short branch runs to Kataba, on the frontier of Yemen. A short cable connects Sheikh Said with Perim. Mecca is connected by telegraph lines with Jedda, its port, and with Taif, the summer residence of the richer Meccans. Medina has a telegraph line to its port at Yambo, and as far as Ma'an its telegraph line to Damascus lies in Arabia.

(2) External

(a) *Ports*

The coast-line of Arabia is less extensive than might have been expected, owing to the comparative lack of indentations. Good natural harbours of considerable size are rare. The three best are Aden, Muscat, and Jedda; Manama and Hodeida have a large trade, but possess few natural facilities. These five ports alone have more than local importance, though there are many small harbours, some of which are now beginning to be developed, especially along the Red Sea.

Aden harbour extends 8 miles from east to west and 4 from north to south. It is divided by a little promontory into two bays, of which the western has a depth of from 3 to 4 fathoms inside and from 4½ to 5 across the entrance. Large vessels lie off Steamer Point at the end of the rocky peninsula which forms the western boundary of the harbour. Passengers are landed at Steamer Point, which constitutes the modern town, but this is some distance from Old Aden, the centre of the import and export trade, and also from the landing-place for lighters, with piers, warehouses, &c. A plan to link up by electric trams Old Aden, Steamer Point, the coal stores, and perhaps also Sheikh Othman, has not yet materialised.

The bulk of the trade of Aden consists in the importation of native produce from the ports of the near African coast, and the exportation to the African coast of manufactured goods and other imports from Europe,

America, and India. Aden is also the chief emporium of Arabian trade, receiving the small quantities of native produce, and supplying the modest wants of the interior and of most of the smaller Arabian ports. Besides this, it furnishes coal and provisions to ships calling, and has to import the whole of its own requirements, as it produces nothing itself but salt.

The German Consul at Bombay pointed out in his report on Aden for 1913 that the prosperity of that port was threatened in various ways. The French Somaliland ports of Jibuti and Obokh were tending more and more to export the produce of their rich back-country direct to France. With the rapid development of Abyssinian railways, Jibuti would become the natural outlet for south Abyssinia, while Massawa and Port Sudan would be the outlets of north Abyssinia, and the process would be accelerated when Port Sudan was connected by rail with Kassala. Again, the projected line from Sana to Hodeida would divert the Yemen trade from Aden to Hodeida.

Whether this would have been so or not, the recent record of Aden's trade is very satisfactory. Its total value rose steadily from £6,627,137 in 1908-9 to £9,157,499 in 1911-12. In 1913-14 it fell to £8,526,611, and in 1914-15 to £6,939,609. In 1916-17, however, it had risen to £10,052,287, though this increase was, of course, largely due to enhanced prices. Full details of Aden's trade will be found below, pp. 92-104, and in the Appendix.

Of the 1,528 merchant ships, with an aggregate tonnage of 3,924,524 tons, which entered Aden harbour between March 1913 and March 1914, the British numbered 767 and the German 180. Detail of the shipping entered between March 1911 and March 1917 will be found in the Appendix (Table I). Before the war British shipping was slowly decreasing in importance, and German was slowly rising. The most noticeable recent feature has been the activity of Japan. Whereas in 1911-12 only 2 Japanese ships visited Aden, in 1916-17 the number had risen to 54.

Hodeida, the only outlet of Yemen, the most populous region of Arabia, has a poor harbour. It has a breakwater and two entrances, of which the northern is the easier. The sheltered area is not large enough to take any but the smallest craft, and large vessels must anchor some 2½ miles away in four fathoms of water. There is no quay or wharfage. A new pier and two stone moles were constructed in 1908, but the depth of water at the moles proved insufficient to allow of lighters being brought alongside, so that stevedores have to wade out to the lighters and all goods are dumped on the beach. In a south-west wind, *i.e.*, between September and April, landing is at times impossible. Coal can usually be had.

About eight miles north of Hodeida there is a sheltered inlet called Bauma, which runs up to within two miles of the town.

In 1909 the Turkish Government proposed to construct a new harbour about 10 miles north-west of Hodeida at Ras el-Kethib, where there is a good natural inlet, well protected from wind and with an average depth of 28 or 29 ft. The new harbour was to accommodate at least 15 vessels of moderate draught, and it was intended to build a stone jetty about 3,600 ft. long, where vessels could be moored. The harbour was to be connected by a light narrow-gauge line with Hodeida, and therefore with the projected Sana–Hodeida Railway. A French syndicate obtained the concession, and construction began, but was checked by the outbreak of the war between Turkey and Italy. The cost was estimated at about £200,000.

The total trade of Hodeida in 1909, the latest year for which figures are available, was valued at £1,050,700. This was considerably less than the total, viz., £1,846,000, returned for Jedda in that year. The Jedda figure may, however, be too high, and since that date Jedda's trade has certainly decreased, so that it may well be that if figures were available it would be found that Hodeida had overtaken it.

The coffee trade, of which Hodeida used to be the chief emporium, has recently been largely transferred to Aden, on account of the greater security of the Aden routes. Direct intercourse between India and the Yemen ports is hampered by unnecessary quarantine restrictions. There is no direct shipping between the United Kingdom and Hodeida.

The chief imports are cereals, rice, &c., from India, cotton goods from Manchester and the United States, petroleum from the United States, iron and steel from Germany, and general stores from Italy and Austria. Hides, skins, coffee, and fuller's earth are exported.

No statistics of shipping are available for Hodeida later than 1909. In that year the harbour was visited by 172 steamers, with a total tonnage of 172,325, of which 80,814 were British, 30,088 Italian, 26,041 Russian, and 20,156 German. Especially notable was the growth of German shipping between 1905 and 1909. In the former year not a single German ship visited Hodeida. British shipping in the same period showed a continued decrease.

Jedda, the port of Mecca, has a good harbour running north and south, with a breadth varying from 340 to 780 yards. The entrance, which is about 250 yards across, and is marked by beacons, is encumbered by three lines of coral reefs, but inside there is always smooth water. About 500 tons of coal are kept at the port. Goods are unloaded on lighters by Arab crews, who handle them carelessly.

Jedda is the landing-place of the large majority of Mecca pilgrims. The numbers in the years immediately preceding the war were as follows:—

1909	71,254
1910	90,051
1911	86,024
1913	83,295

About 50,000 or 60,000 pilgrims every year are brought in British vessels: something like 20,000 come from British India, 4,000 or 5,000 from the British

Malay States, and large numbers from Java, Africa, Persia, Afghanistan, &c. The use of the Hejaz Railway has reduced the number of those brought in Turkish ships to about one-tenth of its former total.

Besides being the great pilgrim port, Jedda is a port of supply for central Arabia. The outstanding feature of its trade is the enormous excess of imports over exports. This is largely due to the necessity of supplying the pilgrims, but also to the requirements of Hejaz, which itself produces little. The value of the total trade of the port in 1913 was stated to be £1,482,000, but these figures may be exaggerated.

In 1912-13 Jedda was visited by 287 steamers, with a total tonnage of 615,842 tons. Of these 222 were British, 39 Russian, and 26 Dutch. In 1911-12 the total was 322, as against 374 in 1910-11, when the tonnage was 643,198.

Manama, on the island of Bahrein, is scarcely more than an open roadstead, protected on the south, but exposed to north-east, north, and north-west winds. Vessels of 19 ft. draught can only get as far as the outer anchorage, 4 miles from the town; smaller vessels can reach an inner anchorage 2 miles nearer. At low tide, however, not even boats can reach the shore, and passengers and cargo have to be conveyed by donkeys for a quarter of a mile. Landing arrangements as late as 1911 were very bad—goods were exposed to the weather and there were long delays in delivery; but in that year the control of the harbour arrangements was entrusted to a Hindu, and a jetty and storing shed were built. Manama is the outlet of the large Bahrein pearl trade, on which account it has been made a port of call for steamers between Bombay and the Gulf; it is also an important distributing centre for goods from India and other countries to El-Katr, Katif, and Okwair. From the two last-named places goods are sent on to the oases of Katif and Hasa and to southern Nejd. This trade is done entirely by boat, and exact statistics cannot be obtained.

The trade of Manama has steadily increased since the beginning of the century. The value, which in 1903 was £1,892,897, increased to over two million pounds in 1907 and to over three million in 1909. In 1911 high-water mark was reached with a total of £4,349,093. The average annual value for the period 1911-14 was £4,167,804. The prosperity of the town is almost wholly dependent on its trade in pearls, which were exported in 1911 to the value of £1,928,000. Katif and El-Katr have shown a slight tendency to deal directly with Bombay themselves instead of sending their pearl output to Bahrein. The interruption of the pearl trade necessitated special measures for the relief of the pearlers in 1915.

The chief imports are rice, textiles, ghi, coffee, dates, sugar, tea, tobacco, fuel, and live animals; the exports, exclusive of trans-shipment goods, pearls, and specie, are almost negligible, the chief being oyster-shells and sailcloth.

In 1911-12 Manama was visited by 52 steamers, with a total tonnage of 82,561 tons. Of these, 47 were British (total 79,181 tons) and 5 Turkish-Arabian (total 3,380 tons). Sailing vessels entered during the same year numbered 858, and of these five-eighths were Persian, while most of the rest were from Koweit. The total tonnage of sailing vessels was 31,156 tons, of which 15,270 tons were Persian, 5,737 were from Koweit, and 4,882 were British. Two German steamers called in 1909 and 1910, but none in 1911. In 1913 British steamship tonnage was 104,717 tons out of a total of 107,586.

Muscat, the chief port of Oman, stands on a bay three-quarters of a mile deep and half-a-mile wide; on the west side of the bay a ridge about 200 yards long shelters a little cove beyond. Muscat's only inland communications are through Matra, about two miles westward. Landing arrangements were improved in 1911, when they were entrusted to a company of four Arab merchants. However, as Muscat's intercourse

with Matra is almost entirely by boat, it remains a serious drawback that goods must be trans-shipped to smaller vessels before they can be taken into the interior.

Goods can be obtained at Muscat from the customs without the production either of a delivery order or of a bill of lading. The Indian bankers, who form the majority of the billholders, are thus kept waiting long periods before payment.

The chief exports of Muscat are dates and specie, an active exchange in the latter being carried on with Bombay and Zanzibar. Cotton goods of Muscat manufacture (of which the production is spasmodic), dry limes, pomegranates, mother-of-pearl shells, hides and skins, sardines, and the sweetmeat *halwa*, are also exported. Muscat is the chief distributing centre of imports for Oman. It used to import arms for Persia and Afghanistan, but in 1912 an arms warehouse was established in the town, and this traffic was strictly controlled.

The high-water mark of trade was reached in 1907-8 and 1908-9, when the total values were £939,468 and £987,409 respectively. Since 1909 the volume of trade has decreased, partly owing to the opening in that year of Dibai in Trucial Oman as a free port, partly to a decline in the arms traffic, partly to unsettled conditions in the interior, and partly to the increasing competition of Sur (*see* p. 61) and other small ports along the shores of the Gulf of Oman.

In 1912-13 Muscat was visited by 113 steamers, with a total tonnage of 168,516. Of these, 98 were British, 14 German, and 1 Russian. The British tonnage was 127,885, the German 39,009. Sixty-three small sailing vessels, mostly native, entered during the same year. The British steamship tonnage in that year was unusually low. For years it had not fallen below 240,000, and in 1906-7 it was 542,525 (this figure, however, included warship tonnage, which was not included after 1908, and which might account for some 50,000

tons). In other words, whereas in 1906-7 British vessels represented over 93 per cent. of the total steam tonnage, in 1912-13 the percentage had dropped to about 75. German tonnage, on the other hand, which in 1906-7 represented only about 2 per cent., had in 1912-13 risen to about 23 per cent.

Among the smaller Arabian ports the following may be specially noted:—

On the Red Sea:

Umlejh.—This is a good harbour, capable of development.

Yambo.—This is the port of Medina, and has a good but narrow harbour. Mecca pilgrims often travel from Jedda to Yambo by sea.

Rabuk.—This stands on a creek, with good anchorage, and should develop greatly when the extension of the Mecca railway is built.

Kunfuda.—This is the official port of Asir and the outlet of Ebha and Muhail.

Jeizan.—This pearl-fishing centre is the chief outlet of the Idrisi's country. Since the outbreak of war its trade has increased, and it has temporarily supplanted Hodeida.

Loheia.—This port has a large dhow trade with Jedda, Hodeida, and Aden, and good road connections.

Mokha has greatly declined in importance, but there has been some revival since the war. Anchorage is difficult. There are also ports at *Muweila, Wejh, Lith, Birk,* and *Midi.*

On the Arabian Sea and Gulf of Oman:

Sheikh Said is a good landing-place, with an important telegraph station.

Makalla has a large coasting trade in native sailing craft, and also trades with India and the Somali countries. During the south-west monsoons the harbour is useless and Burum (16 miles south-west) is used instead.

Sur, just north-west of Ras el-Hadd, does a large trade with India and Africa in native craft. Its

customs (not collected) are estimated at £10,000 a year. It has been made a direct port of call from Africa and India, and the dhows which run between it and Zanzibar absorb trade which used to go to Muscat. It exports shark-fins, fish, dates, &c., and imports from Bombay.

There are also ports at *Shughra*, *Seihut*, *Barka*, and *Sohar*.

On the Persian Gulf:

Koweit, the best harbour on the Gulf, stands on Koweit Bay, of which the inner half, almost land-locked, forms a harbour of 20 to 30 square miles of deep water. Large vessels cannot come within a mile and a half of the shore. There are no wharves or docks, but sheds have recently been put up. The total trade value in 1913 amounted to £570,558, of which £370,817 represented imports, chiefly from India. A small proportion of the imports goes normally to Nejd and Jebel Shammar; the exports all go to India and the Gulf Ports. In 1913 the port was visited by 63 steamships (all British but one), of which the total tonnage was 121,482 tons.

Dibai, the chief port of Trucial Oman, is increasing in importance as a place of call for steamers. It is supplanting both Lingeh (Persia) and Muscat as a distributing centre for the interior, especially for Baraimi oasis. It also does a considerable trade in pearls directly with Bombay.

(b) *Shipping Lines*

Aden is a port of call for every shipping line which sends vessels through the Red Sea. The best direct communication with London before the war was by the British India Steamship Company, with Southampton by the Norddeutscher Lloyd, and with Marseilles by the Messageries Maritimes. The other Arabian ports were visited by the following lines:—

1. The British India Steam Navigation Co., on its way from London to India, called at Aden and Muscat.

It had in normal times one weekly fast mail service and one weekly slow coasting service each way. It also called once a fortnight at Jedda and Dibai. Between Manama and Bombay it had a fortnightly service in each direction.

2. The Khedivial Mail Steamship Co. had a fortnightly service of one vessel each way between Suez and Aden, calling at Jedda and Hodeida.

3. The Austrian Lloyd Steam Navigation Co. called occasionally at Jedda. They made excellent arrangements for the trans-shipment of goods for Jedda from their vessels to those of the Khedivial Mail Steamship Co. Prices could be quoted c.i.f. Jedda, and direct bills of lading were issued at Trieste. They also called once every three months at Lith, Kunfuda, and Loheia.

4. The Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Co., of Bombay, paid irregular visits once or twice a month to Jedda and Hodeida. They carried chiefly grain from Bombay. They also called at Dibai occasionally, and at Manama on their outward journey once a month and again on their return.

5. The Bucknall Steamship Co. and the Strick Line called monthly at Muscat on their way to Basra. The Bucknall Line brought case petroleum.

6. The West Hartlepool Steam Navigation Co. also called at Muscat on the way from Aden to Basra.

7. The Oceanic Steamship Co. called at Jedda.

8. The Hamburg-Amerika Linie called monthly at Muscat and Manama on its way to the Gulf Ports.

9. The Hansa Line sent four or five ships yearly from New York with petroleum.

10. The Arab Steamers, Ltd., called at irregular intervals at Muscat and Manama on their voyages from Bombay to Basra.

11. Cowasji, Dinshaw Bros., a Hindu firm of Aden, initiated irregular calls, nearly every week, at Hodeida.

12. Two Indian steamship companies called at Jedda.

13. A French line (possibly the Messageries Maritimes) called at Jedda.

14. The Navigazione Generale Italiana (Società Riunite Florio-Rubattino) called at Hodeida fortnightly on their Genoa–Aden route. Their vessels were cargo boats, but took passengers. They have been successful at Hodeida, and there was a rumour of their calling also at Jedda.

15. Since 1914 the Società Marittima Italiana, of Genoa, has instituted a monthly service from Massawa, calling at Jedda and Hodeida.

16. The Russian Steamship Co., of Odessa, visited Hodeida once or twice a year, bringing dates, and the Compagnie Russe de Navigation à Vapeur et de Commerce called at Muscat. The Russian Volunteer Fleet Association, calling fortnightly on their way from Odessa to the Far East, would bring from Constantinople troops and frequently goods also.

17. Three Dutch companies called at Jedda on their way to the Dutch East Indies. One of these, the Nederlandsche Stoomvaart Maatschappij "Oceaan," used to send about six ships yearly with pilgrims from Java and the Dutch colonies.

18. The Anglo-Algerian and Persian Steamship Co. visited Muscat in 1908, but is not mentioned later.

(c) *Cable and Wireless Communications*

Aden has excellent telegraphic communication with all parts of the world; there are direct cables to Bombay, Zanzibar, Suez, and Perim.

Muscat has a cable to Jashk, established by the Indian Government.

Medina has telegraphic communication with Damascus along the Hejaz Railway.

Arabia has at present no wireless stations. Turkey has been urged by Germany to establish a wireless station in the mountains of Yemen in order to communicate with Damascus and Constantinople, and thus to make herself independent of British cable lines.

(B) INDUSTRY

(1) Labour

(a) *Supply of Labour; Emigration and Immigration*

Arabia is too poor in soil and other natural resources to support a large population, yet the climate encourages long life and a high birth-rate. Consequently emigration has been going on intermittently for many centuries, and Arabs have spread out over all the surrounding countries. The last example of emigration on a large scale occurred in the nineteenth century, when the Beni Anaza, moving northwards, drove the Beni Shammar before them across the Euphrates, dividing them into northern and southern branches, one of which is now purely Mesopotamian, while the other roams over the northern Nefud of Arabia. Other tribes now live sometimes inside and sometimes outside Arabia. This emigration *en bloc* is confined to nomadic pastoral tribes, and would probably have been greater had it not been for the comparatively high mortality among such tribes, due to semi-starvation and the hardships of a wandering life. Since the emigrant tribes only leave a soil which is too arid to feed flocks large enough to nourish them, their disappearance cannot be said to be an economic loss to the country.

Individual emigration is not widespread. In the Aden interior and Hadhramaut (especially the latter) there is a tendency for individuals belonging to certain warlike tribes to seek military service in Zanzibar or elsewhere. The Jews of Yemen, a useful economic element in the population, have recently been emigrating in large numbers to Jerusalem.

There is a considerable immigration of labour from Africa, both servile and voluntary. Negroes are captured at sea by the pirate tribes of Hejaz and Asir, and occasionally slave raids are made into Africa. Though the slave trade has greatly declined of recent years, it still continues. Many of the slaves imported earlier have in course of time gained their freedom and

formed distinct settlements, some of pure negro blood and some half-caste, but there are still considerable numbers of unfreed slaves in the Persian Gulf districts, in Nejd and Jebel Shammar, and in Hadhramaut. A small number of negro women and boys are regularly brought over by negro pilgrim caravans for sale at Mecca.

Voluntary immigrants from Africa are chiefly Somalis, who settle as dock workers, &c., in the larger Arabian ports, especially at Aden and Hodeida. There used to be a considerable immigration of Baluchis into Oman, where they were originally mercenaries, but have now settled, and in some cases amalgamated with the Arabs. They are mostly sailors, soldiers, and servants. There is, however, no trace of any active immigration of the kind at the present time.

A certain number of pilgrims of very varied nationalities settle at Mecca after their pilgrimage.

(b) *Labour Conditions*

Except in Bahrein (*see p.* 68) and in the ports and the Holy Cities, where there exists a large foreign element employed as hired labourers, the ordinary conditions of wage-labour do not exist in Arabia. Apart from the Aden salt-works there is nothing that can be called factory industry; there is only craftsmanship.

Two outstanding features of Arabian conditions are the existence of a considerable supply of free or servile negro labour, and the Arab tradition by which certain tribes devote themselves *in perpetuo* to special crafts or occupations. Thus the Billi tribe are recognised rice carriers, the Beni Juna are gun-runners and straw weavers, and so on. The existence of servile labour no doubt tends to degrade the status of free labour in the eyes of the Arab, and further stimulates the independence of spirit which is the natural effect of pastoral life. The tribal tradition of occupation, though it should raise the standard of craftsmanship, must also have the effect of discouraging initiative and

strengthening the natural Arab bias against new and improved methods. A moral factor acting against industrial improvement is the fierce fighting spirit of the nomad Arabs, which measures tribal and individual greatness by success in war, and is in sharp conflict with the commercial and industrial spirit. Arabs when they have settled and become more civilized, have a good reputation as workers. At Aden, where they are employed as coolies, road-menders, &c., they are much more industrious than Somalis, and those who have had experience of them in Mesopotamia report very favourably on their work.

The condition of slaves in Arabia is generally not hard; in Hadhramaut especially they are well treated and can rise to positions of trust. One or two tribes in Asir, however, treat their slaves with notorious cruelty. The cultivators of Kheibar oasis, mainly negro tenants of the Beduin owners, only work before noon.

Particulars of wages are only available for Aden and Bahrein. Before the war the following rates were normal at Aden :—

	s. d.	*s. d.*	
Carpenters ...	... from 2 6	to 3 2	per day
Masons ...	... ,, 2 0	,, 3 0	,, ,,
Coal coolies ...	... ,, 0 8	,, 1 0	,, ,,
Day labourers...	... ,, 0 7	,, 1 0	,, ,,

These rates have been raised since 1914. Indian skilled workers generally earn better wages than others.

The pearl-fishing industry at Bahrein has produced a class of labourers living under abnormal conditions. The pearlers, some 20,000 in number, are financed during the whole year by the pearl merchants, although they work only from May to October. They are obliged to obtain the necessities of life from their masters, and therefore during the off-season contract debts, which they pay off with their labour in the summer. There results a kind of serfdom, with a power that may become tyranny on the one hand, and an almost total

lack of self-respect and industry on the other. The pearlers are reported to be thriftless and extravagant. Few of them accept other work, such as ordinary fishing, during the winter, even when it is offered. The import of rice falls also in the summer months, and serves to accentuate the seasonal nature of work at Bahrein.

Wages in Bahrein run as follows :—

For an ordinary servant, 25*s.* to 37*s.* 6*d.* a month.
For a mason or carpenter, 3*s.* to 3*s.* 9*d.* a day.
For a mason's coolie, about 1*s.* 2½*d.* a day.

The cost of living in Bahrein is considerably higher than in Arabia and India.

(2) Agriculture and the Rearing of Live-stock

On account of the insufficiency of the rainfall in Arabia, agriculture is only practicable in favoured spots, and therefore sheep and camel rearing, and to some extent the breeding of horses, are the staple occupations of the country. In the northern half of the Red Sea littoral the ground is too arid to feed large flocks, and the Beduins of this district are the poorest in the country. Farther south, in Asir and Yemen, the rainfall is greater, and there is more cultivation and larger flocks. The largest sheep-rearing district, however, is in the north of the interior, as far south as and including Jebel Shammar. The tribes are compelled to live a nomad life in order to find fresh pasturage for their flocks. Hides and skins, especially the latter, are to-day the most important source of wealth in the country.

(a) *Products of Commercial Value*

Vegetable Products.—Dates form the staple article of food over large areas in Arabia, especially in the oases, and in Oman date stones are used for fodder. Except in the south-west, where the increased rainfall facilitates the growth of cereals, and in the northern

steppes, which serve for pasturage only, the date-palm is grown wherever the necessary moisture can be provided by artificial irrigation.

The most noted date-growing districts are:—

1. The Medina oasis, where 139 varieties are grown, of which the most famous is the Shelebi date, known and exported throughout the Mohammedan world.
2. The valley of Wadi Bisha in Asir, where the production is probably the largest in Arabia; a four months' truce is called to tribal hostilities during the harvest. Distribution is mainly local, from Khamis Musheit market.
3. The Batina littoral district of Oman, where date groves extend inland for seven miles. Sur is the outlet for this region.
4. The Wadi Semail district of Aden Interior, whence there is a considerable export to America.

In the Teima and Kheibar oases date-growing forms the chief occupation. Teima dates go to the Beduins, Kheibar dates to Medina. El-Ala oasis grows a honey date which finds a ready sale at Damascus. Many settled and semi-settled tribes devote themselves almost exclusively to date-growing, and in some cases the date groves are owned communally.

Besides the native produce there is a considerable import from Mesopotamia.

Coffee is the most valuable vegetable product, although far less widely distributed than the date-palm. It grows only in Yemen, Asir, and the Aden interior. Conditions are most favourable in the highlands of Yemen, where thick mists provide the requisite moisture. The plantations are terraced on the hill sides, in rich soil often only a foot or so deep. The best quality of coffee comes from the district between Menakha and Hodeida; farther south, Taiz is the great centre of cultivation. The Raza district of Asir also grows a considerable quantity, entirely for local consumption. The husking of the berries, chiefly done by girls at Aden, reduces their weight by 50 per

cent., and the Arabs frequently use the husk instead of the berry.

Gums are a characteristic product of Arabia, and come chiefly from Asir and the Aden interior. There are several varieties, the best known being gum arabic and frankincense. The latter is the chief gum product of the south coast; it is collected at Harjat, in Hadhramaut, whence it is exported to Bombay. The Kara tribe in Dhofar make their living mainly by the collection and exportation to India of frankincense and other gums.

Cereals, like dates, can only be grown where moisture is present in sufficient quantities, viz., in Yemen, Asir, Aden Interior, parts of Oman, and the oases of the centre, west and south-west. The amount raised is quite insufficient for the wants of the country, and a considerable quantity has to be imported. The cereals grown are millet, maize, wheat, and barley, the last two in very small quantities.

Millet and maize. The chief centre of millet-growing is Yemen, on the inland side of the coastal district in the foothills, where the soil has been washed down from above and is of excellent quality. Millet and maize are also the staple cereals and the chief foodstuffs of the Aden interior district, where their stalks and leaves are used as fodder. Both are grown in the winter in Asir, whence a surplus is often exported to Jedda in the pilgrim season. Millet is also raised in the Teima and Kheibar oases for sale to the nomads. In Jebel Shammar both millet and maize are grown, though dates form the chief food. In Oman millet is preferred to maize. Millet requires a great deal of heat and moisture, and is therefore at its best in the low-lying littorals of the south-west, where it is sown in the rainy season. Millet is known as *dukhn* or *bajri*, and maize as *dhura* or *jowari*.

Wheat and barley are chiefly grown in the south-west districts of Yemen, Asir, and the Aden interior, and in the irrigated parts of Oman; wheat is also found in most of the oases. They are grown as summer crops

in Asir, not requiring so much moisture as millet. In the Aden interior they are only kept alive by the dense night fogs of the winter, which are the sole means of providing moisture before the arrival of the summer thunderstorms.

Oats. A very small quantity is grown in Yemen.

Rice is only grown in the Hasa oasis, where the water supply is plentiful enough to admit of an elaborate system of irrigation.

Sesame also requires much moisture, and is only grown in Asir and Yemen, the regions of greatest rainfall.

Tobacco is cultivated in only a few localities. Gjail Ba Wazir, in Hadhramaut, grows a kind called Humuni, which is very popular locally; the leaf is brown and coarse and the flavour very strong. A little is grown in Oman, where the chief centre is Salale, in the Dhofar district. The Ghamid, an inland tribe of Asir, send locally grown tobacco to Mecca.

Indigo is grown only in the valley of the Wadi Zebid (Yemen), in the Aden interior, and at Dhank in Oman.

Cotton is grown in very small quantities. The centres are Hali, in Asir, the Wadi Zebid, in Yemen, Nisab, in the Aden interior (from a bush of small growth), and Salale, in Oman.

Sugar-cane is only grown at Salale.

Senna is a product of Asir and Hadhramaut, and is exported from Jeizan and Makalla.

Coconut palms with large nuts grow in Dhofar and in Hadhramaut, and there are groves at Lahej.

Fruits. A great variety of tropical and sub-tropical fruits grow in the oases and in most of the wadi valleys. The most valuable of these are limes and pomegranates, but they include also grapes (which are grown not for wine, but either for eating or for raisins), apricots, jujubes, bananas, peaches, plums, oranges, plantains, mangoes, quinces, olives (introduced from Syria), almonds, walnuts, figs and mulberries. The more tropical kinds, such as mangoes and plantains, are grown in Oman. Wadaah in Asir supplies the

Khamis Abida market with raisins. Taif is especially famous for its vines. The blossoms and leaves of the jujube tree contain honey-dew, from which is made the excellent honey of the Yeshbum valley, while the fruit is dried and pounded for food.

Roses are grown at Taif for distillation at Mecca, whence attar of roses goes all over the Mohammedan world.

Vegetables are grown in various oases, especially at Medina.

Kat, a shrub of Yemen, grown chiefly between Taiz and Yerim, is greatly prized in Arabia for the stimulating qualities of its leaves. It can be grown only at an altitude of 4,000 to 5,000 feet, in soil free from sand, so that its cultivation cannot be extended indefinitely.

Fodder. Lucerne is grown for fodder in many parts of Arabia. In Asir it is a favourite winter crop; it is also grown in the Aden interior, Oman, Koweit, Bahrein and other Persian Gulf islands, Jebel Shammar, &c. In the Aden interior, where there is a large production of maize and millet, the stalks and leaves are largely used. Along the coast of Oman animals are fed on fish-heads boiled up with date-stones, &c.

Animals and Animal Products.—Asses, camels, goats, horses, mules and sheep are the most important animals of Arabia, and ghi, hides and skins, honey and wool the chief animal products.

Asses. Very fine asses are bred in Hejaz, Yemen, and Nejd. They are of great value for transport purposes, and are better suited than camels for the hard surfaces of the *harra* desert. The white asses of Hasa and Mecca are widely known: a good Mecca ass can surpass a camel in speed. Many Arab asses are sold in Muscat to Persia. In Bahrein and Hasa a fine breed is reared, and in Bahrein donkeys are used for all transport purposes.

Camels. Arabia is the chief camel-breeding country of the world, but as no Arab living in Arabia can accumulate capital sufficient for large deals, the

centre of the camel trade is at Damascus, and some trade is also carried on at Baghdad. The camel merchants, both at Damascus and Baghdad, employ as buyers the Ukeil, a class of recognised caravan guides (*see* p. 90). In the early summer, and later after the harvest, when the tribes need money to make their purchases for the winter, the Ukeil go down into central Arabia and buy camels through the agency of the Sheikhs. During the winter months no business can be done. The camels bought are kept through the winter in the oases of Kasim, and in spring are driven slowly across the desert, pasturing as they go, to Damascus, and thence into Egypt. Only a few take the more direct route across Sinai. The camels of Jebel Shammar are also of good quality, and are exported in considerable numbers to Mesopotamia.

The largest and most powerful camels, used chiefly for baggage purposes, are reared by the Anaize tribe in the north; the fastest, used for riding, come from central Arabia, and are reared by the Ateiba and the Kahtan. The camels of Oman and the Aden interior are also fast, and a few are exported from Oman and El-Katr to Persia..

Camels can live, even in the dry season, on thorny acacia, tamarisk, and a salt bush which grows in the desert, but can do and endure more when they are able to browse on succulent spring pastures. When used for pilgrims or for some special achievement, they are fed sometimes on pulse and knotgrass, sometimes on balls of millet and flour, sometimes on dates. The usual speed of a caravan is not more than $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles an hour, though a riding camel has been known to cover 9 to 10 miles an hour. They can carry on desert routes about 330 lb. In spring and early summer the nomad depends for sustenance on the milk of the camel, while its flesh and skin are also of great value to him. It is estimated that the chief camel-rearing tribes possess some 720,000 head. Of these only the surplus are sold, amounting to nearly 45,000 per annum.

Goats. Large numbers of goats are reared in Oman, where they are often preferred to sheep, being more suited to the rocky nature of the country. In Hadhramaut they are found wild. In the north they form a less important part of the great flocks of the Beduins, and are most numerous in the Belka districts; in the uplands of the Jordan valley their browsing has the effect of keeping down the growth of young trees. In the Hamad the poorer Beduin will roam the steppes dependent solely upon his camel and a little flock of goats. Goats can be reared even in the more barren districts, because they nourish themselves in winter on mimosas and acacias, which would not support sheep. Their milk, flesh, and hair are almost the only sources of livelihood of their half-starved owners. Statistics of their numbers are not available, and they are not exported. Ghi or semn (*see* p. 75) is made from their milk, and clothing and tents from their hair. Their skins form a valuable export.

Horses. These are of two kinds, the Kadishi, used for rough work, and the Kohlani, the famous thoroughbreds. The latter are small, but symmetrical and hardy. They are very valuable, both for riding purposes and for the improvement of other breeds. They are carefully reared in Nejd by the Shahran tribes and exported to Mesopotamia, Persia, India, &c. For transport they are not much used, as food and water have to be conveyed for them. In Nejd they are fed on dates and water, camel's milk, and desert herbs. Winter is the best time for buying. In Hadhramaut, Oman, and Hasa horses are very scarce.

Mules are also reared, and are very serviceable. They are sometimes yoked to well-machines and used to raise water from a great depth. From El-Katr and Batina mules are exported to Persia.

Sheep. Wherever in Arabia there is pasturage, there sheep are found, but in Nejd their breeding is less important than that of horses and camels, and

in Oman they are less numerous than goats. The largest numbers are found in the north, where Beduins roam with immense flocks over the Hamad steppes from Palestine to Mesopotamia. From the Hamad the Shammar tribes range southwards to the Kasim, where are reared the excellent Jebel Shammar breed of sheep. No statistics are available, as nearly all the sheep are used to supply local needs, for which, indeed, in the west and south-west they are quite inadequate. The only considerable export is from the Duleim tribe, who range the country on both sides of the Middle Euphrates, and supply lambs to the Damascus market. Black sheep are reared by the Abida of 'Asir. The usual variety in Arabia is the fat-tailed sheep. Sheepskins form a valuable export, and ghi (*see* below) is made from sheep's milk.

Cattle are not largely reared in Arabia, since they require well-watered pastures, which are very rarely to be met with. They are most generally found in the coast districts, where the wadis leading to the sea supply a little moisture. Asir, Yemen, Oman, and Hadhramaut, especially the latter, raise considerable numbers. Some are found in southern Nejd, where the Harik oasis rears a horned variety; but the finest breed is in Bahrein Island. In Hasa, Oman, and Hejaz the small Indian hump-backed species is chiefly reared, and these are used for ploughing and for working irrigation appliances. In Hadhramaut oxen are used exclusively for ploughing, and cows for irrigation. Koweit has a cattle market, and Lahej collects cattle for consumption in Aden.

Gazelles roam over the Hamad in large herds. Their skins are tanned and made into winter cloaks.

Ostriches are found in central Arabia, chiefly in the northern Nefud and Dana belts, but appear to be decreasing in numbers.

Of the animal products, *ghi* or *semn* is made throughout Arabia, even in the barren Hejaz district, and is particularly plentiful in Asir and the Aden interior.

It is a kind of clarified butter, much valued as an article of diet in the East, and is produced by beating sheep's, goats', or cows' milk in a skin with sticks.

Hides and skins of late years have replaced coffee as the most valuable article of export. The most important are those of sheep and goats, but the hides of camel and oxen are included. Little tanning, and that of a rough description, is done in Arabia, so that side by side with the export of hides there exists a considerable import of leather.

Honey is chiefly produced in southern Arabia. The finest kind, which is widely exported, comes from the Yeshbum valley, and owes its excellence to the honeydew found in the blossoms and leaves of the jujube tree.

Wool, not as a rule of much value, is used locally for rugs, saddlebags, and tents. The finest quality is obtained from the Jebel Shammar breed of sheep.

The only other products worthy of note are *tortoise shell* and *ambergris*, which are obtained in small quantities only.

(b) *Methods of Cultivation*

Arab methods of cultivation are for the most part extremely primitive. Manuring is unknown, except in some of the coffee plantations and in the Teima oasis. Serious consequences arise from this. The ground is used over and over again for the same crop without replenishment, and as a consequence the crops suffer. This is particularly the case with the coffee plantations of Yemen. An extremely primitive plough is in use, worked at Teima by well-camels, elsewhere generally by oxen. Beyond this nothing whatever exists but hand implements. Wooden rakes are used in Koweit. The Yemen highland farmers do not even use ploughs; they usually possess only a hoe, a mattock, a reed-basket for the transportation of soil, and a watering can. Threshing machines are unknown, and there are only four flour-mills in the country, corn being usually

ground by girls in hand-querns, or crushed on a concave stone with a pestle.

Irrigation.—The tropical heat and the scanty rainfall make artificial irrigation essential over by far the greater part of Arabia. Rain in appreciable quantities only falls in Asir, Yemen, the Aden Protectorate, Hadhramaut, and Oman, and there only in a very narrow belt of higher land, the low-lying littoral getting in some cases almost nothing. Such rain as falls is frequently in thunderstorms, and is therefore less useful for agriculture than gentler showers. The absence of any great permanent rivers makes far-reaching schemes of irrigation impossible. All that can be done is to invent devices for utilising to the utmost every drop of the scanty moisture provided by Nature. This is rendered more difficult by internal dissensions. The Arab will foul wells belonging to a hostile tribe, and will stop up his own wells when he moves to other districts. Moreover, the isolation of the country and the poverty of its inhabitants have hitherto prevented their acquisition of modern appliances. For instance, the oil pumps which are being increasingly used in Mesopotamia for raising the Euphrates water for irrigation purposes, and which could equally well be employed in Arabia, are at present unknown there.

Water for irrigation purposes is obtained from four chief sources—the wadis, wells worked by animal traction, rain cisterns, and conduits.

(1) *Wadis.* The most promising condition for irrigation is the presence of a wadi, whether it be full or dry, for below its bed there exists nearly always a subsoil abounding in moisture, which can in most cases easily be procured; while, even if the banks are high and steep, as in Hadhramaut, the water can be raised by lifts. In Asir, which gets the fringe of the south-western monsoons, the wadis are swollen by floods from the hills, and the water is diverted into channels by dams. In Kasim the fertility of a long chain of oases is due to the moisture in the subsoil of

the Wadi Rumma, and that of Riad is similarly traceable to the damp subsoil of the Wadi Hanifa.

From low wadis water is diverted directly for irrigation purposes by the cutting of channels in the banks. The oases of Nejran and Jauf (in Yemen) are thus fertilised by inland wadis, and the Semail and many other coastal valleys by wadis leading to the sea. Wadi Tiban, in the Aden Protectorate, loses at one part of its course the whole of its water, but receives it again farther on. The main Hadhramaut wadi similarly loses all its water (including its supply from considerable underground reservoirs) a hundred miles before it reaches the sea.

(2) *Wells worked by animal traction.* In many cases water is raised from deep wells for irrigation purposes by this means. The famous well-pit of El-Haddaj supplies water to the whole Teima oasis. This well measures 50 feet across, and the water, which is reached at a depth of 50 ft., is raised in leathern buckets by means of 60 draw-wheels mounted on frames and worked by camels. It then enters troughs, from which it is distributed by means of little runnels. At Kheibar oasis, where the supply is more limited, the cultivators have the right to irrigate with the public water once a week, a fixed time being appointed for each. Smaller installations are often worked by donkeys. The wells at Riad are from 40 to 80 ft. deep, and those at Harik and Jebel Shammar 100 ft. Oil pumps could be substituted for animal traction if petroleum could be obtained easily and cheaply.

(3) *Rain Cisterns.* The famous tanks of Aden, now insufficient even for the city's drinking supply, were possibly intended originally for irrigation purposes. In Hadhramaut and Yemen, especially in the coffee-growing districts, cisterns are built wherever it is possible to collect rain or surface water. As the rainfall in Yemen is greater than in any other part of Arabia, a considerable quantity is procured, but a more comprehensive and economical system would give the district a better prospect of development. The use of

cisterns could, however, be adopted advantageously as a supplementary measure in other parts of Arabia, notably in Jebel Shammar, where storm-water pours down the bare rocky hills and is wasted.

(4) *Conduits.* Underground conduits or *felej* are constructed in Oman to bring water down from the hills, or to utilise distant springs. If they appear as open channels above ground, they are called *sakie*. By these means the Baraima and Ibri oases get an abundant water supply from adjacent hills, and Rostak and the Hawasina district utilise springs.

In parts of the Aden Protectorate and Yemen districts irrigation is to some extent replaced by thick white fogs, which help to keep alive the crops before the summer thunderstorms are due.

(c) *Forestry*

Arabia is, on the whole, a treeless country. The Great Southern Desert, the littorals of the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and, to a great extent, of the Gulf of Oman, and the Nefud and Dana regions are almost entirely without trees. There is a well-wooded district in the north-west, the Belka, where the valleys leading down to the Jordan are lined with oaks, terebinths, &c., but these larger varieties of timber trees are very rarely found farther south. It is known that in Asir many of the wadi valleys are well-forested, but particulars of the timber to be found there are unobtainable. Except in the north-east, the most characteristic tree is, of course, the date-palm, which furnishes useful timber and fibre, as well as fruit. After this come the tamarisk (*ghatha*), the acacia, the mimosa, and the elb or jujube tree. Of the first three of these there are two varieties—a stunted bush, found in the desert, and the ordinary tree. Other trees less universally found are the sycamore, cassia, ash, and thorny lotus.

The tamarisk tree is peculiarly adapted for cultivation in arid districts, for on its roots grow various parasites full of moisture. It flourishes in Yemen,

Oman, and Nejd; in Hadhramaut there are plantations of it, and at Teima it is specially grown for the sake of its timber, which yields the purest charcoal known. Camels feed on tamarisk bush, and, when dried, it makes good fuel. Doughty[1] is of opinion that the great sandy regions of the centre "might become a green wood" if they were planted with tamarisk trees. The cultivation is comparatively easy. The young plants are set in loose sand and watered for a year, after which they grow without further care. The acacia tree yields a hard wood, which is useful for boat-building, and the thorny acacia provides useful grazing for the camel. Long patches of mimosa jungle occur in some of the most unpromising districts; the stunted variety will grow in very arid regions. The elb or jujube tree is planted in Hadhramaut for the sake of its timber, and of the honey-dew in its leaves and blossoms.

If the desiccation of the soil of Arabia be a continuous though slow process, as has been suggested in some quarters, then afforestation, wherever possible, would be a more or less effective remedy. In any case, Doughty's suggestion for the improvement of the sandy interior by means of tamarisk plantations would appear to be very practical; charcoal and timber would thus be secured, and, if the process were extensive, a greater rainfall would be induced. Afforestation on a very small scale was carried out in 1883 at Sheikh Othman with good results.

Political unrest, tribal dissensions, and the consequent lack of enterprise are the chief obstacles to improvements of this kind.

(d) *Land Tenure*

Land tenure is as unsystematic as most other institutions in Arabia. The Turkish system of land tenure does not operate to any large extent, as few Turks live in Arabia for other than military or administrative

[1] *Travels in Arabia Deserta*, 1888.

purposes. Nomad tribes have tribal rights of pasturage in the areas over which they roam, and these ranges, called *diras*, are rigidly conserved, and would prove an insuperable barrier to the absolute ownership of this land by any proprietor. Sometimes a separate *dira* belongs to each main section of a tribe, while in other cases tribes hold their *diras* in common. In certain ill-watered districts several tribes have the right to cross each other's *diras* and to use the water. Raiding parties disregard the rights of the *dira*, but travellers have to pay the chief whose *dira* they cross.

At Aden, until recently, land was not sold, but building sites were granted in perpetuity, and sites for storing coal and salt, beaching boats, &c., were granted on leases for 99 years on payment of quit-rents. Since 1911, land for building has also been granted on lease (maximum 99 years), but it may be disposed of otherwise at the discretion of the resident.

Nomads also possess land, either individually or communally, and many of the Sheikhs are large landowners. Communal or tribal ownership extends to date-groves as well as to other cultivated land. In Kheibar oasis the nomads own all the land, but let it permanently to settled negroes, visiting the oasis themselves once a year to gather in their share of the date harvest. The negro cultivators may not buy the land, which remains the possession of the nomad tribe. In Teima oasis the cultivators own the land. In Hadhramaut, most of the land is owned by the Seyyids, who employ slaves or hired labourers to cultivate it.

(3) Fisheries

The fisheries of Arabia, though not very important commercially, are a very valuable asset for supplying local needs. They are carried on along practically the whole extent of the coast-line, but most extensively in Batina (Oman), where the nets are sometimes a mile long and are the chief possession of a village. The largest centre is Barka, where quantities of fish are

caught, salted, and sent into the interior. Smaller fishing centres on the Oman coast are Kuryat, Tiwi, and Hadd, at the last of which cod of considerable size and large rock-fish are caught. Shark-fins are collected, and a good set would at one time sell in Muscat for a pound or more. In south-east Oman, one poverty-stricken tribe, who have no boats, use inflated skins for fishing, and exchange shark-fins with any passing vessel for dates and other supplies. The small Oman fishing villages nearly all provide salt fish for Baraimi, Muscat, or the interior. They chiefly salt a small fish resembling a sardine, but also the seer-fish, which resembles mackerel, has a delicate flavour, and provides porpoise-oil. Fish-heads are used in Oman as fodder.

Fishing is also largely carried on along the coasts of the Persian Gulf. At Koweit the *zubeidi*, a local fish, is caught with long nets set across the tide-way, while other fish are taken in tidal weirs. Similar methods are used at Bahrein, which in 1914 supplied 500 lbs. of fish daily to the Indian Expeditionary Force. Fishing is also actively pursued in the Aden district, in Hadhramaut, and on the shores of the Red Sea, especially near Lith, where it forms the sole occupation of one small tribe.

Fishing boats on the east coast have to be laid up during the south-west monsoon.

Pearl fishing is a very important industry in the Persian Gulf. Bahrein, El-Katr, and Trucial Oman obtain the largest quantities of pearls. Between 24° 10′ and 27° north latitude, and 50° to 55° east longitude there are 184 pearl banks. These are open to the Arabs of the whole littoral without distinction of tribe, but the external boundaries are well known. The total number of pearl banks is said to be 217. The average depth of a pearl bank is 8 fathoms, and the extreme depth 14 fathoms. There are 24 different kinds of pearls. In 1905 there were 3,411 pearl boats, of which 2,395 were under British protection, and the crews employed numbered 64,390. The number of

pearling boats at the present time is unknown, but the following partial figures are available for 1915:—

Bahrein	...	...	...	...	900
Koweit	...	...	...	...	461
Doha	...	...	...	...	350
Dibai	...	...	...	...	335
Sharga	...	...	...	...	200

Besides these centres, almost every village along the coast of the Gulf has pearling vessels. The fluctuating population in Bahrein engaged in pearling is normally from 18,000 to 20,000 men. The pearling season proper is from May to September or October. There is also a cold-water season in the winter, when small pearls of poor quality are obtained by wading.

The oyster-shells were long thought to be valueless, but of late years there has been a steadily increasing trade in them, Germany and Austria being large buyers. It is doubtful, however, whether they ought not to be returned to the sea in order to secure the continued productivity of the banks.

(4) Minerals

The mineral wealth of Arabia is extremely small, *salt* being the only mineral of economic importance.

At Salif in Yemen there are important salt-works, which are controlled by the Ottoman Public Debt and yield a large revenue. The salt is partly exported to India and partly sent inland. Rock-salt is worked at Teima oasis, where the salt beds lie just beyond the zone of cultivation; this salt is sent all over the peninsula. There are also salt-works, from which salt is exported, in the hills near Abu Arish. Shughra is another centre, and rock-salt is said to abound in Nejd. There are salt-pits in the Abdali country, which were licensed by the Turkish Government to Arabs. About two-thirds of these are now in the hands of Cowasji, Dinshaw Bros., and Menahem Massa. They supply Aden with salt for local consumption.

Salt is also largely obtained by evaporation from sea-water. At Aden this industry is pursued by the large and thriving Italian firm of Agostino Burgarella Ajola and Co., who own the Aden Salt Works, and also by the smaller Bombay firm of Abdullabhoy and Joomabhoy Lalji and Co. This salt is not consumed locally; the local consumption of salt is a monopoly of the Porte.

The total output of salt at Aden in 1916-17 was as follows :—

From the Arab salt works at Sheikh Othman, about 525 tons.

From the Italian salt works (Burgarella Ajola & Co.), 73,620 tons.

From Abdullabhoy & Joomabhoy Lalji & Co., about 50,732 tons.

Wejh and other small Red Sea coast towns also do a little evaporation. In Oman salt is evaporated from the water of a large salt-water lagoon, and sent thence by Sur boats to Sur and to India.

Copper ore is said to exist in Masira Island and to have been slightly worked at one time. It also exists in Yemen, but has not been worked there.

Iron is worked at Ras el-Kheima, on the Persian Gulf, by Persians employed by a Lingeh contractor. Unworked iron-ore exists in Yemen, the chief obstacle to its exploitation being the lack of fuel.

Gold, sulphur, coal, chrome, &c., are said to exist in different parts of Yemen.

Potash is made in the Aden interior from Aden balsam, a mineral found in the Abdali and Fadhli districts. It is exported to Bombay.

Black rock alum is found in Teima oasis, and is used as a medicine for camels.

Saltpetre is plentiful near Khanfar, between Aden and Shughra, and is used locally for the manufacture of gunpowder.

Fine *onyx*, *agate*, *chalcedony*, and *cornelian* stones are found in the hills round Sana.

Petroleum exists in the Farsan Islands. It was investigated by a French engineer, and in 1912 a concession for 75 years was granted to the Red Sea Oilfields Company, who are the proprietors of a similar enterprise on the Egyptian side of the Red Sea.

(5) Manufactures

The manufactures of Arabia are very small and unimportant. As there is no coal and only an inconsiderable amount of iron, there is no prospect whatever of industrial development. Except for the gold and silver work done by skilled Hindu craftsmen at Muscat, some native cotton goods sent from the same port, and the *abbas* (Arab cloaks), of especially good quality, woven in the Jauf el-Amr oasis, not a single product of Arab industry is exported. The rest of the native industry is merely an attempt to supply a part of the simple domestic needs of the country, with the help only of the most primitive appliances.

Muscat was long the centre of flourishing cotton and silk industries, but of late years these have been ousted by the cheaper products of Bombay and America. There is still a spasmodic production, for statistics of certain years show a considerable export.

Textiles.—A coarse striped cotton cloth is woven on hand-looms at Hodeida by a colony of weavers who removed there from Zebid and Beit el-Faki on account of tribal disturbances. Spinning and weaving are carried on by very primitive methods in the Aden interior, where the chief centres are Nisab and Markha, near which cotton and indigo are grown. At Dhala, in the same district, the Jews are occupied in the spinning of cotton thread, and at Yeshbum raw cotton from Nisab is spun. A little weaving is done at Muscat, Nizwa, and Ibri, in Oman, and there is a similar industry, now declining, at Terim, in Hadhramaut. The Gulf districts and the interior oases have a small output, but in Nejd the only textile made is a coarse woollen cloth used for abbas. Hofuf,

however, makes abbas of wool, silk and wool, and silk and cotton, while the abbas of the Jauf el-Amr oasis are of excellent quality, and are exported all over northern Arabia and Syria. Turban-weaving forms a small industry in Oman. Saumaar, in the Aden interior, makes goathair carpets. Sailcloth is made in Bahrein.

Dyeing.—Indigo is grown at Zebid and Beit el-Faki in Yemen, but the preparation of the dye has been transferred to Hodeida. In the Aden district dyeing is done at Jalila, Nisab, Markha, and elsewhere, in Hadhramaut at Terim, and in Oman at Nizwa and Ibri. Synthetic dyes were being popularised before 1914.

Tanning and leather industry.—Hodeida is a centre of tanning and sandal-making, which are also carried on at Zebid, Beit el-Faki, &c. In the uplands of Yemen sheepskins are tanned for boot-making. Goathair sandals and belts, &c., are made in Asir. Camel-saddlery making is carried on at Nizwa.

Straw-plaiting.—The Beni Rijal in Asir weave straw into mats, baskets, and hats; while in Aden town mat-making and string-plaiting are skilfully executed by Somali women. Some of the Asir tribes weave tents of straw. Mats are made also at Nizwa.

Metal-work.—The great centre for gold and silver work is Muscat, famed for the beautiful mounting of daggers and swords by Indians. The Rama tribe living at Ain el-Rama, in Oman, are all goldsmiths. In Asir swords and knives are finished locally. Sana was formally the centre of a famous metal-working industry, but this has greatly declined, and only domestic utensils are now made there. There is a thriving silver, copper, and brass industry at Nizwa. Hofuf makes copper and brass coffee-pots.

Boat-building.—Hodeida is a centre of the dhow-building industry. The small dhow, about 50 ft. long, with a short sturdy mast, and a lateen sail, is used for lighterage purposes in the roadstead, while the

larger, built on the same lines, is used for coastal traffic. The boats are made partly of native acacia wood from the Yemen uplands, which is very hard and durable, and partly of Malabar planks. Boat-building is also carried on along the Hadhramaut coast, where the natives have a natural aptitude for navigation. At Koweit boats are made from timber and fibre imported from India. At Aden jolly-boats are made, which resemble English rowing boats, but are heavier and of rough workmanship.

Flour mills.—There is a flour mill at Menakha which was built by the Turks, and another, worked by water, at Nakl. In 1909 a flour mill with a petroleum engine was set up at Mecca, and in 1912 a small one of the same kind was established at Jedda. Two others were imported but not set up. In Yemen, the most fertile province of Arabia, there is not a single flour mill.

Charcoal-burning, from acacia trees, is carried on at Muweila, at several places in the Aden interior, where the hills are well wooded, and in Nejd. In the Belka district a good deal is also done. The tamarisk tree in particular yields excellent charcoal.

Cigarettes are made at Aden by Jews and Greeks with tobacco imported from Egypt.

Distillation.—In the Aden district a native drink is distilled in primitive fashion from dates, while at Mecca attar of roses is distilled from flowers brought from Taif.

Halwa, the Arab national sweetmeat, is made at Nizwa (Oman), but its manufacture has been declining for some years.

(6) Power

There are no hydro-electric installations, nor is there any water-power which could be permanently used for industrial purposes, for even in Yemen, where the rivers have rapid courses, they only flow for two or three months during the year, and most of them do not reach the sea.

(C) COMMERCE

(1) Domestic

(a) *Principal Branches of Trade*

The chief internal trade of Arabia consists of the distribution of native and imported agricultural produce and of imported manufactured goods. Towns and villages situated in oases, or in the wadi valleys, nearly always become centres for the distribution to the nomads of surrounding districts of agricultural produce, and frequently also of manufactured goods. In addition they may become important centres of supply for caravans if they lie on the main routes. In a more productive district, such towns or villages also become collecting-centres for the produce of the district, which they forward to the nearest port. The chief markets at which nomads can obtain agricultural supplies are Teima, El-Ala, and Kheibar, in Hejaz; Abu Arish, Khamis Musheit and Muhail in Asir; Sana and Yerim in Yemen; Makhlaf in the Nejran Oasis; Lahej in the Aden interior; Shabein and Hautab in Hadhramaut; Semail, Rostak, Ibri, Dhank, Nizwa, Ibra and Baraimi in Oman; Riad, Boreida, Anaize, Hail, and Jauf in Nejd; Hofuf in Hasa; and Manama (Bahrein) for El-Katr and the surrounding districts. Of these Teima, El-Ala and Kheibar, Khamis Musheit, Semail, Nizwa, Ibri and Baraimi specialise in dates. Manufactured goods are supplied to nomads at Teima, Kheibar, Sana, Lahej, Nizab (Aden interior), Rostak, Ibri, Riad, Boreida, Anaize, Hail, Hofuf, and other places.

Muscat formerly imported an enormous quantity of arms for distribution both to Persia and Arabia. A check having been placed on this import by the establishment of a State-controlled arms-warehouse, rifles are largely imported at Birk, and distributed at Shabein and Rueis.

(b) *Towns, Markets, Fairs, &c.*

Mecca, the birthplace of Mahomet, is the Holy City *par excellence* for the greater part of the Moslem world. The pilgrimages were at first suspended on account of the war, but were resumed in 1917, when 58,000 pilgrims visited Mecca. During the pilgrimage month, the valley of Mina, outside Mecca, is the scene of a great fair, to which traders from all parts of the Orient bring goods for sale to the pilgrims. Their wares include cotton shrouds, fancy cotton goods in bright colours, silk goods, brassware (for negro pilgrims), rosaries, henna, perfumes, attar of roses, &c. Before the war, Constantinople and Damascus were probably the largest suppliers, but Austria was also studying the market. The city of Mecca itself and the surrounding country produce nothing. Mecca lives on her pilgrims, and on a large yearly grant from the Porte. Food supplies are brought from Jedda.

Medina, like Mecca, lives mainly on pilgrims and a grant from the Porte, but, as the town stands on a fertile oasis, it is much more self-supporting than Mecca.

Sabia is the Idrisi's capital, and lies in a well-cultivated district.

Sana, the capital of Yemen, with a considerable Jewish population, trades in agricultural produce and in European goods received from Aden. It is well supplied with fruit and grapes, and has good water.

Zebid was formerly an important market for cotton and indigo, but tribal disturbances led to a decline in production.

Lahej has caravan trade with the interior, and is a centre of supply for Aden.

Riad, the capital of Nejd, is the head-quarters of the Wahabite sect, and a centre of caravan trade.

Boreida and *Anaize* have very important camel markets, and much less important cattle markets, and also are centres of an important trans-peninsular traffic between Mesopotamia and Mecca. The last has increased of recent years, for central Arabia has

become more dependent for supplies on Basra than on Damascus. Boreida is the more important, and is visited by all caravans.

Hail, the capital of Jebel Shammar, does a large caravan trade with Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf, and has rapid communication with Damascus by means of the Hejaz Railway, which, however, was in 1914 very little used for goods traffic.

Jauf el-Amr is an important place of call for caravans, as it lies on the only possible route across the north of Arabia.

Ibri has a well-known market for the loot brought in by desert Beduins, and is also famous for its fruit.

Aden and other towns on the coast are described in the section on Ports, pp. 54–62.

Goods which are produced for export are collected at the following markets:—

Camels, at Boreida and Anaize.
Skins, at Rijal (Asir).
Horses, at Hail.
Gums, at Hail and Khamis Abida (Asir).
Ghi, at Hail, Boreida, and Anaize.
Coffee, at Taiz and Lahej.

Goods produced for home consumption are distributed at the following markets:—

Honey, at Yeshbum.
Indigo and cotton, at Nisab.
Raisins, at Khamis Abida.
Young camels, reared by nomads, at Ibri.
Fruit and vegetables, at Taif (for Mecca and Medina).
Firewood and fodder, at Lahej (for Aden).
Tobacco and sugar-cane, at Salale.

(c) *Organizations to promote Trade and Commerce*

Of these, in the usual sense, none exist, except the Aden Chamber of Commerce. Trade is facilitated, however, by the organization of the Ukeil (Ageyl), an

association of recognised caravan guides. The Ukeil are not a tribe, but are chosen from among the tribesmen of central Arabia and Hasa, care being taken to exclude all the large tribes and those which have blood-feuds, so as to preserve the neutral character of the organization. The president of the society must always be a native of Boreida, but must live at Baghdad, the head-quarters of the organization, where members are enrolled. The Ukeil conduct the camel-trade of the desert, and are employed by Damascus dealers to buy from the tribes in Arabia and the Syrian desert. The presence of the Ukeil vouches for the genuinely commercial or travelling character of a caravan. Without these guides no tribesman could safely leave his own tribal territory, and business between tribes would be impossible.

Of lesser importance is the institution of the Rafik, or "companion," chosen from a tribe over whose *dira* or range, a merchant or traveller must pass. The presence of a Rafik is, however, no protection against raiders from another *dira*.

(d) *Foreign Interests*

Though there are no large foreign undertakings of any kind in Arabia, it is noteworthy that such enterprises as do exist are mainly in the hands of foreigners. The predominant foreign activity is Hindu, especially in Oman and Hadhramaut. At Muscat, the fish trade is controlled by an Indian firm, a Hindu has the monopoly of the small but lucrative pomegranate trade, and Hindus are importers, bankers, date exporters, and silversmiths. In fact, most of the Muscat and Matra trade is in the hands of Indians, who also possess a considerable share of the Aden transshipment trade. Two Indian shipping companies call at Jedda and one at Hodeida. Second only to the Hindus are the Italians, whose influence is strongest in the Red Sea provinces, especially at Sana and Hodeida. Italian Somaliland and Eritrea offer convenient bases for their operations. At Hodeida, an

Italian contractor constructed the pier, and another Italian firm supplied plant for a condenser and ice-machine. Guido Caprozzi,* an Italian merchant and commission agent, exerts a large influence in Sana. Italians own the Aden Salt Works, almost the only flourishing industrial concern in the country. A Jew has the monopoly of the Muscat import of American sheeting (which, however, has greatly declined), and Jews are recognised as the best craftsmen of Yemen. Aden trade is in the hands of Germans, French, Americans, Italians, Greeks, Indians, and Jews; neither Arabs, Turks, nor British take any considerable share in it.

Both British and Turkish interests in Arabia were mainly political. Neither power possessed any strong hold on the economic life of the country, if we except the abnormal relations that existed between Turkey and the Holy Cities. It may be noted that Jedda receives a far larger proportion of imports from Turkey than any other Arabian port, although this is in part accounted for by the fact that Moslem pilgrims naturally prefer to buy as presents articles coming from Damascus and Constantinople.

(2) Foreign

(a) *Exports*

It is extremely difficult to gauge the total value of Arabian trade. There is no homogeneous government. Statistics are often unreliable, and in the case of the smaller ports are altogether lacking. Moreover, the distinction between exports and imports is blurred by the fact that Aden has a large trans-shipment trade, and that the internal distribution of goods is carried on largely by sea, so that what appear at first sight to be exports turn out to be imports on their way from a larger to a smaller port for distribution.

As a basis for estimating trade we may take the year 1909, the latest for which statistics can be had for

all five of the principal ports—Aden, Hodeida, Jedda, Muscat, and Bahrein. The gross export figures for that year were as follows:—

	£
Aden	2,621,780
Hodeida	400,700
Jedda	49,704
Muscat	277,580
Bahrein	1,169,471
Total	£4,519,235

If, however, the items which make up these totals are examined in detail, it will be found that certain alterations will have to be made in order to arrive at the actual totals of genuine exports. For instance, Hodeida's gross export of hides and skins was 977 tons, value £84,700, but of these 132 tons, value £14,059, went to Aden. Similarly, 2,365 tons of coffee, value £151,247, were for Aden, out of the 4,715 tons exported, value £287,727. From Jedda Aden received hides and skins to the value of £2,885, out of a total value of £23,658 exported, and gums to the value of £280, out of a gross export of £6,333. Goods which go from one Arabian port to another in this way are obviously not exports in the usual sense of the word. If we leave out of account such goods, also specie, and unspecified goods whose nature cannot be accurately determined, the total exports for the five ports may be estimated as follows:—

	£
Aden	1,377,908
Hodeida	206,049
Jedda	39,039
Muscat	168,800
Bahrein	781,850
Total	£2,573,646

In the Appendix (Table II) will be found a table giving in detail the items which make up this total. In addition, the Aden trans-shipment trade must be taken into account. The percentage of exports from Aden of Arabian origin and of African origin respectively in recent years was roughly as follows:—

——	1909	1911	1912	1913	1916
African	50·5	60	56·25	66·6	85·7
Arabian	49·5	40	43·75	33·4	14·3

Allowing a small proportion for the supply of local needs at Aden, the ratio in 1909 may be taken as roughly one-half, so that the actual Arabian export from Aden will be in round numbers £689,000, and the total from all five ports will be reduced to about £1,884,700.

There are several other important channels of export. Sur, Dibai, and other small ports on the Persian Gulf carry on an active trade in native vessels, chiefly with Africa. Customs arrangements are so inadequate that most of this is unrecorded, but its volume is believed to be increasing. Again, camels and sheep are exported in large numbers to Damascus and Egypt across the Syrian desert, and there is a small but valuable export of Nejd horses. Pilgrims from Mecca and Medina take goods home with them, but only a small proportion of these, such as halwa and attar of roses, are of Arabian origin, the rest being specially imported, chiefly from Constantinople and Damascus.

Any general estimate of the volume of export trade must obviously be largely conjectural. It seems probable that the total value of genuine Arabian export trade in 1909 can scarcely have been above, and may have been considerably below, £3,000,000.

In the Appendix (Table III) will be found details of the exports from Aden between 1910 and 1916, and (Table IV) statistics for Muscat in 1910-12, and Bahrein in 1910 and 1911.

The chief goods exported from Arabia are hides and skins, pearls, coffee, and dates; next in value come ivory, gums, shells, wax, ghi, and salt.

The chief exports may be grouped according to their origin:—

(1) *Trans-shipment exports of mixed Arabian and foreign origin.—Hides and Skins,* the most valuable export of Arabia, are very largely of foreign origin; only about $\frac{1}{6}$ of the total import in 1913 was from Arabian sources. In 1916, however, the proportion was larger.

In 1913 the total import value of hides and skins at Aden was £641,878, made up as follows:—

	£
From Africa	556,632
,, Arabia (ports) ...	59,493
,, the mainland by camel	24,584
,, other sources ...	1,169
Total	£641,878

The total export value at Aden in the same year was £797,969, distributed mainly among the following countries:—

—	Raw hides.	Goat skins.	Sheep skins.	Other skins.	Total.
	£	£	£	£	£
United States	—	254,000	36,000	—	290,000
United Kingdom ..	127,000	22,000	68,000	6,000	223,000
France	50,000	29,000	37,000	—	116,000
Germany	30,000	—	—	14,000	44,000
Italy	39,000	—	—	—	39,000
Austria	33,000	—	—	—	33,000

The exports of raw hides to the United Kingdom, and of goat-skins to France, showed a notable increase between 1909 and 1913. Turkey, once a large customer, had dropped out by 1913.

In 1916 the import of hides from Africa was about stationary, while that from the mainland by camel had greatly decreased. The United Kingdom and the United States took goods to the value of £545,000 and £438,000 respectively, but the increase in quantity did not correspond to the increase in price.

Coffee exported from Aden was formerly chiefly of Arabian origin, but since 1914 less has been received from Arabia, while the African has held its ground, so that coffee has become more and more an article of trans-shipment. Comparing the trade in 1909, 1913, and 1916, we get the following figures:—

	1909	1913	1916
Place of origin—	£	£	£
Hodeida	151,000	167,000	—
Mokha	64,000	43,000	10,000
Jibuti and Obokh	123,000	176,000	117,000
Jeizan	—	—	73,000
British Somaliland (Abyssinia) .	10,000	8,000	11,000
Country of destination—			
France	148,000	103,500	48,000
United States	79,000	145,000	38,000
United Kingdom	42,000	24,000	49,000
Africa	31,000	60,000	95,000
Germany	29,000	17,000	—
Austria	17,000	19,000	—
Italy	15,000	28,000	16,000

Up to 1914 the Aden coffee trade was steadily increasing at the expense of Hodeida; the Turko-Italian War brought about an abnormal increase in 1912, which was not maintained later. The great decline of 1916 is largely in Arabian coffee, the imports at Aden from Jeizan having failed to come up to the large import from Hodeida of previous years. A

noteworthy fact is the great rise in the export of coffee to Africa.

Pearls are an important export. Bahrein has a floating population of about 20,000 employed solely in pearl-fishing, and the island up to 1912 was becoming more and more a market for pearls. Though the local output is said not to vary greatly from year to year, there was a great rise in the export value between 1903 and 1911. The value exported from Bahrein was £685,020 in 1903, £732,666 in 1909, £928,533 in 1910, and £1,928,000 in 1911. This rise was due partly to an increase in the quantity of imported pearls and partly to enhanced prices.

The export from all the ports is almost entirely to Bombay, at which town Austria was normally one of the largest buyers. France took in 1909 pearls to the value of about £253,000. The export at Aden consists of trans-shipment goods from Massawa in Abyssinia. Muscat's pearl export was declining before 1914. There is a large export, for which no statistics are available, direct to India from Dibai, which forms the chief outlet for the Trucial Coast pearl fisheries.

The total value of *gums* imported at Aden in 1913 was £60,585, of which over £24,000 represented frankincense sent from Africa to Makalla. Quite half the total value came from independent Somali ports, the rest chiefly from the Arabian Gulf ports, especially Makalla. The most important buyer was Bombay, followed at a considerable distance by Austria, Germany, and France. The total export amounted in value to £79,429. In 1909 and 1910 Jedda exported small quantities of gum, of which the values were £6,333 and £8,333 respectively.

Wax is exported from Aden only. The chief sources of supply were Massawa and Jibuti, but these ports are beginning to export direct instead of through Aden. Germany and France, especially the former, were the chief customers. Since 1914 the United Kingdom has increased its demand.

Ghi is received mainly from British and French Somaliland and Bombay, and sent chiefly to the Straits Settlements, Zanzibar, and the Arabian Gulf ports. Shughra, on the Arabian Gulf, and Sohar, on the Gulf of Oman, also collect and export ghi. Before the war Aden also supplied Jedda and Hodeida.

Shells, including mother-of-pearl, cowries, tortoise-shell, and other kinds, are exported from Aden, Muscat, Bahrein, and, to a very trifling extent, from Jedda. Those exported from Aden are almost exclusively of African origin, mainly from the independent Somali ports. The Muscat export, which was solely to India, has declined. In 1908 and 1909 its value was about £4,000, in 1910 and 1911 £3,000, in 1912 smaller still. Aden had a large export to the United Kingdom and Austria, and Bahrein to the United Kingdom and Germany.

Sesame seeds are nearly all imported from Bombay, and exported to the Arabian Gulf ports and the African coast. The average annual value during the period from 1912 to 1916 inclusive was £9,000.

Small quantities of *senna* are exported from Hodeida and Makalla to Aden. This trade, which had become almost negligible, showed a notable revival in 1916, when £9,000 worth was exported, chiefly to Egypt, the United Kingdom, and France.

Aloes are imported by Makalla from the African coast and from Sokotra, and exported chiefly to the United Kingdom and Bombay. The average annual export value is under £1,000.

(2) *Articles of purely Arabian origin.—Dates* are both exported and imported, but are not an article of trans-shipment. The import is from Mesopotamia by sea to Aden, and the export is from the rich harvest of the Batina littoral, which finds its chief outlets at Sur and Muscat. Bahrein exports to India, Zanzibar, and Egypt. The chief customers were always the United States and India, the former taking the wet dates and the latter the dry. There is also an export from Muscat to Makalla. Special varieties

of dates are exported from El-Ala and Medina, but no statistics are available. The goods from these localities are small in quantity, but of excellent quality.

Salt is now exported from Aden only; the great bulk of the export goes to India, and a little to Zanzibar.

Dried limes, of an average annual value of £5,000, are exported chiefly to Persia, Turkey, and India.

Muscat's export of *dried fish* declined considerably in 1910 and 1911, owing to the poor catch in the surrounding waters; in 1912 it rose from £3,800 to nearly £8,000, owing mainly to good management by an Indian firm. No statistics are available for the considerable trade in dried fish carried on between the seaports of the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf and the interior.

There is a very small export of *wool* from Jedda. Its average value in 1908, 1909 and 1910 fell below £3,000.

Ambergris is collected and exported at Shughra.

(3) *Article of purely African origin.*—The only export in this category is *ivory*. The value imported was greatly decreasing before 1914, since Jibuti, the chief place of origin, was exporting more and more direct instead of *viâ* Aden. The chief customers were the United Kingdom, Bombay, and the United States. In 1915 and 1916 the United Kingdom took very little, and Bombay a considerably larger quantity.

(b) *Imports*

The great majority of the imports are received at Aden, and are divided into two classes:—

(1) Those which go to supply the needs of Arabia, including Aden itself and ships calling there, and also those goods which are trans-shipped at Aden and re-exported to supply the needs of the adjacent African countries. Most of those destined for Arabia are also trans-shipped to smaller Arabian ports.

(2) Those which are received from Africa for trans-shipment to Europe, America, &c. These are not

strictly speaking imports, but trans-shipment exports, and have already been dealt with under that heading.

In the case of Muscat, Bahrein, Hodeida, and Jedda, the imports are for genuine Arabian consumption.

Arabia being a non-industrial country and her food supplies being inadequate, her chief imports include all the simpler necessaries of life. Textiles bulk most largely, and are closely followed by rice and other grains. Sugar and tobacco are also largely imported, and tea is increasingly popular. The low standard of civilisation in the country and the poverty of the people limit the import of all luxury articles except tobacco.

Detailed statistics for the five principal ports are only available for 1909, and will be found in the Appendix (Table V). The table takes no account, however, of the entry into Arabia of the following goods:—

(i) Indian and other goods entering small ports. No statistics are obtainable, but this import has greatly increased since 1909.

(ii) Goods entering Arabia by caravan from Mesopotamia, Syria, and Egypt. The Persian Gulf ports, especially Basra, were, before the war, ousting Damascus as a source of supply for central Arabia.

(iii) Goods reaching Medina from Syria *viâ* the Hejaz Railway.

(iv) Goods imported for consumption in Aden, including the coal and provisions supplied to ships.

In the Appendix (Table VI) will be found a return of the imports of Aden from 1912 to 1916 inclusive. The figures seem to show a considerable increase of trade, but it must be remembered that this is largely due to the general rise in prices.

In addition to the articles mentioned in the table, Aden also normally imports live animals for garrison consumption to the annual value of about £50,000. These are mainly sheep from Berbera.

The following details may be noted with regard to the chief imports:—

Textiles under normal conditions are supplied chiefly by India, the United States, and the United Kingdom; in addition, Jedda imports considerable quantities of cotton and silk goods and of lace and net from Syria, Austria, and Germany. During the war the Aden import from India has increased enormously, rising in value from £81,000 in 1912 to £880,000 in 1916, and almost supplanting for the moment American unbleached sheeting. Manchester goods show a large increase in value, which does not, of course, represent a proportionate increase in quantity: this rise in the value of textiles has much to do with the great increase in import values in 1916. At Hodeida Indian textiles were supplanting American as far back as 1909, on account of their lower price; Hodeida took in that year a value of £113,000 from the United Kingdom, and nearly £67,000 from India, while the import from America was under £49,000. Jedda took cotton textiles to a value of £102,500 from the United Kingdom, the United States, and Syria, and a value of £73,000 from India. Muscat imports both from India and Aden were falling off, as this town was losing its trade of making up silks and cottons for Zanzibar, which was beginning to prefer European dress. The Oman ports were, moreover, obtaining supplies from Dibai instead of Muscat. Jedda's import is mainly for the supply of pilgrims, who must purchase cotton shrouds at Mecca, and often buy Syrian silk goods for presents.

Rice was in 1909 the second largest import of Arabia. Together with dates, it has long been a staple article of food, yet so poor are parts of the country that it is sometimes considered as a luxury, to be eaten on two or three days a week only. At Aden, Hodeida, and Muscat all supplies come from India; Jedda also obtains a small quantity from Singapore and Basra, £29,000 in value in 1909.

Between 1912 and 1916 the value of the rice imported at Aden shows a decrease as compared with that of other cereals. Hodeida imports comparatively little, as it is situated in a fertile district which grows large quantities of millet. The Muscat import has greatly declined since 1909, as Dibai now supplies the Oman ports, and the import duty levied on rice at Muscat is thus avoided. The Khoja tribe in Oman have a monopoly of the import of Calcutta rice to Oman ports.

There is an enormous *grain* and *flour* import at Jedda, far surpassing that of any other port. The annual value ranges usually from £300,000 to £400,000. In 1913, according to the Austrian Consular Report, the countries of origin and the values imported were approximately as follows:—

	£
Wheat from Basra	208,000
Other grain, &c., from Basra ...	72,800
Other grain, &c., from India and Mohammera	30,000
Wheat from India	2,000
Wheat from Egypt	3,000
Flour from India	80,000
Flour from Austria	1,120
Flour from Russia	400
Total	£397,320

These large quantities are required for the pilgrims, for the fixed population of Hejaz, and in part also for the needs of central Arabia. The corn shipped to Jedda from Basra varies a good deal in quantity, and consists of inferior qualities at lower prices than that sent elsewhere from Basra.

The next largest import is at Aden, where maize and millet show the largest figures. In 1914 their value rose to £224,000, but has since declined. Muscat and Hodeida both import from India only. The Muscat import fluctuates with the movements of the navy.

Sugar was imported from the following countries:—

To Aden.	To Jedda.	To Hodeida.	To Muscat.
Austria (mainly), Germany, China, Java.	Austria, Egypt.	Austria, Aden, Mauritius (through Indian merchants).	Java (through India).

The amount of the sugar import at Aden rose between 1909 and 1912 from a value of £93,000 to a value of £194,000. Since 1914 India has sent the whole supply. Mauritius sugar was gaining ground in Hodeida in 1909. In 1913 there was a large import of Egyptian sugar at Jedda, a speculation which is said to have been unsuccessful. The value of sugar imported at Jedda in that year was £117,000.

The greatest import of *provisions* was at Jedda, to feed the pilgrims, and came from Turkey, Egypt, and Syria. Those imported at Hodeida came from the United Kingdom (biscuits and tinned goods), Italy (vermicelli), and Turkey (canned goods from Smyrna and Constantinople), ghi and oil being supplied in considerable quantities from the near African ports. Provisions imported at Aden were largely used for revictualling ships.

The following particulars may be noted concerning the smaller imports:—

Tobacco is extremely popular in Arabia. The Turkish Government sent considerable supplies, for which it chartered small vessels. Aden supplies tobacco and cigarettes to ships passing through the Canal, and imports this tobacco from Egypt.

Muscat's imports of *petroleum* were reduced after the Standard Oil Co. had set up a depot at Dibai for

the supply of the Oman coast. Russia has been driven off the market by America.

The demand at Jedda for *alcohol* was increasing in spite of the Moslem prohibition.

Dyes. Muscat imports increasing quantities of ochre (*waras*) from Aden for dyeing American sheeting, which is made into shirts for Arab seamen.

The *hardware* imported at Jedda included a petroleum engine for a flour mill, of British manufacture, set up at Mecca.

Timber. Jedda and Hodeida import from Java and Singapore a very hard wood used exclusively for building.

Coal at Aden comes normally entirely from the United Kingdom. Since 1914 Indian coal has been increasingly imported, while British coal has fallen in quantity and risen in price.

Austria and Germany were making considerable progress in their exports to Arabia of cotton goods, lace, and net, silk goods, sugar, false pearls, enamel-ware, paper and paper goods, lamps and lamp-glasses. Their success was due to the energy of their travellers and their good sense in catering for the tastes of the Arabs, who prefer cheap and bright-coloured articles to those which are expensive and durable. Austria had also made advantageous shipping arrangements between Trieste and Jedda (*see* p. 63).

(c) *Customs and Tariffs*

The Customs vary in different ports with the different administrations to which the ports are subject.

Aden has since 1850 been a free port. Duties are levied only on liquors and intoxicating drugs, but licences, for which fees are payable, must be obtained for the importation of petroleum and arms.

At *Hodeida* import duties are 11 per cent., of which 8 per cent. may be paid in cash or in kind, but the

remaining 3 per cent. in cash only. A rebate of 10 per cent. is allowed on the amount paid voluntarily in cash. Export duties are 10 per cent. on all exports to foreign countries, payable in cash or in kind, with 10 per cent. rebate on cash payments. No duty is payable on goods exported to Turkish ports.

At *Jedda* and *Yambo* import duties are 11 per cent. on all goods except those imported from Turkish ports. In 1909 the customs were reformed, being made payable on invoice values, plus lighterage at Jedda.

At *Muscat* and the other Oman ports import duties are 5 per cent. on all articles except arms and ammunition, on which 6 per cent. is payable, in addition to a customs charge variously stated to be one or half a dollar on each rifle. Native and Indian merchants pay large sums in advance, by which means they obtain very considerable rebates. The duty is calculated on the price ruling at the moment in the locality, not on the invoice price.

In all Oman ports except Muscat an export duty of 5 per cent. is levied on goods brought down to the coast. This is called *zakat*, and has been substituted for a tax on agricultural and movable property, which it was found impossible to collect. A transit duty of 5 per cent. is also levied on all dates coming into the Oman ports, whether these are for export or for local consumption.

At Bahrein the import duty is 5 per cent., sometimes paid in kind. The charge for goods imported for re-export without opening is generally $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. There is no general export duty, but the following are the duties on the more important exports:—

Cuttle-fish ...	... 5 per cent. *ad valorem*.
Bahrein dates	... 4*d*. per bag.
Katif dates ...	... 2*d*. per bag.
Fish (generally)	... 4*d*. per bag.
Mussel shells ...	... 8*d*. per bag.
Oyster shells ...	... 4*d*. per bag.
Mother-of-pearl	... 2*s*. 8*d*. per case.

(D) FINANCE

(1) *Public Finance*

Public finance, in the usual sense of the words, can hardly be said to exist at all in Arabia, on account of the backwardness of its civilisation, its poverty, and the dependence on different Powers of a considerable part of the country. For the last-named reason it is only possible to make a few general statements with regard to Arabian finance as a whole.

Part of Arabia is politically dependent on either Turkey or Great Britain, and the mediatised Arab rulers receive subsidies from the protecting Power. In the Turkish sphere taxes are levied where possible, while in the British sphere no taxes are levied, and the control is limited to the payment of a subsidy by the Indian Government on condition that no treaty shall be negotiated with, and no financial aid accepted from, any country other than Great Britain.

Independent Arabia, which is represented, roughly speaking, by a broad belt of the country from north to south, is, except in Hadhramaut, extremely primitive and very little known. Taxes are levied locally by the sultans, or merely by the sheikhs, being imposed chiefly on the live-stock and agricultural produce of the tribes. Much the same state of things exists over the greater part of protected Arabia, but in the Turkish sphere of Yemen complications arise from the competition between the Porte and the local authority in respect of the levying of taxes. This conflict of interests is aggravated in Asir, where the Idrisi has set up his claim to independence, and where the payment of taxes varies according to the political leanings of the sheikhs.

Independent Arabia includes many small tribes who live within the spheres under protection, but who are virtually independent. Nejd and Jebel Shammar are, however, the only important independent sultanates, and Kasim is usually subordinate to one or other of

these. The British Military Report in 1904 gave particulars of heavy taxation in Kasim, which was found very burdensome to agriculture. One-tenth of all produce and one-third of the harvest was said to be claimed for the purpose of occasional *jihads*, or religious wars. On cattle the tax was one-twentieth of their value and on incomes one-fortieth, while a duty of two riyals was levied on every load of imported goods. This heavy taxation is due to Wahabite fanaticism. In Riad the taxation is said to be light.

Hadhramaut, actually under British influence, is nominally subject to Turkey, but no Turkish taxes have ever been levied there. The native local authorities impose taxation chiefly upon the townsmen, while the tribesmen and the Seyyids (a privileged clan purporting to be the descendants of Husain, the Mohammedan martyr) go comparatively free.

Turkish Arabia has always been a financial burden to Turkey, but the Porte found it necessary to shoulder the liabilities involved, in order that the Sultan might maintain his prestige as Caliph, or spiritual head of Islam, which office is closely bound up with the possession of the Holy Cities. Both Mecca and Medina received a large yearly grant, or *surra*, from the Porte, and both were exempt from Turkish taxation. Elsewhere in Hejaz taxes were collected by Turkish officials on the Turkish system with the aid of the Sherif of Mecca, who in his turn received voluntary tribute from the faithful Wahabites of central Arabia. In 1910 the Sultan of Riad agreed that this tribute should be fixed at the yearly payment of £4,000. The Porte found itself further compelled to garrison the Holy Cities and the Hejaz Railway, and to subsidise the tribes whose ranges touched the railway in return for their defence of the line.

In Yemen the Turks formerly levied exorbitant dues on the transit of coffee, but after the rebellion of 1911 an arrangement was made between the Porte and the Imam, providing for the abolition of all

octroi and transit duties. The only taxes now levied are :—

(*a*) Tithes on agricultural produce and stock (from which Zeidists are exempt).
(*b*) Market dues—10 per cent. on all produce sold, and also 1 piastre on every goat killed and 10 piastres on every bullock killed.
(*c*) Customs dues.

In Jedda, Yambo, and Hodeida the Turkish 11 per cent. import duty is levied.

In Asir taxation conditions are chaotic in the extreme. Taxes are collected for the Porte, the Idrisi, and the Sherif of Mecca. The Porte usually subsidises loyal sheikhs for the collection of Turkish dues, but the regular payment of taxes is almost unknown. The tribes pay only when they must, or in accordance with their political sympathies of the moment. At Bisha both the Idrisi and the Sherif of Mecca have tax-collectors. In Khamis Musheit the Turks take toll of the local cultivators, but the sheikh of the Shahran levies his own taxes. He charges 1 piastre for every donkey sold, 2 piastres for every camel sold, and 5 piastres for every skin of ghi sold.

In Hasa, the Turkish Government, instead of taxing dates, took a share of the crops. In Katif it taxed dates. Heavy taxes were also levied on pearl-fishing, which caused the emigration of many divers to Bahrein.

In the British sphere the Sultan of Oman, the Sultan of Koweit, and the sheikhs of the Pirate Coast of El-Katr and of Bahrein receive subsidies from the Indian Government. In Oman the Indian Government prohibited any increase of the 5 per cent. import duty. The sheikh of Bahrein derives his income from customs, agricultural duties, taxes on pearl-boats, judicial fees, and rent of town lands, shops, or khans.

The ports of Arabia usually apply locally most of the revenue raised from import or export duty. Hodeida has a large revenue, partly due to a tax on

petroleum and partly to its appropriation of half the pier dues (levied eight years before the pier itself was built). Jedda and Yambo obtain revenues from import duties; Sur and other rising little ports depend largely on *zakat*, or export duty, only a very small proportion of which, if any, is remitted to the central authority.

The Suluba tribe, a non-Arab tribe scattered throughout the nomads, pay a date-tax to the nomads among whom they live.

Aden is under the control of the Bombay Government. Its budget in 1914-15 was approximately as follows:—

Receipts.	£
Aden Port Trust Fund	34,000
Aden Settlement Fund	28,000
Local supply bills	257,000
Post Office	34,000
Excise, including customs duties...	6,300
Income tax	5,000
Imperial and municipal receipts...	215,700
	£580,000

The expenditure of the same year was approximately £556,000. In 1916-17 receipts amounted to £741,160 and expenditure to £760,650.

The Aden Port Trust manages the port. Its chief duty is to see that the harbour depth is maintained, funds for the purpose being obtained from landing and shipping tolls and wharfage fees. The Aden Settlement Fund is obtained from house-tax, octroi, &c., and is devoted to sanitation, conservancy, and so forth.

(2) *Currency*

The currency of Arabia is extremely chaotic. It is largely influenced by economic and political factors, i.e., nearness to and trade with another country will induce the habit of accepting that country's coinage,

while the greater the preponderance of Turkish or British political influence the larger will be the use of Turkish or British coinage.

Turkish coinage is most in use in Hejaz, where the subsidies granted by the Porte to the Holy Cities are paid in mejidieh or Turkish dollars. The use of foreign money, indeed, is prohibited in Mecca, Medina, and the ports, and also along the pilgrim road, but the prohibition is disregarded in all but Government transactions. The Turkish gold lira, silver mejidieh, and silver piastre (worth respectively about 18*s*., 3*s*. 4*d*., and 2*d*.) are chiefly found in the Turkish provinces, viz., in Hadhramaut and Yemen. In the latter, however, the Turkish pound is rare, and the mejidieh dollar is only worth about 2*s*. 10*d*. In Asir and southern Nejd the Turkish pound is looked upon with suspicion.

The coin most universally found is the silver riyal, or Maria Theresa dollar, minted at Trieste, and generally worth about 2*s*., but in Hejaz worth from 2*s*. to 2*s*. 5*d*. It is in use everywhere except in Hadhramaut, where there is not even a coin of corresponding value. Its use was prohibited in Yemen until 1910.

The Turkish silver piastre is frequently replaced in Asir, and even in Hejaz, by the Indian two-anna piece. In the Aden interior the standard unit is the Indian four-anna piece, locally called a *baule*. In Aden proper it is the rupee at the fixed value of 15 to the pound sterling, or 1*s*. 4*d*. In Bahrein also the rupee has almost completely ousted the dollar.

At Jedda and in Hejaz generally the large influx of pilgrims provided only with money of their native land leads to general acceptance of coins of Indian, Javanese, Japanese, Dutch, Egyptian, Singapore, Tunisian, Persian, Zanzibar, and German East African origin, so that the currency is extremely varied. In Hejaz there are to be found a large variety of foreign dollars, including the Singapore, Japanese, and Mexican (all called *brum*, and worth

from 2*s.* to 2*s.* 4*d.*), and the Javanese, Egyptian, and Tunisian, all more than double the brum in value. The Persian kran (worth about 8½*d.*) is also current. In Nejd the other extreme exists, and not even Indian or Persian coins are accepted. Further confusion arises from the frequent use of "account" or imaginary coins in commercial transactions, and from the fact that often different coins in use in the same locality bear only fractional relations to one another. Both Hejaz and Oman have an imaginary or "account" currency, used for making trade calculations, the actual coins being non-existent. That of Hejaz is as follows:—

28 devanis	...	= 1 rezin.
40 devanis	...	= 1 bad piastre.
28 bad piastres, or 40 rezins	...	= 1 Umla dollar (1*s.* 10½*d.*).

In Oman the imaginary currency is as follows:—

20 gaz	...	= 1 mohamadi.
11½ mohamadi	...	= 1 dollar.

Hadhramaut has a distinctive currency, including the khamsie, a small copper coin of under a half-penny in value, three smaller copper coins, and three silver coins—the haraf, nearly 4*d.*; the okiyah, nearly 8*d.*; and the karsh, nearly 5*s.* Five-franc pieces are also in use, and the ten-cent pieces of the Dutch East Indies.

There is normally a good deal of trade in specie at Muscat. The fluctuation in the relative values of the dollar and the rupee tempts Indian bankers and other speculators to import silver, both specie and bar, from India, the import varying with the current value of the dollar.

Much traffic in Arabia is done by barter. Camel-hire is paid in dates (a month's hire of a good camel is at Teima 100 measures of dates), and in all the oases dates are a common measure of exchange. When land is sold it is a common practice to make

part payment in silver and the rest in dates and other articles.

(3) *Banking*

The National Bank of India has a branch at Aden, and there are branches of the Imperial Ottoman Bank and of Messrs. Gellatly & Hankey at Jedda.

The Mohammedan religion forbids banking, but the prohibition is evaded in most Moslem countries.

There are a considerable number of Hindu bankers at Muscat, who finance pearl-merchants and importers, and also do business in silver, profiting by the fluctuations in the value of the dollar.

(4) *Influence of Foreign Capital*

Foreign capital enters Arabia for both political and economic purposes, but not to any large extent. The Turkish and British Governments pay subsidies to various mediatised sultans and lesser chiefs, and the *surra* (*see* p. 107) is religious as well as political in scope. There is some doubt as to whether it was always regularly paid. To British capital is due Aden's development as a port, but Aden's commerce is chiefly financed by foreign merchants of various nationalities (*see* p. 91). Turkish capital is only invested economically in the Salif salt works, a very flourishing concern. French and Italian capital was beginning to be invested to a small extent in economic undertakings, such as piers and railways (*see* pp. 50, 91), and Italian capital also in the successful salt works of Aden. The pastoral tribes of the north are dependent on Damascus capital and the camel-rearing tribes of the centre on that of Baghdad. Hindu bankers finance the pearl-merchants of Oman and also the Muscat importing firms, while Jewish capital is engaged more or less at most of the ports and at Sana, where there is a Jewish quarter. European merchants are reputed to do

almost half of the Bahrein pearl trade, the remainder being done by Arabs and Hindus in the ratio of 3 to 1.

(E) GENERAL REMARKS

The prospects of economic development in Arabia are not very promising. An increase of trade can only be looked for through the following channels :—

(1) The development of the pilgrim traffic. Already Mohammedanism is embraced by one-seventh of the human race, and it is rapidly spreading over pagan Africa. Hitherto comparatively few pilgrims have travelled from inland Africa, because the journey was so long, difficult, dangerous, and expensive. The extension of railways in Africa, however, will in course of time transform these conditions, and a great increase of pilgrim traffic may then reasonably be expected. Pilgrimages bring with them not only personal profit for the citizens of Mecca and Medina, but great opportunities for trade, as pilgrims usually take back with them merchandise both for their own use and as gifts to friends. A still greater impulse would be given to pilgrim visits to Arabia if greater security and better sanitary arrangements were provided for the pilgrims. It is said that the sanitation of Mecca has recently been improved. The numbers of pilgrims are, in normal times, continually being increased by the efforts of agents from Mecca, who travel over the Mohammedan world preaching the necessity of pilgrimage.

(2) The construction of inland railways, such as the lines projected from Hodeida to Sana, Mecca to Jedda, and Sana to Aden. The prospect of greater and cheaper facilities of inland transport would stimulate the production and collection of agricultural and pastoral produce.

(3) The improvement of political conditions, so as to give greater security for persons and property. At present the nomad tribes make continual raids upon

their neighbours, carrying off or destroying their property, a state of things which does not encourage either thrift or enterprise.

(4) The introduction of improved agricultural methods and implements, and, possibly, an extension of the area under cultivation by means of additional irrigation works, artesian wells, &c. Afforestation might do something to abate the aridity of the more barren districts. The soil of Arabia is fertile where it is well watered; and there is no doubt that it could be made to produce much more than it does if proper attention were paid to manuring, the rotation of crops, deep ploughing, &c. It seems likely, also, that by the introduction of a better stock of sheep, wool could be made into a valuable commercial asset.

(5) Although the lack of water power, as well as the absence of coal and iron, makes any large schemes of industrial development impracticable, something could be done to improve tanning and weaving by the introduction of improved methods and modern machinery. The Arab in Mesopotamia has shown himself not only capable of learning but also, under good conditions, a steady worker.

APPENDIX

TABLE I.—SHIPPING ENTERED AT ADEN, 1911–1917.

——	1911–12.	1912–13.	1913–14.	1914–15.	1915–16.	1916–17.
Tonnage ...	3,594,190	3,685,056	3,924,524	3,058,251	2,076,795	1,639,658
No. of merchant vessels	1,510	1,535	1,529	1,155	901	782
Nationality—						
British ...	804	793	767	698	570	476
German	166	162	180	57	—	—
British-Indian...	149	152	172	162	85	51
French ...	113	108	117	107	92	92
Italian	113	116	84	89	94	61
Austrian	111	132	151	—	—	—
Dutch ...	19	20	18	8	15	6
Russian ...	13	9	19	6	1	1
Spanish ...	6	6	9	4	4	5
Norwegian	6	30	4	9	13	17
Danish	4	3	1	—	3	—
Japanese ...	2	—	—	8	16	54
Turkish	1	—	—	—	—	—
Swedish	1	3	3	3	2	3
Other nationalities	2	1	4	4	6	16

TABLE II.—VALUES OF EXPORTS, 1909.

——	Aden.	Hodeida.	Jedda.	Muscat.	Bahrein.	Totals.
	£	£	£	£	£	£
Trans-shipment articles of mixed origin—						
Hides and skins	707,442	70,641	20,773	4,000	2,687	805,543
Pearls	29,173	..	..	33,976	732,666	795,815
Coffee	415,480	134,478	..	..	10,449	560,407
Gums	52,551	..	6,053	..	..	58,604
Shells	17,444	..	80	4,618	27,400	49,542
Wax	30,287	..	..	..	..	30,287
Ghi	25,344	..	..	..	..	25,344
Sesame oil	3,426	..	..	..	..	3,426
Senna	..	930	..	..	..	930
Articles of purely Arabian origin—						
Dates	..	..	..	114,709	8,018	122,727
Salt	20,591	..	..	568	..	21,159
Henna	..	..	9,333	..	..	9,333
Limes	..	..	.	5,861	630	6,491
Dried fish	..	..	...	5,068	..	5,068
Wool	..	..	2,800	..	..	2,800
Trans-shipment article of purely African origin—						
Ivory	76,170	..	..	..	..	76,170
Total	1,377,908	206,049	39,039	168,800	781,850	2,573,646

TABLE III.—EXPORTS FROM ADEN, 1910–16.

—	1910.		1911.		1912.		1913.		1914.		1915.		1916.	
	Quantity in Tons.	Value in £.	Quantity in Tons.	Value in £.	Quantity in Tons.	Value in £.	Quantity in Tons.	Value in £.	Quantity in Tons.	Value in £.	Quantity in Tons.	Value in £.	Quantity in Tons.	Value in £.
Trans-shipment articles of mixed origin—														
Hides and skins	6,280	687,188	6,096	652,250	6,271	713,865	6,837	797,969	5,914	640,805	5,569	621,206	6,737	1,063,528
Coffee ..	6,633	409,081	6,390	415,018	7,643	540,268	6,951	487,257	5,052	376,426	6,408	506,802	4,172	281,339
Pearls ..	..	41,000	..	83,433	..	59,133	..	37,633	..	17,381	..	27,067	..	52,153
Gums ..	2,620	67,908	2,641	77,096	2,962	75,756	3,239	79,429	1,461	34,812	2,903	67,204	2,817	72,995
Wax ..	12	15,306	18	22,238	98	12,533	73	9,500	53	6,757	32	4,203	89	10,492
Ghi.. ..	286	15,877	313	20,328	343	24,433	379	28,704	238	20,652	143	12,374	130	10,564
Shells ..	..	21,864	..	21,176	..	30,776	..	25,625	..	9,254	..	11,377	..	10,390
Sesame seeds ..	299	4,338	280	4,339	360	6,135	740	13,240	596	10,160	260	4,027	222	4,016
Article of purely Arabian origin—														
Salt.. ..	..	27,281	..	44,107	..	54,848	..	52,771	..	76,243	..	66,779	..	76,921
Trans-shipment article of purely African origin—														
Ivory ..	48	51,666	34	41,075	43	27,461	15	16,297	5	6,679	8	8,411	11	11,752

TABLE IV.—EXPORTS FROM MUSCAT AND BAHREIN.

—	Muscat.						Bahrein.			
	1910.		1911.		1912.		1910.		1911.	
	Quantity, tons.	Value in £	Quantity, tons.	Value in £	Quantity, tons.	Value in £	Quantity, tons.	Value in £	Quantity, tons.	Value in £
Pearls	..	2,173	..	2,997	..	1,227	..	928,553	..	1,994,666
Dates	12,887	131,741	13,685	116,534	10,807	103,369	..	24,314	..	13,205
Shells	112	3,683	72	3,756	..	2,679	3,670	30,116	1,051	6,457
Cotton goods (Muscat manufacture)	..	16,657	..	7,340	..	13,380	..	..	..	..
Limes	276	5,355	202	5,869	201	6,730	..	193	..	1,040
Dried fish, shark fins, &c.	365	3,107	57	3,851	1,001	7,915	..	400	..	232

TABLE V.—VALUES OF IMPORTS, 1909.

—	Aden.	Hodeida.	Jedda.	Muscat.	Bahrein.	Totals.
	£	£	£	£	£	£
Brass and copperware ..	1,200	..	12,500	..	2,500	16,200
Carpets	3,000	..	17,500	..	..	20,500
Coal	156,000	..	..	..	..	156,000
Dates	56,000	13,000	7,000	..	62,500	138,500
Drugs, &c.	7,000	..	.	..	2,800	9,800
Dyes	10,000	5,000	1,500	..	460	16,960
Earthenware	4,000	4,000	..	.	2,000	10,000
Fruit and vegetables ..	16,000	..	..	..	..	16,000
Glassware	5,000	6,200	18,000	..	970	30,170
Hardware and cutlery ..	12,000	2,500	80,000	..	2,100	96,600
Machinery	4,000	..	..	..	..	4,000
Paper, &c.	6,000	2,000	..	..	..	8,000
Petroleum	23,000	22,000	12,000	2,000	3,700	62,700
Provisions	52,000	27,000	130,000	18,000	61,000	288,000
Rice	144,000	20,000	287,000	139,000	207,000	797,000
Seeds	24,000	..	..	..	2,000	26,000
Soap	10,000	7,900	6,700	.		24,600
Spices	36,000	3,000	..	..	14,600	53,600
Sugar	93,000	39,000	76,000	15,000	17,700	240,700
Tea	6,000	..	11,000	..	16,000	33,000
Textiles	621,000	274,000	225,000	78,000	144,000	1,342,000
Tobacco	138,000	11,000	29,000	..	23,300	201,300
Wheat, flour, and other grain	131,000	53,000	304,300	20,000	24,000	532,300
Wines and spirits ..	13,000	..	..	2,000	..	15,000
Wood	10,000	800	9,000	..	8,600	28,400

TABLE VI.—IMPORTS TO ADEN, 1912–16.

——	1912.	1913.	1914.	1915.	1916.
	£	£	£	£	£
Coal	188,000	173,000	206,000	290,000	478,000
Dates	79,000	81,000	69,000	62,000	78,000
Drugs	19,000	10,000	8,000	9,000	18,000
Dyes, &c. ..	40,000	38,000	16,000	6,000	5,000
Fruit and vegetables	17,000	18,000	19,000	24,000	18,000
Glassware ..	11,000	10,000	6,000	4,000	6,500
Grain and pulse (except rice)	248,000	330,000	347,000	250,000	210,000
Hardware ..	12,000	14,000	10,000	5,000	8,000
Iron and steel ..	11,000	11,000	14,000	9,000	14,000
Machinery ..	8,000	5,000	6,000	4,000	8,000
Paper, pasteboard, and stationery	11,000	7,000	8,000	8,000	18,000
Petroleum and kerosene	49,000	54,000	52,000	69,000	44,000
Provisions ..	63,000	67,000	65,000	83,000	85,000
Rice	200,000	193,000	143,000	96,000	223,000
Seeds	40,000	49,000	47,000	27,000	37,000
Soap	16,000	10,000	10,000	14,000	32,000
Spices	70,000	41,000	35,000	51,000	70,000
Sugar ..	194,000	121,000	91,000	103,000	146,000
Tea	10,000	7,000	8,000	24,000	24,000
Textiles	1,006,000	759,000	613,000	902,000	1,726,000
Tobacco	174,000	209,500	151,500	144,000	146,000
Wines and spirits ..	12,000	13,000	12,000	15,000	20,500
Wood	16,000	26,000	13,000	10,000	19,000

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ISLANDS

OF THE

NORTHERN AND EASTERN AEGEAN

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1920

EDITORIAL NOTE

In the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connexion with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious, and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous inquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics, and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes ; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,

General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

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I. GEOGRAPHY PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL

General Description

The islands included in the present survey are Thasos, Samothraki, Imbros, Tenedos, Lemnos, Agiostrati (Strati), Mytilene (Lesbos), Psara, Khios, Samos, Nikaria (Ikaria), Patmos, Leros, Kalymnos, Kos, Astropalia, Nisyros, Tilos, Symi, Khalki (Kharki), Rhodes, Karpathos, Kasos, Kastellorizo.

These islands lie off the coast of Thrace and Asia Minor and form, with the other Aegean Islands,[1] a link between Greece and Asia Minor. The most northerly, Thasos, lies close to the coast of eastern Macedonia. Samothraki, Imbros, and Tenedos lie off the Dardanelles, with Lemnos and the small island of Agiostrati farther to the west. Mytilene, with the Moskonesia between it and the mainland, lies off the Gulf of Adramyti. Khios and Psara form a distinct group farther south, being the extension of the promontory which runs west from Smyrna. South again Samos and Nikaria form a continuation of the Mykale promontory, and from them the Southern Sporades run down the coast in a south-easterly direction as far as Rhodes. The Dodekanese, or Twelve Islands, is a term loosely used, and varies in signification. In Turkish times it did not include Kos and Rhodes, but at the present day these two are included in common parlance, and Nikaria and Kastellorizo omitted. They are, from north to south—(Nikaria,) Patmos, Leros, Kalymnos, Kos, Astropalia, Nisyros, Symi, Tilos, Rhodes, Khalki, (Kastellorizo,) Karpathos, and Kasos. The islands marking the western limit are Thasos, Lemnos, Agiostrati, Psara, Nikaria, Astropalia, and

[1] See *Greece, &c.*, No. 18 of this series.

Kasos, with the intervening islets, Lebinthos (Levitha), Kinaros, and Syrina (Syrnos). Between Astropalia and Kasos lie some groups of rocks or islets of which the attribution is doubtful.

The climate of these islands resembles that of the Cyclades (see *Greece*, No. 18 of this series). It is mild and equable.

Sanitary conditions are on the whole good. The chief defect is the prevalence of malaria in low-lying or marshy districts. There is also a certain amount of leprosy in some islands.

The people of these islands are of the Greek race and speak the Greek language. In some cases, as in Astropalia and Karpathos, they preserve dialects containing classical forms unknown to the modern tongue; but all the Greeks are mutually intelligible. They also preserve ancient marriage and other customs at Lindos in Rhodes, in Kalymnos, and elsewhere.

The population amounted before the war to a total of about 375,000, the great bulk of whom are Greek by race and Orthodox Christians by religion; there were only about 24,000 Turks, most of them in Rhodes and Mytilene, and a few Jews. Since the war of 1912 many Greek refugees have come from Asia Minor, and some of the Turks have emigrated.

The people of the islands live for the most part in the towns and villages near the sea, and are engaged in some form of maritime industry or in agriculture or mining. The Dodekanese has suffered very much during the war from the lack of communication with the mainland and with Egypt; while Mytilene and Khios have had to support the great body of refugees from Asia Minor.

THASOS

Thasos, the most northerly island in the Aegean, lies only about 4 miles from the Macedonian coast. The islet of Thasopoulo is in the middle of the channel. Thasos is about 160 square miles in area, and roughly circular in shape. It is mountainous (highest point,

Ypsarion, 3,428 ft.) and well wooded. The principal village, Panagia, is on the north-east, and has a landing-place, Limani, with two small harbours. There are also landing-places on the east coast at Potamia Bay, and at Kinara within the islet of Kinara. On the south coast a tongue of land jutting into the sea forms a small harbour. Near Cape Kokkina, at the southern extremity of the island, is Astris, with a small landing-place. On the north-west is Poto, from which the zinc worked by the Germans was exported. On the west are the landing-places of Mories, Kakerachi, Sotiro, Kazaveti, and Vulgaro. The island is peculiarly rich in metals. The population are Greek Christians and number about 13,000.[1]

SAMOTHRAKI

Samothraki (Turkish, Semendrek), 38 miles east-south-east of Thasos, and 15 miles north-west of Imbros, is 12 miles by 10 in size, and mountainous, containing the highest peak in the archipelago (Mt. Phengari, 5,248 ft.). The general formation of the island, with a central peak from which all the land slopes down to the sea, is volcanic; the high ground is bare and the valleys fertile. Owing to the strong currents from the Dardanelles, the anchorages and roadsteads are not safe in a north wind. The safest landing-place is in the Bay of Kamariotis, near Cape Akrotiri, on the west coast. There is another landing-place at Malathrea in the south, others at the mouths of the Phonias and the Angistro, small rivers of the north-west. The usual landing-place is at Palaeopolis on the north coast.

The climate is mild on the west. The population numbers 4,600 Greek Christians. The chief village is Pyrgos, or Chora, with 3,700 inhabitants. It has some sulphur springs three hours distant, which are much frequented by people from the mainland.

[1] The figures given for population throughout are for the most part only approximate estimates. In few cases are census statistics available.

IMBROS

Imbros (Turkish, Imruz) lies 15 miles south-east of Samothraki, and is about 18 miles from east to west by 8 miles from north to south. The principal place, Kastro, on the north coast, is on the site of the ancient town of Imbros. The usual landing-place is in the bay to the south of Nikolaos at the mouth of the Ilissus. From Lemnos the landing-place is at Pyrgos, half-way between Cape Avlaka and Cape Niger. The harbour of Kephalo is important as lying off the Dardanelles, nearly 12 miles from Cape Helles.

The chief village in the interior is Panaghia. Kusu Bay, from which was exported the brown coal (lignite) worked by a German company, is not now used as an anchorage, owing to its exposure to the north winds. Here, as in Samothraki, the valleys are very fertile. The population consists of about 9,000 Greeks.

TENEDOS

Tenedos has a circumference of 10 miles. With it go the small islands at the mouth of the Dardanelles known as the Rabbit Islands (Tavchan Adasi), the longest of which is 4 miles in length. There is a town and harbour on the east coast, separated by a channel only 3 miles wide from the mainland. Tenedos has a population of about 5,000, one-third of whom are Moslems.

LEMNOS

Lemnos (Turkish, Ilmeli; Italian, Stalimeni) lies in the middle of the northern Aegean, and is of an irregular square shape, 15 miles each way across. The bays of Purnea on the north and Mudros on the south divide the island into an eastern and a western portion. Mudros harbour, the most important in this part of the Aegean, is nearly land-locked and affords good

anchorage for a number of large ships. There is another harbour farther west, Kondia, smaller but capable of accommodating large ships. The Bay of Kondia is open to the south-west, while the prevailing winds are from the north. It is divided from Mudros by a neck of land a quarter of a mile in breadth. Lemnos is hilly, but the hills do not rise to so great a height as on some of the other islands, their highest point being 1,400 ft. There are no trees; the water, which is obtained from wells, is good. The coast is rocky, except in the bays mentioned; and the current of the Hellespont sets with great force between Lemnos and Imbros. The population is mainly Greek and numbers about 27,000; many of the men migrate in winter to Egypt in search of work. The chief town, Kastro, on the west coast of the island, has an old citadel crowning the promontory, and warm baths not far distant. On the east coast there is a shallow salt lake called Megalo Limni, about 2 square miles in extent, separated from the sea by a narrow strip of land, but connected with it at the northern end. It is dry in autumn. From it grassy dunes stretch southward to Mudros.

AGIOSTRATI

Agiostrati, Aistrati, or Strati (Agios Eustratios; Turkish, Bozbaba), lies south of Lemnos and north-west of Mytilene and Psara, but so far from all the others as to be almost forgotten. It is difficult of approach in a north wind, but has a good small harbour on the west, sheltered both from north and south by precipitous cliffs, 3 miles from the northern extremity, where the island runs up in a long narrow spit.

There are two rich valleys, Tenediotis and Paradeisos, where the peasants grow all kinds of fruit and vegetables. The population amounts to 1,300 Greeks. The island is considered by some scholars to be the ancient Halonesos.

MYTILENE

Mytilene (Mitylene) or Lesbos (Turkish, Midüllü), measuring 44 miles by 28, is rugged and mountainous. The highest peak is Mt. Olympus (3,080 ft.) in the south-east. The island is only 10 miles from the coast of Asia Minor and has two remarkable gulfs, Port Iero (Hiero) and Port Kalloni, which form two large land-locked harbours lying on the south-east and south-west of the island. Their great drawback is the narrowness of the entrance in both. Port Iero is 4 miles long by 2½ broad, with hot baths near. Port Kalloni is 11½ miles long by 4 miles wide. The entrance is hampered by a rocky bank which narrows the channel to 70 ft. wide for the first half-mile. Sigri Island (Megalonesi), on the west, forms a harbour with the coast, but the northern entrance is shallow. The north coast of the island is irregular and indented, the mountains rising to a height of 1,000 ft. close to the shore. The town of Molyvos has an open roadstead. There are great olive-groves on all the lower slopes of the hills. The climate is healthy except in the marshes in autumn. The population before the war numbered 152,000, of whom 14,000 were Turks; but during the war about 70,000 Greek refugees from Asia Minor took shelter here. The chief town, Mytilene, is a clean, well-built, busy place, with a population in ordinary times of about 15,000 Greeks. The town is situated on a promontory on the east coast of the island and is the principal port, though it has only an open roadstead. Two small harbours, suitable only for small craft, lie on each side of the promontory. The northern harbour is the more commodious, but less used. The small island group known as Moskonesia (with a population of about 5,500 Greeks), a dependency of Mytilene, lies close to the coast, off Aivali (Kydonia), with which it is intimately connected.

PSARA

Psara, a dependency of Khios, is a small rocky island, known in history for the heroic part it played in the Greek revolution against Turkish rule. There is a good roadstead on the west of the island sheltered by an islet, Antipsara, and a small harbour to the south. The population, which, according to Finlay, numbered about 6,000 at the time of the Greek revolution, has never recovered from the Turkish massacres; it now numbers about 3,500 Greeks.

KHIOS

Khios (Italian, Scio; Turkish, Sakiz Adasi, i.e. Mastic Island), 7 miles from the mainland, 32 miles long by from 5 to 8 wide, is rocky throughout. Mt. Elias, the highest point (4,157 ft.), is at the northern end. The hills become lower towards the south. There are several anchorages along the shores of the island, the principal being that in the strait, one at Port Kolokithia, and one at Volisso. This island is the most fertile and richest in the Aegean, the principal source of its wealth being the mastic, made into chewing gum, used by Turkish women. The Khiotes have suffered much both from earthquake and massacre. Kastro (Port Scio), the chief town, is situated on the east coast, on the site of the old Genoese citadel. There is a large open bay on the west coast. The population is about 74,000, of whom 3,000 are Moslems.

SAMOS

Samos (Turkish, Susam Adasi) is less than a mile from the mainland, and is about 30 miles from east to west and 10 from north to south. It is mountainous, but very fertile in the plains. On the north the heights are precipitous and barren, rising to 4,000 ft. The lower slopes are well wooded, and there are numerous streams. The Mytilenous runs into the sea east of Port Tigani, on the south-east coast of the island, and the

Imbrasus to the west of that port. Vathi, the modern capital, is the port lying at the head of a deep inlet on the north coast of the island, and is protected from the north winds by the adjacent mainland. It is famous for its cigarette factories. The town of Vathi possesses a system of waterworks with three reservoirs. The old aqueduct of Polycrates, leading to Tigani (the ancient capital) and cut through the mountains, still exists, but is not in use. The strait between Samos and Nikaria is the passage generally used by ships plying between Egypt and Constantinople. The population is about 69,000, mostly Greeks. The island group of Phurni (Korassiae), between Samos and Nikaria, possesses one good harbour.

NIKARIA

Nikaria (Ikaria), about 29 miles long by 5 broad, lies south-west of Samos. It has a population of about 12,800 Greeks and 100 Turks. The island is a chain of mountains running from north-east to south-west. The open bay of Manganitis lies on the south side. The chief town, Messaria (Agios Kyriakos), lies on the north coast.

PATMOS

Patmos (Patino), 20 miles south of the western end of Samos, is irregular in form and about 10 miles long by 5 miles wide. The surface is rugged and broken, rising to 800 feet in St. Elias, and the shore is deeply indented with numerous land-locked creeks. At the middle the island is almost divided in two. The soil is volcanic and barren; and the large bay on the east, which is said to be the safest in the Greek islands, looks like the crater of a submerged volcano. The inhabitants number about 2,500 and are Greeks, for the most part occupied in sponge-fishing. The southern half of the island is mainly occupied by monks and contains the famous monastery and cave of the Apocalypse. Arki and Lipso lie to the east, the latter having a village on it.

LEROS

Leros, 6 miles long by 4 broad, consists of rocky hills. The population numbers 5,000 Greeks. The port of Partheni on the north side of the island is sheltered by some barren rocks at the entrance.

KALYMNOS

Kalymnos, south-east of Leros, is of irregular shape, about 12 miles by 8. It has about 17,000 inhabitants, all Greeks. All this group of islands is mainly concerned in sponge-fishing. The best harbour of Kalymnos is Pothia. The island is bare and mountainous, without trees; there are a few fertile valleys. It was once well wooded, as Ovid calls it '*silvis umbrosa*'. The islet of Telendos lies close to the west coast.

KOS

Kos (Italian, Stanchio; Turkish, Istan-Keui), close to the coast of Asia Minor, is a long and narrow island, 23 miles long from north-east to south-west and about 5 miles across, with the north-east end facing the Bay of Budrum. The chief town, Kos, is at the north-east end of the island. The mountains are high at the north and gradually sink to a tableland in the centre and rise again into a mountainous region south. The gardens in the central region produce a wealth of garden stuff, amongst others the famous Kos lettuces. The modern town of Kos is on the ancient site, and its most interesting feature is the mediaeval castle of the Knights of Rhodes. A huge tree, traditionally reported as that under which Hippocrates stood to prescribe, stands in the Castle square. The ancient port is silted up and can only be used by small vessels. An open bay lies on the south facing Nisyros. The population consists of 9,000 Greeks and about 500 Turks. The climate is healthy except near the town of Kos, where fever is prevalent in summer owing to the proximity of a lagoon.

ASTROPALIA

Astropalia (Astypalaia; Italian, Stampalia), south-west of Kos, consists of two large rocky masses, together about 11 miles by 7, joined in the centre by a narrow isthmus. On the north and south of this are two deep bays, the southern of which is sheltered by some rocky islets. The harbour of Maltezana is good. The population consists of 1,500 Greeks.

NISYROS

Nisyros, a small round island south-west of Cape Krio (Knidus), between Kos and Tilos, not quite 10 miles in circumference, is of volcanic origin and the central crater is filled by a sulphur lake. There are also some hot sulphur springs. The population consists of 2,500 Greeks. There is no good harbour.

TILOS

Tilos (Telos), or Piskopi, measuring about 8 miles by 4, between Nisyros and Rhodes, has three ports. There are about 3,000 inhabitants, many of whom are lepers.

SYMI

Symi (Turkish, Sümbeki), between the Knidus peninsula and Rhodes, about 8 miles long by 6 broad, has a broken rugged outline, and is surrounded by islets and rocks. The harbour of Panormus on the western side has a large monastery near it. The population consists of about 8,000 Greeks and 200 Turks, mainly engaged in the sponge fishery.

KHALKI

Khalki (Kharki, the ancient Aethraea or Ophiussa), off the west coast of Rhodes, is a rugged and mountainous island about 6 miles long by 3 broad. The inhabitants number about 2,500 and are mostly sponge-fishers.

RHODES

Rhodes (Rhodos, Rodi), the most easterly island of the Aegean, 12 miles distant from the coast of Asia Minor, is 43 miles from north-east to south-west and 20 miles in width. The northern half of the island is the more picturesque and fertile. In the south there is no coast plain, and in winter the torrents rush down from the mountains to the sea. The Rhodians have always been a maritime people. The island was noted for timber in ancient times, and in modern times has supplied Constantinople with timber for shipbuilding. The city of Rhodes, at the north-east extremity of the island, is built round an amphitheatre which rises from the water, with the mediaeval towers of the famous Knights of Rhodes flanking each side, and the Turkish mosques behind. The best quarter is now occupied by Jews. The Greek quarters, Maras and Neomaras, are outside the city. There are two harbours, now only used by small craft, the smaller of which has a fine basin but a narrow entrance. It is sheltered on all sides, but is now choked up. The larger harbour is exposed to the north-east wind. Lindos, on the east coast, is on one side of a small bay almost enclosed by rugged cliffs. As at Rhodes, the houses are picturesque, and ornamented with mediaeval carvings. The island is subject to earthquakes. The manufacture of the pottery for which the island was famous has ceased, though rough ware is still made for local use. The population of the island of Rhodes totals 31,000, of whom 6,000 are Moslems, 3,000 are Jews, and the rest Greeks.[1] Of these inhabitants 10,000 live in the capital. The fine climate has a wide reputation.

KARPATHOS

Karpathos (Italian, Scarpanto; Turkish, Kerpe) is a barren and rocky island running north and south,

[1] Estimates differ somewhat, cf. p. 24.

about 30 miles long by 7 to 3 broad. It reaches the height of about 4,000 feet. The coast has many small harbours. The population consists of about 8,000 Greeks. Many of the men go to work in Asia Minor during the summer, and what agriculture there is is mostly done by women. The isolation of the island has led to many curious survivals in language, customs, and dress.

KASOS

Kasos, between Karpathos and Crete, is about 12 miles by 4, and consists of a single range of mountains of considerable height. There is no harbour. There are about 7,500 Greeks and 100 Turks, mostly seafaring.

KASTELLORIZO

Kastellorizo (Megisti; Italian, Castelrosso), which strictly falls outside the Aegean, is a small island, only about 3 miles by 2, 60 miles east of Rhodes and about 1 mile from the mainland. There are about 7,000 Greek inhabitants, a great proportion of whom are sponge-fishers and ship's carpenters; they also have a good reputation as sailors. The island has a small land-locked harbour.

II. POLITICAL HISTORY

Chronological Summary

1000 B.C. (*circa*). Greeks in Asiatic Islands.
2nd cent. B.C. Islands under Rome.
A.D. 325. Foundation of Constantinople. Beginning of Greek Empire of the East.
13th–15th cent. Franks, especially Genoese, in islands.
1309–1522. Knights of St. John in Rhodes.
1453. Constantinople taken by Turks.
1462–1566. Islands gradually conquered by Turks.
1821. Several of islands join Greek War of Independence.
1822. Massacre of Khios.
1831. Asiatic Islands restored to Turkey.
1912. Rhodes, Kos, and Dodekanese occupied by Italy.
1912. Rest of Asiatic Islands occupied by Greece

(1) Classical and Byzantine Periods

The history of the islands of the eastern Aegean is part of the general history of the Greek race, and their fortune has been similar to that of other lands inhabited by Greeks. From the time of their earliest recorded history, that is from about 1000 B.C., they have been inhabited by Greek-speaking peoples, at different times ruled and influenced by foreigners, but always retaining their own marked national characteristics. The history of the Greeks can be roughly divided into six distinct periods. The first is the classical period of free Greek city-states, which lasted till about the middle of the second century B.C. This period also saw the extension of Greek civilization over the whole of Asia Minor and Syria, and in some degree over Egypt. The second is the period of Roman rule, when all Greek-speaking peoples were subjects of the Roman Empire. But throughout this time Greek civilization remained predominant in the eastern portion of the Empire, and the Greek language was that used by the earliest apostles

of Christianity. Consequently the division of the Empire into two parts by Constantine the Great in A. D. 325, with Constantinople—the old Greek city of Byzantium—as the capital of the Eastern Empire and with Christianity as its established religion, was only the official recognition of the already existing distinction of the Greek and Latin halves of the Empire. With this begins the third period of Greek history. Though its laws and its administration were based mainly on those of Rome, and Latin long remained its official language, the Eastern Empire became more and more Greek in character, and its severance from Western Europe was finally marked by the quarrel between the Orthodox and the Roman Churches. This third period ends with the capture of Constantinople in 1204 by the Franks of the Fourth Crusade. During most of the period the Greeks had maintained their rule over all Asia Minor by constant struggles against the Persians and Saracens of the East.

(2) Frankish Period

The fourth period, when western princes ruled in the Near East, is the shortest and least important of the periods of Greek history. Western traders had for some time been conducting an active commerce with the Greeks, and the rival republics of Genoa and Venice had been granted special trading privileges in the territory of the Empire. On the capture of Constantinople, the lands of the Empire were divided between different Frankish princes and barons and the republic of Venice; and there was a short-lived Latin dynasty at Constantinople. Though the Greeks, who had maintained themselves on the eastern shore of the Sea of Marmora, soon retook the capital, and afterwards some of the islands and half the Peloponnese, the Western Powers retained their control over the greater part of what is now the kingdom of Greece, and especially over the islands. Already the greater part of Asia Minor had fallen to the Turks,

and here nearly every trace of Greek civilization disappeared; only on the coasts of the Aegean and the Black Sea, where a second Greek empire, with its capital at Trebizond, maintained itself till the middle of the fifteenth century, did the Greeks preserve their religion, language, and national characteristics. The actual power of the Greeks had thus dwindled to very small proportions, but in the lands ruled by the Franks the Greek inhabitants tenaciously clung to their own customs, language, and religion, and there was but little intermingling between them and their western conquerors. When the latter, therefore, were driven out by the Turks they left but little mark on the country, and their permanent influence on Greece was very small, though their rule served to emphasize the feeling the Greeks already had of the deep distinction between themselves and all western nations.

(3) Turkish Period

The fifth period is the period of Turkish rule. The Turks established their power in Europe by the battle of Kossovo in 1389, and soon after extended their empire over the whole of the Balkan peninsula, Constantinople falling to them in 1453. Though some islands held out longer than others—Crete, which was held by the Venetians, not falling till 1669—and Venice made another appearance as a Power in the Near East towards the end of the seventeenth century by capturing the Peloponnese and holding it for thirty years, generally speaking, from the beginning of the fifteenth to the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Turks were all-powerful in south-eastern Europe and in Asia Minor, in all those lands inhabited by Greeks and where they once had held sway. During this time the Greeks were cut off altogether from the rest of Europe, and the ruling Turks were the only foreign people with whom they came in contact. By far the greater number of them retained their own customs, language, and religion, and the traditions of their past.

The sixth period of Greek history is that of the independent kingdom of Greece, a period which began for the inhabitants of continental Greece and some of the islands in the revolution of 1821; for the majority of the islands off the coast of Asia Minor it only began in 1912; for large numbers of Greeks it has not yet begun.

(4) Genoese Companies

A history of these Greek islands separate from that of the rest of Greek lands does not begin till the fourth of the six periods above described—the period of Frankish predominance; and even from that time their history only differs in so far as they came more or less under the influence of the Franks and the Turks. Two of the islands—the two largest, most fertile, and most thickly-populated of them all—Khios and Mytilene, were for long under the rule of the Genoese. In 1275 the Zaccaria family established themselves at Phocaea on the mainland opposite Khios, and in 1304 in Khios itself, first with commercial privileges granted them by the Greek Emperor, then as rulers in the island. In 1346, after a short interval of Greek rule, the *maona*, a chartered company of Genoese merchants, leased the island from the republic and ruled it and Samos in much the same way as chartered companies have ruled in Africa. They remained in Samos till 1475, in Khios till 1566. Another Genoese family, the Gattilusii, secured Mytilene for themselves, and later ruled also in Lemnos, Samothraki, and Imbros (1355–1462). The Genoese were the most tolerant of all the Frankish rulers in Greece; they did not interfere with the religion or customs of their Greek subjects, and left them always a large measure of local autonomy. Moreover, as they were primarily traders, they were interested in the suppression of piracy and in preserving the security of the seas. They maintained a precarious tenure of power even after the Turkish capture of Constantinople, but were finally driven from Khios in 1566.

(5) Knights of Rhodes

Rhodes, the next most important of the islands, had a somewhat different history. The famous Knights of St. John (Hospitallers) seized Rhodes in 1309, and there maintained a heroic struggle against the Turks till 1522, when they were granted honourable terms and retired to Malta. But, unlike the Genoese in Khios and Mytilene, their only interest was in fighting the Turks; and the Greek inhabitants of Rhodes and the neighbouring islands suffered greatly from the continual irregular warfare which they carried on. While they were known to the West as the most heroic champions of Christianity against the infidels, the Greeks regarded them as oppressors, pirates, and heretics.

(6) Privileges of Islands

During the long centuries of Turkish rule, the whole of the Aegean was under the command of a single governor; and the islands were distinguished from one another and from the rest of the Greek lands only by the degree of immunity from the presence of Turkish officials that each enjoyed. Special privileges were granted by the Turks to Khios and to the group of twelve small islands of the Southern Sporades known as the Dodekanese. The Greeks of Khios were allowed to manage their own local affairs much as they had been by the Genoese; a Turkish garrison was kept in the capital, but the Greeks elected their own municipal council; their Church and their schools were not interfered with; they were allowed to use the Greek language in their correspondence with the Turkish Government; and they had an official of their own in Constantinople, the Dragoman of the Porte, to represent them in any complaint they might have to make to the Government. Still greater privileges were enjoyed by the inhabitants of the Dodekanese. These twelve islands, Nikaria, Patmos, Leros, Kalymnos, Astropalia, Nisyros, Symi, Tilos, Khalki, Karpathos, Kasos, and Kastellorizo or Megisti, are

distinguished by the rocky and barren nature of their soil and the poverty of their inhabitants, who maintain themselves almost exclusively by sea-faring, fishing, and sponge-diving. The two fertile islands of the Southern Sporades, Kos and Rhodes, do not belong to the Dodekanese properly so called, and did not enjoy its privileges. The inhabitants of the twelve islands had to pay a single tax—and that not a high one—yearly to the Turkish Governor of Rhodes; they settled the amount each island was to pay towards this tax themselves; and if they paid the tax regularly they were free from all other interference by the Turks. No Turkish soldiers, nor any Turkish officials, were allowed to land on their islands; and each island managed its own affairs, settled its taxes, and built schools or churches, as it willed.

(7) Greek Revolution

The stories of the different islands in the nineteenth century vary greatly. Only four of those off the Asiatic coast played a part in the Greek revolution, viz. Khios, Psara, Samos, and Kasos. Of these, Psara and Kasos took a very prominent part in the activities of the Greek fleet; both were conquered by the Turks before the end of the war. But a worse fate befell Khios. A small body of Samiotes landed on that rich and peaceful island in 1822, defeated the Turkish garrison, and proclaimed its union with free Greece. But the Turks soon returned, drove out the Samiotes, and took their revenge on the inhabitants of the island. More than 50,000 Khiotes were massacred or deported; and the island has never since enjoyed the prosperity it had had previously.

(8) Islands in Nineteenth Century

On the establishment of the independent kingdom of Greece in 1831, all the islands, together with Crete, were returned to Turkey. But all their former privileges were restored to Khios and the Dodekanese, and Samos was made an autonomous principality under a Christian prince, appointed by the Sultan. The

subsequent history of these islands is largely one of attempts made by the Porte to infringe these privileges. Particularly in 1866, when the Law of the Vilayets was introduced, and in 1909, after the Young Turkish revolution, when another attempt was made to unify the government of the whole empire, were the privileges infringed, Turkish garrisons maintained, and more taxes imposed. In 1910 the attempt to apply the law of conscription to the Christian inhabitants of the empire met with very strong opposition, and memorials were presented to the Great Powers by the islanders.

(9) Principality of Samos

Samos had a disturbed history during this period. Though the autonomy of the island was guaranteed by France, Great Britain, and Russia, the three protecting Powers of Greece, attempts were constantly being made by the Porte to interfere in its government. The prince, chosen generally from among the Phanariot Greeks of Constantinople, was used by the Turkish Government as a Turkish official; and many conflicts broke out between him and the Assembly of the island, in which, according to the statute granting autonomy, lay the ruling authority. Finally, in 1908, the prince executed a *coup d'état* by dismissing the Assembly and introducing Turkish troops to support him; and his unconstitutional rule lasted till 1910. His successor was soon after deposed by the people; and Samos remained independent till the arrival of the Greek fleet in the first Balkan War.

(10) Italo-Turkish War

With the outbreak of the war between Italy and Turkey in 1911 begins a new period in the history of the islands. Italy, meeting with more resistance in Tripoli than she had expected, occupied, in the spring of 1912, the Southern Sporades (Rhodes, Kos, and the islands of the Dodekanese), except Nikaria and Kastellorizo. At the same time Nikaria and Samos

declared themselves independent republics. On October 10, 1912, Turkey, threatened with war by the Balkan States, concluded the Peace of Lausanne with Italy, according to which Italy was to return all the islands occupied by her to Turkey as soon as the last Turkish soldier was withdrawn from Tripoli. Since however this condition was not carried out, Italy has remained in provisional occupation of the islands.

(11) Greek Occupation

On the outbreak of the Balkan War, Nikaria and Samos, like Crete, at once proclaimed their union with Greece; and the Greek fleet soon occupied the remaining islands, Lemnos, Thasos, Samothraki, Imbros, Tenedos, Agiostrati, Mytilene, Khios, the Moskonesia, and Psara. The occupation of the Southern Sporades by Italy prevented their union with Greece. At the conclusion of the Balkan Wars, Turkey agreed to surrender Lemnos, Thasos, Psara, Agiostrati, Samos, Nikaria, and Crete; and Bulgaria resigned to Greece all claim to Thasos. But Turkey would not give up Samothraki, Imbros, and Tenedos, as being necessary for the defence of the Dardanelles, nor the rich islands of Khios and Mytilene; and when war broke out in 1914 no treaty had been signed between Turkey and Greece, and diplomatic relations were strained. The Great Powers, however, had recognized Greek claims to Khios, the Moskonesia, and Mytilene, while insisting that Imbros and Tenedos must be returned to Turkey.

Owing to the refusal of the Turks to agree to these terms, all the islands, including Imbros and Tenedos, have been since administered as part of the Greek Kingdom, and return members to the Greek Parliament. They form three new *nomoi*, or prefectures, of the Greek kingdom as follows: Mytilene, Lemnos, Agiostrati, Samothraki, Imbros, and Tenedos form the *nomos* of Lesbos, with its capital at Mytilene; Khios, the Mos-

konesia, and Psara form the *nomos* of Khios, with its capital at Khios; and Samos and Nikaria form the *nomos* of Samos, with its capital at Vathi. Thasos is part of the *nomos* of Drama, the most easterly province of Greek Macedonia. Kastellorizo proclaimed its union with Greece, but has been occupied by the French since 1915.

III. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

THE 'Asiatic Islands' must, for the purpose of the present section, be divided into two classes: (*a*) all north of, and including, Samos, which have become, for all practical purposes, a part of the Greek kingdom, and (*b*) Rhodes, Kos, and the Dodekanese, which, remaining nominally Turkish, have been since 1912 under Italian administration.

Those which are now included in Greece share in the religious and political institutions and system of public education common to the whole of the Greek Kingdom,[1] though there has not been much opportunity since 1913 for peaceful organization and development.

ISLANDS OCCUPIED BY GREECE

(1) *Religion*

The great majority of the population of these islands belong to the Orthodox Greek Church; but they were, before Greek annexation, under the Oecumenical Patriarch at Constantinople, and they have not yet been brought into definite relation with the Greek autocephalous Church in Old Greece. A Synod of bishops from the new provinces, including Macedonia and Crete, as well as these Asiatic Islands, was held at Salonika under the Provisional Government in 1917; but its relation to the Synod of Old Greece at Athens has not yet been defined.

There are about 1,300 Roman Catholics and a Roman Catholic Bishop in Khios.

[1] See *Greece, &c.*, No. 18 of this series.

There is a Moslem minority, which will probably diminish, in some of the islands (14,000 in Mytilene and about 3,000 in Khios). Under Greek administration its spiritual heads (Muftis) receive a contribution from the State. Toleration is extended to all recognized forms of worship by the Greek revised Constitution of 1911.

(2) *Political*

Until 1912 all the islands were subject to Turkey, which has never formally consented to give up Samothraki, Imbros, Tenedos, Mytilene, and Khios, though these, as well as the others, have been actually annexed by Greece. Khios enjoyed local autonomy under Turkish rule; and Samos had special privileges under a Christian prince appointed by the Sultan. All alike now send deputies to the Greek Parliament, and are administered by Greek officials.

(3) *Naval and Military Organization*

The population of the islands serve in the Greek army and navy under the same conditions as the inhabitants of Old Greece.

(4) *Public Education*

Even before the Greek annexation, education in these islands was provided by local administration ann by the endowments given by rich Greeks, mainly od the model of the educational system established in Old Greece. The teachers were in many cases graduates of Athens University or came from Greek schools. There were gymnasia in Mytilene and Khios; and in Samos secondary schools both for boys and girls were provided by the French religious communities. Anglophil Greeks sent their children to grammar schools in Smyrna. Statistics of illiteracy seem to show that, on the whole, Old Greece is more literate than the new territories, and the smaller and remoter islands have a lower standard of education;

the number of illiterates is everywhere much greater among the girls than among the boys. The educational system in these islands will doubtless soon be assimilated to that in Old Greece.

RHODES, KOS, AND THE DODEKANESE

(1) *Religion*

In Kos and the Dodekanese almost all the population are Greek Orthodox Christians, under the Oecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople. There are a few Turks in Kos. In Rhodes the great majority are also Greek Christians; there are about 7,000 Turks and 2,500 Jews, mostly in the town of Rhodes.[1]

(2) *Political*

The Dodekanese had special privileges as to local autonomy in Turkish times. The Italian occupation has not been popular; and large numbers of the inhabitants have emigrated to Crete or elsewhere, nearly half the population, it is said, from Kalymnos. This is especially due to the restrictions on their main industry of sponge-fishing, and the regulation that any one away from the island more than a month should not be permitted to return. The war must in any case have reduced the islanders to great straits, by cutting them off from Egypt and Asia Minor.

(3) *Public Education*

Education has been well provided for in some of the islands by private endowment or local administration. In Leros, for example, there is an education committee administering a fund of 10,000 drachmas yearly, derived from private benefactions, church contributions, and one-third of the harbour dues. This maintains elementary schools for 350 boys and 200 girls, with teachers trained in Athens, and a 'Hellenic' school of the Greek type. There are also one Greek and one French private

[1] Cf., however, p. 11.

school, a library, and a high school, in Greek and theology, where several of the local ecclesiastical dignitaries have been trained. This may be taken as a typical, though possibly favourable, example of the smaller islands. In Kalymnos there are, apart from elementary schools, a good endowed school for boys of gymnasium type, and a gymnasium for girls, supported and administered by the municipality.

IV. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

GENERAL SUMMARY [1]

It is very difficult to obtain an accurate estimate of the economic value of the islands newly acquired by Greece. The information available is scanty, and there are large gaps in it. The efforts made to estimate the possibilities of these lands appear to have been quite insufficient; but, such as they are, they reveal the inadequacy of the attempts to develop their agricultural resources and the still greater neglect of their mineral resources. Some islands, it is true, such as Lemnos and Tenedos, owe most of their importance to their geographical position; but others, as for example Khios and Samos, could be brought to a much higher state of economic development than that existing at present.

(1) Means of Communication

Roads are few; on many of the islands they do not exist, and mule-tracks are the only means of communication. In Mytilene there has been a considerable expenditure recently on road-making, and Khios and Samos have some good roads. During the Italian occupation there has been some road-making on Rhodes. There are no railways on any of the islands; one was projected in 1910 on Samos, but work upon it has not yet been begun.

Good ports are few, but anchorages are numerous. The ports which receive the most shipping are Mudros in Lemnos, Kastro in Mytilene, Kastro (Port Scio) in Khios, Port Vathi in Samos, and the port of Rhodes.

All the larger islands, except Samothraki, are

[1] The Islands are dealt with individually below, pp. 29 *seq.*

connected by cable, and some of them have wireless stations. The internal postal arrangements have improved vastly since the end of the Turkish rule.

(2) Industry

Labour is on the whole backward, and the methods employed are primitive. In Samos the inhabitants have the reputation of being improvident, lazy, and pleasure-loving; and even on islands such as Lemnos, where their reputation for industry stands higher, their methods of cultivation are so antiquated that the results are poor; for instance, they thresh corn by driving their mules over the threshing-floor. Agriculture is usually in the hands of women; such of the male population of Mytilene as do not find regular employment in the factories of the island obtain work on the mainland as masons and carpenters. The result has been that the war has made less difference to the productivity of these islands than it has to that of other countries.

A considerable amount of emigration has taken place in recent years, especially to America. Tenedos, Mytilene, Khios, Samos, and Rhodes have all sent many emigrants. In 1908 as many as 5,000 persons emigrated to America from Samos and the neighbouring islands and coasts. From Rhodes a great number of peasants emigrate each spring to Anatolia and Greece to work as masons; as a rule they return in winter with their earnings, but some settle in those lands permanently. A large number have also emigrated to Egypt both from the country and the towns, and the Rhodians have made successful immigrants in America, the Transvaal, the Far East, and Australia. The occupation by Greece has stemmed the flow of emigration from the islands. Mytilene received in 1913 an influx of 10,000 refugees.[1]

[1] These are exclusive of the 70,000 who have taken refuge in the island since August 1914.

Few of the islands are fertile, though Samos is well watered and has some irrigation works. The chief agricultural products exported are as follows:

Thasos: timber.
Lemnos: grain, wine.
Tenedos: wine, raisins.
Mytilene: olive oil, valonea.
Khios: gum mastic, fruits, olive oil, valonea, fir bark, tobacco.
Samos: wine, olive oil, tobacco, locust-beans, raisins.
Rhodes: fruit, wine, onions.

The mineral resources of these islands have been very little exploited. It is said that there are in one or more of them copper, antimony, silver-lead, zinc, copper pyrites, chrome ore, alum, calcium, emery, iron, manganese, calamine, coal, lignite, and marble; but of these the only minerals worked are in Thasos silver-lead and zinc, in Nikaria iron, and in Imbros lignite (unremuneratively), while in Khios some variegated marble is quarried. Potter's clay is obtained in Thasos, white clay in Samos, and kaolin in Rhodes.

The northern islands have no manufactures except that of cotton stuffs in Lemnos. Industries are more numerous in the Asiatic Islands. In Mytilene cotton, soap, and olive oil are produced, in Khios soap and silk, in Samos oil and cigarettes, in Rhodes soap. There are also tanneries in Samos and Rhodes, and distilleries in Rhodes.

(3) Commerce

It is not easy to give a satisfactory conspectus of the trade of these islands, the information supplied by the consular reports being often deficient. The fact that in some cases the only figures available are not for the most recent years is, however, not a great disadvantage, for since the outbreak of the war between Turkey and Italy in 1911 there has been no normal year in the Aegean. A considerable trade is carried on by small sailing craft, especially between the southern

islands and Egypt; but this has been much interrupted during recent years.

The Germans, before the European War, had been much more successful than the British in pressing their trade. In 1908 Mytilene was visited by thirty German commercial travellers, eight French, seven Italian, and only one British. In the same year at Khios, German imports led, in spite of the fact that there is a greater demand for British goods. In Samos the bulk of the textiles were formerly obtained from the United Kingdom, but recently a large part of the orders have been secured for German and Italian houses. Among the reasons for the better success of the Germans are the following: (1) the goods, if inferior, are cheaper; (2) greater facilities for payment are offered; (3) commercial travellers representing German houses pay regular visits; (4) the Germans send out advertisements, in which they use the decimal system of weights and measures; (5) there is, generally speaking, a greater consideration shown by the Germans for the tastes of their customers, and a much more general knowledge of the Greek language.

British interests do not figure prominently in these islands. In Samos, however, a British company dealing in Samian wines under the title of the Samos Wine Company, Ltd., was established in 1912 with a registered capital of £120,000.

THASOS

(A) Communications

(*a*) *Roads.*—There are no roads on the island; transport is by mules.

(*b*) *Telegraphs and Telephones.*—There is telegraphic and telephonic communication between Panagia and Kastro.

(*c*) *Ports.*—There are no ports suitable for use in bad weather. Vessels visiting the island anchor in Panagia Roads off Limani. The following landing-places are used:

Limani, on the north coast, the most frequented by steamers visiting the island. There is a small pier in the small artificial harbour, with a depth of 2 ft. alongside, and farther west is another small pier, which is connected with an oil factory by two lines of light tramway.

Mail steamers from Kavalla call twice a week at Limani.

Sotiro, on the west coast, used for loading ore. There is a small pier and also some sheds for storing ore. The depth of water alongside the pier is about 6 ft.

Hamadieh, the *skala* (landing-place) of Kastro on the south-east coast, the chief loading centre for minerals exported from the mines on the island. It possesses an iron pier 120 ft. long and 20 ft. wide, with a depth of 20 ft. at the end. There are two cranes with a lifting capacity of 1 ton each, two steam tugs, a motor-boat, and a number of small lighters capable of carrying about 10 tons.

(*d*) *Cables.*—There is a cable from Limani to Koan Point on the mainland opposite and thence to Kavalla. There is also a wireless station.

(B) Industry

(1) *Agriculture.*—Agriculture is fairly widespread, but the produce is all consumed locally. Maize, olives, tobacco, and vegetables are grown, and the island possesses some sheep and good cattle. A considerable part of the island is covered with trees, chiefly fir, of which there is some export. Wine is produced, but not in very large quantities.

(2) *Minerals.*—The island has from ancient times been reputed to be rich in minerals. The Phoenicians worked the gold-mines on a large scale, but it is stated that all traces of these mines have now been lost; on the other hand, extensive evidence of ancient mining operations is to be seen on the east side, though there is no information as to the mineral obtained from them. The island is said to contain iron, copper, and antimony

in addition to the deposits of silver-lead and zinc in the south and west, which are being worked at the present time. In 1903 the right to work these was obtained by a German company, Friedrich Speidel & Co., who are stated to have exported ore in the years 1905, 1906, and 1907 to the amount of 19,000, 21,000, and 20,000 tons respectively. It is said that the mines are now in the hands of a Greek syndicate, but that the quantity of good ore is greatly reduced. The mines are equipped with furnaces for smelting, with ore-dressing plant, storage sheds, and a light railway on which the ore is brought down by a double line and hawser, the full truck pulling up the empty one. The industry employs about 1,000 men.

There are large quantities of marble on the island, and some is quarried and exported. Good potter's clay is found in the north of the island, but the local potteries have decayed.

(3) *Manufacture.*—A small boat-building industry is carried on at Limani.

SAMOTHRAKI

(A) Communications

(*a*) *Roads.*—The island is very mountainous, and there are no roads. Mule-tracks are the only means of internal communication.

(*b*) *Telegraphs.*—There is no telegraphic communication.

(*c*) *Ports.*—There are no ports or roadsteads in the island, but there are a certain number of landing-places. The only sea communication is by caique to Dedeagach, Thasos, and Imbros.

(B) Industry

(1) *Agriculture.*—The island produces corn, fruit, oil, honey and wax, and supports a large flock of goats, but it has no trade, and is economically unimportant. The cultivated land is chiefly in the west and south-west.

(2) *Minerals.*—Evidence of the existence of deposits of silver-lead has been found on the west side of the island, but no mining has been done. On the north coast are hot sulphur springs.

IMBROS

(A) Communications

(*a*) *Roads.*—A road runs from Plaka on the north-east coast to Paraskevi, a distance of about 8 miles.

(*b*) *Telegraphs.*—There is no internal telegraphic communication.

(*c*) *Ports.*—There are several fairly safe anchorages, chiefly on the south side of the island, but no ports. Coasting steamers now call weekly.

(*d*) *Cables.*—There is a telephone cable to Lemnos.

(B) Industry

(1) *Agriculture.*—The island is fertile and well wooded, and, like all the neighbouring islands, abounds in game. Wine, olive oil, and cotton are produced in small quantities, but there is no trade. The inhabitants are occupied chiefly in growing wheat, oats, and barley, breeding goats, and keeping bees.

(2) *Minerals.*—Lead and copper pyrites were mined about the year 1890, but no results of value appear to have been obtained. The island is said also to contain deposits of lignite near Arassia. A lignite mine has been worked, but unremuneratively, by a German company.

LEMNOS

(A) Communications

(*a*) *Roads, &c.*—There are numerous rough tracks, especially in the plains in the centre of the island. There are three roads from Kastro (on the west coast), the first going east to Mudros, the second north to Kaspaka, and the third south to Tothanos. There is also a rough carriage-road from Mudros town to the

air-station on the north coast. Ponies and donkeys are used for transport.

A naval tram-line, three miles in length, has been constructed from Mudros town.

(*b*) *Telegraphs.*—There is telegraphic communication between Kastro and Mudros.

(*c*) *Ports.*—The island has at least three good natural harbours, *Mudros* and *Kondia* on the south coast, and *Purnea* on the north coast. The first-mentioned affords a safe anchorage for many large ships. Before the war, however, *Kastro* on the west coast was most used. Mudros Bay at that time had two ports, Mudros town on the east side and Port Mudros on the west side of the bay, both of which had small piers, but otherwise were ill equipped for dealing with cargo; several piers were constructed during the Allied occupation. Mudros town possesses a custom-house; the quay has recently been somewhat improved, but this part of the harbour is shallow. Port Kondia, westward of Mudros Bay, where there is also a custom-house, has an anchorage in 7–10 fathoms on mud, but no landing facilities. Port Kastro has a harbour for small boats with a pier and quays; larger vessels can anchor a little farther out in about 10 fathoms. Purnea, on the north coast, is little used.

(*d*) *Shipping.*—Steamers, trading with Constantinople, Smyrna, the Piraeus, and Salonika, call regularly at the island.

(*e*) *Cable and Wireless Communication.*—There are telegraph cables to Salonika and Tenedos, and a telephone cable to Imbros. There is also a wireless station.

(B) Industry

(1) *Agriculture.*—Though water abounds, the soil is thin and sandy; in the north, except in the immediate neighbourhood of villages, there is little cultivation, but sheep and cattle graze on the coarse grass. Grapes, corn, and some cotton are grown in the valleys and plains near Mudros, Kastro, Tothanos, Kondia, Livadhi,

and Skandali. Tobacco was grown experimentally by refugees from the mainland in 1917. There are no olive-trees; and the sheep reared on the island (normally about 40,000 head) form the chief source of profit. Grain and wine are exported.

(2) *Fisheries.*—It is stated that a little fishing is done, but the boats belonging to the island are not numerous.

(3) *Manufacture.*—There is some manufacture of cotton stuffs.

TENEDOS

(A) Communications

(*a*) *Roads.*—There are no roads on the island.

(*b*) *Ports.*—The port of *Tenedos* on the east side of the island is formed by a curve of the shore and a mole projecting one cable eastward. The maximum depth is 6 fathoms at the entrance. Large vessels must anchor outside, but should remain under steam. There are no facilities for handling cargo. There is a Lloyd's agent at the port.

(*c*) *Shipping.*—Austrian Lloyd steamers used to call at the island every fortnight. It is also frequently visited by coasting steamers and sailing-vessels.

(*d*) *Cables.*—The island is connected by cable with Khios, Lemnos, and Constantinople, and with the mainland at Beshika Bay.

(B) Industry

The island is fertile and well cultivated, producing raisins, corn, cotton, oil, and an excellent light wine.

(C) Commerce

The chief exports of the island are wine and raisins, and the chief imports wheat, flour, and textiles. The trade is conducted almost entirely with Turkey, Egypt, and Rumania. The following approximate statistics

are taken from the reports of the British Vice-Consul at Tenedos:

	1907.	1908.	1909.	1910.	1911.
	£	£	£	£	£
Imports . . .	20,000	19,400	19,200	18,800	19,200
Exports . . .	10,500	7,400	8,250	8,400	9,400

MYTILENE

(A) Communications

(*a*) *Roads.*—In recent years money has been spent on the construction of roads, and there are now about 70 miles of first-class roads in the island. In 1914 the repairing of roads cost £12,000, and two British steam-rollers were imported for the purpose. In addition there are many mule-tracks; and mules, of which there are large numbers, are used generally for transport.

(*b*) *Posts and Telegraphs.*—Posts are now delivered at all the towns and villages; under Turkish rule letters waited till they were called for. The following places are connected by telegraph and also, for official purposes, by telephone: Kastro, Iero (Hiero), Potamos, Mandamados, Kalloni, Polichnitis, Sigri, Erisos, Molyvos, Petras, and Skamnia.

(*c*) *Ports.*—*Mytilene* (Kastro). This is the chief town of the island. There are two ports, known as the north and south ports. Of these the former, which has a depth of 2–5 fathoms, is the more commodious, but is little used; it is badly obstructed by the remains of ancient moles. The south port, where the maximum depth of water is 3 fathoms, is better suited for landing cargo, as it possesses a good quay all round with about 4 ft. of water alongside, and it is therefore always used by coasting vessels. There are a small steamboat, a few motor-boats, and some lighters belonging to the port. A stock of about 1,500 tons of Heraclea coal is usually kept, and can be loaded from lighters. There is a Lloyd's sub-agent at the port.

Molyvos Road, on the north coast, off the small town

of Molyvos, is also used as a place of call by steamers running between Smyrna and Constantinople, but has only a boat harbour. Supplies can be readily obtained.

There are also two natural harbours, *Port Iero* on the south-east coast and *Port Kalloni* on the south coast. Neither of these has any trade of importance, and the entrances are difficult. *Port Sigri* on the west coast is a place of refuge for vessels to and from Constantinople.

(*d*) *Shipping.*—Mytilene is an important trading centre, and, lying as it does on the route from Constantinople to Smyrna, is a port of call for all steamship lines engaged in the trade of the Eastern Mediterranean. There is also a regular service to and from the Piraeus. The following is a return of shipping which entered and cleared at the port of Mytilene for the years 1904–7 and for 1914 :

		1904.	*1905.*	*1906.*	*1907.*	*1914.*
Steamers . .	No.	1,426	1,365	1,489	1,531	1,654
	Tons	718,138	735,547	779,205	738,298	776,973
Sailing-vessels .	No.	2,756	2,482	2,822	2,613	4,384
	Tons	27,811	26,031	26,781	30,361	25,346

Of the shipping of 1914, 153 steamers with a total tonnage of 128,168 and 10 sailing-vessels of 120 tons were British.

(*e*) *Cable and Wireless Communication.*—There are cables to Khios and to Aivali on the mainland. There is also a wireless station on the island by means of which messages can be sent to Khios, Lemnos, and Syra.

(B) Industry

(1) *Agriculture.*—The long-continued subdivision of hereditary properties has had unfavourable results. The holdings of the peasants are small and scattered, with the result that much energy and time are wasted. A large part of the island is covered with olive-trees, many of which have now been pruned under European guidance with good results. The olive crop is of the first importance to the industry and trade of the island ; olive oil is exported in considerable quantities,

and the refuse oil is manufactured locally into soap, which is also exported. The following figures give approximately the yield of olive oil from the crops gathered in the years 1909–14:

	1909–10.	*1910–11.*	*1911–12.*	*1912–13.*	*1913–14.*
Tons	12,600	5,470	33,600	2,400	18,800

Next in importance is the valonea crop, obtained from the cups of the acorns of the *Aegilops* oak. The crop averages about 2,500 tons annually. Other products are vegetables and fruit of all kinds, wheat, barley, and cotton; but of these the export is unimportant.

At one time silk cocoons were exported in large numbers, but disease broke out and ruined the industry, and no steps have since been taken to revive it.

The island is mountainous, and pines and oak grow on the high ground. At one time the island abounded in pine-trees, but for many years under the Turkish rule these had been habitually destroyed for the sake of the bark, which was used for tanning, and no replanting was done. When the island came under Greek rule in 1912, the destruction was stopped.

(2) *Fisheries.*—There are plenty of fish in the waters round the island, mullet, sardines, lobsters, and dory being the most common, but the industry is insignificant.

(3) *Minerals.*—The island contains deposits of antimony, but the mines have not recently been worked, and there is no information as to the quality of the mineral. Other minerals said to be in the island are chrome ore, copper, alum, and coal; there is also some marble.

(4) *Manufacture.*—The following factories are established in the island: at Mytilene town, 2 cotton-mills, 12 olive-oil presses, 30 soap factories, 3 steam flour-mills, 30 tanneries, and 2 steam saw-mills; at Potamos, 20 soap factories, a flour-mill, and a fishing-boat yard; at Port Iero, an oil factory, soap-works, and a flour-

mill. There are also many small oil-mills which are worked by hand in other parts of the island, as well as over a hundred steam oil-presses.

(C) Commerce

The imports consist chiefly of textiles and iron goods, the greater part of the latter being supplied by Belgium. No figures giving the value of imports in recent years are available.

The chief exports are olive oil, soap, and valonea: the greater part goes normally to Turkey or the Black Sea. The following approximate figures of the export of soap and valonea have been taken from the British Consular Reports:

	1905.	*1906.*	*1907.*	*1910.*	*1911.*	*1912.*	*1913.*	*1914.*
	Cwt.	Cwt.	Cwt.	Cwt.	Cwt.	Cwt.	Cwt.	Cwt.
Soap	180,000	220,000	180,000	45,000	225,000	30,000	12,500	15,000
Valonea	34,000	9,000	20,000	—	—	—	—	—

(D) Finance

Banking.—The banks in Mytilene are, or were, a branch of the Banque Impériale Ottomane, an agency of the Banque d'Orient, and one of Christofa Hadji Frères; as well as branches of the National Bank of Greece and the Bank of Athens.

KHIOS

(A) Communications

(*a*) *Roads.*—There is a first-class road about 18 miles in length which traverses the island in a north-westerly direction from Port Scio to Volissos on the west coast, and another which goes north from Port Scio for about 10 miles to Pityos. In addition, there are numerous mule-tracks between the different villages on the island.

(*b*) *Ports.*—The only port of the island is Kastro (Port Scio) on the east coast. It is rectangular in shape and is protected by two breakwaters. The area of the harbour is about 750 by 360 yds., and a depth of 30 ft. in the centre is kept by dredging; alongside the quays the depth is about 6–8 ft. The total length of the quays is 1,350 yds. There is only one crane (lifting capacity

3–4 tons) for dealing with cargo. Minor repairs to vessels can be effected at the port. Outside there is anchorage in 12–18 fathoms on mud. There is a Lloyd's sub-agent at the port.

(*c*) *Shipping.*—Kastro is a regular port of call for all the steamship lines engaged in the trade of the Eastern Mediterranean. In addition to numerous small steamers and sailing-vessels the Austrian Lloyd, the Russian Steam Navigation Co., the Panhellenic Co., the Pantaleon Co., and the Hamadieh Line visited the port regularly before the war.

The island possesses about 90 sailing and 25 steam vessels, which are used in the trade of the surrounding islands and of the coast of Asia Minor. In 1914 the total number of vessels which entered and cleared at Kastro was 2,250, of which 1,068 were steamers with a total tonnage of 717,598. Of these 40 were British, with a tonnage of 32,060. Ships entered and cleared at Kastro in the years 1904–10 were:

	Steamers.		*Sailing-vessels.*	
	No.	*Tonnage.*	*No.*	*Tonnage.*
1904	1,242	675,044	2,579	37,976
1905	1,250	728,226	2,820	45,040
1906	1,278	724,932	2,903	40,395
1907	1,233	736,968	2,753	39,217
1908	1,327	814,216	2,693	38,915
1909	1,426	888,608	2,648	41,982
1910	1,138	732,675	2,520	38,463

(*d*) *Cables.*—Kastro has a telegraph station, and is connected by two cables with Chesme on the mainland, by two with Syra, with Spalmatori Island, with Tenedos, and also by Greek Government cables with Samos and Mytilene.

(B) Industry

(1) *Agriculture.*—Khios has been described as the most fertile of the Aegean Islands, but the proceeds of agriculture provide only a small part of the wealth of the inhabitants. The island produces olives, almonds, figs, grapes, oranges, &c., and a little corn; but agriculture is carried on mainly for the purpose of supplying local

needs, and only olive oil and almonds are exported in any considerable quantity, though there is some export of fruit, both fresh and dried.

Gum mastic, which is obtained from the mastic tree (*Pistacia lentiscus*) by incision of the bark in August and September, forms a considerable source of profit. The gum is treated on the island and is then exported mostly to Constantinople, where it is sold as a chewing gum or for dental purposes. A popular liqueur (*mastika*) is made from it in large quantities.

Tobacco cultivation was started in the island in 1910, and it is stated that in time it is likely to become a considerable industry. Its quality has been pronounced to be very much like that of the tobacco produced in Xanthi and Kavalla.

Olive oil is produced in considerable quantities and is exported. There are twelve oil-pressing establishments.

Wine is produced; also a spirituous liquor made from raisins, called *raki*. The quality of the latter is better than that produced in any other island of the Archipelago.

(2) *Minerals.*—The island is reported to possess rich antimony and calcium mines, but these are not worked at the present time. Good variegated marble is also found and is quarried for local use.

(3) *Manufacture.*—There are twelve tanneries in the island, of which five are driven by steam. The hides are imported, as is the valonea required in the treatment. Valonea is also re-exported after having been ground at the mills established in the island. There are four large flour-mills, two iron-works, one soap factory, one factory for evaporating soap-lyes. Silk is produced and manufactured into stockings, gloves, &c.

(C) Commerce

The principal articles of export are leather, gum mastic, fruit (especially oranges and mandarines), olive oil, almonds, ground valonea, and pine-bark. The

trade is chiefly with Turkey, Bulgaria, and Rumania, but also to some extent with the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Russia, Egypt, and even the Far East.

The chief imports are hides, wheat, barley, and flour, manufactured goods, sugar, cotton yarns, rice, planks and timber, valonea, coffee, and paraffin.

The following statistics of the value of imports and exports are taken from the British Consular Reports:

	Imports. £	*Exports.* £
1909	233,950	271,000
1910	246,250	293,500
1911	268,000	297,500
1912	203,250	191,400
1914	487,125	234,700

(D) Finance

Banking.—There are in Khios branches or agencies of the Bank of Athens and the Commercial Bank of Greece.

SAMOS

(A) Communications

(*a*) *Roads.*—The map marks good roads radiating from Port Vathi to all the important points in the island, but most of these are not yet built. Those which can be used by carriages are:

To Tigani and Khora, usually in good repair.

To Karlovassi, passable in good weather, but in very bad condition.

To Kotzilea, suburban, in fair condition.

To Flammari and Murtia Bay: this was unfinished in 1915.

To Mytilene: this is unfinished and out of repair.

In other parts communication is by mule-tracks.

(*b*) *Railways.*—A concession to build a railway from Vathi to Karlovassi was granted in 1910 to a Greek and a British subject. No work has yet been done.

(*c*) *Posts, Telegraphs, and Telephones.*—A Samian post office has been established to take the place of the

Turkish office previously in existence. There is a good system of telephones between all the towns and villages of the island.

(*d*) *Ports.*—There are several good natural harbours on the island, and Port Vathi, Karlovassi, Tigani, and Marathocampo are all capable of accommodating large vessels and possess fair loading facilities. The bulk of the trade is concentrated at *Port Vathi.* This port, which lies at the head of a small gulf on the north side of the island, is protected by a breakwater 370 ft. long, and has a harbour depth of 6–20 fathoms. The quay has 6 ft. of water alongside and there are three wooden piers. Steamers of the largest tonnage can enter and leave at any time in any weather. There is a Lloyd's sub-agent at the port. *Karlovassi*, 12 miles west of Port Vathi, has a harbour protected by two breakwaters. The general depth is 16 ft.; along the quay, between the breakwaters, it is 10 ft.

(*e*) *Shipping.*—Samos is the junction of three main local trade routes of the Aegean: (1) to Syra and the Piraeus; (2) to Khios and Mytilene; (3) to the Dodekanese and Rhodes. In consequence it enjoys a double service to the Piraeus, and has become a distributing and collecting centre. It is also visited by steamers from all parts of the Mediterranean. Three Greek steamers touch regularly at Port Vathi from the Piraeus, and two from Smyrna each week. There are also in normal times weekly steamers of the Austrian Lloyd and fortnightly steamers of the Messageries Maritimes, as well as steamers of the Italian Servizi Marittimi. There is a daily steamer from Vathi to Karlovassi, calling at three or four small anchorages on the way. The following figures of the shipping entered and cleared at the island are taken from the British Consular Reports:

		1904.	*1905.*	*1907.*	*1908.*	*1910.*	*1914.*
Steamers	No.	1,476	1,200	1,230	1,294	1,260	876
	Tons	363,444	349,667	377,990	435,616	467,659	465,432
Sailing-vessels	No.	3,830	3,782	3,388	2,964	3,737	450
	Tons	36,809	36,503	31,727	28,520	33,996	7,076

(*f*) *Cable and Wireless Communication.*—Samos is connected by cable with Khios, and with Scalanuova on the mainland. There is also a wireless station.

(B) Industry

(1) *Agriculture.*—The island is fertile and well watered; it is capable of much higher production than is obtained from it by its not very industrious inhabitants. The agricultural products are grapes, raisins, olives, tobacco, locust-beans, and valonea. Only a small amount of corn is produced, and for cereals the island is almost entirely dependent upon imports. The numerous streams of the interior are used to some extent for irrigation. Oxen, sheep, and poultry exist in considerable numbers.

There are large forests of oak, plane, and fir, but they are not exploited, except for the supply of fuel and timber required for the building of caiques and lighters at Tigani. Pitch and tar were formerly made in large quantities in the mountains.

Wine.—A considerable amount of sweet wine (*moscato* or *robola*) is produced, and there are twenty factories engaged in the industry. The export is chiefly to France, Germany, and Malta, where the wine is used in the manufacture of vermouth and liqueurs. There is also a good red wine used for local consumption, and a *rezinato* (white wine flavoured with resin) superior to that of other districts in Greece. The production of wine in 1914 amounted to about 90,000 hectolitres. Cognac is made at nine distilleries, and a fairly good liqueur called *Samienne.* Phylloxera has been very rife in the island, but has now been successfully combated, and American vines have been planted on a large scale.

Tobacco is being cultivated to an increasing extent, and is to a certain degree taking the place of grapes. No statistics are available for the annual value of the crop. Of 700,000 okes[1] produced in 1914, about 300,000

[1] 1 oke = $2\frac{3}{4}$ lb.

were exported to Germany and the United States, and another 300,000 were used locally for the manufacture of cigarettes. There were in 1912 as many as 33 cigarette factories in the island, employing a large portion of the population. Tobacco for this industry is imported in large quantities from Macedonia.

(2) *Minerals.*—It is stated that Samos contains antimony, lead, emery, manganese, copper, calamine, and large quantities of marble, but only emery is produced. Near Platano a kind of white clay is found, which is used as a substitute for soap.

(3) *Manufacture.*—Considerable quantities of valonea and pine-bark (*pevka*) are produced for use in the tanning trade. There are about thirty tanneries at Karlovassi; the hides are nearly all imported in the raw state (chiefly from Egypt), and subsequently re-exported as leather. There are in the island three oil-presses, some flour-mills, a weaving factory at Karlovassi, and a small factory where simple machinery is made.

(C) Commerce

The exports comprise wine, leather, olive oil, tobacco, locust-beans, raisins, and emery. Sailing-vessels and lighters are built for export. In 1914 the value of the principal exports amounted to £265,000.

The chief imports are grain and flour, hardware, textiles, hides, tobacco, and alcohol. The latter is used for the manufacture of wine; the annual value of the import is about £25,000, the greater part coming from Hungary, Russia, and Greece. The total imports in 1914 amounted to about £280,000. In 1908 it was estimated that about one-third consisted of British and British colonial products and manufactures.

(D) Finance

Banking.—There are agencies of the Bank of Athens at Vathi and Karlovassi.

NIKARIA AND PHURNI

Within the prefecture of Samos are included Nikaria and Phurni.

NIKARIA was formerly inhabited only by wood-cutters and shepherds, but has now considerable olive cultivation, with vineyards and small agriculture. Fuel and timber are still cut, though much of the island is now deforested. There is no port, but steamships can anchor off Messaria (Agios Kyriakos) on the south coast or at Avdilos Bay on the north, according to the weather. There is a small iron mine at Messaria with a Decauville track and staith for direct loading into vessels moored inshore.

PHURNI is a group of almost barren islands, with numerous small coves. Sailing-vessels lie up here for the winter and for repairs, and the islands have a bad reputation for smuggling.

KALYMNOS

(A) COMMUNICATIONS

Ports.—Pothia is the chief harbour, and almost the whole population clusters here. The port occupies a deep bay opening southward, and has been improved by local enterprise into a safe winter anchorage for small craft; it has a breakwater not quite completed (about 150 yds. long in 1917) and one stone-loading jetty within. Coasting steamers anchor in four fathoms abreast of the breakwater, and are safe in all but the worst weather, but cannot communicate with the shore in a south-west gale on account of the swell.

The only other refuges are a deep cove on the east coast, and the channel inside Telendos islet on the north-west. The latter, however, is liable to dangerous squalls.

(B) INDUSTRY

(1) *Agriculture.*—Kalymnos consists of a rugged mass of limestone mountains, without trees and almost without shrubs, except in the narrow valley bottoms,

which are fertile. The enclosed plain of Emborio produces fine oranges and mandarines; the Prosta basin is mostly under figs and olives; behind Pothia there are vineyards and vegetable gardens. Corn is hardly grown at all, and nearly all the agricultural produce required, except olives, figs, and summer vegetables, has to be brought from elsewhere. Excellent honey is produced on apparently desert hill-sides. Bees are even brought over during the flower season from the mainland, where the Kalymniotes have many farms.

(2) *Sponge Fishery.*—In the nineteenth century sponge-fishing was the most important industry, but even before the Italo-Turkish War the island's prosperity had suffered greatly from the competition of the North African sponge grounds and the development of the Florida sponge fisheries, which was accomplished chiefly by Kalymniote colonists. In normal times the sponge fishery used to employ a fleet of about 400 sailing-vessels, and almost the whole population of the island. In recent years the prosperity and number of the Kalymniotes have declined rapidly; and the prohibition of sponge-fishing since 1916 has deprived the islanders of their means of subsistence. The men have gone as sponge-fishers to other countries; a large number are engaged in the Florida sponge fishery at Tarpon Springs, and others in the West Indies and Bermuda. Many hundreds of the women and children have emigrated to Crete, Naxos, and other islands within the Greek kingdom. There has been emigration also to South Russia, where the Kalymniotes engage in shoemaking and coffee-house keeping. The emigrants sometimes return to the island bringing with them the wealth they have acquired, and sometimes they send it home to their families when these remain on the island.

(3) *Tobacco Manufacture.*—In the slack season for sponge-fishing as many as 1,000 hands were employed in small tobacco-cutting factories. The raw material came from Macedonia, and the output, tobacco cut and

blended or cigarettes, was largely smuggled into Greece and Turkey in small skilfully handled sailing-vessels.

(C) Commerce

There is a large export of oranges and mandarines to Greek and Turkish ports. Good honey and wax are also exported.

KOS

(A) Communications

(*a*) *Roads.*—There are neither roads nor vehicles; but the mule tracks in the lowland parts are broad and usually dry.

(*b*) *Ports.*—The harbour-town of Kos lies in the north-east at the end of fertile lowland, which fringes, on the north, the mountains that cross the island. Off the town is an open roadstead with good anchorage in 5–6 fathoms, and a stone jetty, the depth at the end of which is 3 fathoms. Cargo is handled with lighters, but in east and south-east winds the surf drenches the jetty and prevents communication with the shore. The ancient harbour is badly silted, but it suffices to shelter the fleet of fast schooners and caiques, which carry the summer cargoes of fresh grapes, melons, &c., and the winter cargoes of oranges and mandarines to Alexandria, Smyrna, Salonika, and Constantinople. There is constant intercourse with Koan farms on the mainland and with the flourishing Turkish town of Budrum, where the prosperous Greek element is mostly Koan and Kalymniote.

(B) Industry

(1) *Agriculture.*—There is a corn-growing plateau round Antimachia in the central lowland. There are several large olive- and vine-growing villages (Pylli and its neighbours), maintained by perennial springs high on the foot-hills of the larger range of mountains. Very little timber exists now even in the glens. The principal

agricultural products, other than those already mentioned, are fresh fruit, tobacco, raisins, and vegetables of all kinds. There is ample pasture above cultivation level, and large cattle are raised on the mountain farms. The island also possesses pigs, sheep, goats, and poultry. A little silk is produced near the town.

(2) *Fisheries.*—There is extensive fishing in the shoals, in the channel, and off the opposite coast.

(C) Commerce

Tobacco and fruit are exported mainly to Egypt, and also to ports of the Aegean and to Constantinople.

SYMI

(A) Communications

Ports.—The one town on the island is piled up on the sides of a narrow open cove facing north-east, which is safe in all weathers for sailing-vessels and small steamers; there is anchorage in 10–15 fathoms. The harbour is much used by vessels of 200 to 300 tons, and is hardly large enough to hold the number of boats which visit it in winter.

(B) Industry

(1) *Agriculture.*—A few vegetables are grown and sheep are raised on the island. But Symi men have settled in Datcha and other villages on the adjacent promontories of the mainland, where they grow corn, olives, vines, and vegetables, and are engaged in poultry-keeping and dairy farming.

(2) *Sponge Fisheries.*—Symi early followed the lead of Kalymnos in sponge-fishing; but since the prohibition of the occupation in 1916, the population has been much reduced by emigration. Symi men settle mainly in the Argentine and other parts of South America, whence they send their earnings home to their families.

RHODES

(A) Communications

(*a*) *Roads.*—Until recently there were no good roads in the island, transport being effected by mules. The Italians have constructed roads leading to the principal villages.

(*b*) *Telegraphs and Telephones.*—There is no internal telegraphic or telephonic communication.

(*c*) *Ports.*—Rhodes town has two harbours, both of them artificial, and neither suitable for large ships. The northern harbour, which is known as Tershaneh, is protected from the east by a mole 500 yds. in length with two piers, both of which were recently reported to be in a bad state of repair. The entrance to the harbour is difficult: it is exposed to the north-east and is much silted up, the depth of water being only 8 ft. The Italians claim to have deepened it to 10 or 12 ft., but it silts rapidly. Inside the harbour the maximum depth is 18 ft. There is a quay on the south side of the harbour, but owing to silting this cannot be used except by boats; a tug can moor to the north-east mole. The southern harbour is very treacherous in bad weather; ships must either moor bow and stern, or keep steam and be prepared to take refuge under the high ground west of the north point of the island. Having a depth inside of 10–22 ft., it is more suitable than the northern harbour for large ships; but there is only room for two at a time. There are no facilities for handling cargo, which is loaded into lighters and taken out into the roadstead when the weather is good. Small wooden vessels are built at the port, and repairs to wooden vessels can be effected.

(*d*) *Shipping.*—Rhodes is a port of call for all the important steamship lines engaged in the trade of the Eastern Mediterranean. The establishment of a lazaretto at Rhodes town in 1906 was a great boon to all vessels trading with the Anatolian coast. Since

then there has been a considerable increase in the number of lines using the port. Before the war the following steamship lines called regularly: Messageries Maritimes, Archipelago-American Steamship Co., Pantaleon & Co., La Phocéenne (financed by Belgian money), Khedivial Mail Steamship Co., Russian Steam Navigation Co., Società Nazionale di Servizi Marittimi, and Austrian Lloyd.

The following figures, taken from the British Consular Reports, show the shipping that entered and cleared at the port during the years 1908–12:

	Steamers.		*Sailing-vessels.*	
	No.	*Tonnage.*	*No.*	*Tonnage.*
1908	973	518,796	2,961	74,304
1909	1,012	585,430	2,671	59,381
1910	740	495,651	2,304	69,706
1911	660	531,183	2,693	42,995
1912	572	528,490	706	7,900

(e) *Cable and Wireless Communication.*—Rhodes town is connected by cables with Marmarice, on the mainland, and with Karpathos and Crete. A wireless station was established immediately after the commencement of the Italian occupation.

(B) Industry

(1) *Agriculture.*—The island is fertile, especially in the north-west, and is watered by numerous streams. In the mountains there are pine forests; in the plains the vegetation consists of plane-trees, cypresses, and oleanders. The island is ill-cultivated; much of the forest has been destroyed by fires for the purpose of cultivation; and, after a few crops have been raised, the land has often been left waste. Peasant proprietorship is universal in the island, but no effort is made to get more out of the soil than is required for the owners' wants. The chief products are fruit and vegetables, honey, wine, olives, sesame seed, and silk. Some corn is grown, but the crop has to be supplemented by imports. There has recently been extensive production of potatoes at Kremasti in the north-west.

There are but few horses, and the only beasts of burden are mules and donkeys.

(2) *Fisheries.*—The waters surrounding the islands of the Dodekanese contain excellent fish, and a certain amount of fishing is done. A large portion of the inhabitants of Rhodes were formerly engaged in the sponge-fishing industry.

(3) *Minerals.*—There are said to be deposits of emery, lead, antimony, manganese, copper, and calamine, but these are not worked, and there is no information as to the commercial value of the deposits. The island also produces kaolin, from which rough pottery is made for local use. There are some marble quarries.

(4) *Manufacture.*—There are tanneries and distilleries on the island. Olive oil is manufactured, also soap, the oil for which is extracted from olive stones.

(C) Commerce

Approximate figures (derived from British Consular Reports) of the import and export trade of Rhodes in the years 1908–12 are:

	1908.	*1909.*	*1910.*	*1911.*	*1912.*
	£	£	£	£	£
Imports . .	219,250	241,850	226,430	228,000	194,000
Exports . .	86,375	94,500	97,500	83,000	48,100

It will be seen that the volume of trade remains fairly constant; 1912 was exceptional, as trade was adversely affected by the war between Turkey and Italy. The imports consist of textiles, cereals and flour, cattle, hardware, sugar, hides, coffee, tobacco, and rice. The exports are fruit, sesame seed, leather, honey and wax, wine and spirits, olive oil, onions, cocoons, and sponges.

A large amount of both imports and exports, represented by about £75,000 annually, consists of transit trade to and from Anatolia and the neighbouring islands, which export sesame seed, storax oil, wax and honey, almonds, figs, maize, and sponges, and import cotton and woollen goods, hardware, corn and flour, sugar, and rice. This trade might be increased, if it were not hampered by

the insufficiency of the warehouse accommodation at the port.

The bulk of the import trade is in the hands of Austria and Germany. This is due to the cultivation of the Turkish and Jewish market by merchants of Central Europe, who consign goods direct *via* Trieste in subsidized Austrian steamers. The goods offered are distinguished by cheapness rather than by any other quality; and British goods, although they are in sufficient demand to cause the wholesale counterfeit of trade-marks and labels by German manufacturers, are more expensive.

(D) Finance

Banking.—Agencies of the Crédit Lyonnais, Banque de Salonique, Anglo-Egyptian Bank, and Deutsche Orient Bank are established in Rhodes. There was a branch of the Banque Impériale Ottomane, but probably this has been closed.

ASTROPALIA, &c.

Of the other islands of the Dodekanese little need be said. Astropalia has a serviceable land-locked harbour, which has been utilized during the war as a base for patrol vessels; it is about a mile in diameter, with anchorage in 8–12 fathoms. Although the greater part of the island is under pasture, cultivation is not entirely neglected.

Karpathos and Kasos are remote weather-beaten ridges with pasture, terrace cultivation, and fisheries; they were never closely inhabited, and in recent years have been almost entirely depopulated. There are two natural harbours in Kasos, but little use is made of either.

Khalki, off Rhodes, has fisheries.

Leros has two land-locked harbours, Partheni and Lakki; the former is about a mile deep with an inner basin and a copious water-supply; the latter, about

3 miles by 1, is safe in all weathers, but is troubled by a westerly swell and has no good springs. The island has extensive corn-terraces and fertile irrigated garden grounds. There is an ample supply of vegetables, fruit, flowers, and poultry, and good partridge, woodcock, and quail shooting. Leros owes much of its prosperity to its long-standing associations with Egypt, whence rich Leriotes bring their families to summer residences scattered on the island.

PATMOS has a small harbour, which is land-locked and safe; it is less than half a mile in diameter and has anchorage in 5–8 fathoms, and a stone quay. The soil is volcanic and rich, and there is intensive garden cultivation; but the island is little more than a pleasaunce for its famous monastery, 1½ miles from the port, which gathers rents from all over the Levant and spends them locally in support of the church and the schools. The only survival of its former nautical fame is the curious local industry of ship-breaking.

KAPPARI, or PSERIMO, a small island near Kalymnos, has some pasture-land and fisheries. There is also a brickfield, which supplies the district with tiles for floors and gutters.

TILOS (Episkopi) grows almonds.

APPENDIX

TABLE 1.—TENEDOS

Value of the principal articles of export and of the total export for the years 1908–11. (British Consular Report, Smyrna, 1908–11.)

	1908.	*1909.*	*1910.*	*1911.*
	£	£	£	£
Wine	5,200	5,700	6,000	5,800
Raisins	800	1,200	1,400	1,600
Other goods	1,400	1,350	1,000	2,000
Total	7,400	8,250	8,400	9,400

TABLE 2.—TENEDOS

Value of the principal articles of import and of the total import for the years 1908–11. (British Consular Report, Smyrna, 1908–11.)

	1908.	*1909.*	*1910.*	*1911.*
	£	£	£	£
Wheat	3,000	2,500	2,000	2,500
Flour	1,900	2,700	3,300	3,700
Other goods	14,500	14,000	13,500	13,000
Total	19,400	19,200	18,800	19,200

TABLE 3.—KHIOS

Value of the principal articles of export and of the total export for the years 1909–12. (British Consular Report, Smyrna, 1909–12.)

	1909.	*1910.*	*1911.*	*1912.*
	£	£	£	£
Almonds	23,000	27,500	16,000	20,000
Aniseed	3,000	3,000	3,000	—
Carobs	7,000	5,500	5,000	4,500
Fir-bark and valonea (ground)	3,500	3,500	3,000	2,500
Fleshing	2,500	2,000	4,500	—
Gum mastic	45,000	45,000	44,000	15,000
Hides	—	—	—	1,800
Leather	125,000	126,000	87,500	64,000
Olives and olive-oil	37,000	42,500	77,500	25,000
Oranges and lemons	25,000	37,500	55,000	52,100
Tobacco	—	1,000	2,000	6,500
Total	271,000	293,500	297,500	191,400

TABLE 4.—KHIOS

Value of the principal articles of import and of the total import for the years 1909–12. (British Consular Report, Smyrna, 1909–12.)

	1909.	*1910.*	*1911.*	*1912.*
Food-stuffs:	£	£	£	£
Cereals and flour	59,000	55,000	52,500	63,250
Rice	12,000	11,500	11,000	11,500
Sugar	16,000	15,000	14,500	16,000
Coffee	3,700	3,500	3,250	3,600
Minerals:				
Coal	2,000	2,000	2,250	2,500
Iron	3,000	2,500	2,500	1,600
Manufactured goods:				
Glassware and earthenware	5,750	5,500	5,500	—
Hardware	—	—	2,750	5,500
Cotton yarn	16,500	16,000	14,500	11,000
Others	29,000	28,000	27,000	27,500
Hides	60,000	80,000	110,000	40,000
Planks and timber	9,500	9,000	9,000	9,800
Dyes and colours	6,000	5,500	5,000	4,500
Fir-bark and valonea	5,000	6,000	5,500	4,500
Extract of tannin	3,750	4,000	2,750	2,000
Paper and cardboard	2,750	2,750	—	—
Total	233,950	246,250	268,000	203,250

TABLE 5.—SAMOS

Value of the principal articles of export and of the total export during the years 1908 and 1910. (British Consular Report, Smyrna, 1908, 1910–11.)

	1908.	*1910.*
	£	£
Alcoholic drinks (other than wine)	2,900	5,300
Cigarettes	25,400	21,200
Grapes (dried)	2,000	2,000
Hides and skins	14,800	2,400
Leather	20,680	38,300
Locust-beans	2,000	4,000
Olive oil	34,850	16,000
Tobacco	7,800	14,600
Wine	84,500	82,600
Other goods	11,520	13,540
Total	206,450	199,940

TABLE 6.—SAMOS

Value of the principal articles of import and of the total import for the years 1908 and 1910. (British Consular Report, Smyrna, 1908, 1910–11.)

	1908.	*1910.*
	£	£
Food-stuffs:		
Cereals and flour	70,083	75,400
Vegetables, &c.	—	4,850
Salt fish	4,100	3,950
Provisions	7,500	8,250
Sugar and coffee	7,700	7,560
Minerals:		
Petroleum	3,075	2,500
Sulphur	2,000	2,000
Manufactured goods:		
Hardware and machinery	7,100	8,760
Tin sheets	3,500	2,000
Cotton and woollen goods	28,413	29,650
Tobacco	17,516	23,950
Hides and leather	14,506	16,120
Alcohol	14,168	15,700
Cattle	6,414	6,570
Wood	7,000	2,500
Cigarette paper	3,000	3,000
Miscellaneous	23,108	21,240
Total imports	219,183	234,000

TABLE 7.—SAMOS

Return of the shipping of all nationalities which entered and cleared in the foreign trade of the port of Vathi (Samos) during the year 1912. (British Consular Report, Smyrna, 1912–13.)

(*a*) Steam Vessels

Entered and Cleared.

Nationality.	*Vessels.*	*Tonnage.*
British	12	13,374
American (U.S.)	319	78,246
Austro-Hungarian	99	183,055
Bulgarian	2	1,506
Dutch	21	22,580
French	24	52,689
Greek	760	106,857
Italian	1	219
Ottoman	1	4
Rumanian	2	1,728
Russian	1	1,524
Samian	101	21,217
Total	1,343	482,999

(*b*) SAILING-VESSELS

Entered and Cleared.

Nationality.	*Vessels.*	*Tonnage.*
British	4	117
American (U.S.)	1	298
Austro-Hungarian	3	19
Greek	129	3,165
Ottoman	930	7,927
Samian	2,153	19,444
Total	3,220	30,970

TABLE 8.—RHODES

Value of the principal articles of export and of the total exports for the years 1909, 1910 and 1912. (British Consular Report, Smyrna, 1909, 1910–11, and 1912–13.)

	1909. £	*1910.* £	*1912.* £
Almonds	350	1,000	2,090
Cocoons	2,600	1,300	2,640
Figs (dried)	4,000	6,900	5,200
Fruit (fresh) and vegetables	20,000	26,000	8,250
Honey and wax	9,300	3,150	3,910
Leather and hides	10,000	8,400	4,000
Oil extracted from the residue of olives	8,000	6,800	440
Olive oil	250	2,500	1,600
Sesame seed	7,300	10,500	4,200
Soap	3,400	2,400	1,150
Storax oil	6,400	6,250	5,120
Wines and liquors	7,000	2,900	2,320
Miscellaneous	15,900	19,400	7,180
Total	94,500	97,500	48,100

Included in the above-given figures are those for the re-export of goods coming from Anatolia. The total value of such re-exports for the years given above is £23,400, £24,000, and £18,690 respectively.

TABLE 9.—RHODES

Value of the principal imports and of the total imports for the years 1909, 1910 and 1912. (British Consular Report, Smyrna, 1909, 1910–11 and 1912–13.)

	1909.	*1910.*	*1912.*
Food-stuffs:	£	£	£
Cereals and flour	30,000	38,650	37,000
Butter	6,500	5,600	6,200
Cheese	2,500	3,200	5,000
Provisions	700	—	6,000
Sugar	12,000	10,600	10,000
Coffee	6,500	7,300	5,400
Manufactured goods:			
Cotton and woollen goods	67,000	50,000	26,000
Glassware	2,100	3,000	8,000
Hardware	20,000	20,000	10,200
Steel, iron and ironware	5,500	6,250	4,200
Cattle	15,000	14,000	26,500
Hides and leather	13,000	14,000	7,900
Planks and timber	8,000	8,500	6,000
Tobacco and tumbeki	5,100	4,000	5,600
Miscellaneous	47,950	41,330	30,000
Total imports	241,850	226,430	194,000

Included in the above figures are the goods imported for re-export to Anatolia. The total value of such goods for the years given above is £61,750, £51,600, £16,400 respectively.

TABLE 10.—RHODES

Value of the exports and imports of Rhodes, showing the countries with which trade was conducted, 1909 and 1910. (British Consular Report, Smyrna, 1909, 1910–11.)

	1909.		*1910.*	
	Exports.	*Imports.*	*Exports.*	*Imports.*
	£	£	£	£
Austria-Hungary	7,600	25,000	4,100	21,000
Belgium	—	5,500	—	5,400
Brazil	—	4,700	—	5,000
Bulgaria	8,000	3,200	7,700	4,000
China	—	1,800	—	4,000
Cyprus	3,800	300	2,550	—
Egypt	17,000	8,500	10,200	6,000
France	8,000	9,000	5,000	11,000
Germany	1,000	28,000	—	24,000
Greece	2,000	1,300	—	—
India	1,500	8,250	—	—
Italy	—	17,700	—	16,000
Rumania	1,100	4,600	—	6,500
Russia	7,000	3,500	3,600	3,300
Turkey	37,500	80,000	59,130	90,000
United Kingdom	—	38,300	—	28,760
United States	—	1,000	—	—
Other countries	—	1,200	5,220	1,470
Total	94,500	241,850	97,500	226,430

TABLE 11.—RHODES

Return of the shipping of all nationalities which entered and cleared in the foreign trade of the port of Rhodes during the year 1912. (British Consular Report, Smyrna, 1912–13.)

(*a*) STEAM VESSELS

Entered and Cleared.

Nationality.	*Vessels.*	*Tonnage.*
British	32	55,592
American (U.S.)	106	43,278
Belgian	66	45,210
French	18	40,500
Greek	172	39,578
Italian	95	197,798
Rumanian	2	2,585
Russian	63	102,501
Samian	18	1,448
Total	572	528,490

(*b*) SAILING-VESSELS

Entered.

Nationality.	*Vessels.*	*Tonnage.*
British	2	104
Greek	1	198
Ottoman	699	7,550
Samian	4	48
Total	706	7,900

Cleared.

Nationality.	*Vessels.*	*Tonnage.*
British	2	104
Greek	1	198
Ottoman	719	7,650
Samian	4	48
Total	726	8,000

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A special map of 'The Aegean Sea' (G.S.G.S., No. 3694) on the same scale has been issued by the War Office in connexion with this series.

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